Hotard v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JARED HOTARD 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 25-1634
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC 	SECTION: “H”
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jared Hotard’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 6).
For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jared Hotard brought this action in the 40th Judicial District
Court for the Parish of St. John against his mortgage holder, Defendant
Pennymac Loan Services, LLC. Plaintiff is the owner of property located at
3508 Main Street, LaPlace, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleges that his property
sustained damage during Hurricane Ida and a subsequent fire. Plaintiff filed
a claim with his insurer. However, Plaintiff’s insurer was later “placed into
receivership 	and 	the 	Louisiana 	Insurance 	Guaranty 	Association 	became
responsible for Plaintiff’s insurance claims.”1 Plaintiff and the Louisiana
1 Doc. 1-1 at 5.
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Insurance 	Guaranty 	Association 	settled 	his 	claims, 	but 	Defendant, 	as
mortgagee on the property, was included as an additional payee on the
settlement 	checks. 	Defendant 	removed 	this 	action 	based 	on 	the 	Court’s
diversity 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction. 	Plaintiff 	now 	moves 	to 	remand.
Defendant opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, a defendant may remove a civil state court action to federal
court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action.2 The burden
is on the removing party to show “that federal jurisdiction exists and that
removal was proper.”3 When determining whether federal jurisdiction exists,
courts consider “the claims in the state court petition as they existed at the
time of removal.”4 “In making a jurisdictional assessment, a federal court is
not limited to the pleadings; it may look to any record evidence, and may
receive affidavits, deposition testimony or live testimony concerning the facts
underlying 	the 	citizenship 	of 	the 	parties.”5 For 	removal 	to 	be 	proper, 	a
defendant must also comply with the procedural requirements set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1446.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
3 Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 212 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Manguno v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 2002)).
4 Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723.
5 Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996).
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Motion asserts that remand is proper because removal was
untimely 	and, 	in 	the 	alternative, 	that 	the 	Court 	lacked 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction at the time of removal. The Court will address each argument in
turn.
A. Timeliness
A defendant must file its notice of removal “within 30 days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding
is based.”6 However, “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,
a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the
case is one which is or has become removable.”7
Prior to filing the instant action, Plaintiff sent a demand letter to
Defendant, asking that Defendant endorse and return four settlement checks
totaling $100,000 or to return $25,386.00 to Plaintiff’s counsel and remit the
balance to Plaintiff.8 Plaintiff filed his state court petition on May 30, 2025
alleging violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) and
seeking actual damages, treble damages under LUTPA, and attorney’s fees.9
On July 4, 2025, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel, acknowledged
Plaintiff’s 	demand 	letter, 	and 	noted 	that 	after 	deducting 	$25,386.00 	for
6 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
7 Id. at § 1446(b)(3).
8 Doc. 6-4. Plaintiff’s letter is dated April 10, 2025.
9 Doc. 1-1 at 4.
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Plaintiff’s 	counsel, 	“there 	would 	be 	$70,552.66 	net 	proceeds 	available 	to
[Plaintiff].”10 Plaintiff’s counsel responded on July 11, 2025, confirming the
balance 	owed 	to 	Plaintiff 	and 	offering 	to 	settle 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	for
$90,552.66.11 On July 18, 2025, Defendant sent two checks to Plaintiff’s
counsel in the amounts of $70,552.66 and $25,386.00.12 Then, on July 23, 2025,
Plaintiff withdrew his settlement offer and filed a motion for leave to amend
his state court petition, seeking to abandon his LUTPA claims and assert class
allegations against Defendant for violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes §
6:337.13 Defendant removed this action on August 8, 2025.
In his Motion for Remand, Plaintiff argues that removal was untimely
because the tolling of the 30-day removal window pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446
began when Defendant sent its July 4, 2025 email regarding the available
$70,552.66 in net proceeds. According to Plaintiff, the July 4, 2025 email
establishes that Defendant had actual knowledge of the amount in controversy
on 	that 	date. 	Further, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	Defendant 	had 	constructive
knowledge of the amount in controversy as soon as Plaintiff filed his state court
petition because Defendant received the April 10, 2025 demand letter and was
in possession of the four checks that form the subject of this dispute. Defendant
counters that removal was timely because the 30-day period prescribed by §
1446(b) commenced upon on its receipt of Plaintiff’s July 11, 2025 email.
10 Doc. 6-3.
11 Doc. 6-5. The $90,552.66 settlement amount does not include the $25,386.00 claimed by
Plaintiff’s counsel.
12 Doc. 6-6.
13 Doc. 6-7. Plaintiff’s state court motion to amend was set for hearing on September 16, 2025.
Doc. 1-1 at 19.
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The 	Fifth 	Circuit 	rejected 	Plaintiff’s 	arguments 	in 	Chapman 	v.
Powermatic, 	Inc.14 	In 	Chapman, 	the 	plaintiff 	argued 	that 	removal 	was
untimely because the defendant had knowledge that the plaintiff’s medical
expenses exceeded the jurisdictional amount in controversy prior to suit.15
Further, the Chapman plaintiff argued that once served with the initial
pleading, the defendant must exercise due diligence to investigate the amount
in controversy and timely remove.16 Affirming the district court, the Fifth
Circuit held that removal was timely because the initial pleading “did not
reveal on its face that the amount in controversy was in excess of [the
jurisdictional minimum]” and thus the 30-day time period for removal could
not begin until the defendant received both the initial pleading and some
“other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which
is or has become removable.”17 In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit strictly
construed the text of § 1446 and rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding a
defendant’s actual and constructive knowledge.18
As in Chapman, this Court must first look to the face of Plaintiff’s state
court petition at the time of removal and then turn to any “other paper”
received by Defendant after the filing of the initial pleading. The Court need
not consider Defendant’s actual or subjective knowledge regarding the amount
14 See generally 969 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1992).
15 Id. at 163–65.
16 Id. at 161–63.
17 Id. at 165; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3); see also Morgan v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 879 F.3d 602
(5th Cir. 2018) (holding that oral deposition testimony did not begin the tolling of the 30-day
time period for removal because the defendant had not received a “written document or
instrument.”).
18 Chapman, 969 F.2d at 163–165. The Chapman court noted that its reading promotes
judicial certainty and efficiency.
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in controversy. Plaintiff concedes, and this Court concurs, that the face of
Plaintiff’s state court petition does not indicate that the amount in controversy
was met. Thus, Defendant was unable to remove the action until it received
some “other paper” indicating the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
The first document that Defendant received after Plaintiff filed its state court
petition and that indicated that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000
was Plaintiff’s July 11, 2025 settlement demand email.19 Defendant filed its
Notice of Removal on August 8, 2025, squarely within the 30-day period
beginning on July 11, 2025.20 Accordingly, Defendant timely removed this
action under § 1446.
B. Amount in Controversy
Having 	established 	that 	removal 	was 	timely, 	the 	Court 	moves 	to
Plaintiff’s alternative argument. Plaintiff asserts that the Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because the amount in controversy
was not met.21 Plaintiff bases his argument on the fact that Defendant had
voluntarily tendered a $70,552.66 check to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff had a
pending motion in the state court proceeding wherein he sought to amend his
petition. Plaintiff argues that these facts are relevant because the voluntary
tender combined with the allegations in Plaintiff’s proposed amended state
court petition would mean that the actual amount in dispute at the time of
removal would be lower than the court’s jurisdictional threshold. Defendant
19 Doc. 6-5. Although Plaintiff’s email states that the balance due to Plaintiff is only
$70,552.66, Plaintiff’s state court petition seeks statutorily imposed treble damages and
attorney’s fees.
20 Doc. 1.
21 The parties do not dispute that the diversity of citizenship requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
is met, and the parties are indeed diverse.
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correctly counters that these facts are not relevant to the Court’s inquiry, as
the operative complaint controls.
Although Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his petition was pending
before the state court, Fifth Circuit precedent plainly instructs district courts
to “consider the claims in the state court petition as they existed at the time of
removal.”22 Defendant’s tender of the $70,552.66 has no effect on the Court’s
jurisdictional analysis, as Plaintiff’s state court petition still included claims
intended to recover this amount. Accordingly, at the time Defendant filed its
Notice of Removal, Plaintiff’s state court petition, combined with Plaintiff’s
July 11, 2025 offer of settlement, established that the federal jurisdictional
amount in controversy was met.
As Defendant “carried its burden of proving the jurisdictional amount,”
“the case should be remanded only if [Plaintiff] can prove to a legal certainty
that [his] recovery will fall below $75,000.”23 Plaintiff’s Motion does not argue
that he would be unable to recover more than $75,000, only that Defendant
was unable to meet his burden to remove based on the information presented
in Plaintiff’s July 11, 2025 email. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not proved to a
legal certainty that his recovery will fall below the requisite jurisdictional
amount.
22 Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723; Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264
(5th Cir. 1995) (“The rationale for determining removal jurisdiction on the basis of claims in
the state court complaint as it exists at the time of removal is obvious. Without such a rule,
disposition of the issue would never be final, but would instead have to be revisited every
time the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint . . . all at considerable expense and delay to
the parties and the state and federal courts involved.”).
23 Manguno, 276 F.3d at 724.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Remand (Doc. 6) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 28th day of January, 2026.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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