Jynes v. Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GREGORY REGINALD JYNES 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1062
ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, ET AL
SECTION: N
ORDER AND REASONS
Before this Court is a Report and Recommendation from the Magistrate Judge1
on a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by defendants.2 Plaintiff Gregory
Jynes 	opposed 	the 	motion,3 	and 	he 	filed 	an 	Objection4 	to 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. After de novo review of the parties’ memoranda, the record, the
Report and Recommendation, and applicable law, the Court hereby adopts the Report
and Recommendation and overrules Jynes’s objections in part.
I. 	Legal Standard
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a district court judge “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been
properly 	objected 	to.”5 	The 	district 	judge 	“may 	accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify 	the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.”6
1 Rec. Doc. 48.
2 Rec. Doc. 39.
3 Rec. Doc. 47.
4 Rec. Doc. 49.
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (a)(3).
6 Id.
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II. 	Legal Analysis
First, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the defendants’ motion to
dismiss be denied without prejudice to defendants’ ability to reassert the exhaustion
claim in a properly supported motion for summary judgment.7 No party objected to
this recommendation. As a matter of judicial efficiency and because of this lack of
objection, 	the 	Court 	adopts 	sections 	III.A 	and 	III.B 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation.8
Second, in connection with the Court’s frivolousness review, the Magistrate
Judge recommended two separate dismissals: (1) the dismissal with prejudice of
Jynes’s civil rights claims for compensatory relief relating to his First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion against Jones, Giovingo, Williams, Stevenson, and
Ahmad, individually, and Sheriff Hutson, officially; and (2) the dismissal with
prejudice of Jynes’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief relating to his civil
rights claim for failure to protect on January 30, 2025, against Giovingo, Duncan,
Brown, Lewis, and Ahmad, individually. Jynes has no written objection to the latter
dismissal—his civil rights claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court
adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning in regard to that issue.9
Jynes 	does 	object 	to 	the 	dismissal 	of 	his 	First 	Amendment 	claims 	for
compensatory and nominal or punitive damages. He raises two arguments in support
of his claims for compensatory damages in relation to the alleged violation of his First
7 See Rec. Doc. 48.
8 Id. at 7-12.
9 Id. at 14-15.
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Amendment rights. First, he alleges that the requisite physical harm that he suffered
is “intertwined” with his failure-to-protect claim.10 In particular, he argues that “but-
for his religious activities on Tier 4B and his filing of grievances to assert his religious
accommodation request, Mr. Jynes would not have been moved into harm’s way.”11
Second, Jynes argues that other circuit courts have held that §1997e(e)’s requirement
of physical injury does not apply to First Amendment claims.12
The 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	correctly 	concluded 	that 	the 	Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), precludes monetary relief for First
Amendment claims where, as here, there is a lack of physical injury.13 The Court
finds Jynes’s arguments in response unpersuasive. The Fifth Circuit has squarely
held that the PLRA bars recovery of compensatory damages by prisoners alleging a
constitutional 	violation 	absent 	physical 	injury, 	including 	First 	Amendment
violations.14 Jynes does not allege that he suffered any physical injury as a result of
defendants preventing him from practicing his religion. Jynes’s assertion that the
physical injury requirement is satisfied by the alleged harm suffered by his failure-
to-protect claim is too attenuated of a conclusion. Indeed, Jynes cites no case law in
which the alleged physical harm was analogously attenuated to a First Amendment
claim. That he later allegedly suffered physical injury at the hands of fellow inmates
when he was moved to a different housing section “at least part[ly]” to minimize his
10 Rec. Doc. 49.
11 Id. at 2.
12 Id. at 3.
13 Rec. Doc. 48 at 13.
14 Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Allen v. Stalder, 201 F. App'x 276
(5th Cir. 2006).
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religious activities in his then-current housing section is insufficient. Under the
traditional standing analysis, a plaintiff’s injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant—“‘and not the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court.’”15 Such physical harm is more properly
considered harm underlying his failure-to-protect claim.16 The Court thus agrees
with the Report and Recommendation that Jynes has failed to allege physical injury
resulting from the defendants allegedly preventing him from practicing his religion
in 	any 	of 	his 	complaints 	or 	other 	filings. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	adopts 	the
recommendation that Jynes’s request for compensatory damages as to his First
Amendment claims should be dismissed as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state
a claim for which relief can be granted.17
Jynes also objects to the supposed dismissal of his claims for nominal or
punitive damages for the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights. Neither
defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	nor 	the Report 	and 	Recommendation 	seeks 	or
recommends the dismissal of his First Amendment claim to the extent he requests
these forms of relief. Jynes cites Hutchins v. McDaniels, where the Fifth Circuit
concluded 	that 	an 	incarcerated 	individual 	could 	recover 	nominal 	or 	punitive
damages, despite not suffering physical injury sufficient to recover compensatory
damages 	under 	§ 	1997e(e), 	in 	relation 	to 	the 	alleged 	violation 	of 	his 	Fourth
15 Reule v. Jackson, 114 F.4th 360, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
167 (1997)).
16 Compare, e.g., Mayfield v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 529 F.3d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the prisoner’s First Amendment claims for compensatory damages were barred by the PLRA
because he did not suffer physical injury), with Luna v. Davis, 59 F.4th 713, 715 (5th Cir. 2023)
(physical harm suffered by the prisoner was brought in connection with a failure-to-protect claim).
17 Rec. Doc. 48 at 13-14.
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Amendment rights.18 This decision followed from the Circuit’s existing precedent
recognizing that application of § 1997e(e) turns on the type of relief sought, allowing
injunctive and declaratory relief despite § 1997e(e), and allowing punitive and
nominal damages in non-prison settings.19 While the Court makes no determination
of whether Jynes’s claims for such relief might be subject to a later motion, they
remain in the case at present.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Gregory Reginald Jynes’s Objection20 to the
Report 	and 	Recommendation 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	is
OVERRULED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court APPROVES the Report and
Recommendation21 and ADOPTS it as its opinion in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant
to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(B)(6)22 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to defendants’
ability to reassert the exhaustion claim in a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jynes’s federal civil rights claims for
compensatory damages relating to his First Amendment right to free exercise of
18 Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2007).
19 Id. (citing Geiger, 404 F.3d at 375, Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999), and
Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003)).
20 Rec. Doc. 49.
21 Rec. Doc. 48.
22 Rec. Doc. 39.
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religion against defendants Jones, Giovingo, Williams, Stevenson, and Ahmad, in
their 	individual 	capacities, 	and 	Sheriff 	Hutson, 	in 	her 	official 	capacity, 	be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This dismissal does not apply to the claims to
the extent Jynes seeks punitive and nominal damages.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Jynes’s 	claims 	for 	declaratory 	and
injunctive relief as they relate to his federal civil rights claim for failure to protect or
failure to protect him on January 30, 2025, against Giovingo, Duncan, Brown, Lewis,
and Ahmad, in their individual capacities, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jynes’s federal civil rights claim for
monetary damages for failure to protect on January 30, 2025, against Giovingo,
Duncan, Brown, Lewis, and Ahmad, in their individual capacities, be allowed to
proceed.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 14th day of September, 2026.
__________________________________
ANNA ST. JOHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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