Lightfoot et al v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CHAD LIGHTFOOT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 26-434
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants
SECTION: “E” (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by Robert
Hodges (“Colonel Hodges”) and Alan Arcana (“Lieutenant Arcana”) (sometimes
collectively referred to as “State Defendants”).1 Plaintiffs Chad Lightfoot, Geralyn
Hawkins, and their minor children (“Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition.2 The State
Defendants filed a reply.3
BACKGROUND4
This case arises out of a vehicle accident in Orleans Parish and the subsequent
criminal prosecution of Plaintiff Chad Lightfoot for insurance fraud.5 Plaintiffs allege that,
on August 29, 2011, Mr. Lightfoot was involved in a vehicle accident in Orleans Parish.6
Mr. Lightfoot filed insurance claims with multiple insurance carriers, including Liberty,
Progressive, and others.7 Plaintiffs allege the insurance claim was not “resolve[d]. . . to
Mr. Lightfoot’s satisfaction” and, as a result, in 2012, he brought a personal-injury lawsuit
1 R. Doc. 82.
2 R. Doc. 87.
3 R. Doc. 88.
4 These factual allegations are based on the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. R. Doc. 60.
5 Id.
6 Id. at ¶ 85.
7 Id. at¶ 87. Apparently, these are Chad Lightfoot’s underinsured motorist insurance carriers.
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in Orleans Parish Civil District Court against multiple insurance companies and other
related defendants (“the underlying civil action”).8
Plaintiffs allege that, on or about September 19, 2014, two of the attorneys
representing Progressive in the underlying civil action, Megan Kiefer and Ignatz Kiefer
assaulted Mr. Lightfoot inside the Orleans Parish Courthouse in retaliation for bringing
the underlying civil action.9 Plaintiffs further allege that, in December 2014, Megan Kiefer
prepared and swore to a false affidavit she submitted to the New Orleans Police
Department stating that Mr. Lightfoot fraudulently obtained a $50,000 payment from
Progressive Insurance Company in connection with the August 29, 2011 accident.10
Plaintiffs allege the affidavit included Megan Kiefer’s statement that, in obtaining the
$50,000 payment, Mr. Lightfoot committed perjury, insurance fraud, and filed false
public records.11 Plaintiffs allege these statements were false and Progressive’s own
records confirmed that Mr. Lightfoot never received a $50,000 payment.12
Plaintiffs allege New Orleans Police Department Detective Frank Denton, without
conducting further investigation into the affidavit’s validity, relied on Megan Kiefer’s false
affidavit to obtain an arrest warrant for Mr. Lightfoot.13 Plaintiffs allege that, on January
6, 2015, Mr. Lightfoot was arrested pursuant to this warrant.14 Plaintiffs further allege
that the Louisiana State Police Insurance Fraud Division began an investigation into Mr.
Lightfoot’s alleged insurance fraud scheme.15 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant State Police
8 Id. at ¶¶ 87-88.
9 Id. at ¶ 90. Plaintiffs do not bring a cause of action for damages resulting from this physical altercation.
10 Id. at ¶¶ 95-96.
11 Id. at ¶ 96.
12 Id. at ¶ 98.
13 Id. at ¶ 107.
14 Id. at ¶ 110.
15 Id. at ¶ 115.
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Lieutenant Alan Arcana stated in a police report that Mr. Lightfoot received $50,000 in
payments from Progressive, which caused the State of Louisiana to bring criminal charges
against him.16 Plaintiffs allege also that Colonel Hodges, as Louisiana State Police
Superintendent, had authority to correct, discipline, and remedy Arcana’s actions, yet
failed to do so after notice.17 Plaintiff was charged with theft of over $50,000, automobile
insurance fraud, and perjury.18 Plaintiffs allege Lieutenant Arcana testified that
Progressive insurance investigator Glenn Pardiane represented to him that Mr. Lightfoot
received a $50,000 payment.19 Plaintiffs allege that, during the criminal proceedings, it
was discovered there was no record of a $50,000 insurance payout to Mr. Lightfoot but
that, despite this lack of evidence, Mr. Lightfoot was criminally prosecuted for insurance
fraud.20 Plaintiffs allege the criminal charges against Mr. Lightfoot were dismissed on
October 15, 2024.21
Mr. Lightfoot and his spouse, Geralyn Hawkins, filed this suit pro se on October
20, 2025 in Orleans Parish Civil District Court.22 In their original petition, Mr. Lightfoot
and Ms. Hawkins brought a single claim against “unknown named Defendants” under La.
R.S. 15:572.8, which provides compensation to persons wrongfully convicted and
imprisoned.23
On November 10, 2025, Mr. Lightfoot and Ms. Hawkins filed a First Amended
Petition, adding their minor children as named Plaintiffs and bringing eight counts
16 Id. at ¶¶ 117-18.
17 Id. at ¶ 190.
18 Id. at ¶ 107.
19 Id. at ¶ 121.
20 Id. at ¶ 136.
21 Id. at ¶ 142.
22 R. Doc. 1-2.
23 Id. at pp. 1-2.
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against various defendants, including Colonel Hodges and Lieutenant Arcana, for actions
related to Mr. Lightfoot’s criminal prosecution and the civil judgment entered against him
and recorded as a judicial mortgage.24
On January 20, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Petition in state court.25
While this petition did not alter or amend any of the causes of action Plaintiffs attempted
to plead in their First Amended petition, it removed Plaintiffs’ minor children as parties.26
Robert Hodges and Alan Arcana removed the matter to this Court on February 27,
2026.27 Following removal, multiple defendants filed motions to dismiss, including
Lieutenant Arcana and Colonel Hodges.28 In their motion to dismiss, Lieutenant Arcana
and Colonel Hodges argue the majority of Plaintiffs’ claims are prescribed.29 Defendants
argue Lieutenant Arcana is entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims.30
Defendants further argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.31 Lastly, Lieutenant
Arcana and Colonel Hodges assert that Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory and fail to
state a claim.32
On April 15, 2026, in response to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs moved, pro se,
to file a First Amended Complaint in federal court in order to provide additional factual
details, clarify their claims for relief, and “narrow[] certain theories to address issues
raised or anticipated in Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions.”33 The Plaintiffs attached
24 R. Doc. 1-3.
25 R. Doc. 1-4.
26 See id. at p. 1.
27 R. Doc. 1.
28 R. Doc. 42
29 Id. at 1.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 R. Doc. 52 at p. 1.
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their proposed amended complaint to their motion.34 On April 22, 2026, the Court
granted Plaintiffs’ leave to file an amended complaint, but advised Plaintiffs to revise their
proposed restated and amended complaint, as the proposed version failed to address the
arguments Defendants made in their motions to dismiss.35 The Court ordered Plaintiffs
to file a revised and restated amended complaint, addressing “fully and completely, all
arguments raised in the Defendants’ motions to dismiss,” on or before on May 6, 2026.36
On May 6, 2026, rather than file their amended and restated complaint, Plaintiffs
simultaneously moved to enroll counsel of record and for an extension of time to file their
restated and amended complaint.37 The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and ordered
Plaintiffs to file their restated and amended complaint on or before June 8, 2026.38
On June 8, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint39—their fourth
petition/complaint filed in the course of this litigation40—in response to the Court’s order
that the amended complaint address fully and completely all arguments raised in the
defendants’ motions to dismiss. In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
bring claims against various defendants they allege were associated with Mr. Lightfoot’s
criminal prosecution. The Second Amended Complaint again asserts claims against,
among other defendants, Colonel Hodges and Lieutenant Arcana. While Plaintiffs’
previous complaints brought only eight counts against the defendants for violating La.
C.C.P. art. 2315 and various constitutional violations, their Second Amended Complaint
34 R. Doc. 52-1.
35 R. Doc. 53 at p. 3.
36 Id.
37 R. Doc. 56.
38 R. Doc. 59.
39 R. Doc. 60.
40 Plaintiffs prepared a restated and amended complaint and requested leave to file it on April 15, 2026, but
the Court ordered them to further revise it to address the arguments made in the pending motions to
dismiss. R. Doc. 52.
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asserts twenty counts against various defendants for multiple state law tort claims and
constitutional violations.41
On July 10, 2026, the State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.42 In their motion, the State Defendants argue the majority of claims asserted
against them should be dismissed because they are prescribed.43 State Defendants further
argue Lieutenant Arcana is entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims, which
they claim arise solely from Lieutenant Arcana’s testimony before grand juries.44
Defendants further argue they are entitled to the absolute defense that Mr. Lightfoot’s
indictments were supported by probable cause.45 Defendants argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity as well.46 Lastly, Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ allegations are
conclusory and fail to state a claim.47
Plaintiffs argue that they have made sufficient factual allegations against the State
Defendants, who they claim are asking the Court to decide factual issues outside of the
complaint, contrary to the typical Rule 12(b)(6) standard.48 Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants’ motion relies on a mistaken interpretation of Fourth Amendment caselaw.49
Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants calculate prescription incorrectly, and that rather
than prescription accruing at the earliest arrest or investigative event, the prescription
accrual date is calculated at later dates.50
41 In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, they added Eric Cusimano, Jason Williams, and Sgt. Patrick
Bradley of the Louisiana State Police as Defendants.
42 R. Doc. 82.
43 Id. at p.1.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at p.2.
48 R. Doc. 87 at 4-5.
49 Id. at 7-10.
50 Id. at 10-14.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”51 A complaint that does not meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.52 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.”53 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”54 “Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”55
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss
a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff
has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief.56 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”57 “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”58
The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory
statements, and “‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
53 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)).
54 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
55 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
56 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
57 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
58 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’”59 Indeed, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”60
or “naked assertion[s]”61 devoid of “further factual enhancement”62 are not sufficient.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’”63 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”64 “Determining whether
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”65 “Although
detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the
complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”66 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer
sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the context of a
motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to
dismiss.67 “‘[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for
summary judgment . . . .’”68
59 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
60 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
61 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
62 Id.
63 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
64 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 545.
65 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
66 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (citations
omitted).
67 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019).
68 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar.
28, 2022) (quoting Bilyeu v. Johanson Berenson LLP, 2010 WL 3896415, at *9 (W.D. La. Sep. 30, 2010)).
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. There are no factual allegations to support a claim based on the
individual liability of Colonel Hodges.
Plaintiffs’ first mention of Colonel Hodges by name in the Second Amended
Complaint is in the listing of defendants, wherein Plaintiffs, in Paragraph 81, describe
Hodges as:
Defendant Colonel Robert P. Hodges is the Superintendent
of Louisiana State Police. He is sued in individual capacity
for his own conduct and, to the extent legally available, in
official capacity for prospective declaratory or injunctive
relief only.69
Plaintiffs continue in Paragraph 82:
On information and belief, Hodges is alleged to have failed to
train, supervise, correct, discipline, or remedy LSP Insurance
Fraud Division practices that allowed troopers to adopt
unverified SIU allegations, label insurers as victims without
confirming losses, and maintain false reports after notice.70
Plaintiffs mention Colonel Hodges in two additional places in the Second Amended
Complaint. First, in Paragraph 148 under the “Factual Allegations” section, it is further
alleged:
LSP supervisory actors, including Bardley71 and Hodges, were
placed on notice that the $50,000 payment allegation was
false or unsupported.72
Elsewhere, in Paragraph 190 under the “Monell, Policy, Custom, Ratification, and Failure
to Train” section, it is alleged:
Hodges, as LSP Superintendent, had authority to correct,
discipline, train, supervise, and remedy LSP actors, yet failed
69 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 81.
70 Id. at ¶ 82.
71 Bardley has not yet been served and is not a movant in this motion.
72 R. Doc. 60 at ¶148.
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to do so after notice.73
In Paragraph 81, Plaintiffs allege that Colonel Hodges is being sued in part in his
individual capacity. In Paragraph 82, Plaintiffs do not allege any individual actions of
Colonel Hodges. It is alleged that he failed to train, supervise, correct, discipline, or
remedy LSP Insurance Fraud division practices, but that action (or lack thereof) pertains
to actions in his official capacity, not actions in his individual capacity.
Neither do the allegations in paragraphs 148 and 190 pertain to actions undertaken
by Hodges in his individual capacity. The allegation that he failed to correct, discipline,
train, supervise, and remedy LSP actors pertains to actions in his official capacity as
Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police. That Hodges allegedly was placed on notice
that the $50,000 payment was false, and that he then failed to correct LSP actors despite
that notice, addresses his liability in his official capacity only.
Since Plaintiffs make no factual allegations regarding Colonel Hodges’ actions
taken in his individual capacity, any claims against him in his individual capacity will be
dismissed. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the
plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him
to relief.74 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”75 A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.76
73 Id. at ¶190.
74 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
75 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
76 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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“[N]aked assertion[s]”77 devoid of “further factual enhancement”78 are not sufficient.
Plaintiffs assert Colonel Hodges is being sued in his individual capacity for “his own
conduct,”79 but that assertion regarding “his own conduct” is devoid of “further factual
enhancement.”80 The only factual allegations pertain to actions undertaken by Colonel
Hodges in his official capacity. The Complaint cannot survive the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss standard, with respect to claims against Colonel Hodges in his individual
capacity.81
II. Colonel Hodges, in his official capacity as the Superintendent of the
Louisiana State Police, is immune under the Eleventh Amendment
from liability under Monell as the Louisiana State Police is a state
agency; Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs allege in Paragraph 190 of their Amended Complaint that: “Hodges, as
LSP Superintendent, had authority to correct, discipline, train, supervise, and remedy
LSP actors, yet failed to do so after notice.”82 While the State Defendants do not raise an
Eleventh Amendment issue in their response, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte
jurisdictional issues that go to subject-matter jurisdiction.83 The Louisiana State Police,
as a state-based law enforcement agency, is entitled to sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.84 In Whitaker v. Barksdale Air Force Base, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
against the Louisiana State Police for allegedly unconstitutional surveillance of Plaintiff.85
77 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
78 Id.
79 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 81.
80 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
81 Count XVII for declaratory relief is asserted against all Defendants but none of the relief requested could
be obtained from Colonel Hodges. This count will be dismissed as well with respect to Colonel Hodges.
82 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 190.
83 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
84 Whitaker v. Barksdale Air Force Base, No. CIV.A. 14-2342, 2015 WL 574697 at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 11,
2015).
85 Id.
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The court explained that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary relief by
citizens in federal court against either states or their agencies, unless that state has waived
its immunity and consented to suit.86 Similarly, suits brought against state officials or
agents are also barred when the state is the “real, substantial party in interest,” regardless
of whether a plaintiff seeks damages.87 It is well-settled law in the Fifth Circuit that the
Louisiana State Police is “an arm of the State” that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity for purposes of § 1983 liability.88 Thus, the district court in Whitaker declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983.89
Colonel Hodges is the Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police whose alleged
constitutional violations were undertaken in his official capacity.90 This situates this case
squarely in the realm of Whitaker, which also featured § 1983 claims against the
Louisiana State Police.91 The Louisiana State Police, as an arm of the State, is entitled to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.92 Therefore, even accepting as true
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear these
constitutional claims.
Count XVIII seeking declaratory relief is asserted against all Defendants.93
Paragraph G of the Prayer requests “correction, retraction, or non-use of false official
86 Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Champagne v. Jefferson
Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 313 (5th Cir.1999)).
87 Id. (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,
464 (1945))).
88 See id. (citing Lavergne v. La. State Police, No. 6:13–cv–2189, 2014 WL 906285, at *3–4 (W.D. La. Mar.
7, 2014) (citing cases)).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See discussion supra.
92 Lavergne v. La. State Police, No. 6:13–cv–2189, 2014 WL 906285, at *3–4 (W.D. La. Mar. 7, 2014) (citing
cases)).
93 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 328-332.
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records” with respect to all defendants, which would include Colonel Hodges.94 While
sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims for damages against Colonel Hodges as
Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police, such immunity does not extend to claims
for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief under the Ex parte Young standard.95
Under Ex parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to suits for prospective relief
against a state employee’s activity in his official capacity.96 For Ex parte Young to apply,
“(1) A plaintiff must name individual state officials as defendants in their official
capacities; (2) the plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation of federal law; and (3) the
relief sought must be properly characterized as prospective.”97 “[A] court need only
conduct a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’”98
Nonspecific and speculative allegations of continuing unlawful conduct are insufficient to
demonstrate an ongoing violation under Ex parte Young.99 Failure to allege an ongoing
violation is fatal.100
Plaintiffs’ request for “correction, retraction, or non-use of false official records”
with respect to the Louisiana State Police does not allege an “ongoing violation of federal
law.” To the extent Plaintiff alleges the “ongoing collateral consequences” of such
practices, that allegation is the type of nonspecific and speculative allegation insufficient
94 Id. at p.53.
95 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
96 Nelson v. Univ. of Texas at Dallas, 535 F.3d 318, 321-322 (5th Cir. 2008).
97 Tawakkol v. Vasquez, 87 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
98 City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. V.
Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)).
99 James v. Hegar, 86 F.4th 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 2023).
100 See Morrison v. Dall. Cnty. Hum. Sex Trafficking Task Force, No. 23-cv-2046, 2023 WL 9231399, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2023) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 150506 (Jan.
12, 2024).
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to demonstrate an ongoing violation under the Ex parte Young standard. Plaintiffs’
request for injunctive or declaratory relief also will be dismissed.
III. The majority of Plaintiffs’ claims arising under federal law—Counts I,
II (Wrongful Detention), V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX—are prescribed.
Sections I, II, and III supra detail the bases for the dismissal of claims against State
Defendants—namely, the lack of factual allegations to support a claim, state sovereign
immunity, and impermissible group pleading. Those reasons are sufficient in themselves.
Nonetheless, an additional standalone barrier exists as to Plaintiffs’ claims: prescription.
The majority of Plaintiffs’ claims under both federal and state law are prescribed. This
section discusses claims under federal law that are prescribed: Counts I, II (Wrongful
Detention)101, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. The following section V, infra, discusses claims
under Louisiana law that are prescribed: Counts XII, XIII, XV, XVI, and XVII.
A. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and
Malicious Detention Claims under Counts I and II are
prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.102 Prior to July 1, 2024, delictual actions
in Louisiana were “subject to a liberative prescription of one year.”103 Liberative
prescription for actions prior to July 1, 2024 “commence[d] to run from the day that
injury or damage is sustained.”104 “Jurisprudence has interpreted this rule to mean that
prescription commences on the date the injured party discovers or should have
101 The malicious prosecution component of Count II, unlike the wrongful detention component, has not
prescribed. Nonetheless, the malicious prosecution component suffers from the same defects outlined in
Sections I-III supra.
102 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
103 LA. CIV. CODE ART. 3492 (Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024).
104 Id.
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discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based.”105 For false arrest and false
imprisonment claims, prescription commences on the date of arrest (and not from the
date of release).106 In this case, Plaintiff’s alleged arrest date was on January 6, 2015.107
Accordingly, Count I alleging false arrest and false arrest is prescribed. Similarly, the
Count II claim alleging false detention108 also is prescribed.
B. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Selective Prosecution Claim under
Count V is prescribed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that selective
prosecution claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are analogous to abuse of process claims and
that prescription commences on the date of arrest.109 Given that Louisiana prescription
rules for delictual actions imposed a one-year liberative prescription period, the selective
prosecution claim prescribed one year after January 6, 2015. Given that this suit was filed
on October 20, 2025,110 over ten years later, Plaintiffs’ selective prosecution claim under
Count V is prescribed.
C. Plaintiffs’ 42. U.S.C. § 1983 familial integrity claim under Count
VI is prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.111 The Louisiana Supreme Court has
declared that a cause of action for loss of consortium (the Louisiana state law equivalent
of a familial integrity claim), does not accrue “until the party suffers the actual loss of
105 Dowd v. Helena Emergency Physicians, PLLC, 2023-00132 p.1 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So. 3d 969, 970-71.
106 Eaglin v. Eunice Police Dep’t, 17-1875, p. 8 (La. 6/27/18); 319 So. 3d 225, 230.
107 R. Doc. 60 at ¶110.
108 Lieutenant Arcana does not argue that the part of Count II alleging malicious prosecution has prescribed.
R. Doc. 88 at p.2.
109 Aly v. City of Lake Jackson, 453 F. App’x 538, 540 (5th Cir. 2011).
110 See R. Doc. 87 at p.11.
111 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
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consortium, which has been held to occur at the time an injured party’s condition
deteriorates to such an extent that his family is actually deprived of his consortium.”112
Plaintiff’s state custody ended in 2018,113 and thus prescription accrued one year later in
2019.114 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ familial integrity claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
prescribed.
D. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for race discrimination under
Count VII is prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.115 Prior to July 1, 2024, delictual actions
in Louisiana were “subject to a liberative prescription of one year.”116 A § 1981 claim
accrues “when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act
has occurred.”117 In this case, Plaintiff Mr. Lightfoot filed a complaint with the Louisiana
State Police around December 2018 regarding Lieutenant Arcana’s conduct in Lightfoot’s
case file.118 Accordingly, prescription accrued one year later in or around December 2019.
Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for race discrimination under Count VII is prescribed.
E. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 claims for Civil Rights
Conspiracy and Neglect to Prevent Civil Rights Conspiracy under
Counts VIII and IX are prescribed.
For 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims, federal courts in Louisiana apply the relevant
Louisiana prescription rules for delictual actions.119 For 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claims, Section
112 Landry v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 03-0719, p. 4 (La. 12/3/03); 864 So. 2d 117, 122 (collecting cases).
113 R. Doc. 17-4 at p. 6.
114 LA. CIV. CODE ART. 3492 (Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024).
115 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
116 LA. CIV. CODE ART. 3492 (Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024).
117 McWilliams v. Escambia Cty. Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
118 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 147.
119 See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 515 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (E.D. La. 2007) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 265 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir. 2008).
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1986 specifically states that actions brought under that provision must be commenced
within one year of when the cause of action has accrued.120 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a cause of action for a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 civil
conspiracy claim accrues as soon as the plaintiff knows or should have known of the overt
acts involved in the alleged conspiracy.121 Again, Mr. Lightfoot filed a complaint with the
Louisiana State Police around December 2018 regarding Lieutenant Arcana’s conduct in
Lightfoot’s case file.122 Accordingly, prescription accrued one year later in or around
December 2019. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim for race discrimination under Count
VII is prescribed. Likewise, Section 1986 provides for liability against third parties based
on their knowledge of Section 1985 violations. Plaintiffs knew or should have known of
the alleged section 1986 violation around the same time they knew or should have known
of the section 1985 violation. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim also is prescribed.
IV. The majority of Plaintiffs’ Louisiana tort claims—Counts XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, XVI, and XVII are prescribed.
Prior to July 1, 2024, delictual actions in Louisiana were “subject to a liberative
prescription of one year.”123 Liberative prescription for actions prior to July 1, 2024
“commence[d] to run from the day that injury or damage is sustained.”124 “Jurisprudence
has interpreted this rule to mean that prescription commences on the date the injured
party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is
based.”125 The causes of action for the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ Louisiana tort claims126
120 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (“But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not
commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”).
121 Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987).
122 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 147.
123 LA. CIV. CODE ART. 3492 (Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024).
124 Id.
125 Dowd v. Helena Emergency Physicians, PLLC, 2023-00132 p.1 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So. 3d 969, 970-71.
126 The exception is Count XI “Louisiana Malicious Prosecution.” R. Doc. 60 at pp. 45-46.
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accrued well before filing of the lawsuit in October 2025, and were prescribed long ago.
A. Louisiana case law establishes that Plaintiffs’ abuse of process
claim is prescribed.
Counts XII and XVII, both of which are based on the Louisiana tort of abuse of
process, name specifically only “private attorney” and “insurance” defendants,” (and not
“State Defendants”).127 Count XII also is brought against “other Defendants who misused
civil or criminal process for ulterior purposes,” but this allegation is not sufficient to give
State Defendants notice of their alleged wrongdoings.128 Nonetheless, to the extent
Plaintiffs attempt to assert these abuse of process claims against State Defendants, these
claims also are prescribed.
Louisiana recognizes abuse of process claims under La. Civ. Code art. 2315.129 To
state an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of an ulterior
purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
prosecution of the proceeding.”130 Abuse of process is a tort claim that, at the time the
incidents alleged herein occurred, was governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which provided a
prescriptive period of one year from the date of injury or damage.131 The Court must
determine whether the prescriptive period for this claim begins to run from the date a
127 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 291 and 324.
128 As explained in Section III, supra.
129 Waguespack, Seago & Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 1999-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So. 2d
287, 290.
130 Id. (citing Succession of Cutrer v. Curtis, 341 So.2d 1209, 1213-14 (La. App. 1 Cir.1976)).
131 Morice v. Yorkshire Ct. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 23-118, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/23), 377 So.3d 848, 853
(stating that “claims for abuse of process raise delictual claims that are subject to a prescriptive period of
one year.”); Louisiana law regarding prescription was amended effective July 1, 2024 to extend the one-
year prescriptive period to a two-year prescriptive period for delictual actions. See La. C.C. art. 3493.1.
However, these changes apply prospectively only to delictual action arising after July 1, 2024. See 2024 La.
Acts, No. 423, §§ 1 and 2 (providing that the extended period “shall be given prospective application only
and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective date of this Act” and that “[t]his Act shall
become effective on July 1, 2024”).
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defendant allegedly used the improper legal process or from the date the resulting
criminal proceeding was dismissed.
In Rieth v. Munguia, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit analyzed
whether an abuse of process claim was prescribed.132 In that case, the defendant filed a
reconventional demand alleging the plaintiff committed abuse of process by filing the
state court petition relating to a property dispute between the parties.133 The court found
the abuse of process claim was prescribed because the defendant filed the reconventional
demand making the abuse of process claim more than a year after the plaintiff filed the
state court petition that allegedly constituted abuse of process.134 Importantly, the
Louisiana appellate court held “the continuing tort doctrine does not apply to extend the
prescriptive date . . .” and that “[t]he act of filing the petition by [plaintiff] was a singular
act; any damages that occurred may have been continuing, but the allegedly tortious act
occurred when the petition was filed.”135 Similarly, in No Drama, LLC v. Caluda, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit found the prescriptive period for an abuse
of process claim began to run on the date the defendant filed the petition the plaintiff
alleged constituted abuse of process.136 The court held that “[a]lthough plaintiff alleges to
have continuously sustained damages to its reputation and its finances until the dismissal
of the underlying suit, the operating cause, the filing of the lawsuit, is not a continuous
tort.”137 The prescriptive period for an abuse of process claim does not begin at a later date
even when the plaintiff alleges he has continuously sustained damage.138 Moreover, the
132 Rieth v. Munguia, 23-0547, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/24), 391 So. 3d 39, 43-47.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 48.
135 Id.
136 177 So.3d 747, 752, (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/14/15).
137 Id.
138 Id.
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prescriptive period does not begin to run at later date just because the plaintiff allegedly
suffered damages from the abuse of process after the abuse of process occurred.139
The prescriptive period for Plaintiffs’ abuse of process claims against the State
Defendants began when the allegedly “willful act[s] in the use of the process not proper
in the regular prosecution of the proceeding” occurred.140 The State Defendants argue that
all of their acts alleged to constitute abuse of process occurred more than one year prior
to Plaintiffs filing this action in state court on October 20, 2025.141 The State Defendants
argue the last process involving the State Defendants was the 2022 hearing in which
Lieutenant Arcana allegedly testified before a grand jury.142 The State Defendants further
argue that Plaintiffs made no argument in reply to the State Defendants’ argument that
Counts XII and XVII should be dismissed as prescribed.143
It is clear that all of the alleged acts of abuse of process by the State Defendants
occurred well over a year prior to Plaintiffs filing the present action. Plaintiffs allege: on
January 23, 2015, “private attorney Defendants” obtained a civil judgment against Mr.
Lightfoot in the underling civil litigation;144 and on August 22, 2016 “attorney and
insurance Defendants recorded or caused to be recorded” the judgment in the underlying
civil litigation as a judicial mortgage against Lightfoot’s homestead.145 Mr. Lightfoot’s
criminal prosecution was allegedly initiated by NOPD Detective Frank Denton and LSP
Lieutenant Alan Arcana.146 Even if the Court found that the initiation of Mr. Lightfoot’s
139 Id.
140 See Waguespack, Seago & Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 1999-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So.
2d 287, 290.
141 R. Docs. 82-1 at pp. 10-11.
142 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 121.
143 R. Doc. 88 at p.2.
144 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 124.
145 Id. at ¶ 126.
146 Id. at ¶¶ 101, 116.
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criminal prosecution constituted abuse of process on the part of State Defendants, Mr.
Lightfoot was arrested in 2015, over a decade before the present action was filed. Mr.
Lightfoot’s state custody terminated in 2018,147 and the last time any State Defendant
testified regarding Mr. Lightfoot’s arrest and/or custody was the 2022 grand jury
testimony by Lieutenant Arcana.148 These events are situated well over a year before the
2025 filing of the lawsuit.
B. All remaining Louisiana tort law claims are prescribed under the
1-year liberative prescription rule.
Count XIII Louisiana Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation, Count XIV Louisiana
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Count XV Louisiana Loss of Consortium,
Service, and Society, and Count XVI Louisiana Negligence/Gross Fault/Civil Fault also
are prescribed. These Louisiana tort claims, at the time the incidents alleged herein
occurred, were governed by La. C.C. art. 3492, which provided a prescriptive period of
one year from the date of injury or damage. While these counts suffer from the fatal group
pleading and conclusory defects outlined in Section III supra, and as such it is difficult
for the Court to determine with certainty the last alleged wrongdoing on behalf of the
State Defendants, the last plausible date appears to be in 2022, the date of Lieutenant
Arcana’s grand jury testimony. Accordingly, these Louisiana torts claims are prescribed.
V. Plaintiffs’ group pleadings fail to state a claim against Lieutenant
Arcana in his individual capacity in Counts III and XI.
The remaining claims against Lieutenant Arcana are Count III for fabrication of
evidence and judicial deception under 42 USC 1983 and Count XI for malicious
prosecution under Louisiana law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short
147 R. Doc. 17-4 at p. 6.
148 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 121.
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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Based on
this Rule, courts have held that the Federal Rules entitle “each defendant . . . to know what
he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful.”149 Mere “conclusory allegations against
[d]efendants as a group” that “fail[ ] to allege the personal involvement of any defendant”
are insufficient to put Defendants on notice of their alleged wrongdoing.150 A plaintiff
must allege facts that “establish each individual [d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct
alleged.”151 When a number of defendants are named in a complaint, a plaintiff cannot
refer to all defendants “who occupied different positions and presumably had distinct
roles in the alleged misconduct” without specifying “which defendants engaged in what
wrongful conduct.”152 “While referring to a collective group of defendants is not a fatal
pleading deficiency, “[e]ach defendant is [still] entitled to know what he or she did that is
asserted to be wrongful.”153 The critical inquiry is whether the complaint, with its group
allegations, provides each defendant with adequate notice of the plaintiff’s claims and the
grounds upon which the claim rests.154 The Court must disregard “bare assertions of
collective responsibility, unsupported by concrete factual allegations.”155
A complaint that contains “impermissibly vague group pleading” will be
dismissed.156 For example, in Cain v. City of New Orleans, the plaintiffs brought 42 U.S.C.
149 Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
150 Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims without prejudice for failure to provide each defendant with notice of its alleged participation in the
racketeering enterprise).
151 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (finding that a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution);
Aruanno v. Main, 467 F. App'x 134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2012) (dismissal of § 1983 action was appropriate where
Defendants were collectively sued as “[government] personnel” and failed to allege the personal
involvement of the individual Defendants).
152 Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).
153 Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 F. App'x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021).
154 Valadez v. City of San Antonio, No. SA21CV0002JKPRBF, 2022 WL 1608016, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 20,
2022).
155 Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
156 Falat, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3.
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§ 1983 claims against the City of New Orleans, the Sheriff, and various court officials for
their involvement in the plaintiffs’ allegedly unconstitutional criminal prosecution.157 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs directed their allegations towards “‘defendants’ as a group”
and failed to identify specific acts of misconduct by specific defendants.158 This district
court found such allegations insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief because the
allegations “largely prevent[ed] the Court from discerning which defendants [were]
allegedly responsible for which allegedly unlawful actions.”159 Accordingly, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that “lump[ed] all defendants together and assert[ed]
identical allegations as to each, without distinction.”160
Lieutenant Arcana argues in part that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against him and his fellow “Law-Enforcement
Defendants.”161 Lieutenant Arcana argues that “the large number of defendants and the
lack of interrelatedness between the multiple defendants” in the “Law-Enforcement” and
“Supervisory” categories is an example of “impermissibly vague group pleading.”162
Plaintiffs respond that, based on the allegations in their complaint, Lieutenant Arcana is
aware of the conduct for which Plaintiffs seek redress.163
First, Plaintiffs’ Count III is asserted against certain named defendants, including
Lieutenant Arcana and against “any prosecutorial Defendant whose non-immune
investigation or evidence-management conduct involved fabrication or continued use of
157 2016 WL 2849478, at *3.
158 Id. at *5.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 R. Doc. 82 at p.15-16.
162 Id.
163 R. Doc. 87 at p.24.
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fabricated evidence.”164 All of the allegations in Count III are made against “Defendants”
as a group and fail to allege the personal involvement of any defendant. Count XI for
malicious prosecution under Louisiana law is brought against “Defendants whose
conduct legally caused the commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings
against him without probable cause and with malice.165 The allegations in Count XI are
brought against “Defendants” as a group and fail to allege the personal involvement of
any defendant. Bringing a cause of action against defendants as a group is not sufficient
to allege the personal involvement of any defendant and does not put any defendant on
notice of alleged wrongdoing. No defendant could receive adequate notice of a claim and
the grounds upon which the claim rests based on this type of pleading. Apparently, the
Plaintiffs would put the burden on the Defendants to determine which counts are asserted
against each of them rather than giving each defendant notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which each claim rests. This unprecedented manner of pleading,
never before seen by this Court, is vague and impermissible group pleading on steroids.
Based on these allegations, neither the Court nor Lieutenant Arcana can discern what
unlawful actions were committed by Lieutenant Arcana or on what grounds the claims
rest. Such vague, collective allegations do not state plausible claims for relief.166 “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’”167 Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
164 R. Doc. 60 at ¶ 227.
165 Id. at ¶ 283.
166 See Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-4479, 2016 WL 2849478, at *5 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
167 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
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action, supported by mere conclusory statements”168 or “naked assertion[s]”169 devoid of
“further factual enhancement”170 are not sufficient. The complaint must provide the
defendants with “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”171 Plaintiffs allegations do not allow Lieutenant Arcana or the Court to discern what
wrongful conduct Plaintiffs allege the Lieutenant Arcana committed.
Finally, in a return to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, Plaintiffs have failed to allege
facts that support the elements of their many causes of action. The Fifth Circuit instructs
that a plaintiff “must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order
to make out a valid claim.”172 Plaintiffs argue that they did include allegations in the
complaint173 against Lieutenant Arcana related to Arcana’s alleged role in preparing or
maintaining the Louisiana State Police investigative report.174 To plausibly state a claim
against Lieutenant Arcana, Plaintiffs’ complaint would have to include factual allegations
supporting the elements of each cause of action and show how they are entitled to relief.175
A complaint does not suffice if it “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’”176 Plaintiffs’ barebones allegations fail to establish or even plead facts to
support, the elements of any of Plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action. For this reason, as
well, Plaintiffs’ factual allegations against Lieutenant fail to state a valid claim for relief.
168 Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
169 Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
170 Id.
171 Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Mississippi, Puerto Rico Tchrs. Ret. Sys. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 320
(5th Cir. 2014).
172 City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010).
173 R. Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 61-70, 112-136,, 201-203.
174 R. Doc. 87 at p. 24.
175 City of Clinton, Ark., 632 F.3d at 152.
176 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
(2007)).
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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Lieutenant Arcana in
Counts III and XI.
VI. Plaintiffs have been given multiple opportunities to amend their
complaint and will not be given another.
Plaintiffs ask the Court for leave to amend their complaint “should the Court
determine that any individual claim would benefit from additional factual specificity.”177
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely granted
when justice so requires.” A “court must have a ‘substantial reason’ to deny a request for
leave to amend” and “may consider factors such as whether there has been ‘undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment.’”178 “The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a
motion to amend.”179
The Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs already have filed four
complaints—three petitions in state court and one amended complaint in this action after
they retained counsel.180 Plaintiffs have had ample opportunities to state plausible claims
for relief against the State Defendants. The Court finds the fact that the Plaintiffs have
been given numerous opportunities to amend is a substantial reason to justify a refusal to
allow the Plaintiffs another opportunity. The Court is not obligated to provide Plaintiffs
with unlimited opportunities to try to state a claim against the State Defendants.
177 R. Doc. 87 at p. 36.
178 Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 566 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Jacobsen v.
Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1998)).
179 Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones
v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)).
180 Plaintiffs even had the benefit of a review of their proposed amended complaint (R. Doc. 52-1) by the
Court. The Court advised Plaintiffs that the proposed amended complaint failed to address the arguments
raised in the defendants’ motions to dismiss and that it should be revised before filing. R. Doc. 53.
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Based on Plaintiffs’ “repeated failure[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed,”181 the Court finds further amendment is not warranted. Moreover,
Plaintiffs cannot remedy the fact that the vast majority of their claims have prescribed.182
As a result, the Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint and will
decide these motions based on the current pleadings.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by the State Defendants is
GRANTED with respect to Colonel Hodges.183 All claims asserted against Colonel
Hodges in his official and individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by the State
Defendants is GRANTED with respect to Lieutenant Arcana. All claims asserted against
Lieutenant Arcana in his official and individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by the State
Defendants is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive or declaratory
relief. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive or declaratory relief is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of October, 2026.
________ ______ _____________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
181 Herrmann Holdings Ltd., 302 F.3d at 566.
182 See Section IV and V supra.
183 R. Doc. 84.
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