3612 Edenborn, LLC v. Chaucer Insurance Company DAC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
3612 EDENBORN, LLC,
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-2039
CHAUCER INSURANCE
COMPANY DAC,
Defendant
SECTION: “E” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by
Defendant Chaucer Insurance Company, DAC (“Defendant”). 1 Plaintiff 3612 Edenborn,
LLC (“Plaintiff”) filled an opposition. 2 Defendant filed a reply. 3
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of property damage allegedly caused by Hurricane Francine.
Plaintiff owns property located in Metairie, Louisiana. 4 Plaintiff alleges its property was
insured at the time of Hurricane Francine under a policy issued by Defendant. 5 Plaintiff
alleges its property sustained damage as a result of the hurricane. 6 Plaintiff alleges it filed
a claim with Defendant, and Defendant assigned an adjuster to inspect and adjust the
claim. Plaintiff alleges Defendant paid $18,294.24 under the policy. 7 Plaintiff alleges it
then obtained a repair estimate for damages to its property of $126,081.11 from Built-in
New Orleans, Louisiana, LLC (“BINOLA”).8 Plaintiff alleges it submitted the estimate to
1 R. Doc. 25.
2 R. Doc. 26.
3 R. Doc. 29.
4 R. Doc. 20 at ¶ 6.
5 Id. at ¶ 7.
6 Id. at ¶ 9.
7 Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12-14.
8 Id. at ¶ 18.
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Defendant’s claims handler on May 1, 2025 and that more than sixty days elapsed after
submission 	without 	Defendant 	tendering 	the 	estimate 	amount. 9 	Plaintiff 	alleges
Defendant breached the insurance contract by failing to adequately compensate Plaintiff
for its property damage and that, as a result, its property has remained in a state of
disrepair since Hurricane Francine.10
On September 30, 2025 Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against Defendant.11 The
Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to properly allege its citizenship, 12
which Plaintiff did. 13 On December 12, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 14 The
Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to address the arguments
raised in Defendant’s motion.15 Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, 16 and the
Court dismissed Defendant’s Motion. 17 In the prayer of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for breach of contract, bad faith claims
handling, negligent claims handling, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
violation 	of 	La. 	R.S. 	§ 	22:1892, 	violation 	of 	La. 	R.S. 	§ 	22:1893, 	and 	negligent
misrepresentation.18
On March 5, 2026, Defendant filed a second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim. Defendant argues that, because the property damage at issue allegedly arose
9 Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, 23.
10 Id. at ¶¶ 35, 41.
11 R. Doc. 1.
12 R. Doc. 6.
13 R. Doc. 7.
14 R. Doc. 14.
15 R. Doc. 19.
16 R. Doc. 20.
17 R. Doc. 21.
18 R. Doc. 20 at ¶ 54.
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from a catastrophic event, La. R.S. § 22:1892.2 governs Plaintiff’s claims. 19 Defendant
argues this statute requires that an insurer be given sixty days' written notice of the
violation prior to the insured’s filing a claim. 20 Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff
failed to transmit notice to Defendant prior to filing suit, the Court should dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims. 21 In Defendant’s first motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that, in the
alternative, the Court should stay this matter until sixty days after Plaintiff provides
adequate written notice. 22
Plaintiff argues § 22:1892 governs Plaintiff’s claims and as a result, Plaintiff was
not required to provide sixty days’ written notice to Defendant. 23 Plaintiff argues that,
even if § 22:1892.2 did apply to Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff provided Defendant with
BINOLA’s estimate on May 1, 2025, well over sixty days before bringing this action, and
that this constitutes written notice of Defendant’s violation. 24
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss
a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff
has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to
19 R. Doc. 25-1 at p. 4.
20 Id. at pp. 4-6.
21 Id. Defendant also argues Plaintiff failed to state a claim under La. R.S. § 22:1893(b), which provides that
if damage to immovable property is covered under a policy, the burden is on the insurer to establish an
exclusion under the terms of the policy. Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not allege it invoked a policy
exclusion in adjusting Plaintiff’s claim and, as a result, fails to state a claim under this statute. Plaintiff
argues that, because Defendant acknowledged that coverage existed, the Defendant held the burden of
establishing that an exclusion applied to Plaintiff’s claim, which it failed to do. However, as discussed infra
Section III, Section 22:1893(b) does not create its own cause of action; it merely establishes which party
carries the burden of proof at trial to establish an exclusion applies in a breach of insurance contract claim.
Accordingly, there is no cause of action under Section 22:1893(b).
22 R. Doc. 14.
23 R. Doc. 26-1 at pp. 7-8.
24 R. Doc. 26 at p. 7.
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relief.25 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 26 “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”27
The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory
statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” 28 Indeed, “threadbare recitals
of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient. 29 However, in
assessing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true
and must liberally construe all such allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. 30 Twombly does not require detailed factual allegations but does “require[] more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” 31
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’”32 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.” 33 “Determining whether
25 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
26 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
27 Id.
28 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
29 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
30 Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999).
31 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
32 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)).
33 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555.
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a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 34 “Although
detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the
complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’” 35 However, “[m]otions to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) ‘are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.’” 36 Whether a plaintiff “will
be able to offer sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the
context of a motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a
motion to dismiss. 37 “[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate
for summary judgment . . . .” 38
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. 	La. R.S. § 22:1892.2 governs Plaintiff’s claims.
La. R.S. § 22:1892.2 applies to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff seeks statutory penalties
under § 22:1892. Section 22:1892(B)(1)(c)(i) defines a catastrophic loss as “a loss that
arose from a natural disaster, windstorm, or significant weather-related event that was a
presidentially declared emergency or disaster or a gubernatorially declared emergency or
disaster.” 39 Section 22:1892(B)(1)(b) of that section provides:
In the case of a catastrophic loss, any penalty for payment and adjustment of a first
party claim arising under an insurance policy for immovable property shall be
subject to penalty pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 22:1892.2, and the provisions
of this Paragraph shall not apply. 40
Plaintiff’s alleged property damage arose from Hurricane Francine, which was a
34 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
35 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed.Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
36 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs.,
Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2005)).
37 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019).
38 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar.
28, 2022).
39 La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(1)(c)(i).
40 La. R.S. § 22:1892(B)(1)(b).
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presidentially 	declared 	major 	disaster 	and 	a 	gubernatorially 	declared 	state 	of
emergency.41 As a result, Plaintiff seeks damages for a catastrophic loss. Accordingly, the
provisions of § 22:1892 do not apply, and § 22:1892.2 governs Plaintiff’s claims. Although
Plaintiff’s complaint specifically seeks relief under § 22:1892, the Court will construe the
complaint as one for relief under § 22:1892.2.
II. 	Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the provisions of La. R.S. §
22:1892.2, the Court will stay this matter.
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of La. R.S. § 22:1892.2(c)(1).
This section provides that
As a condition precedent to bringing an action pursuant to this Section, the
insurer shall be given sixty days' written notice of the violation by the insured or
his representative, hereinafter referred to in this Section as the “cure period
notice.42
Section 22:1892.2(C)(2) states that the cure period notice “may be provided through
either a form transmitted by the department [of insurance] or by formal written demand
providing sufficient notice of the facts and circumstances of the dispute.” 43 Furthermore,
Section 22:1892.2(C)(7) provides that “[i]f any suit is filed prior to transmitting the cure
period notice required by this Subsection, it shall be automatically stayed until sixty days
after the cure period notice is received. 44
Plaintiff argues it has complied with the cure period notice condition,45 as it
“transmitted the complete $126,081.11 estimate to the assigned Senior Claims Handler,”
41 “Both declarations are facts that can be judicially noticed pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201 because they are
not subject to reasonable dispute, are generally known within this Court's territorial jurisdiction, and
because the accuracy of the cited sources cannot reasonably be questioned.” Lumar v. Allied Tr. Ins. Co.,
No. 25-1264, 2025 WL 2792217, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2025).
42 La. R.S. § 22:1892.2(C)(1).
43 La. R.S. § 22:1892.2(C)(2).
44 La. R.S. § 22:1892.2(C)(7).
45 R. Doc. 26 at pp. 7-8.
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who acknowledged receipt of the estimate in writing.”46 Plaintiff argues this satisfied any
condition precedent under § 22:1892.2. 47
Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to comply with the cure period notice
requirement. 48 Defendant argues Plaintiff does not allege that the repair estimate it
submitted to Defendant contained any reference to a statutory violation, any demand that
Defendant cure such a violation, or any statement that Plaintiff intended to seek statutory
penalties. 49
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the cure period notice requirement of Section
22:1892.2. The statute clearly states that the insured must provide the insurer written
notice of the violation, not of an estimate to property damage. 50 In Castro-Rochez v. Allied
Trust Insurance Company, another section of this district court found that an insured
bringing a claim against its insurer for a catastrophic loss had not complied with the cure
period notice requirement even though the insured had submitted a repair estimate and
demand letter to the insurer “because [these forms] only informed [the insurer] of the
property damage, not of its violation of the statute.” 51 In this case, Plaintiff does not allege
that its repair estimate contained any notice that Defendant violated La. R.S. § 22:1892
or § 22:1892.2. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the cure period notice
requirement.
While Defendant argues the Court should dismiss all claims due to Plaintiff’s
failure to comply with Section 22:1892.2, the statute does not allow for such an action.
46 R. Doc. 20 at ¶ 20.
47 Id. at ¶ 33.
48 R. Doc. 25-1 at p. 6.
49 Id.
50 La. R.S. § 22:1892.2(C)(1).
51 No. CV 25-2431, 2026 WL 472748, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2026).
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Section 22:1892.2(C)(7) states that any suit filed before the insured provided cure period
notice to the insurer shall automatically be stayed until sixty days after the insured
provides cure period notice to the insurer. Accordingly, the Court will stay this matter
until sixty (60) days after Plaintiff provides adequate cure period notice to Defendant.
III. 	La. R.S. § 22:1893(B) does not create a cause of action.
La. R.S. § 22:1893 provides that:
A. (1) No insurer shall use the floodwater mark on a covered structure without
considering other evidence, when determining whether a loss is covered or not
covered under a homeowners’ insurance policy.
(2) No insurer shall use the fact that a home is removed or displaced from its
foundation without considering other evidence, when determining whether a
loss is covered or not covered under a homeowners’ insurance policy.
B. If damage to immovable property is covered, in whole or in part, under the terms
of the policy of insurance, the burden is on the insurer to establish an exclusion
under the terms of the policy.
C. Any clause, condition, term, or other provision contained in any policy of
insurance which alters or attempts to alter the burden on an insurer as provided
in Subsection B of this Section shall be null and void and of no effect.
D. Any insurer determined to be in violation of the provisions of this Section shall
be liable pursuant to R.S. 22:1892. 52
Plaintiff argues Defendant failed to comply with Section 22:1893(B). Plaintiff
argues it alleged that Defendant acknowledged that coverage existed by making a partial
payment on the claim, and as a result, the burden fell on Defendant to establish that an
exclusion precluded full coverage. 53 Because Defendant failed to invoke any exclusion,
Plaintiff argues it violated Section 22:1893(B). 54
Defendant argues it did not cite or rely on any policy exclusion in calculating the
52 La. R.S. § 22:1892.2.
53 R. Doc. 26 at pp. 8-9.
54 Id.
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amount it owed Plaintiff under the insurance policy.55 Defendant argues as a result, the
Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under this statute. 56
Section 22:1893(B) is not the basis for a cause of action; it merely establishes which
party carries the burden of proof at trial to establish an exclusion applies in a breach of
insurance contract claim. To the extent Plaintiff includes “failure to abide by La. R.S.
22:1893” in its list of causes of action in its prayer, 57 the claim will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect
to Plaintiff’s claim for “failure to abide by La. R.S. 22:1893.” 58
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of this matter is stayed until
sixty (60) days after Plaintiff provides cure period notice to Defendant.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of March, 2026.
________________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
55 R. Doc. 25-1 at p. 8.
56 Id.
57 R. Doc. 20 at ¶ 54.
58 R. Doc. 25.
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