Winch v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction filed by plaintiff Justin Lamar Winch.1 Having considered the motion, the complaint,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion for a temporary restraining order
because Winch has not clearly shown that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result before the adverse parties can be heard. 	The Court defers ruling on the motion for a
preliminary injunction until the defendants receive notice of the application and have an
opportunity to respond.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Winch’s allegations that the defendants have engaged in
systematic misconduct in the servicing and collection of Winch’s mortgage loan, which is backed
by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”).2 	Winch named the following parties as
defendants: Freedom Mortgage Corporation (“Freedom”); Stanley C. Middleman, president and
CEO of Freedom; John Does 1-25, employees of Freedom; and Halliday, Watkins & Mann, P.C.
(“HWM”), a law firm that conducts debt-collection activities on behalf of Freedom.3
1 R. Doc. 5.
2 R. Doc. 1 at 2-4.
3 Id. at 3-4.
JUSTIN LAMAR WINCH
VERSUS
FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-2469
SECTION M (2)
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Winch alleges that Freedom services his FHA loan, which is secured by a mortgage on his
home.4 After his July 2025 mortgage payment became overdue, he says that he attempted to pay
the delinquent installment, but that Freedom’s online payment system did not permit him to pay
only his balance due for July.5 Instead, Freedom’s system only permitted him to pay either the
entire outstanding balance for the months of July, August, and September, plus inspection fees and
late charges, or nothing at all.6
At some point in November 2025, Freedom removed Winch’s access to its online payment
system, preventing him from making any online payments or accessing other functions available
on Freedom’s online platform.7 Winch then says that on or about November 12, 2025, he received
a letter from Freedom stating that his loan “remains in default” and that failure to cure his default
“may” result in acceleration or foreclosure.8 He also alleges that Freedom’s borrower-facing app
displayed that his loan was in “active foreclosure,” even though he says his loan could not have
been in active foreclosure because Freedom never issued a written acceleration notice, which he
submits “is a strict prerequisite to foreclosure.”9 Winch further alleges that, also around November
12, 2025, he received a letter from HWM, identifying itself as a debt collector and providing
generic collection disclosures, without stating that foreclosure had been initiated, providing a
Louisiana sheriff sale date, or attaching and identifying any foreclosure pleading.10 Finally, Winch
alleges that Freedom engaged in “confusing and inconsistent handling of escrow, including
4 Id. at 3. 	Notably, Winch neglected to attach to his complaint any documentation of the terms of the
mortgage or loan. As a result, certain claims made by Winch, such as whether acceleration was a prerequisite to
foreclosure, are impossible for this Court to analyze.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 8.
8 Id. at 9.
9 Id. at 8-9 (quote at 9).
10 Id. at 9-10.
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mortgage insurance charges and corporate advances,” which made it unclear to Winch the amount
necessary for him to reinstate his loan.11
On December 10, 2025, Winch filed the instant action, asserting claims: (1) against
Freedom and Middleman for unsafe and unsound mortgage-servicing practices (Count I); (2)
against HWM and Freedom for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Count II); (3)
against Freedom for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and Regulation X
(Count III); (4) against Freedom for violations of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z
(Count IV); (5) against all defendants for violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act
(Count V); (6) for declaratory judgment against all defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201; (7)
for injunctive relief against all defendants; and (8) against Freedom and Middleman for fraud.12
Winch seeks to have the case certified as a class action.13
Winch now asserts that, after he commenced this suit, “Defendants” instituted a foreclosure
action against him in Orleans Parish Civil District Court on December 16, 2025.14 Although his
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is less than clear on this point,
Winch seems to suggest that the state court issued a writ of seizure and sale.15 Winch also states
that, via correspondence mailed to him in the days before he filed the motion, Freedom expressly
extended its loss mitigation consideration period to January 28, 2026, but he does not explain the
significance of this date for purposes of the relief he seeks.16
11 Id. at 11.
12 Id. at 16-32.
13 Id. at 13-16.
14 R. Doc. 5 at 5-6.
15 See id. At page 6 of the motion, Winch refers the Court to an attached “current status of service of the
Orleans Parish Writ,” although there is no such attachment to his motion.
16 Id. at 7.
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II. 	LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65 provides that “[t]he court may issue a temporary
restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A)
specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and
the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 	A preliminary injunction
cannot be granted unless notice of the motion has been provided to the opposing party. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
The movant for a temporary restraining order, like an applicant for a preliminary
injunction, must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2)
a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the restraining order is not
granted (i.e., that there is no adequate remedy at law); (3) the movant’s threatened injury outweighs
the threatened harm to the party whom the movant seeks to enjoin; and (4) that granting the request
for a temporary restraining order will not disserve the public interest. 	See PCI Transp., Inc. v.
Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F. 3d 535, 545 (5th Cir. 2005). “A temporary restraining order is
an extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried
the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” 	Terry v. Network Funding, LP, 2016 WL
8674352, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 20, 2016) (citing PCI Transp., Inc., 418 F.3d at 545).
B. Analysis
In his motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, Winch asks this
Court “to prevent Defendants from initiating, continuing, or threatening further unlawful
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foreclosure activity or collection conduct on Plaintiff’s mortgage loan, to compel the restoration
of Plaintiff’s payment portal access, to prohibit the addition or assessment of any further fees or
charges, and to maintain the status quo while this matter proceeds.”17
Winch has not shown that he is entitled to an ex parte temporary restraining order because
he has not clearly pleaded specific facts which show that irreparable injury will result before the
defendants can be heard in opposition. To the extent that the TRO seeks the restoration of Winch’s
payment portal access or the prohibition of further fees, the Court does not see how irreparable
injury – that is, injury which could not be cured by monetary damages – would occur without this
Court’s ordering this requested relief. Then, although he alleges that a foreclosure action has been
initiated, he has not provided any details about (or even alleged) a pending foreclosure sale. He
does not provide a notice of foreclosure, nor does he provide the date of a scheduled foreclosure
or any evidence that the defendants have scheduled the property for foreclosure. Because of the
conclusory nature of the allegations in the complaint and motion in this regard, this Court cannot
even determine with certainty which of the defendants instituted the foreclosure action and might
be seeking to repossess his home. In sum, Winch has not carried his burden of demonstrating a
substantial threat that he will suffer immediate irreparable injury if the restraining order is not
granted.
In addition, Winch has not shown that he has a likelihood of success on the merits. 	He
pleads a number of claims, generally reciting the elements of those claims in conclusory fashion,
but he has again failed to plead specific factual allegations tied to provisions of the mortgage or
servicing documents, as to show that he has a likelihood of success on the merits. This begs the
question whether he could have raised these arguments as defenses in the state-court foreclosure
17 R. Doc. 5 at 1.
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proceeding, where the judge there could weigh these arguments against the relevant provisions of
the documents missing here.
Having failed to show both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits,
Winch’s motion is denied insofar as it seeks a temporary restraining order. 	Further, by rule, a
Court cannot issue a preliminary injunction unless the adverse party has received notice of the
application. 	Although Winch has certified that he has attempted to notify all defendants of the
present motion, he has not provided this Court with evidence of such notice. As a result, the Court
will defer ruling on the request for a preliminary injunction until the defendants receive notice and
have an opportunity to respond.
Finally, the Court observes that Winch’s application for injunctive relief (whether as a TRO
or preliminary injunction) can be read as indirectly seeking to enjoin the state-court foreclosure
litigation, but this Court is prohibited from issuing an order to that effect. 	Viewed in this way,
Winch’s request for injunctive relief
necessarily implicates the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The AIA
provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
28 U.S.C. § 2283. This Act “has been interpreted consistently as an absolute bar to
any federal court action that has the effect of staying a pending state court
proceeding unless that action falls within one of the Act’s three specifically
designated exceptions.” Phillips v. Charles Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131-32
(5th Cir. 1990). These exceptions are each construed narrowly and should not be
broadened by “loose statutory construction.” Gibbs v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 487 Fed.
App’x. 916, 919 (5th Cir. 2012). As to the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction”
exception, courts have found that it applies “only where a state proceeding
threaten[s] to dispose of property that form[s] the basis for federal in rem
jurisdiction 	or 	where 	the 	state 	proceeding 	threaten[s] 	the 	continuing
superintendence by a federal court.” Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 301 (5th
Cir. 2002). “Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court
proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in
an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v.
Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970).
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Glass v. Finley, 2019 WL 13172344, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2019) (quoting Hart v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 12531171, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2014)). The injunctive relief which
Winch seeks in this case – barring litigants from proceeding in a pending state-court action – at
least indirectly has “the effect of staying a pending state court proceeding.” Phillips, 894 F.2d at
131-32. 	And Winch has not provided evidence of this Court’s authority to enjoin such
proceedings.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Winch’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction (R. Doc. 5) is DENIED insofar as it seeks a temporary restraining order and
DEFERRED insofar as it seeks a preliminary injunction.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of January, 2026.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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