Shirah v. Falcon et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WILLIAM CHILDS SHIRAH 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 	26-173
LELAND FALCON, ET AL. 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is pro se plaintiff William Childs Shirah’s (“Shirah”) motion1
for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). For the following reasons, the Court
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Shirah alleges that “for approximately eight (8) years” defendant Adam Mayon
(“Mayon”), a deputy with the Assumption Parish Sheriff’s Office (“APSO”), has
“engaged in a continuous campaign of harassment against [him] under color of law.”2
Examples 	of 	such 	alleged 	harassment 	by 	Mayon 	include, 	among 	others:
“disseminat[ing] false allegations to [Shirah’s] property owner and then-fiance,
claiming [Shirah] was a ‘needle junkie,’ effectively destroying [Shirah’s] personal and
professional relationships;” a false arrest that resulted from Mayon “fabricat[ing] a
felony theft charge involving a ‘found phone’” and “falsely claim[ing] a SIM card was
removed to create probable cause where none existed;” and Mayon “intentionally”
turning his bodycam off “to hide verbal abuse and misconduct.”3
1 R. Doc. No. 2.
2 R. Doc. No. 1, at 1.
3 Id.
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 7

2
Shirah brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution4 against both
Mayon and defendant Leland Falcon (“Falcon”) (collectively, “defendants”). Shirah
alleges that Falcon is the Sheriff of Assumption Parish and the “final decisionmaker
for the Department.”5 He asks this Court to: “issue a declaratory judgment that
defendants’ actions violated the Constitution; award compensatory damages in the
amount of $350,000; award punitive damages against defendant Mayon in the
amount of $700,000; and order a trial by jury on all issues so triable.”6
Shirah originally filed this action in the Middle District of Louisiana on
January 7, 2026.7 He filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that same day.8
On January 27, 2026, this case was transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana
and assigned to the undersigned.9
The TRO motion seeks an order that Mayon “remain at least 1,000 feet away
from [Shirah’s] residence on Mitchy St.”10 In support of the request, Shirah explains
that he “is the primary caregiver for Donna Dupre, a 61-year-old stroke survivor” and
that, during a recent incident of alleged harassment, Mayon “drove his cruiser slowly
by [and] angrily glared at Ms. Dupre, then parked [the] cruiser in middle of road, for
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2 (cleaned up).
7 See generally id.
8 See R. Doc. No. 2.
9 See R. Doc. No. 4.
10 R. Doc. No. 2, at 1.
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 7

3
5–7 minutes continuing his glare[,] causing Ms. Dupre acute fear.”11 The motion
represents that without such TRO, Ms. Dupre will “suffer[] severe emotional distress
and a direct threat to her medical stability due to the persistent threat of Mayon’s
presence.”12 The TRO further explains that Shirah attempted to obtain a protective
order from the 23 rd Judicial District Court of Louisiana, but that “[t]o date, the State
Court has failed to process the filing or provide a hearing, necessitating Federal
intervention to protect Constitutional liberties and physical safety.”13
Shirah attached three affidavits to his complaint that seem to support his TRO
motion. The first is the affidavit of Donna Dupre confirming that she depends on
Shirah for her “daily care, safety, and medical assistance,” that she observed Mayon
glaring at her from the roadway while she was in her home, and stating that
“[b]ecause of Defendant Mayon’s history of erratic behavior, including his previous
entry into my home with a taser drawn, and the fabricated arrest of my caregiver, I
live in constant fear of law enforcement appearing at my property.”14
The 	second 	is 	the 	affidavit 	of 	plaintiff 	Shirah 	reiterating 	some 	of 	the
allegations of his complaint.15 The third is the affidavit of Cary Breaux who
represents to be “a resident of Assumption Parish” having “personal knowledge of the
conduct 	of 	Defendant 	Adam 	Mayon,” 	including, 	having 	“personally 	witnessed
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.; see also R. Doc. No. 1-5–1-8.
14 R. Doc. No. 1-1, at 1.
15 See R. Doc. No. 1-2.
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 7

4
Defendant Mayon utilize his service weapon and the ‘Color of Law’ to coerce and
intimidate civilians without legal justification.”16
There is no evidence of service in the record of the complaint or the TRO motion
on either defendant.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) explains that “[t]he court may issue a
temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its
attorney only if:”
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give
notice and the reasons why it should not be required.
“The Rule 65(b)(1) criteria are strict requirements, not mere technicalities, that
establish minimum due process.” Cajun Servs. Unlimited, LLC v. Benton Energy
Serv. Co., No. 17-491, 2020 WL 10486334, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2020) (Ashe, J.)
(internal modifications omitted).
With respect to notice, “[t]he normal circumstances for which a district court
is justified in proceeding ex parte is where notice to the adverse party is impossible,
or in cases where the adverse party is unknown or is unable to be found.” Evans v.
Select Jan. Six Comm., No. 22-682, 2022 WL 17724137, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15,
2022). The moving party must make “a clear showing that immediate and irreparable
16 R. Doc. No. 1-3.
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 7

5
injury will result before the adverse party can be heard” for the court to issue a TRO
ex parte. CompuCom Sys., Inc. v. WJ Glob., LLC, No. 14-3625, 2014 WL 5032747, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2014).
A plaintiff proceeding pro se must “still demonstrate facts that would entitle
him to the relief requested,” including ex parte injunctive relief. See Martono-Chai v.
Williams, No. 25-578, 2025 WL 974251, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2025) (Barbier, J.); see
also Hampton v. First Guar. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-632, 2016 WL 5796886, at *1 (M.D.
La. Sept. 30, 2016) (“[W]hile the Court is aware that the Plaintiff is proceeding pro
se, she has failed to certify in writing any efforts made to give notice to the
Defendants, nor has she stated the reasons why notice should not be required.”).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Although the three affidavits Shirah filed with his complaint in support his
motion for TRO17 might satisfy the first requirement of Rule 65(b), Shirah has failed
to satisfy the notice requirement and, therefore, the Court cannot issue the ex parte
TRO he seeks.
Even if the Court were to consider the allegations in the affidavits and
complaint, Shirah makes no effort to establish that irreparable harm will result
before defendants are given an opportunity to respond. See Cajun Servs. Unlimited,
LLC v. Benton Energy Serv. Co., No. 17-491, 2020 WL 10486334, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct.
16, 2020) (“Plaintiffs have not begun to carry their heightened burden under Rule
65(b)(1)(A) of showing that immediate and irreparable injury ‘will result’ in the short
17 See R. Doc. Nos. 1-1–1-3.
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 7

6
period needed for [the defendant] to respond.”); see also Stone Metals Am., LLC, 2020
WL 570906, at *2 (“For all of his statements claiming irreparable harm resulting from
both Defendants’ actions, [the] declaration is missing the key requirement: ‘specific
facts . . . [which] clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.’”
(emphasis in original)).
Shirah’s filings also have not certified that he has made any effort to notify
defendant of the motion for TRO, nor has he explained why he should not be required
to provide notice to defendant of the same. See Silver v. Off. of Att’y Gen., No. 24-1298,
2025 WL 890734, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-50350,
2025 WL 3079092 (5th Cir. June 4, 2025) (denying plaintiff’s request for ex parte relief
because plaintiff had not “certif[ied] in writing any efforts made to give notice to
Defendants or why notice should not be required.”). No summons have been issued
as to defendants and no proof of service has been filed in the record.
A plaintiff’s “noncompliance with Rule 65, alone, is sufficient for the Court to
deny the motion.” Howell v. Lake Villas No. 2 Homeowners Ass’n, No. 18-14332, 2019
WL 95472, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2019) (Africk, J.); Goodson v. City of Dallas, No. 25-
816, 2025 WL 1373737, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:25-816, 2025 WL 1333657 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2025) (“[Plaintiff’s] failure
to satisfy Rule 65(b)(1)’s requirements, standing alone, is a sufficient basis to deny
his request for a TRO.”); see also St. v. Christ, No. 25-01882, 2025 WL 3623319, at *1
(W.D. La. Dec. 12, 2025) (denying the pro se plaintiff’s request for ex parte TRO to
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 7

7
enjoin the defendant deputy from “coming within 100 feet of [the plaintiff’s] home”
because the plaintiff “ha[d] not served the Defendants” and could not satisfy either
requirement of Rule 65(b)(1)).
IV. 	IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s ex parte motion18 for a temporary restraining
order is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 29, 2026.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18 R. Doc. No. 2.
Case 2:26-cv-00173-ASJ-DPC Document 5 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 7