Klein v. Girod LoanCo, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
HENRY L. KLEIN 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1515
GIROD LOANCO, LLC, ET AL. 	SECTION: D(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) filed by Defendants Girod LoanCo, LLC, Girod Titling
Trust, and Girod REO, LLC (“Defendants”).1 Plaintiff Henry L. Klein (“Klein”)
opposes the Motion,2 	and Defendants have filed a Response in Support.3 	After
careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable law,
the Motion is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case follows in a series of cases both based on cases that Klein brought
when he was a licensed attorney regarding Girod’s purchase of notes from the FDIC
that were previously held by First NBC Bank before it collapsed and based on Girod
LoanCo’s attempt to recover a post-foreclosure sale balance owed to Girod by Klein
as the guarantor of a promissory note.4
On July 22, 2025, Klein instituted the instant suit by filing the Original
Complaint to Enforce the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, to
1 R. Doc. 10.
2 R. Doc. 22.
3 R. Doc. 24.
4 See Civ. Act. No. 21-724, Civ. Act. No. 24-1993, Civ. Act. No. 24-2161, Civ. Act. No. 24-2366, Civ. Act.
No. 25-1047, Civ. Ac. No. 25-1127.
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Annul All Lawsuits Filed by Girod LoanCo, LLC, and Girod Titling Trust, for Petitory
Relief, for 28 U.S.C. §2201 Declaratory Judgments and a Rule 57 Speedy Hearing.5
While not filed as a class action, in the initial complaint, Klein aims to convert this
action into a class action “[u]pon Rule 23 certification.”6 On August 4, 2025, Klein
filed a Supplemental and Amended Complaint in which Klein demands a speedy
hearing under Rule 57; details alleged harms against non-parties, the Pittmans; and
asserts 	violations 	under 	the 	Real 	Estate 	Settlement 	Procedures 	Act 	and 	the
Louisiana Civil Code.7
Defendants 	filed 	the 	instant 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	on 	August 	22, 	2025.8
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the present
case.9 Defendants first contend that the Plaintiff lacks Article III standing because
he himself has not suffered an injury that can be redressed by a favorable judgment
in the present case.10 Defendants further state that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because the Court is barred from reviewing state court judgments under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.11 Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff’s complained-of
constitutional and statutory violations are intertwined with previous state court
5 R. Doc. 1.
6 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4. While 28 U.S.C. §1654 permits a person to appear pro se in federal court, the statute
does not allow individuals without a law license to represent anyone other than him or herself. See,
e.g., Williams v. Solar Alternatives, Inc., No. CV 23-2533, 2023 WL 4931853 (E.D. La. Aug. 2,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 23-2533, 2023 WL 6121796 (E.D. La. Sept. 19,
2023). An unlicensed lay person, therefore, cannot prosecute claims on behalf of others who are
similarly situated without a licensed attorney.
7 R. Doc. 6.
8 R. Doc. 10.
9 R. Doc. 10 at pp. 1-2.
10 R. Doc. 10-5 at pp. 5-6.
11 Id. at pp. 6-10.
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judgments.12 Additionally, Defendants assert that the Court does not possess subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 because the Plaintiff’s claims contain only
“incidental references” to federal law that do not create federal question jurisdiction
under the statute.13 Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s claims do not arise under
the Constitution or federal law and that Plaintiff only seeks remedies under
Louisiana law.14 As a result, Defendants reiterate that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the present action.
Defendants further argue that, should the Court find that it possesses subject
matter jurisdiction over the present action, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).15 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requested
relief of a declaratory judgment regarding judicial demands made by Defendants does
not comport with substantive Louisiana law, particularly Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 12:1343 and 1354.16 Defendants contend that the no-registry-door-closing argument
based on these statutes has been rejected by Louisiana appellate courts and another
section of this court.17 Defendants further assert that Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act and Regulation X only apply to residential real property and that the
only property mentioned in Plaintiff’s Complaint is not residential.18
12 Id. at pp. 9-10.
13 R. Doc. 10-5 at p. 10.
14 Id. at pp. 11-12.
15 Id. at p. 12.
16 Id. at p. 14.
17 Id. at pp. 15-16 (citing Girod Titling Trust v. Hermes Health Alliance, L.L.C., 401 So.3d 721 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 7/1/24) and Heisler v. Kean Miller, LLC, No. 21-CV-724, 2021 WL 5919507 (E.D. La. Dec.
15, 2021) (Morgan, J.)).
18 Id. at pp. 17-18.
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Plaintiff Klein filed a response in opposition.19 In it, Klein claims that he has
suffered an injury, “an invasion of a legally protected interest which was concrete and
particularized,” that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of Defendants.20
Additionally, Klein states that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is dwarfed by the fact
that state courts “have mocked the ruling in Henson v. Santander.”21 Klein argues
further that he brings no claim under Louisiana law and reiterates that this Court
has subject-matter jurisdiction over the present case.22
In reply, Defendants emphasize that the Plaintiff’s Response does not respond
directly 	to 	their 	contentions 	regarding 	this 	Court’s 	lack 	of 	subject-matter
jurisdiction.23 Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have standing to file suit on
behalf of other people and entities that are aggrieved by lawsuits and judgments.24
Furthermore, Defendants state that Plaintiff’s mention of federal statutes does not
create jurisdiction because the present case neither arises under federal law nor
depends necessarily on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.25
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having the power to hear only
cases that present a federal question or are between citizens of different states.”26
19 R. Doc. 22.
20 R. Doc. 22 at p. 5.
21 R. Doc. 22 at p. 4.
22 Id.
23 R. Doc. 24 at p. 2. Defendants also note that the Pittman Family Members, mentioned in the
Opposition, are not parties to the present suit.
24 Id.
25 Id. at p. 3.
26 Quinn v. Guerreo, 863 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
513 (2006)).
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“The burden of subject matter jurisdiction lies with the party asserting jurisdiction,
and it must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”27 If the court’s jurisdiction
is based on a federal question, the federal question must appear on the face of the
pleading.28 Indeed, the plaintiff need not specifically cite the federal provision under
which his claims allegedly arise.29 “[B]ut he must allege facts sufficient to establish
a colorable issue of federal law.”30 “If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”31
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court now turns to Defendants’ arguments regarding this Court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction over the present action:
1. 	The Court Lacks Federal Question Jurisdiction over the Action under
to 28 U.S.C. §1331.
The Defendants argue that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the action under 28 U.S.C. §1331.32 They state that Plaintiff Klein seeks relief
only under Louisiana law and that said relief does not depend on the resolution of a
substantial federal question.33 Furthermore, they contend that Plaintiff’s failure to
plead for any relief under federal law or seek redress under state law that necessarily
depends upon federal law renders this Court unable to exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331.34 Plaintiff Klein responds that he asserts no claim
27 In re S. Recycling, LLC, 982 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020).
28 Quinn. 863 F. 3d at 358 (citing Bernhard v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 523 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2008)).
29 Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014)).
30 Id. (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391–92 (1987)).
31 FED. R. C IV. P. 12(h)(3).
32 R. Doc. 10-5 at p. 10.
33 Id. at p. 11.
34 Id. at pp. 11-12.
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under Louisiana law and that Defendants’ motion “ignores the Louisiana Supreme
Court ruling in LHSAA v. Caldwell to the effect that ‘... special laws...’ cannot trump
‘... general laws...’ as a matter of 14 th Amendment ‘... equal right...’ violations.”35
“Federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	exists 	when 	‘a 	well-pleaded 	complaint
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law.’”36 “If the complaint presents no federal question, a federal court may not hear
the suit.”37
The face of the Complaint38 invokes this Court’s federal question jurisdiction
and asks the Court to “enforce Henson v. Santander” in accordance with the
supremacy clause in Article VI of the Constitution.39 While it may appear that the
well-pleaded complaint rule is met by the invocation of federal law, “mere presence
of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-
question jurisdiction.”40 The Court finds that such is the case presently. While
Plaintiff has mentioned federal law, he seeks relief under Louisiana law.41 The relief
also 	does 	not 	“necessarily” 	depend 	on 	the 	resolution 	of 	a 	substantial 	federal
35 R. Doc. 22 at p. 4.
36 Borden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009).
37 Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26, 145 S. Ct. 41, 47, 220 L. Ed. 2d 289 (2025).
38 R. Docs. 1 and 6.
39 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 1.
40 Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3234, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650
(1986).
41 See, e.g., R. Doc. 6 at ¶ 12 (“LOANCO and TITLING are estopped from denying that they have
‘...presented judicial demands...’ in Louisiana Courts without authority”); R. Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 29-30 (“All
instances where REO is the record owner are a sham and must be declared absolute nullities pursuant
to Louisiana Civil Code Article 2480”; “REO simply has to show that it paid money out of its
independent pocket - although that alone will not avoid the overarching declaration that no Girod
Entity had the threshold right to present judicial demands in a Louisiana Court of law”); R. Doc. 22 at
pp. 1-2 (“LOANCO's multiple foreclosures in violation of La. R.S. 12:1354 are absolute nullities.”).
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question.42 While the Complaint invokes the United States Supreme Court’s ruling
in Henson v. Santander,43 Plaintiff fails to identify how specifically that decision of
federal law creates the cause of action upon which he relies or how the relief he
requests depends on a resolution of a federal issue. It is Plaintiff’s burden, as the one
seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, to prove by a preponderance that it exists.44
For those reasons, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331.
To the extent that Klein relies on violations of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and alleged violations of Regulation X, the Court finds that
his claims under these statutes relate solely to non-parties, including the Pittman
Family and Capital Crossing Servicing Company, LLC.45 Because a pro se litigant
cannot bring suit on behalf of another or those similarly situated,46 these laws cannot
be said to “create” the cause of action for Plaintiff Klein against Defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Klein has failed to demonstrate
that 	this 	Court 	possesses 	subject-matter jurisdiction 	over the 	present 	case 	in
accordance 	with 	28 	U.S.C. 	§1331.47 	Because 	Klein 	also 	invokes 	this 	Court’s
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332,48 the Court must consider Defendants’ additional
arguments as to why this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.
42 See Borden 589 F.3d at 172.
43 582 U.S. 79 (2017).
44 In re S. Recycling, LLC, 982 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020).
45 R. Doc. 6 at ¶¶ 36-38.
46 See 28 U.S.C. §1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally…”) (emphasis added).
47 See in re S. Recycling, LLC, 982 F.3d at 379.
48 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 2.
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2. 	Plaintiff’s Suit is Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
Defendants 	argue, 	additionally, 	that 	the 	Court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction over the present action because the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars
inferior federal courts from modifying or reversing state court judgments.49 The
Defendants contend that each prong of the doctrine is met in the present case and
that “creative allegations to enforce the Supremacy Clause or about alleged violations
of RESPA or Regulation X on behalf of non-parties do not” affect the applicability of
Rooker-Feldman to the present case.50 Plaintiff Klein responds that the “Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine does not come close to the proposition that all state court judges
have mocked the ruling in Henson v. Santander.”51 Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s
statements further demonstrate the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because Plaintiff “doubles down on his request that this Court declare absolutely null
all state court lawsuits to which LoanCo and Trust are parties.”52 Defendants
emphasize that such a request is barred by Rooker-Feldman.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the present case. “Reduced to its essence,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power
to modify or reverse state court judgments.’”53 “The doctrine applies where: 1) the
plaintiff loses in the state court proceeding, 2) the plaintiff’s complaint alleges the
49 R. Doc. 10-5 at p. 6.
50 Id. at p. 8.
51 R. Doc. 22 at p. 4.
52 R. Doc. 24 at p. 2.
53 Union Planters Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004).
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state court judgment causes an injury, 3) the judgment was rendered before federal
proceedings commenced; and 4) the plaintiff seeks review and rejection of the state
court judgment.”54
Each of these elements is met here. 	As to the first element, the state court’s
July 7, 2023 order granting summary judgment was both a final judgment under
Louisiana 	law 	and 	adverse 	to 	Klein, 	against 	whom 	summary 	judgment 	was
granted.55 	Second, Klein appears to allege that the state court litigation, including
the final judgment, caused injuries.56 Third, the state court judgment was rendered
on July 7, 2023—well before this case was filed on July 22, 2025.57
Finally, Klein’s chief complaint is that the state court erred in issuing a
judgment against Klein. 	Klein’s Complaint makes plain that he will request the
Court “to certify a class of all FNBC Guarantors were filed and remain pending.”58
But it becomes clear that what Klein really seeks is the reversal of the state court
judgment by his statement that “no Girod Entity had the threshold right to present
judicial demands in a Louisiana Court of law.”59 Such statement within the body of
the Complaint represents an invitation to this Court to reject the state court’s
54 Williams v. Trosclair, 627 F.Supp.3d 594, 603 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2022) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
55 R. Doc. 10-2 at p. 2 (“This is a final appealable judgment.”).
56 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4 (“[O]n June 15, 2021, Klein was sued by Girod LoanCo, LLC ("LOANCO") in the
Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans at Docket 2021-5090, Girod LoanCo, LLC v. Henry L.
Klein, giving him standing against LOANCO as a pro se litigant…”).
57 R. Docs. 1 and 10-2 at p.2.
58 R. Doc. 1 at p. 2. The Court notes that, while the Fifth Circuit does not have a blanket prohibition
on pro se plaintiff’s serving as class representatives, “courts throughout this circuit consistently hold
that pro se plaintiffs may not serve as class representatives.” Williams v. Solar Alternatives, Inc., No.
CV 23-2533, 2023 WL 4931853, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2023) (collecting cases), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CV 23-2533, 2023 WL 6121796 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2023).
59 R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 6.; R. Doc. 6 at ¶ 30.
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judgment. Furthermore, even if this was not Klein’s chief prayer in filing the present
suit, this suit would still be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 	Klein “cannot
circumvent [the Rooker-Feldman doctrine] by asserting claims not raised in the state
court proceedings or claims framed as original claims for relief,” because “these claims
are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with [the] state judgment[.]”60 Further, Plaintiff’s
claims of violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) 12
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and Regulation X by non-party Capital Crossing Servicing
Company, LLC (“CCSC”) as it relates to non-parties, such as the Pittman Family, do
not serve to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon this Court. Such a maneuver
would necessarily require this Court to review the July 7, 2023 state court judgment,
“and the originality of the district court’s jurisdiction precludes such a review.”61 This
prong, therefore, like the others, is met. For these reasons, the Court finds that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the present case.62
While Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend his Complaint, the Court will
“freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”63 Nonetheless, leave to amend
“is by no means automatic.”64 	In exercising its discretion, this Court may consider
such factors as “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
60 Heisler v. Girod LoanCo, LLC, No. 21-CV-1343, 2021 WL 4125057, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2021)
(citing Turner v. Cade, 354 F. App’x 108, 111 (5th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotations omitted).
61 Id. (quoting United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations
omitted).
62 Because the Court has found that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, it need not address the standing arguments or Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.
63 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
64 Halbert v. City of Sherman, Tex., 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
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prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility
of the amendment.”65 The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.66 Denying leave to amend
Plaintiff’s Complaint “is not an abuse of discretion if allowing an amendment would
be futile.”67 Here, allowing leave to amend the Complaint would be futile because
there is no set of facts that would confer this Court with the subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the present case.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims brought by Plaintiff against
Defendants in this case are DISMISSED without prejudice due to this Court’s
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 27, 2026.
_____________________________
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
65 Nolan v. M/V SANTE FE, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Gregory v. Mitchell, 635 F.2d 199,
203 (5th Cir. 1981)).
66 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief.”).
67 Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing
Briggs v. Miss., 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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