Jynes v. Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GREGORY REGINALD JYNES
VERSUS
ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-1062
SECTION “N”(3)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Gregory Reginald Jynes, formerly a state pretrial detainee confined at
the Orleans Justice Center, filed this pro se and in forma pauperis civil action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, Orleans
Parish Justice Center, Colonel Giovingo, Sheriff Susan Hutson, Assistant Sheriff
Ahmad, Classification Officer Duncan, Lieutenant Brown, Captain Michael Lewis,
Captain Jones, SRT Officer Patton, Sergeant Dunn, SRT Officer Harris, Pod Officer
Williams, Pod Officer Stevenson, the “Medical Department,” Deputy Rodriguez, and
John Doe Classification Officers, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated
in multiple ways over a five-months period in 2025.1
At the Court’s direction, Jynes provided further information with regard to the
roles of some of the defendants in the various incidents.2 After a Spears hearing, the
Court issued a report and recommendation.3 On January 26, 2026, the District Court
Judge adopted the undersigned’s report and recommendation addressing Jynes’s
1 R. Doc. 4.
2 R. Docs. 4 and 9.
3 R. Docs. 14 and 15.
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claims, and dismissed with prejudice:
(1) Jynes’s federal civil rights claims against the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s
Office, 	Orleans 	Justice 	Center, 	the 	Medical 	Department, 	Deputy
Rodriguez, SRT Officer Harris, and SRT Officer Patton, Sheriff Hutson
in her individual capacity, and Assistant Sheriff Ahmad, Classification
Officer 	Duncan, 	Lieutenant 	Brown, 	Michael 	Lewis, 	Captain 	Jones,
Sergeant Dunn, Pod Officer Williams, and Pod Officer Stevenson, in their
official capacities;
(2) his February 4, 2025 and April 16, 2025 federal civil rights claims for
failure to protect, the claims relating to May 13–15, 2025, as well as his
claims of access to courts, retaliation, and deprivation for personal
property; and
(3) the federal civil rights claims for failure to protect on January 30,
2025 against Sheriff Hutson in her official capacity.4
Jynes’s federal civil rights claims related to the May 25, 2025 incident were dismissed
without prejudice for failure to exhaust under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, but with prejudice
for purposes of proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.5
As the case currently stands, the only claims remaining are Jynes’s federal civil
rights claims for failure to protect on January 30, 2025 against Giovingo, Duncan,
Brown, Lewis, Ahmad, and Williams, in their individual capacities, and violation of
4 R. Doc. 16; R. Doc. 17.
5 Id. at 2.
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the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion against Jones, Giovingo,
Williams, Stevenson, and Ahmad, in their individual capacities, and Sheriff Hutson,
in her official capacity.6
Despite the adoption of the extensive report and recommendation, defendants
Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Susan Hutson, Giovingo, Duncan, Brown,
Ahmad, and Williams move to dismiss Jynes’s claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on two bases.7 First, defendants claim that Jynes fails to demonstrate that he
exhausted his administrative remedies.8 Second, defendants claim that Jynes fails to
state a claim of deliberate indifference to his medical care, ability to practice religion,
and unsafe housing condition.9
Jynes filed a response in which he made many additional factual allegations
relating 	to his 	claims.10 He 	claims 	that his 	additional 	allegations 	provide 	the
heightened pleading necessary to cure any deficiency that could serve as a basis for
dismissal as urged in the motion.11 Jynes claims that OJC never responded to any of
his related administrative grievances or his follow-up letters and, thus, hindered his
6 Id. Notably, the motion does not address Michael Lewis, Captain Jones, and Officer
Stevenson. The Court ordered these defendants to file an answer or responsive
pleading to the complaint by May 13, 2026, and advised defense counsel, that if he
intended to include these defendants in the motion to dismiss, to withdraw his motion
and file a new motion to dismiss addressing all defendants. R. Doc. 44. To date, no
answer or responsive pleading has been filed and the motion to dismiss was not
withdrawn.
7 R. Doc. 39.
8 R. Doc. 39-1 at 3–6.
9 Id. at 7–10.
10 R. Doc. 47.
11 Id. at 24, 33–34.
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attempts at exhausting them.12 He claims that he was, therefore, allowed to proceed
in filing his lawsuit.13 Jynes further asserts that, as the motion does not address
defendants Lewis, Jones, and Stevenson or his claims of denial of the right to freedom
of religion under the First Amendment, those claims should be retained.14 Jynes
acknowledges that his medical indifferences claim was dismissed.15
II. Standards of Law
A. Statutory Frivolousness Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the
Court is required to sua sponte dismiss cases filed by prisoners proceeding in forma
pauperis upon a determination that they are frivolous. The Court has broad discretion
in determining the frivolous nature of the complaint. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318,
325 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir.
1993). 	The Court, however, may not sua sponte dismiss an action merely because of
questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in the complaint.
Under this statute, a claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138
F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). “A [claim] lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation
of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718
12 Id. at 14–23.
13 Id. at 17–20.
14 Id. at 23, 33.
15 Id. at 24, 32–33.
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(5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998)). It lacks an
arguable factual basis only if the facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” a category
encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional allegations. Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28). Thus, the Court must
determine whether the plaintiff’s claims are based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory or clearly baseless factual allegations. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th
Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Mabus,
976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts
as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, a
court’s task is to “determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim
that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.” Body by Cook,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Doe ex rel.
Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Still, the plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint is insufficient if
it contains merely “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. Rather, a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When reviewing pro se
complaints, 	the 	Court 	must 	employ 	less 	stringent 	standards, 	look 	beyond 	the
plaintiff’s formal complaint and consider material subsequently filed as amendments
to that complaint. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
A defendant may use a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to assert affirmative defenses,
including non-exhaustion. Dismissal on that basis, however, is appropriate only if the
defense is evident on the face of the complaint. See Hamilton v. Promise Healthcare,
No. 23-30190, 2023 WL 6635076, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023). The party asserting an
affirmative defense bears the burden to show that it applies. See id.
Ultimately, courts reviewing motions under Rule 12(b)(6) must dismiss all
claims for which the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations fail to state a
cognizable claim for which the defendant could reasonably be held responsible.
C. 	The PLRA’s Exhaustion Requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, provides that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional 	facility 	until 	such 	administrative 	remedies 	as 	are 	available 	are
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exhausted.” The “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)
(citation omitted). Failure to exhaust, however, is an affirmative defense under the
PLRA. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Accordingly, “inmates are not required
to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Id.
III. 	Discussion
A. Exhaustion
Defendants first claim that Jynes fails to demonstrate that he exhausted the
second step of the administrative grievance procedure.16 Defendants argue that Jynes
included with his complaint documents demonstrating that he filed grievances, but
that 	he 	did 	not 	attach 	correspondence 	or 	documentation 	demonstrating 	that
completed the second step of the process.17
But, again, “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate
exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
is appropriate only when a plaintiff’s own allegations in the complaint demonstrate
the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion. See, e.g., Hamilton, 2023 WL 6635076, at
*3 (citing cases).
Here, Jynes included with his complaint two statements entitled “Grievance
Exhaustion Statement” and “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Statement.”18
16 R. Doc. 39-1 at 5–6.
17 Id. at 6.
18 R. Doc. 4-4 at 11–15. It does not appear that these statements were provided in
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According to the first statement, dated April 10, 2025, on February 4, 2025, Jynes filed
a grievance (ARP 755331) related to his classification and housing placement.19 Jynes
states that the facility failed to respond and, therefore, he was “moving forward with
legal action to seek relief and account ability for the ongoing threats to my safety and
the emotional and physical stress I have endured as a result.”20
According to the second statement, dated May 4, 2025, Jynes filed another
grievance on April 6, 2025 (ARP 757167).21 He alleged that he did not receive a
response to that grievance, and therefore was “pursuing a claim in federal court to
seek justice and accountability for violations of my constitutional rights, including
failure to protect, deliberate indifference, and due process violations.”22
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Jynes claims that he filed two
additional grievances related to the January 30, 2025 incident (ARPs 755869 and
757176) on February 20 and April 7, 2025, respectively.23 He also claims that he filed
a grievance on March 18, 2025 (ARP 756631), in which he complained that he was
being denied religious accommodation for proper observation of Ramadan and that,
specifically, the staff was not serving meals before daybreak and after sunset.24 He
response to instructions to a court-provided form designed to elicit answers regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Compare McDonald v. Cain, 426 F. App’x 332,
333 (5th Cir. 2011). Rather, Jynes’s original deficient complaint, to which he attached
statements regarding exhaustion, was not on the approved § 1983 civil rights
complaint form. R. Doc. 1.
19 Id. at 11–12.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 14–15.
22 Id.
23 R. Doc. 47 at 15–16,
24 Id. at 16.
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filed yet another grievance on April 10, 2025 (ARP 757326), in which he sought copies
of all of his pending grievances and any responses.25 He claims that he did not receive
a response to any of his grievances, follow up letters, and exhaustion statements, and,
therefore, was entitled to proceed with the filing of his lawsuit after the 90-day
grievance process ran as to each grievance.26
In the Fifth Circuit, a prison’s failure to timely respond at a preliminary step
only entitles the prisoner to move on to the next step rather than result in § 1997e
exhaustion, Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2015), provided that the
prison’s procedure affords a next step to the prisoner if the prison fails to timely
respond. See Cantwell v. Sterling, 788 F.3d 507, 509 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n
Underwood . . . , we held that when a prison’s procedures prescribe deadlines by which
the authorities must respond to grievances and do not set out any additional steps
that prisoners must take upon that time elapsing, the prisoners in such circumstances
have exhausted the available procedures.”); Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 452 (5th
Cir. 2016). Further, the Supreme Court has identified three instances in which
administrative remedies would be considered unavailable: (1) when it operates “as a
simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief
to aggrieved inmates;” (2) when the process is “so opaque that it becomes, practically
speaking, incapable of use;” and (3) when “prison administrators thwart inmates from
taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or
25 Id.
26 Id. at 14-20.
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intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016).
OJC’s grievance procedure is not part of the record.27 Without the applicable
grievance procedure before it, the Court cannot determine whether the grievance
procedure permits an inmate to proceed to the next step if the prisoner does not receive
a response in the requisite time period.
In summary, defendants fail to identify allegations in the complaint, as
supplemented, demonstrating non-exhaustion. As a result, defendants’ motion to
dismiss 	based 	on 	failure 	to 	exhaust 	must 	be 	denied 	without 	prejudice 	to 	the
defendants’ ability to reassert the claim in a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.
B. Failure to State a Claim for Deliberate Indifference
Defendants 	Hutson, 	Giovingo, 	Ahmad. 	and 	Williams 	claim 	that 	Jynes’s
complaint fails to include any allegations against them, and that he may not “lump”
them 	together 	without 	specifying 	separate 	factual 	allegations 	against 	them.28
Defendants Brown and Duncan similarly claim a lack of specific factual allegations
against them.29 These arguments lack merit.
27 Defendants cite to the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), La.
R.S. 15:1171, et seq., and the Department of Safety and Corrections’ administrative
regulations, Louisiana Administrative Code, title 22, Pt. I, §325. R. Doc. 39-1 at 4–6.
According to that procedure, at the first step, the warden has 40 days from the date
of the request to respond. Id. at 5 (citing 22 La. Admin Code. Pt. 1 § 325(J)(1)(a).
Jynes cites to the grievance policy at OJC, which he claims requires a response within
seven to 15 days. R. Doc. 4-4 at 11; R. Doc. 47 at 14–15, 17. Thus, it appears that
there may be a different grievance procedure in place at OJC than the one provided
for by the state statute and administrative code relied upon by defendants.
28 R. Doc. 39-1
29 Id. at 9–10.
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First, Jynes is correct that defendants fail to recognize that his medical care
claims as well as his claims against Sheriff Hutson relating to the January 30, 2025
incident were dismissed.30 Thus, there are no remaining claims based on allegations
of 	inadequate 	medical 	care. 	Further, 	as 	previously 	explained, 	the 	only 	claim
remaining against Sheriff Hutson is Jynes’s First Amendment claim brought in her
official capacity.31
Second, while defendants claim a lack of specific factual allegations against
them in the complaint, because Jynes is proceeding without counsel in this matter,
the Court is “required to look beyond the [plaintiff’s] formal complaint and to consider
as amendments to the complaint those materials subsequently filed.” Howard, 707
F.2d 	at 	220. 	Here, 	defendants 	fail 	to 	recognize 	that 	Jynes’s 	complaint 	was
supplemented by both his response to the Court’s order requesting further information
as well as his Spears testimony, and that his testimony became part of his filing. Eason
v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court previously considered Jynes’s
allegations and found them to be sufficient to state an individual-capacity claim for
30 R. Doc. 15 at 11–12, 18–19, 36–28.
31 The Court notes that, in a footnote of his response to the motion to dismiss, Jynes
requests that his failure to protect claim against Sheriff Hutson be reinstated. R. Doc.
47 at 27 n. 21. This issue has not been appropriately raised in a motion nor briefed,
nor did defendants have an opportunity to reply to Jynes’s response. Furthermore,
significantly, on January 26, 2026, the Court entered a partial final judgment, finding
“no just cause for delay” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and dismissing with
prejudice Jynes’s federal civil rights claims for failure to protect on January 30, 2025
against Sheriff Hutson in her official capacity, R. Doc. 17. Jynes did not appeal that
judgment. Any request for relief from the judgment must be submitted in a motion
and filed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s
Local Rules.
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failure to protect on January 30, 2025 against defendants Giovingo, Duncan, Brown,
Lewis, and Ahmad, and for violation of the First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion against defendants Jones, Giovingo, Williams, Stevenson, and Ahmad, in
their individual capacities, and Sheriff Hutson, in her official capacity.32 Defendants
ignore this prior ruling and provide no reason to reconsider it.
Moreover, “when ruling on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court must
also consider any additional allegations in [plaintiff’s] oppositions that embellish the
original complaint’s averments.” See Howard, 707 F.2d at 220; see also Lozano v.
Schubert, 41 F.4th 485, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2022); Brenckle v. MacFay, No. 17-13500,
2018 WL 3340382, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 3329075 (E.D. La.
July 6, 2018). Here, Jynes has made additional factual allegations against defendants
in his response to the motion to dismiss.33 Those allegations, taken together with his
previous allegations, are sufficient to state an individual-capacity claim for failure to
protect on January 30, 2025 against defendants Giovingo, Duncan, Brown, Lewis, and
Ahmad, and for violation of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
against defendants Jones, Giovingo, Williams, Stevenson, and Ahmad, in their
individual capacities, and Sheriff Hutson, in her official capacity
For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
should be denied.
32 R. Doc. 15 at 16-20, 31–33, 36–38.
33 R. Doc. 47 at 1–66.
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C. Jynes’s First Amendment Claims & Requests for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief
In connection with the Court’s required frivolousness review, for the reasons
explained 	below, 	supplemental 	consideration 	demonstrates 	that 	Jynes’s 	First
Amendment claims related to his right to practice the Islamic religion and his claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief be dismissed.
Jynes seeks monetary damages for the conditions that prevented him from
practicing his faith.34 He also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as it relates to
both his failure to protect and First Amendment claims.35
Initially, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) precludes Jynes’s claims
for monetary relief as it relates to his First Amendment claims as he does not allege
facts demonstrating he suffered a physical injury as a result of defendants preventing
him for practicing his religion. Monetary relief of this kind is prohibited under 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). Section
1997e(e) provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” The Fifth Circuit has
made clear that this provision is based on the relief sought by a prisoner and prevents
a prisoner from seeking compensatory damages for violations of federal law where no
physical injury is alleged. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005).
In this case, Jynes has had multiple opportunities to allege a physical injury
34 R. Doc. 4 at 5; R. Doc. 4-4 at 9–10.
35 Id.; R. Doc. 4-4 at 9–10.
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resulting from the defendants preventing him for practicing his religion, but has failed
to do so. Nowhere in his original deficient complaint, complaint, response to the
Court’s order requesting additional information, Spears testimony, or response to the
motion 	to 	dismiss, 	has 	Jynes 	alleged 	any 	physical 	injury 	that 	resulted 	from
defendants’ alleged denial of his right to practice his religion.36 As a result, Jynes’s
request for monetary damages for any emotional injury caused by the conditions of his
confinement as it relates to his First Amendment claims is barred by § 1997e(e) and
also should be dismissed as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted. See Busick v. Neal, 380 F. App’x 392, 398 (5th Cir. 2010)
(applying § 1997e(e) to bar prisoner’s request for compensatory damages for religious
freedom claim).
As noted, Jynes also requests declaratory and injunctive relief. Since the filing
of this lawsuit, Jynes has been transferred to the Louisiana State Penitentiary.37 All
defendants are employees at OJC and that is where the alleged events occurred. Jynes
offers no suggestion that there is a strong likelihood that he will return to OJC.
Further, any suggestion of relief based on the possibility of transfer back to OJC
is too speculative to warrant relief. See Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 279 (5th
Cir. 1987). Therefore, Jynes’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot and
he cannot proceed against them. See Flaming v. Alvin Community College, 777 F.
App’x 771, 772 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that claim was properly dismissed as moot
36 See R. Docs. 1, 4, 12, 14, and 47.
37 R. Doc. 23.
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“where the cause of action is no longer live”) (quoting Henschen v. City of Houston, 959
F.2d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1992)); Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a transfer to a new correctional facility rendered an inmate’s “claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief moot”); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929
F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that an inmate’s transfer to a different facility
mooted his claims for injunctive relief); see also Coleman v. Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858
F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (facility transfer mooted declaratory and injunctive
claims). Once “a plaintiff’s stake in a lawsuit [or claim for relief] falls away, so too does
[the Court’s] subject matter jurisdiction.” Shemwell v. City of McKinney, Tex., 63 F.4th
480, 483 (5th Cir. 2023).
Based on the foregoing reasons, Jynes’s First Amendment individual-capacity
claims against defendants Jones, Giovingo, Williams, Stevenson, and Ahmad, and
official-capacity claim against Sheriff Hutson should be dismissed. Additionally,
Jynes’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as it relates to his federal civil
rights claim for failure to protect on January 30, 2025 should also be dismissed.38
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6), R. Doc. 39, be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
to defendants’ ability to reassert the exhaustion claim in a properly supported motion
for summary judgment.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Jynes’s federal civil rights claims
38 R. Doc. 4 at 5; R. Doc. 4-4 at 10.
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relating to his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion against defendants
Jones, Giovingo, Williams, Stevenson, and Ahmad, in their individual capacities, and
Sheriff Hutson, in her official capacity, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Jynes’s claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief as they relate to his federal civil rights claim for failure to protect or
failure to protect him on January 30, 2025, against Giovingo, Duncan, Brown, Lewis,
and 	Ahmad, 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities, 	should 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Jynes’s federal civil rights claim
for monetary damages for failure to protect on January 30, 2025 against Giovingo,
Duncan, Brown, Lewis, Ahmad, in their individual capacities, be allowed to proceed
at this time pending further development.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party
has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 12 th day of June, 2026.
__________________________________________
EVA J. DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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