Blank v. Vannoy, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANIEL JOSEPH BLANK
VERSUS
DARREL VANNOY
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 16-00366-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER
This is a death penalty case. Before the Court is the State’s Motion for
Expedited Reconsideration of the Court’s October 22, 2025 Order. (Doc. 162).
Petitioner opposes the Motion. (Doc. 163). For the following reasons, the State’s
Motion (Doc. 162) is DENIED.
The Order at issue—the Court’s October 22, 2025 Order (“October 22, 2025
Order,” Doc. 161)—accomplished the following: (1) set a hearing; and (2) required
Counsel for the Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) to be present at the hearing.
(Doc. 161). Now, after a lengthy pattern of ignoring the Court’s Orders, the State
threatens 	that 	if 	this 	Court 	does 	not 	vacate 	its 	October 22, 2025 	Order 	by
October 31, 2025, then Respondent, and potentially LSP, “will be forced to seek
mandamus relief from the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Fifth Circuit.”
(Doc. 162 at 1 (emphasis added)). Because the Court plainly has the authority to set
a hearing and require attorneys to appear before it, the State’s Motion is wholly
without merit.
The procedural history of this case provides critical context for Respondent’s
2025 request for reconsideration.
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A. Petitioner’s Unopposed 2019 Discovery Motions and Court
Order Granting Same.
Approximately six years ago, on October 7, 2019, Petitioner filed three
discovery motions (the “2019 Discovery Motions”). The Court previously described the
2019 Discovery Motions as follows:
The first, titled Motion To Conduct Habeas Rule 6 Discovery (Doc. 27,
the “DNA Data Motion”), seeks an order directing the FBI to produce
the “DNA profiles and raw data” generated from the bat used to murder
Mr. Rossi, the fingernail scrapings collected from Mr. Arcuri, and the
cigarette 	butts 	collected 	from 	the 	Millet 	crime 	scene.
(See Doc. 27-2 at 1).
The second, titled Motion For The Transfer Of Evidence To Defense
Expert Bode Technology (Doc. 28, the “Physical Evidence Motion”),
seeks an order directing the State to produce the actual (physical) Rossi
murder weapon, Arcuri fingernails, and Millet cigarette butts, for DNA
testing and analysis by Petitioner’s DNA expert, Bode Technology. (See
Doc. 28-3).
The third, titled Motion To Transfer Respondent opposed only one of the
three Motions, and that opposition Fingerprint Evidence For Defense
Expert Evaluation (Doc. 29, the “Fingerprint Motion”), seeks an order
directing the State to produce a subset of the fingerprint evidence
collected from each of the various crime scenes for examination and
analysis by Petitioner’s fingerprint expert, Max L. Jarrell. (Doc. 29-3).
(Doc. 101 at 5–6).
As the Court has previously emphasized: “The State offered no opposition
whatsoever to the Physical Evidence Motion or the Fingerprint Motion[,] and “[t]he
State filed an untimely and perfunctory (two-page) opposition to the DNA Data
Motion. (Doc. 43).” (Doc. 101 at 5–6 (emphasis added)).
Although 	Respondent 	failed 	to 	oppose 	the 	2019 	Discovery 	Motions, 	the
Magistrate Judge denied Petitioner’s request for discovery. (Doc. 79). Petitioner
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timely moved the 	Court 	to 	review 	the Magistrate Judge’s 	Order denying 	the
requested discovery. (Doc. 82). Respondent again failed to oppose Petitioner’s
Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order.
On September 13, 2021, after full consideration of the arguments, the Court
granted Petitioner’s Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order. (Doc. 101). The
Court also granted Petitioner’s 2019 Discovery Motions and ordered the State to
produce and transfer certain items on or before September 27, 2021. (Id. at 16–20).
The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.
B. Petitioner’s Unopposed September 16, 2021 Motion to Amend
Discovery Order and Court Order Granting Same.
On 	September 	16, 	2021, 	Petitioner 	moved 	to 	amend 	the 	Court’s
September 13, 2021 Order, asking the Court to order the transfer of the evidence at
issue to a different expert because Petitioner’s expert had passed away. (Doc. 103).
Respondent did not oppose Petitioner’s Motion. Also on September 16, 2021, the
Court granted Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Discovery Order. (Doc. 104). In doing so,
the Court provided the State until September 30, 2021, to produce and transfer the
evidence at issue. (Id.).
The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.
C. Respondent’s Notices of Compliance with the Court’s Order
Granting 2019 Discovery Motions.
On September 27, and 30, 2021, Respondent filed two Notices of Compliance,
stating that each entity in possession of the evidence at issue complied with the
Court’s Order by producing and transferring the evidence at issue as the Court
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ordered. (Doc. 105; Doc. 106). As exhibits to the Notices of Compliance, Respondent
attached September 17, 2021 letters from Louisiana Assistant District Attorney
Donald D. Candell to the following entities: (1) LSP Crime Lab; (2) Ascension Parish
Clerk of Court; (3) St. John the Baptist Sheriff’s Office; (4) Ascension Parish Sheriff’s
Office; and (5) Gonzales Police Department. (Doc. 105 at 3–5; Doc. 106 at 3–6). The
September 17, 2021 letters are written on letterhead for the State of Louisiana,
District Attorney’s Office for the 23rd Judicial District of Louisiana. (Id.).
Critical here, the letters direct each entity, including LSP Crime Lab, as
follows: “[P]lease be advised that pursuant to Order of Judge Brian A. Jackson,
US District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, you are tasked with the submission
of any and all items [described in] the attached ruling and order.” (Id. (emphasis
added)). The letters then provide instructions on where each entity must direct the
evidence at issue. (Id.). Finally, the letters provide: “Upon submission by you of the
evidence required, please notify this office immediately so that we may inform the
court of the State’s compliance with the Court’s order.” (Id. (emphasis added)).
To be clear, the letter to the LSP Crime Lab provided:
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(Doc. 106 at 6).
Respondent also attached e-mails, letters, and FedEx receipts from each
respective agency as additional exhibits to the Notices of Compliance, which confirm
that the agencies either shipped the evidence at issue to the proper party pursuant
to the Court’s Order, or conducted a search of their files and determined that the
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evidence at issue had already been returned to another agency, such that that agency
no longer had access to the evidence. (Doc. 105 at 6–12; Doc. 106 at 7–13).
D. Petitioner’s Unopposed September 7, 2022 Motion to Amend
Discovery Order and Court Order Granting Same.
On September 7, 2022, Petitioner moved the Court to order that a qualified
LSP Crime Lab technician must perform searches of 29 relevant prints identified by
Petitioner’s Counsel in the manual Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (“IAFIS”) in the presence of Petitioner’s expert witness. (Doc. 120 at 3).
Petitioner’s Motion indicated that since his expert received the evidence at
issue, Petitioner’s expert microscopically evaluated dozens of fingerprints to identify
which were of sufficient quality for entry into IAFIS. (Id. at 2). Petitioner’s expert
determined that 29 fingerprints and/or palmprints, less than 10% of the total prints
collected from crime scenes in this case, were sufficient for comparison to prints in
the IAFIS system. (Id.). Petitioner represented:
“[The 	LSP 	Crime 	Lab] 	previously 	compared 	the 	29 	prints 	to
[Petitioner’s] prints and determined that he was excluded as the
contributor of the prints.”
(Id. 	(emphasis 	added)). 	Petitioner’s 	expert 	thus 	sought 	to 	determine 	whose
fingerprints were left at the crime scenes. (Id.).
LSP indicated that Petitioner’s expert could not access IAFIS because she was
not a member of law enforcement. (Id.). LSP Crime Lab further indicated that the
dissemination of information obtained from IAFIS/Next Generation Identification
(“NGI”) is limited to agencies “where such disclosures may promote, assist, or
otherwise 	serve 	law 	enforcement” 	interests. 	(Id.). 	Based 	on 	these 	roadblocks,
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Petitioner asked the Court to order a qualified LSP Crime Lab technician to conduct
the search instead of Petitioner’s expert. (Id. at 3).
The State failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion. (Doc. 120).
On November 30, 2022, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motion and
ordered that a qualified LSP Crime Lab technician, in the presence of Petitioner’s
expert, shall perform the manual IAFIS/NGI searches of 29 relevant fingerprints
and/or palmprints identified by Counsel for Petitioner as described in Petitioner’s
Motion. (Doc. 121).
The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.
E. Petitioner’s Unopposed March 20, 2023 Motion to Compel and
Court Order Granting Same.
Four months later, on March 20, 2023, Petitioner moved the Court to compel
the State to comply with the Court’s November 30, 2022 Order requiring LSP Crime
Lab to perform the manual IAFIS/NGI searches of 29 relevant fingerprints and
palmprints Petitioner’s Counsel identified. (Doc. 122). Apparently, LSP refused to
comply with the Court’s November 30, 2022 Order unless Petitioner released LSP
Crime Lab from any liability should a search of IAFIS reveal the source of the prints.
(Id. at 1). Petitioner signed such a waiver on his own volition, although it was not
required by the Court’s Order. (Doc. 123-1).
The State, yet again, failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion to Compel.
On December 13, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion to Compel,
emphasizing: 	“Incredibly, 	despite 	having 	refused 	to 	submit 	to 	the 	Court’s
November 30 Order, the State offers no response to Petitioner’s motion to compel, or
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his ‘Statement Of Waiver Of Liability.’” (Doc. 125 at 2). The Court stated: “Absent
any response or objection, it is incomprehensible that the State would flout this
Court’s November 30 Order requiring IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially
exculpatory prints in the presence of [Petitioner’s expert.]” (Id. (emphasis added)).
Thus, the Court again ordered the State to comply with its November 30, 2022
Order, without additional preconditions to compliance, by December 23, 2023.
(Id. at 3). The Court further ordered that “upon satisfactory completion of the
required the IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory prints, the State
shall immediately file written notice of the same.” (Id.). The Court emphatically
ordered that “[t]he terms of this Order and all Orders of this Court will be
enforced through civil contempt proceedings, as necessary.” (Id.).
The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.
F. The Court’s August 23, 2024 Order Addressing the State’s
Noncompliance with Court Order.
On August 23, 2024, the Court ordered a status conference to discuss the status
of the State’s compliance with its November 30, 2022 and December 13, 2023 Orders.
(Doc. 126). The Court emphasized: “On December 13, 2023, [] [t]he Court ordered []
that the State ‘immediately file written notice’ of the satisfactory completion of the
required IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory prints, and ordered
that such searches were to be completed” by December 23, 2023. (Id.). The Court
further noted: “To date, [as of August 23, 2024,] no written notice has been filed.”
(Id.). Thus, the Court set a status conference to ascertain the status of discovery.
Following the status conference, the Court ordered Petitioner to provide
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results of the fingerprint cross-comparisons to Respondent and ordered the parties to
submit a proposed scheduling order. (Doc. 128).
G. Petitioner’s 	November 	13, 	2024 	Unopposed 	Motions 	to
Compel and Court Orders Granting Same.
On November 13, 2024, Petitioner filed two Motions to Compel. (Doc. 137;
Doc. 138). One Motion to Compel asked the Court to order LSP Crime Lab to perform
a DNA database search of the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), including the
National DNA Indexing System (“NDIS”), State DNA Indexing System (“SDIS”), and
any local indexing system, to compare the two partial DNA profiles obtained by the
FBI from the cigarette butts collected at the Millet crime scene against the DNA
profiles contained in those databases. (Doc. 137 at 1).
The State failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion to Compel.
Petitioner’s second Motion to Compel asked the Court to order the State to
transfer the original DNA samples taken by crime scene investigators from the Rossi
murder weapon and stored in vials at the Ascension Parish Sheriff’s Office to the
Serological Research Institute (“SERI”) for testing. (Doc. 138). Petitioner argued that
SERI is an accredited DNA lab capable of testing the DNA samples with the most
advanced technology. (Id.). Petitioner further asserted that SERI had a current
agreement with a law enforcement agency to conduct CODIS searches to compare the
DNA profiles at issue. (Id. at 2).
The State, again, failed to oppose Petitioner’s Motion.
The Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed Motions to Compel, and ordered
the following:
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[O]n or before July 7, 2025, the State shall cause the transfer from the
Ascension Parish Sheriff’s Office to the Serological Research Institute
(SERI) the sealed evidence bag containing, inter alia, (1) Victor Rossi’s
known sample, marked as K1 (or any variation reflecting concentration
or dilution, including “K1 1:10,” “K-1 1:100”); (2) the sample from the
baseball bat, marked as Q5 (including Q5 1:10 and Q5 1:100); and
(3) any negative or control samples.
(Doc. 141 at 1). The Court also ordered:
[T]he Louisiana State Police (LSP) Crime Laboratory shall perform a
DNA database search (i.e., a full search, a keyboard search, and/or an
emergency upload and request search) of the Combined DNA Index
System 	(“CODIS”), 	including 	the 	National 	DNA 	Indexing 	System
(“NDIS”), State DNA Indexing System (“SDIS”), and any local indexing
system, to compare the two partial DNA profiles (one male, one female)
obtained by the FBI from the cigarette butts collected at the Millet crime
scene against DNA profiles contained in those databases[.]
(Doc. 142). The Court further ordered that:
[S]hould the LSP receive any “candidate matches,” “partial matches,” or
“hits” 	from 	CODIS/NDIS/SDIS, 	it 	shall 	promptly 	carry 	out 	its
confirmation 	procedures, 	as 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	NDIS 	Guidelines, 	to
determine whether there is a “confirmed match” and release this
information to the parties.
(Id.).
The State did not move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order.
H. Respondent’s July 2, 2025 Motion to “Clarify” and Court’s
Order Denying Same.
At 6:30 P.M. on July 2, 2025, one business day before the Court’s July 7, 2025
deadline to transfer certain evidence and conduct certain searches, and after the
expiration of the time window in which the State could have moved the Court to
reconsider its June 4, 2025 Orders, Respondent moved to “clarify” the Court’s
June 4, 2025 Orders. (Doc. 146). The Court denied Respondent’s Motion, finding it
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both procedurally improper and wholly without merit. (Doc. 147). The Court again
emphasized:
The Court notes this is part of a pattern of delay by the State, and the
LSP in particular, having already been threatened with sanctions by the
Court in connection with its delays related to the same evidence.
(Doc. 125). The Court considers this baseless Motion—filed just before
the expiration of the July 7th discovery-related deadline and just before
the July 4th Holiday—as yet another attempt at delaying execution of
the 	Court’s 	discovery 	Orders. 	This 	type 	of 	gamesmanship 	is
unacceptable, especially given the nature of these proceedings and what
is at stake for Blank. Counsel for Vannoy and the State are advised that
these delay tactics will not be tolerated going forward and that sanctions
will be considered should a pattern of contumacious conduct ensue.
(Id. at 4 n.1).
I. 	Court’s September 25, 2025 Order Requiring Joint Status
Report.
On September 25, 2025, after hearing nothing further from Respondent, and
with no similar Notice of Compliance filed into the record, the Court ordered the
parties to file a Joint Status Report within 14 days of the issuance of the Order. The
Court emphasized that by September 25, 2025, which was 113 days after the Court’s
June 4, 2025 Order, and 80 days after the Court-ordered July 7, 2025 deadline,
“[f]orensic testing and database searches should be well underway, if not complete.”
(Doc. 157). Thus, the Court ordered that the Joint Status Report detail the following:
• 	The 	joint 	Status 	Report 	should 	provide 	detailed 	information
updating the Court on the status and any results of the “forensic
testing or analysis as granted by the Court” in its two discovery
Orders (Docs. 141, 142) issued on June 4, 2025. (Doc. 143 at 1).
• 	If Petitioner’s “forensic testing or analysis” has been completed
(Doc. 143 at 1), the parties should indicate, for all tested evidence,
both the results of testing and the date of completion.
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• 	If the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory’s DNA database
searches have been completed (Doc. 142), the parties should indicate
both the results and date the parties were informed of those results.
• 	If the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory has not completed its
DNA 	database 	searches 	(Doc. 	142), 	Respondent 	will 	provide 	a
detailed update from the LSP on the status of those searches and an
anticipated date of completion.
• 	Respondent should also explain whether he has begun (or intends to
begin) any forensic testing of his own (Doc. 143 at 1) and provide the
Court with an anticipated timeframe in which to complete that
testing.
(Doc. 157).
J. Parties’ October 8, 2025 Joint Status Report.
In the parties’ Joint Status Report, Respondent, incredibly, indicated that it
had 	“no 	update” 	regarding 	the 	Court-Ordered 	discovery 	because 	Respondent
“assumed” 	that 	Petitioner’s 	Counsel 	would 	coordinate 	testing 	with 	LSP.
(Doc. 159 at 5). Respondent further represented that it was only the Court’s Order
“directing 	the 	parties 	to 	provide 	a 	status 	[that] 	brought 	this 	glaring
miscommunication to the forefront.” (Id.).
After reviewing the parties’ Joint Status Report, the Court determined that a
hearing was appropriate. Thus, the Court issued its October 22, 2025 Order setting
a hearing, requiring LSP’s Counsel to be present at the hearing, requiring the State
to serve LSP’s Counsel and the LSP Crime Lab Director with the Court’s Order, and
requiring the State to file notice of same to avoid any “further assumptions as to who
is responsible for informing the LSP and its counsel, Faye Morrison, of this Order.”
(Doc. 161).
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Now, Respondent appears to threaten the Court, arguing that if the Court does
not vacate its October 22, 2025 Order by October 31, 2025, then Respondent will be
“forced” to seek a writ of mandamus before the Fifth Circuit. (Doc. 162).
Respondent strays into a procedural no-man’s land—the same Respondent who
failed to oppose Petitioner’s seven discovery motions over a five-year period. (Doc. 27
(dated October 7, 2019); Doc. 28; Doc. 29; Doc. 103; Doc. 120; Doc. 122; Doc. 137;
Doc. 138 (dated November 13, 2024)). In fact, the one time Respondent did respond
to a discovery Motion, his Opposition was untimely and perfunctory (two pages).
(Doc. 43).
The Court has issued eight Orders granting Petitioner’s unopposed discovery
motions and governing the scope of discovery over four years. (Doc. 101 (dated
September 13, 2021); Doc. 104; Doc. 121; Doc. 125; Doc. 126; Doc. 128; Doc. 141;
Doc. 142 (dated June 4, 2025)). Respondent failed to timely move to reconsider any of
the Court’s eight discovery Orders. Without a proper procedural avenue before him,
Respondent filed an untimely Motion to “Clarify,” which the Court flatly rejected.
(Doc. 146; Doc. 147).
Now, Respondent threatens to seek a writ of mandamus to the Fifth Circuit,
asking the Circuit to overturn the Court’s October 22, 2025 Order, which merely sets
a hearing. (Doc. 161; Doc. 162). The October 22, 2025 Order does not order additional
discovery. (Doc. 161). The October 22, 2025 Order does not require the State to do
anything other than appear at a hearing, serve the Court’s Order on LSP, and file
notice of service into the record. (Id.). The State’s delay tactics are nothing short of
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astounding, and a direct repudiation of a Federal Court Order, particularly when the
Court has already emphasized:
• 	“The terms of this Order and all Orders of this Court will be
enforced through civil contempt proceedings, as necessary.”
(Doc. 125 at 3, December 13, 2023 Order).
• 	“Absent any response or objection, it is incomprehensible that the
State would flout this Court’s November 30 Order requiring
IAFIS/NGI searches of the 29 potentially exculpatory prints in the
presence of [Petitioner’s expert.]” (Doc. 125 at 2 (emphasis added),
December 13, 2023 Order).
• 	“On December 13, 2023, [] [t]he Court ordered [] that the State
‘immediately file written notice’ of the satisfactory completion of the
required 	IAFIS/NGI 	searches 	of 	the 	29 	potentially 	exculpatory
prints, and ordered that such searches were to be completed” by
December 23, 2023. [] To date, [as of August 23, 2024,] no written
notice has been filed.” (Doc. 126, August 23, 2024 Order).
• 	“The Court notes this is part of a pattern of delay by the State, and
the 	LSP 	in 	particular, 	having 	already 	been 	threatened 	with
sanctions by the Court in connection with its delays related to the
same 	evidence. 	(Doc. 125). 	The 	Court 	considers 	this 	baseless
Motion—filed 	just 	before 	the 	expiration 	of 	the 	July 	7th
discovery-related deadline and just before the July 4th Holiday—as
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yet another attempt at delaying execution of the Court’s discovery
Orders. This type of gamesmanship is unacceptable, especially given
the nature of these proceedings and what is at stake for Blank.
Counsel for Vannoy and the State are advised that these delay tactics
will not be tolerated going forward and that sanctions will be
considered 	should 	a 	pattern 	of 	contumacious 	conduct 	ensue.”
(Doc. 147 at 4 n.1, July 9, 2025 Order).
K. The Law.
It bears repeating that this is a death penalty case. Petitioner’s life is at stake.
The victims’ families deserve closure. The Court has twice informed the State that it
would hold it in contempt of Court if it continued with its pattern of conduct. What’s
more, the Order to which the State takes offense does not grant any relief to
Petitioner, nor does it make any ruling adverse to the State. Instead, it does nothing
more than set a hearing. Nonetheless, the State now threatens to pursue a writ of
mandamus if the Court fails to vacate its October 22, 2025 Order.
This Court has the authority to require Ms. Morrison, LSP’s counsel, to appear
at the hearing to further explain LSP’s continued failure to assist the State in
complying with the Court’s discovery Orders. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,
provides that any court established by an “Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.” Because of this Act, federal courts may “issu[e] orders
appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries,” and that authority
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“extend[s] to habeas corpus proceedings.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299–300
(1969).
Relevant here, the “power of the Act extends” to persons or entities not
technically 	named 	as 	parties, 	but 	who 	“are 	in 	a 	position 	to 	frustrate 	the
implementation 	of 	a 	court 	order 	or 	the 	proper 	administration 	of 	justice.”
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (district court had
authority to compel nonparty phone company to assist the FBI’s implementation of a
pen register and noting: “[Under] the facts of this case, we do not think that the
Company was a third party so far removed from the underlying controversy that its
assistance could not be permissibly compelled.”).
And again, it matters not that LSP is a state agency that may otherwise be
entitled 	to 	Eleventh 	Amendment 	Immunity. 	The 	State 	confuses 	this 	habeas
proceeding with traditional civil litigation.1 Here, the Court has issued Orders
compelling Respondent, the Warden of Angola, to comply with discovery. But as the
Supreme Court has long recognized, the AEDPA’s requirement that a warden act as
respondent in a habeas proceeding is itself a legal fiction; the warden has no personal
knowledge of the underlying facts. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969)
1 The Court was aware of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 515
(5th Cir. 2022) when it stated that “the Eleventh Amendment does not shield the Louisiana
State Police from assisting the Respondent in complying with the discovery ordered by the
Court in this habeas proceeding . . . .” (Doc. 161 at 3 n.5) (emphasis added). Unlike the present
case, Russell involved Rule 45 subpoenas to “Felony Judges” who had previously been
dismissed as defendants on grounds of sovereign immunity. Russell, 49 F.4th at 515
(“Plaintiffs may not obtain by third-party subpoena what they could not obtain from the
Felony Judges as defendants.”). Russell, while exhaustive and well-written, presented a
distinct set of facts and issues.
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(“Rule 33 . . . provides for written interrogatories to be served by any party upon any
‘adverse party.’ As the present case illustrates, this would usually mean that the
prisoner’s interrogatories must be directed to the warden although the warden would
be unable to answer from personal knowledge questions relating to petitioner’s arrest
and trial.”). And so, responding to discovery in habeas proceedings necessarily
requires the assistance of closely-related state entities who are not the respondent—
i.e., those with personal knowledge of the underlying facts, or possession, custody or
control of the records.2
For that reason, “literal application” of civil discovery rules to “habeas corpus
proceedings would do violence to the efficient and effective administration of the
Great Writ.” Harris, 394 U.S. at 297. Instead, courts “may fashion appropriate modes
of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial
usage.” Id. (finding authority under the All Writs Act). Indeed, “it is the duty of the
court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry,”
when discovery is allowed. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997). What those
facilities and procedures may be are left to the court’s discretion under Rule 6(a).3
2 Again, discovery has been requested from Respondent and the Court has granted discovery
Motions directed at Respondent. Discovery requests, including Rule 45 subpoenas, have
never been served on LSP, and LSP has never been ordered to directly comply with discovery.
Instead, the Court’s Orders have required its assistance and participation, which is necessary
for Respondent to provide the discovery ordered by the Court. The State’s counsel fails to
recognize this distinction. See Harris, 394 U.S. at 296 (“Presumably the warden could solicit
answers from the appropriate officials and reply ‘under oath,’ as the rule requires; but the
warden is clearly not the kind of ‘adversary party’ contemplated by the discovery rules, and
the result of their literal application would be to invoke a procedure which is circuitous,
burdensome, and time consuming.”).
3 In 1976, Congress adopted the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee
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Exercising this discretion, federal courts have often required state agencies or
officials—police departments, prosecutors, crime labs—to provide information or
otherwise assist the respondent in complying with discovery orders in habeas
proceedings. See Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 777 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“[T]he
proper individuals to whom this Court should look to provide the information Cherrix
needs to develop his habeas petition are the Attorney General and the Clerk of the
trial court, who are the equivalents to ‘parties’ to this suit under the common notions
of who constitutes a party for discovery purposes.”); Hall v. Davis, 2022 WL 16574136,
at *3 (D. Idaho Nov. 1, 2022) (ordering state agencies and custodians of evidence to
preserve all evidence in their possession and cooperate with petitioner’s investigation
and noting “death penalty cases are different from regular civil cases in that third-
party law enforcement agencies generally function as decades-long custodians of
critical evidence upon which the defendant’s life or death may turn.); Clark v.
Schweitzer, 2020 WL 6823118, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2020) (rejecting warden’s
objections that he could not answer discovery because he lacked personal knowledge,
as well as custody or control of requested records, and finding a Rule 45 subpoena
was 	“not 	required” 	to 	obtain 	information 	from 	“[t]he 	police, 	prosecutors 	and
Attorney General’s Office (the entities with custody and control over the requested
discovery),” who were ordered to “work with” respondent to answer discovery); Hill v.
Mitchell, 2007 WL 2874597, at *7–8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2007) (granting petitioner’s
Notes to Rule 6 point out that the rule “contains very little specificity as to what types and
methods of discovery should be made available to the parties.” Rather, district court judges
are allowed to “fashion their own rules in the context of individual cases.”
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motion to compel discovery, including deposing attorneys within the Hamilton
County 	prosecutor’s 	office 	regarding 	its 	“policies, 	procedures, 	and 	guidelines
regarding who should be charged with capital murder”); Warden, Kentucky State
Penitentiary v. Gall, 865 F.2d 786, 788 (6th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse
discretion in granting capital habeas petitioner’s discovery motion and ordering
Kentucky State Police Crime Lab to provide petitioner with hair samples and
microscope 	slides 	for 	“examination 	by 	petitioner's 	experts, 	with 	appropriate
safeguards.”); Jenkins v. Scully, 1992 WL 32342, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1992)
(granting capital habeas petitioner’s discovery motion for “an order directing the Erie
County District Attorney (not a party to the instant proceeding) to produce the hair
samples in question so that they can be subjected to DNA fingerprinting tests at an
appropriate facility.”). Because these state entities—police departments, crime labs,
district attorney’s offices, attorney general’s offices, and clerks of court—are the ones
with personal knowledge of the criminal proceedings, or actually have possession,
custody or control of the records, they are “the equivalents to ‘parties’” in habeas suits
“under the common notions of who constitutes a party for discovery purposes.”
Cherrix, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
Accordingly,
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IT 	IS 	ORDERED 	that 	Respondent’s 	Motion 	for 	Expedited
Reconsideration (Doc. 162) is DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 31st day of October, 2025
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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