Jacquet v. Dorrance Publishing Company et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KIESHA ANN JACQUET
VERSUS
DORRANCE PUBLISHING
COMPANY, ET AL.
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-2349
SECTION “E” (2)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Keisha Ann Jacquet filed a Complaint on November 19, 2025. ECF No. 1. On
November 25, 2025, I granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and, consistent with
the duties imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (e)(2)(B), ordered that summons not be issued until
completion of the statutorily mandated review. ECF No. 3. This Order also required Plaintiff to
show cause why her case should not be dismissed by filing a written response setting forth the
specific facts upon which she relies to establish bases for her claims, in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). ECF No. 3 at 7. Plaintiff timely filed a response. ECF No. 5. In accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915, I submit this Report and Recommendation.
I. 	PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND RESPONSE
Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting a Bivens claim against Dorrance Publishing Company
and Xlbris Publishing Company and invoking federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ I(B), II
at 2-3. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), a plaintiff may sue federal officials for the violation of certain constitutional rights. In this
case, however, Plaintiff fails to identify, in either her complaint or response, any constitutional
right allegedly violated by any federal officials. See id. ¶ II(C)-(D), at 3-4; ECF No. 5.
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Instead, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to royalties on August 3, 2002, March 15,
2015, and May 7, 2023. ECF No. 1 ¶ III(B)-(C), at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff indicates that the two
publishing company defendants have failed to pay her royalties allegedly owed for books she has
written. 	ECF No. 5 at 2. 	Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff has published two books
entitled Keisha Ann Jacquet and Keisha Life Story. Id. Plaintiff states that she has not received
any royalty checks from Dorrance Publishing or Xlibris Publishing, and Xlibris Publishing’s
owner said on the phone that they would give her $1,000,000 for her book rights. Id.
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
A. Statutorily Mandated Review
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) grants the Court authority to summarily dismiss in forma pauperis
complaints if the asserted claims are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.1 Indeed, the statute specifically mandates that the court “must sua sponte
dismiss [the case] at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune.”2 This statutory review mandate applies to non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases equally
to prisoner cases.3
A claim is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”4 A claim
“lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if
the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”5 A court may
1 Tam Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4624, 2011 WL 743466, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2011), R.&R. adopted sub
nom., Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4264, 2011 WL 740909 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).
2 Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
3 James v. Richardson, 344 F. App’x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires dismissal of frivolous
IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.”); see also Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227,
231 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying § 1915(e)(2)(B) to a non-prisoner whose complaint was frivolous).
4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
5 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.
1997)).
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not dismiss a claim simply because the facts are “unlikely.”6 A factually frivolous claim alleges
only facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise
to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them.”7
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual
allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in
the complaint are true, even if doubtful.8 	The Supreme Court clarified the standard for a Rule
12(b)(6) motion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 	To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face (i.e., the factual allegations must “be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).9 If the “facts” alleged are “merely consistent”
with those minimally required to establish liability, the complaint “stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility.”10 “Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.”11
Although the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and consider the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”12 	The court may consider not only the
6 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)).
7 Id. (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33).
8 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
11 Roy v. Cobb, No. 20-0167, 2020 WL 2045791, at *2 (W.D. La. April 7, 2020) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
12 Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540,
544 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Lehman Bros. Small
Balance Com. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3, 881 F.3d 933, 943–44 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding
conclusory fraud allegations that the defendant intended plaintiff to act upon representations and plaintiff acted in
reliance on representations insufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) challenge).
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allegations but also any documents attached to the complaint, referenced documents that are
central to the claim, and documents that are part of the public record or subject to judicial notice.13
In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule
12(b)(6), the Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), held that a claim that is
dismissed under one rule does not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.14 If an in forma pauperis
complaint lacks even an arguable basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule 12(b)(6)
and § 1915(e).15 “When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court
ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate; however, dismissal under [§ 1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”16
B. Bivens Claims
A Bivens claim remedies constitutional violations by federal government officials in their
individual capacities.17 To state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of statutory
or constitutional rights by a federal officer acting under color of federal law.18 “[P]rivate actors
are not subject to liability under Bivens for conduct that typically falls within the scope of
traditional state tort law.”19
13 See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (directing courts to “consider the
complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.”); Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court may rely on the complaint,
its proper attachments, documents incorporated by reference, and matters of judicial notice).
14 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Affiliated Pro. Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999); see F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994).
18 See 403 U.S. at 397.
19 Vela v. Presley, No. 22-40484, 2023 WL 3255010, at *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2023) (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S.
118, 131 (2012); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63-64 (2001); Eltayib v. Cornell Cos., 533 F. App’x
414, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also Goodloe v. United States, No. 22-5, 2023 WL 4712204, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June
21, 2023) (Ramirez, M.J.) (citing Lampley v. Doe, No. 21-261, 2021 WL 3396777, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 3, 2021),
R.&R. adopted, 2021 WL 3367677 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2021) (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72-73)), R.&R. adopted,
2023 WL 4707997 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2023).
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Somewhat like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens extends the protections similar to those under
§ 1983 to parties injured by federal, rather than state, actors.20 Bivens is not, however, broadly
construed and does not create rights of actions in the same manner, or as extensively, as § 1983.21
“The Supreme Court has authorized an implied damages remedy against federal officers for
constitutional violations (Bivens actions) only three times.”22 	Bivens does not extend to “new
contexts”—that is, those that are “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases
decided by the Court.”23 Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to
any new context or new category of defendants . . . for the past 30 years.”24
C. Pleading Standard
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint set forth “sufficient
facts from which the court can determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and from
which the defendants can fairly appreciate the claim made against them.”25 	While Rule 8’s
pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does demand more than an
“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”26 While documents filed pro se
20 See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 863 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A Bivens action is analogous to an action under § 1983–
the only difference being that § 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state, rather than federal officials”),
overruled on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 948–49 & n.36 (5th Cir. 2003).
21 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855-57 (2017). Bivens claims may not be implied under contexts not
previously recognized by the Supreme Court, and there are very few recognized contexts. Id. at 1857; Oliva v. Nivar,
973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2669 (2021).
22 Springer v. United States, No. 21-11248, 2022 WL 2208516, at *1 (5th Cir. June 21, 2022) (citing Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980) (inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical assistance); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment Due Process claim for gender discrimination); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search and
seizure)).
23 Id. (quoting Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864)).
24 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68).
25 Kinchen v. Sharp, No. 11-1040, 2012 WL 700920, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2012) (quoting Bremer v. Hous. Auth.
of New Orleans, No. 98-2735, 1999 WL 298795, at *1 (E.D. La. May 12, 1999)), R.&R. adopted, 2012 WL 700265
(E.D. La. Feb. 29, 2012).
26 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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are “liberally construed,”27 even the complaints of pro se litigants must satisfy Rule 8 to convince
the court that plaintiff has a colorable claim.28
D. Availability of Amendment
Although frivolous claims may be dismissed with prejudice,29 before doing so, the Court
should allow the pro se Plaintiff the opportunity to state his best case:
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice
of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to
amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him
to 	the 	legal 	theory 	underlying 	the 	defendant's 	challenge 	and 	enable 	him
meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by
clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the requirements of a valid
legal cause of action.30
Thus, the court should generally allow a plaintiff the opportunity to amend before
dismissing an action for failure to state a claim.31 	Indeed, unless it is clear that a plaintiff is
unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal, the court errs in not providing
a pro se plaintiff with at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing.32
When, however, the “complaint alleges the plaintiff's best case,” a further factual statement from
the plaintiff need not be allowed.33
27 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 98, 106 (1976)).
28 Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating “[a]lthough we treat pro se pleadings more
liberally, some facts must be alleged that convince us that the plaintiff has a colorable claim; conclusory allegations
will not suffice.”).
29 See Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1506 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
30 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329-30.
31 See, e.g., Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
15(a)(2); F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1385 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that Rule 15(a) “evinces a strong bias in
favor of granting . . . leave to amend a pleading”).
32 Dierlam v. Trump, 977 F.3d 471, 478 n.44 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned
up); Brown v. Brown, 842 F. App'x 948, 949 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se
complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.”
(quoting Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up))).
33 Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
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III. 	ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
A. Bivens Claims
Plaintiff’s Bivens claims are frivolous. Despite explicit instruction as to the necessity to
identify a claim against a federal officer in the Show Cause Order,34 Plaintiff provided no
additional factual allegations involving any federal official as necessary to state a Bivens claim.
Again, Plaintiff complains only of actions by private actors.
Plaintiff’s complaint and response fail to state a Bivens claim as she names only private
entities rather than any federal officials, and she fails to allege violation of any constitutional right
for which a Bivens remedy has been recognized.
B. Plaintiff’s Demand for Royalties
1. 	Breach of Contract
Plaintiff’s complaint appears to seek recovery of royalties from private publishers. 	In
Louisiana, a failure to pay book royalties is governed by contract law.35 	An author’s right to
royalties is included in a publication contract between the publisher and author. In order to prevail
on a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) that the obligor
undertook an obligation to perform; (2) that the obligor failed to perform the obligation (the
breach); and (3) that the failure to perform resulted in damages to the obligee.36 	Instead of
providing any facts regarding these elements, Plaintiff merely alleges that she is owed royalty
checks from Dorrance Publishing and Xlbris Publishing for a book(s) she has written and demands
$1,000,000 from Xlbris Publishing.
34 ECF No. 3 at 4-5.
35 See Fonseca v. Pelican Publ’g. Co., 921 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2006).
36 Walker v. Pelican Publ’g. Co., No. 10-4389, 2011 WL 2976271 at *6 (E.D. La. July 22, 2011) (Zainey, J.) (citing
Garco, Inc. v. Rob's Cleaning & Powerwash, Inc., 12 So. 3d 386, 391 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2009)).
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Plaintiff has failed to set forth any factual basis to support her claim for royalties. Nowhere
in either her complaint or response does she identify a publication contract or any provisions
thereof. Further, she has not stated any dates in which a contract may have been entered, who the
parties to the agreement were, and for which book(s). Thus, she has not demonstrated that either
of the defendant publishing companies undertook an obligation to pay her royalties or that they
failed to perform any agreed obligation. 	Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient facts so that
Defendants can fairly appreciate the claim made against them.
2. 	Copyright Infringement
To the extent that Plaintiff may seek to demand royalties based on copyright infringement,
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that Dorrance Publishing and Xlbris Publishing
violated any exclusive rights of Plaintiff in terms of reproduction, distribution, or creation of a
derivate work. 	To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove that she
owned a valid copyright, and that the defendant impermissibly copied that work or otherwise
infringed upon the copyright.37 One such statutory formality is registration.38 “A certificate of
registration, if timely obtained, is prima facie evidence both that a copyright is valid, and that the
registrant owns the copyright.”39
Here, Plaintiff has not asserted that she owned a valid copyright or how Defendants
impermissibly copied or infringed upon that copyright. Therefore, she has not asserted a claim for
which relief can be granted under copyright law.
37 Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Recs., 394 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds,
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Quintanilla v. Tex. Television Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 500 (5th
Cir. 1998).
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
39 Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
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IV. 	RECOMMENDATIONS
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Keisha Anna Jacquet’s claims under Bivens be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to amend for being frivolous.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Keisha Anna Jacquet’s claims against
Dorrance Publishing Company and Xlbris Publishing Company for unpaid book royalties be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, but with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days to set forth the necessary
facts to state a claim under either state or federal law.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.40
Dated this ____ day of March, 2026.
________________________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
40 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). Douglass referenced the previously
applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended
to extend the period to fourteen days.
9th
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