Taylor v. LeBlanc et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PERCY TAYLOR 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL. 	NO. 21-00072-BAJ-RLB
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Timothy Hooper and Robin Milligan’s Second
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23). Plaintiff opposed the Motion (Doc. 25). Defendants
filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 26).
For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that he was overdetained in a
Louisiana prison in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to due
process. Defendants James LeBlanc, Hooper, and Milligan filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against them under a theory of qualified immunity. (Doc. 3). The
Court 	denied 	the 	motion 	with 	respect 	to 	Defendants’ 	invocation 	of 	qualified
immunity. (Doc. 10). Defendant LeBlanc appealed, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, determining that Defendant LeBlanc was
entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 21).
Now, Defendants Hooper and Milligan bring a Second Motion to Dismiss,
asserting that based on the Fifth Circuit’s Ruling, they are also entitled to qualified
immunity and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against them. (Doc. 23). For present
purposes, the following facts are accepted as true:
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On December 14, 1995, Plaintiff Percy Taylor pleaded guilty to a felony drug
offense 	and 	was 	sentenced 	to 	ten 	years 	in 	prison. 	(Doc. 	4-1 	at 	2). 	On
December 9, 2000, Plaintiff was released “onto good time parole supervision.” (Id.).
On July 16, 2001, while on parole, Plaintiff committed a new felony offense. (Id.); see
also State v. Taylor, 05-280, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/05), 920 So. 2d 287, 290.
Although relevant provisions of Louisiana law at the time of the offense required
automatic revocation of Plaintiff’s parole, Plaintiff was not arrested for this conduct
until February 20, 2002. (Doc. 4-1 at 4). Even after his arrest there is no indication
that a detainer was filed for Plaintiff’s parole revocation, nor was he ever shown to
have been in custody on the parole revocation simultaneously with the new felony
offense. (Id.). Instead, Plaintiff was not informed that his parole was revoked until
October 15, 2003, over a year and a half after his arrest. (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff remained in custody for 602 days: from February 20, 2002, until
October 15, 2003, when he pleaded guilty to the new offense. (Id.). He was initially
adjudicated as a habitual offender and sentenced to life in prison. (Id.). However, the
sentence was amended on June 14, 2006, to twenty-years hard labor, “giving
Defendant credit for all time served.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, as such, his sentence
actually commenced on February 20, 2002.
Plaintiff further alleges that on October 27, 2017, his “rap sheet” indicated that
his “full time” release date was March 16, 2021, and his “good time adjusted date”
was May 5, 2020. (Doc. 4 ¶ 11). He asserts that his in-custody start date was allegedly
incorrectly calculated because it did not include credit for the 602 days he spent in
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pretrial detention. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he met with Defendant Robin Milligan
“seven to ten times” to convince her to correct this error, but that she failed to review
Plaintiff’s documentation or the applicable law. (Id. ¶¶ 15–18). Plaintiff also met with
Defendant Tim Hooper, a warden at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, to address the
alleged miscalculation. Hooper, allegedly relying on Milligan’s conclusion, also
refused to review Plaintiff’s documents. (Id. ¶ 19).
On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed an administrative remedy procedure (“ARP”)
asserting that “he was not being allowed 18 months of parole credit, which was
causing him to be held past his release date, which should have been the last of
October 2017 and no later than January 1, 2018.” (Id. ¶ 20). The ARP was denied by
Milligan and signed by Hooper on July 9, 2018. (Id. ¶ 21).
Plaintiff appealed and a “2nd Step” was issued on August 30, 2018, affirming
Milligan’s determination. 1 (Doc. 4 ¶ 34). Plaintiff then appealed the “2nd Step” to the
19th Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana (“19th JDC”).
(Id.).
On November 25, 2019, the 19th JDC Commissioner recommended judicial
review 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	petition 	and 	reversal 	of 	the 	Department 	of 	Corrections’
calculation. The Commissioner further recommended that the state court find that
1 Under Louisiana law, incarcerated individuals must exhaust a two-step ARP before
proceeding with a suit in federal or state court. Collins v. Vannoy, 2014-0675, p. 3 (La. App.
1 Cir. 1/15/15), 169 So. 3d 405, 406. When an incarcerated person has initiated the first step
of an ARP, the warden is required to respond using the first step response. LA. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(a)(ii). An inmate who is not satisfied with the warden’s first step
response may proceed to the second step of the ARP and appeal to the Secretary of Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(b)(ii).
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Plaintiff was improperly denied credit for the 602 days he was in custody between his
arrest and conviction.2 (Id. ¶ 37; Doc. 4-1). The Commissioner found that Defendants
misunderstood Plaintiff’s request and noted that, in his appeal to prison officials,
Plaintiff was specifically challenging the failure to award jail credits for the time he
spent in custody between February 20, 2002, and October 15, 2003, rather than credit
for time served for good behavior while on parole, “also known as ‘street credits.’”
(Doc. 4-1 at 3).
At the time of Plaintiff’s detention, Louisiana law provided that “a defendant
shall receive credit toward service of his sentence for the time spent in actual custody
prior to the imposition of sentence.” 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 788 (West) (codified
at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN . art. 880). When Plaintiff was sentenced, there was no
express prohibition on overlapping jail credits. An express prohibition was only
implemented 	on 	August 	15, 	2006, 	well 	after 	Defendant 	was 	sentenced.3
2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 174 (West) (codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN .
art. 880). Therefore, the Commissioner recommended that Plaintiff be “given credit
for time served . . . beginning February 20, 2002 when he was arrested on the new
felony offense.” (Id. at 6). The state court adopted the recommendation on January
13, 2020. (Doc. 4-2) (“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED
2 “The office of the Commissioner of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court was created by
La. R.S. 13:711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising
out of the incarceration of state prisoners.” Anderson v. La. Dep’t Pub. Safety & Corrs.,
2017-0987, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/7/18), 242 So. 3d 614, 616.
3 LA. CODE CRIM . PROC . art. 880 (“Under the provisions of this Article, no defendant shall
receive more than thirty days of jail credit for any calendar month while serving a term for
consecutive sentences.”).
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that the Petitioner’s master prison record shall be recalculated to show the Petitioner
is given credit for time served in both docket numbers . . . from February 20, 2002.”).
Plaintiff asserts that after the Commissioner’s Recommendation was issued,
he personally delivered copies of the report to both Milligan and Hooper, both of whom
allegedly refused to abide by the Recommendation. (Doc. 4 ¶¶ 38–39). After the state
court 	adopted 	the 	Commissioner’s 	Recommendation, 	Plaintiff 	allegedly 	again
delivered copies to Hooper and Milligan, who refused to comply with the court’s
Order. (Id. ¶¶ 48–50). After two weeks, Plaintiff filed another ARP. (Id. ¶ 51). On
February 18, 2020, Plaintiff was finally released from custody. (Id. ¶ 3).
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Louisiana state law against James LeBlanc, individually and in his official capacity
as the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) Secretary;
Timothy Hooper, individually and in his official capacity “as the policy maker and
Warden 	of 	Elayn 	Hunt 	Correctional 	Center 	[‘EHCC’]”; 	and 	Robin 	Milligan,
individually. Plaintiff alleges that he was “deprived of his liberty for an extended
period of time” due to Defendants’ unwillingness to properly credit him for time spent
in custody prior to his sentencing. (Id. ¶ 109).
In their first Motion to Dismiss, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff’s claims
should be dismissed because each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 3
¶¶ 4–5).
The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
determining that all three Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for the
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violation of Plaintiff’s right to timely release. (Doc. 10 at 8–16). Accordingly, the Court
denied Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. (Id. at 16).
Defendant LeBlanc appealed the Court’s Ruling. (Doc. 11). On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit issued a now-withdrawn opinion holding as follows:
Department officials declined to credit Taylor’s pre-trial detention to
both of his consecutive sentences. That was correct under current law.
See LA. CODE CRIM. P ROC. art. 880(B). But it was wrong here, because
Taylor’s release date should have been governed by the law applicable
at the time of his sentence. That would have allowed Taylor to credit his
jail time to both of his sentences.
Taylor v. LeBlanc, 68 F.4th 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2023), opinion withdrawn, No. 21-
30625, 2023 WL 4155921 (5th Cir. June 23, 2023). The Circuit continued that “Taylor
was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at the time his sentence was
entered,” and “[a]ccording to the correctly calculated release date, Taylor should have
been released over a year earlier.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit then withdrew its opinion and issued a new one. (Doc. 21). In
the new opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed the Court’s Ruling, determining that the
Section 1983 claim against LeBlanc should be dismissed. (Id.). The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that “[b]ecause La. R.S. 15:574.9(E) independently prohibited good time
credit for parole violations, Taylor should not have received 602 days of credit towards
his first sentence” (emphasis in original). (Id. at 4). In other words, Plaintiff was
entitled to a 602-day credit for only his subsequent sentence and not both sentences.
(Id. at 3). Therefore, the Circuit concluded, “the prison officials’ calculations were
correct” and Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that he was unconstitutionally
overdetained. (Id. at 2, 4).
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Now, Defendants Hooper and Milligan again move to dismiss, arguing that the
Fifth 	Circuit’s 	Ruling—that 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	that 	he 	was
unconstitutionally overdetained—also entitles them to a dismissal of the claims
against them. (Doc. 23). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint
against the legal standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which
requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible 	on 	its 	face.’” 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	678 	(2009) 	(quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.
“[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Hence, the
complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations,” but something “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When conducting its inquiry, the Court
“accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable
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to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks omitted).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
In their Motion, Defendants Timothy Hooper and Robin Milligan ask the Court
to 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	Section 	1983 	claims 	against 	them, 	arguing 	that 	the
Fifth Circuit’s 	Ruling 	that 	Defendant 	LeBlanc 	did 	not 	violate 	Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights also entitles them to dismissal of the claims against them.
(Doc. 23 at 1). Plaintiff, in turn, argues the following: (1) the Fifth Circuit’s Ruling
did not affect Defendants Hooper and Milligan; and (2) Defendants Hooper and
Milligan are procedurally barred from requesting that the Court grant them qualified
immunity. For the following reasons, this Court grants Defendants’ Second Motion to
Dismiss.
The Fifth’s Circuit’s Ruling bears directly on the validity of Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants. Because a public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless
the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011), “[t]o overcome LeBlanc’s
motion 	to 	dismiss, 	Taylor’s 	complaint 	must 	plausibly 	allege 	that 	he 	was
overdetained.” (Doc. 23 at 2 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))).
However, the Fifth Circuit “conclude[d] that Taylor did not plausibly allege that he
was detained past his proper release date,” and that “the prison officials’ calculations
were correct.” (Doc. 23 at 2, 4). The Circuit further concluded that because Plaintiff’s
Complaint failed to establish a constitutional violation, LeBlanc was entitled to
qualified immunity and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against him.
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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hooper and Milligan are based on the
same instance of alleged overdetention. Plaintiff’s allegation that his constitutional
rights were violated has already been rejected by the Fifth Circuit, and the Court is
bound by Fifth Circuit precedent. Based on the Fifth Circuit’s Ruling, Defendants
Hooper and Milligan are also entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of
Plaintiff’s 	Section 	1983 	claims 	against 	them. 	See 	Omar 	v. 	Casterline,
414 F. Supp. 2d 582, 594 (W.D. La. 2006) (dismissing constitutional claims against
officers under the law of the case doctrine after previously dismissing those claims
against other officers in the same action); Baber v. Harris Cnty. Precinct 4 Sheriff,
No. CV H-21-900, 2023 WL 3127690, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2023) (granting
qualified immunity to a defendant after similarly situated defendants were granted
qualified immunity, reasoning that “[t]he Fifth Circuit has held that when one
defending party establishes that the plaintiff has no cause of action, the defense can
be applied to the benefit of other, similarly situated defendants”); Lewis v. Lynn,
236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001); Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 762
(5th Cir. 1983) (The law of the case doctrine is a “rule of practice, based upon sound
policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the
matter.”); United States v. U.S. Smelting Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198
(1950)). Further, the Court is not procedurally barred from reaching a conclusion in
this Order that is different from its previous Order, and in fact, must make such a
conclusion. See Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010)
(Section 1983 plaintiff “contend[ed] that the district court could not properly grant
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summary judgment to the City on the same issues decided in the prior order.
However, the law-of-the-case doctrine [did] not operate to prevent a district court
from reconsidering prior rulings. ‘A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of
its 	own 	. 	. 	. 	in 	any 	circumstance. 	. 	. 	.’”) 	(citing 	Christianson 	v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)).
On the record before it, the Court is constrained to conclude that Plaintiff’s
Complaint 	fails 	to 	establish 	a 	constitutional 	violation. 	Therefore, 	Defendants’
Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is GRANTED.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Timothy Hooper and Robin Milligan’s
Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against
Defendants Hooper and Milligan are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Final judgment shall be entered separately.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 24th day of February, 2026
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Louisiana, this 24 	dayyyyyyyyyy of Februar
_____________________________	____	___	_____	__ _________
DGE BRIAN A. JAC	C	AC	AC	AC	A	AC	C	AC	C	AC	AC	C	AC	C	C	C	C	C	C	AC	AC	C	C	C	C	C	AC	C	C	C	C	AC	C	C	C	C	C	C	AC	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	CKS	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K 	ON
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