Woodberry v. LeBlanc et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DERRICK WOODBERRY CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 22-979-BAJ-RLB
JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. (R. Doc. 113).
The motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 116). Plaintiff filed a Reply. (R. Doc. 121).
I. Background
On December 1, 2022, Derrick Woodberry (“Plaintiff”), while proceeding pro se and at
the time incarcerated at the David Wade Correctional Center (“Wade”), commenced this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (R. Doc. 1).
On January 3, 2023, the Court issued a standard case management order for pro se
prisoner litigation in this district. (R. Doc. 6). This order required defense counsel to “provide to
the plaintiff all medical records, administrate remedy proceedings, unusual occurrence reports,
and all other documents pertinent to the issues in this case” within the deadline set by the Order.
(R. Doc. 6 at 1). In addition to this “mandatory discovery,” the Court allowed the parties to
“serve upon one another additional written discovery requests . . . limited to 10 interrogatories, 5
requests for production of documents, and 10 requests for admissions,” with each discovery
request and response to be filed into the record. (R. Doc. 6 at 2).
On February 22, 2024, the district judge issued a Ruling and Order directing Plaintiff to
file an amended Complaint and providing Plaintiff with the opportunity to request the
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appointment of Counsel. (R. Doc. 43). Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 44)
and sought the appointment of counsel (R. Doc. 47).
On May 1, 2024, the Court granted, in part, Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of
counsel, requesting volunteers from the Court’s Civil Pro Bono Counsel panel. (R. Doc. 50).
Prior to the enrollment of counsel, the Court again ordered Defendants to “provide to the
plaintiff all medical records, administrate remedy proceedings, unusual occurrence reports, and
all other documents pertinent to the issues in this case” given their failure to comply with the
Court’s earlier orders. (R. Doc. 58; see R. Docs. 6, 40). On July 12, 2024, the defendants filed a
“Notice of Compliance” stating that they had provided Plaintiff with the following documents,
which have been filed into the record:
1) A Certified Copy of Plaintiff’s Medical Records dated January 2019 to August 2023;
2) Certified Copy of ARP EHCC-2022-324;
3) Certified Copy of ARP EHCC-2022-388; [and]
4) Certified Copy of Plaintiff’s Master Prison Record dated January 2019 to July 2023.
(R. Doc. 60; see R. Docs. 60-1 to 60-4).
The district judge then allowed pro bono counsel to seek enrollment on Plaintiff’s behalf.
(R. Doc. 61). Plaintiff’s counsel was enrolled on August 21, 2024. (R. Doc. 66).
On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, filed his Second Amended
Complaint, alleging he was previously incarcerated at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center (“Hunt”).
(R. Doc. 79). In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief from the following
officials at Hunt: Assistant Warden (and former Deputy Warden) Jason Russ; Colonel (and
former Assistant Warden) Donald Johnson; Lead Investigator (and former Assistant Warden)
Brandy Landry; and (former Lieutenant Colonel) Jason Linzy (collectively, “Defendants”).
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Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred from the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”) to Hunt in
September 2019 after being attacked by an inmate. (R. Doc. 79 at 3).
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment with respect to a coordinated and
retaliatory attack on him while previously incarcerated at Hunt on April 21, 2022, and violations
for the First Amendment with respect to the filing of a lost property claim and a grievance claim
against Donald Johnson, including the alleged retaliatory transfer to Wade where he had known
enemies.1
On January 23, 2025, the Court issued a Scheduling Order requiring, among other things,
all non-expert discovery to be completed by May 16, 2025 and dispositive motions to be filed by
August 1, 2025. (R. Doc 87). The Scheduling Order did not vacate the limitations on discovery
detailed in the pro se prisoner case management order.
On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline,
stating that additional time was needed to conduct written discovery and to complete certain
depositions, further representing that neither party would need to conduct any expert discovery in
this action. (R. Doc. 88). The Court granted the motion, extending the deadline to complete non-
expert discovery to July 2, 2025. (R. Doc. 89).
On June 2, 2025, Plaintiff served 20 interrogatories and 44 requests for production on
each of the Defendants. (See R. Doc. 103-2).
On June 24, 2025, Defendants responded to the discovery requests by stating that they
were working on providing formal responses by July 2, 2025, but that “due to the vast number of
requests and the number of objections the Defendants intend to raise we are producing all
documents and media which appear to be discoverable and responsive to the propounded
1 At some point after the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was transferred back to LSP. (See R.
Doc. 94).
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requests, most, if not all, of which were produced previously in Defendants’ Initial Disclosures”
provided to Plaintiff on February 3, 2025. (R. Doc. 103-3). The parties agreed to further
extensions beyond the Court’s deadlines without seeking any modification of the Court’s
deadlines. (See R. Doc. 103-6, 103-7).
The extended discovery deadline of July 2, 2025 came and went without the filing of any
discovery motions. Then, on August 1, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. Doc. 96). In response, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Suspend Summary Judgment Pending the
Completion of Discovery. (R. Doc. 100). Through that motion, Plaintiff sought an order
suspending or denying the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice,
“pending the completion of discovery in this matter, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. R. 56(d).” (R.
Doc. 100 at 1). In support of this motion, Plaintiff submitted copies of the June 2, 2025 discovery
requests (R. Doc. 100-2) and specifically sought responses to those discovery requests. (See R.
Doc. 100-1 at 12). Plaintiff also sought to take the outstanding deposition of Donald Johnson. (R.
Doc. 100-1 at 3-4).
On September 25, 2025, while the foregoing Rule 56(d) motion remained pending,
Plaintiff filed his initial Motion to Compel, which sought an order compelling responses to the
written discovery served on June 2, 2025, as well as dates for the outstanding deposition of
Donald Johnson. (R. Doc. 103). Without referencing any specific written discovery requests,
Plaintiff argued that the discovery sought was targeted on “core” issues. (R. Doc. 103-1 at 7).
Despite having failed to file the motion to compel prior to the extended discovery deadline,
Plaintiff argued that Defendants have “waived” their objections to the written discovery sought.
(R. Doc. 103-1 at 6-7).
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On October 9, 2025, the district judge granted Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion, denied
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice to refile after the resolution of
Plaintiff’s motion to compel, and referred the matter to the undersigned to set a deadline for
Defendants to file a renewed motion for summary judgment after the resolution of Plaintiff’s
motion to compel. (R. Doc. 104). Given the foregoing, the undersigned issued a notice to counsel
providing the following: “Discovery is reopened for the sole purpose of resolving the Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel, which is deemed timely filed. No further motions related to discovery will be
considered.” (R. Doc. 105).
On November 13, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s initial Motion to Compel without
prejudice to refile. (R. Doc. 110). In this ruling, the Court recognized that in seeking relief
pursuant to Rule 56(d), Plaintiff specifically argued that 7 interrogatories and 13 requests for
production at issue sought “facts essential to justify Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment:
[L]ooking at the substance of the requests, they are narrowly-tailored to
uncover information related to Defendants’ prior conduct, and the institutional
practices at issue in this litigation and the incidents set forth in the Second
Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 79). More specifically, the Discovery Requests
seek the identity of all persons with knowledge of facts of the relevant incident
(Exh. A at ROG No. 15); Defendants’ communications about Mr. Woodberry (Id.
at RFP Nos. 1 and 10); information surrounding the handling of Mr. Woodberry’s
property (Exh. A at ROGs 7-10); the investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints (Id. at
ROG No. 11); the policies, procedures, and training materials relative to housing
inmates, inmate transfers between facilities, administrative segregation,
shakedowns, return of inmate personal property and anti-discrimination/anti-
harassment (Id. at RFP Nos. 11, 32-37 and ROGs No. 6-10); Plaintiff’s accident,
injury, or incident reports (Id. at RFP No. 19); records of prior discipline (Id. at
RFP No. 7) and Defendants’ personnel files (Id. at RFP No. 39). Plaintiff requires
responses to these requests to establish the pattern of retaliation, deliberate
indifference, and constitutional violations alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint, to quantify the damages suffered by Mr. Woodberry as a result of
Defendants’ actions which is necessary to establish facts to respond to
Defendants’ summary judgment. Exh. J – Mathews Decl. at ¶¶ 8-10.
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Additionally, one of Plaintiff’s requests is for Defendants to produce
unedited video footage and surveillance of the incidents he complains about.
(Exh. A at RFP Nos. 25-26) Elayn Hunt surveillance videos of the April 21, 2022
incident involving Plaintiff and Depton Jones produced with Defendants’ initial
disclosures contain interrupted segments with blue screens. When defendants
were asked about the cause of the blue screens during their depositions, their
answers varied.
(R. Doc. 100-1 at 5-6).
Given the foregoing, the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed with limited discovery with
respect to the specific written discovery requests referenced in the Rule 56(d) motion:
Interrogatory Nos. 6-11, 15, and Request for Production Nos. 1, 7 10, 11, 19, 25-26, 32-37. (R.
Doc. 110 at 12). In doing so, however, the Court did not issue any ruling on whether these
requests sought information within the scope of discovery or were otherwise objectionable. The
Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion with respect to the other discovery requests given that they
sought “virtually all information and documents that could possibly pertain to this civil action or
Plaintiff in general.” (R. Doc. 110 at 3).
The Court required Defendants to respond or object to the foregoing written discovery
requests on an expedited basis. The Court further ordered the parties to meet-and-confer to the
extent any disagreements remain regarding this limited set of written discovery requests. Finally,
the Court informed the parties that it would reset the deadline to file Rule 56 motions after the
instant discovery dispute is fully resolved.
After Defendants provided objections and responses as ordered, the parties held a
discovery conference on November 26, 2025. (R. Doc. 113-2). Few details of counsel’s
discussions regarding the discovery requests at issue are provided. Plaintiff represents, however,
that “[a]s a result of the conference, Defendants produced several DPSC policies that counsel for
Defendants indicated could be responsive to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production. (R. Doc. 113-3
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at 2). Plaintiff’s instant renewed Motion to Compel seeks an order compelling supplemental
productions in response to Request for Production Nos. 1, 10, 11, 25, 26, 32-37. (R. Doc. 113).
In the instant motion, Plaintiff focuses on Defendants’ objection to these requests for
production on the basis that they are not in “possession, custody/ or control” of responsive
documents or information maintained by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (“DPSC”). Plaintiff argues that “Defendants have control over the requested
documents because of their relationship with the DPSC, the non-party entity in possession of the
documents, is sufficient to enable them to obtain and produce these materials,” given that
“[o]fficials, including wardens, assistant wardens, deputy wardens, and officers, are directly
employed by and affiliated with the DPSC.” (R. Doc. 113-3 at 3-4). Plaintiff notes that
Defendants have produced other “documents clearly derived from the DPSC systems in the
initial disclosures, including prison records and investigative documents,” which “serves as
evidence that these Defendants have the ability to obtain additional responsive documents
through DPSC.” (R. Doc. 113-3 at 4).
Plaintiff does not reference any specific jurisprudence providing that assistant wardens or
correctional officers have “control” over DPSC documents for the purposes of Rule 34(b).
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not however, raise any arguments in his opening brief regarding
Defendants’ objections based on irrelevance, overbreadth, vagueness, undue burden, and lack of
proportionality.
In opposition, Defendants represent that notwithstanding their objections to the requests
as “exceedingly broad, vague, and unduly burdensome based upon the unlimited (or
exaggerated) timing of the request or the incredible vagueness of the request[s],” Defendants
obtained and produced additional documents in response to the requests. (R. Doc. 116 at 1-2).
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Defendants represent that, in addition to advising Plaintiff’s counsel that responsive documents
“are maintained by and/or in the custody and control” of the DPSC, counsel discussed the
objections based on overbreadth and vagueness, leading to a supplemental production of DPSC
policies:
During the conference between counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel was advised that, due
to the sheer breadth and vagueness of the requests, it could not be determined
what, if any, documents beyond what had been produced (either previously or in
response to the Court-limited discovery) may actually be responsive to Plaintiff’s
requests without blindly requesting from DPSC a massive collection of
documents in hopes that there might be something that somehow relates to the
claims at issue in this case. Plaintiff’s counsel was, similarly, unsure of what
documents are believed to still be missing or have gone unproduced; however,
over the course of the conference, undersigned was able to obtain enough
information from Plaintiff’s counsel to determine and produce several additional
DPSC policies that were believed to potentially be sufficiently related and
responsive to Plaintiff’s requests so as not be utterly irrelevant to the current
proceedings.
(R. Doc. 116 at 2). Acknowledging that they have produced some documents obtained from
DPSC, Defendants assert that “the fact that those documents were previously requested and
obtained does not mean that the Defendants have possession, custody, or control over any other
documents that are in the actual possession, custody, and control of DPSC.” (R Doc. 116 at 5).
In reply, Plaintiff argues that the documents produced in the supplemental production
“are responsive to Request for Production Nos. 32-35, 37, and partially to No. 36” and otherwise
demonstrate that Defendants have “possession, custody, or control” of DPSC documents. (R.
Doc. 121 at 1). Plaintiff does not state whether the instant motion is moot with respect to those
document requests. Plaintiff also, for the first time, argues that Defendants’ remaining objections
are “boilerplate” and should be disregarded. (R. Doc. 121 at 4).
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II. Law and Analysis
A. Legal Standards
“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this
scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). The court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that: “(i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii)
the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C).
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a protective
order after a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)’s
“good cause” requirement indicates that the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to
show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of
fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134
F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
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A party must respond or object to a request for production within 30 days after service of
the discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). This default date may be modified by stipulation
between the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(b). If a party fails to respond fully to discovery requests
made pursuant to Rule 34 in the time allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the party
seeking discovery may move to compel responses and for appropriate sanctions under Rule 37.
An “evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to
disclose, answer or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). A party may move to compel the
production of documents as requested under Rule 34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv).
B. Analysis
1. Possession, Custody, or Control
Plaintiff’s motion focuses on whether and to what extent the individual Defendants in this
action have possession, custody, or control over responsive documents and information.
Accordingly, the Court will briefly address this issue before turning to whether, and to what
extent, the document requests are objectionable as irrelevant, overly broad, vague, unduly
burdensome, or disproportionate to the needs of this case.
Rule 34 requires that a responding party produce responsive documents that are within
their “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). Documents are deemed to be
within the “possession, custody, or control” of a responding party if that party either has “actual”
possession, custody, or control of the documents or if that party “has the legal right to obtain the
documents on demand or has the practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the
action.” Estate of Monroe v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., No. 03-2682, 2004 WL 737463, at * 10
(E.D. La. April 2, 2004). “Rule 34 is broadly construed and documents within a party’s control
are subject to discovery, even if owned by a nonparty.” Id. (citing Commerce and Industry Ins.
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Co. v. Grinnell Corp., Nos. 97–0775, 97–0803, 98–2200, 2001 WL 96337, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb.
1, 2001)). The burden, however, is on the party seeking discovery to make a showing that the
other party has control over the documents sought. Id. “When determining the sufficiency of
control of material for purposes of Rule 34, the nature of the relationship between the party and
the non-party is the key.” Id.; see MacNair v. Chubb Eur. Grp. SE, No. 23-761, 2024 WL
663652, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 2024) (“In determining the sufficiency of control over material
for discovery purposes, the nature of the relationship between the party and the non-party is
key.”).
There can be no dispute that Defendants must produce responsive documents and
information in their actual possession, custody, or control (in light of their current positions at
Hunt) unless the Court sustains their objections to the requests for production. The Court
recognizes, however, that Plaintiff has not set forth any Fifth Circuit decision definitely
providing that an employee’s “practical ability” to obtain documents from an employer satisfies
“control” for the purposes of Rule 34(b). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recognized a distinction
between “access” and “possession, custody, or control” in the context of reviewing a Rule 45
subpoena to a non-party. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEVA Logistics Singapore, Ltd.,
348 F.R.D. 54, 67 (E.D. La. 2024) (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812,
821 (5th Cir. 2004)). In Wiwa, the subpoena at issue requested documents in the “control,
possession, or have access to [sic]” of a non-party individual formerly employed with an oil
company. See Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 815. The Fifth Circuit agreed that in this context the implied
phrase “to which he has access” was overly broad as it would require the retrieval of documents
(potentially from Nigeria) not under the non-party individual’s “custody, control, or possession,
but to which he could conceivably have access by virtue of his prior position with” his former
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employer. Wiwa 392 F.3d at 821. Defendants argue that Wiwa supports a finding that the Fifth
Circuit rejects the “practical ability” test with respect to determining “control” pursuant to Rule
34(b). (R. Doc. 116 at 4-5). In fact, Wiwa does not address whether and to what extent a current
employee has “control” over an employer’s documents in the context of responding to a Rule 34
request.2
At any rate, neither party has cited any decision directly addressing whether an assistant
warden or correctional officer has “control” over DPSC documents for the purposes of Rule
34(a). Arguably, there is a sufficient employment relationship between the individual Defendants
still employed by Hunt and the DPSC for the purposes of establishing “control” over documents
relevant to Hunt and the underlying incidents. Notably, each of the individual Defendants is
represented by an Assistant Attorney General provided by the Office of the Louisiana Attorney
General of the Louisiana Department of Justice. Throughout this litigation, Defendants have
requested and obtained documents from the DPSC, demonstrating their “practical ability” to do
so. (See R. Doc. 116 at 5). If the “practical ability” test is applicable, then the individual
Defendants still employed by Hunt would arguably have “control” over relevant DPSC
documents. See Estate of Monroe, 2004 WL 737463, at * 10.
Some federal district courts have applied “practical ability” test to reach a comparable
conclusion. See Gross v. Lunduski, 304 F.R.D. 136, 142-43 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that
2 Defendants also rely on Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1427 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he fact that a
party could obtain a document if it tried hard enough and maybe if it didn’t try hard at all does not mean that the
document is in its possession, custody, or control; in fact it means the opposite.”). The Chaveriat decision does not
address the context of a current employer-employee relationship between the responding party and the non-party.
See Strom v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 667 N.E.2d 1137, 1143–44 (Mass. 1996) (“Chaveriat dealt with separate
corporations, where the entity possessing the materials had had a prior contractual relationship with the litigating
party against whom the discovery demand was made, but no present tie or incentive to assist either party to the
dispute.”) (citing Chaveriat, 11 F.3d at 1423, 1426-1427). In fact, courts have recognized that the Chaveriat
decision does not “require a degree of control tantamount to a master-servant relationship before Rule 34 requires
production.” Engel v. Town of Roseland, No. 3:06 CV 430, 2007 WL 2903196, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 1, 2007).
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the individual defendant, a correctional officer employed by the N.Y. Department of
Correctional and Community Services (“DOCCS”), had “control” over DOCCS documents for
the purposes of Rule 34(a) where, among other things, defense counsel was an assistant N.Y.
Attorney General who had the practical ability to acquire from DOCCS many of the documents
requested by the plaintiff); see also Guillory v. Skelly, No. 12-00847, 2014 WL 4542468, at *8
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2014) (“Here, although DOCCS is not a party to this action, the relationship
between DOCCS and Defendants, all DOCCS employees[,] is sufficiently closely coordinated to
find Defendants have practical access and control over the requested documents.”). At least one
district court, however, has rejected this analysis. See Robinson v. Moskus, 49zx1 F. Supp. 3d
359, 366 (C.D. Ill. 2020) (rejecting the “practical ability” test over the “legal right” test in
concluding that the plaintiff in litigation against correctional officer employed by the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) must seek IDOC documents by Rule 45 subpoena).
Here, Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that the individual Defendants in
this action have possession, custody, or control over DPSC documents. In the absence of more
detailed briefing – including the potential impact on prisoner litigation, the employer-employee
relationship at issue, and the logistics of document sharing between DPSC and correctional
facilities – the Court will not issue a definitive ruling with respect to “control” over DPSC
documents and information in the context of this litigation. Importantly, and as discussed further
below, the Court will only compel a limited subset of documents and electronically stored
information sought. To the extent these documents are not in the actual possession, custody, or
control of Defendants, or that DPSC will not voluntarily turn them over to defense counsel
for production as it has in numerous other cases in this district, then the Court will provide
Plaintiff an opportunity to seek these documents and information from the DPSC by subpoena.
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2. Requests for Production Nos. 11, 32-37
Plaintiff’s Requests for Production Nos. 11, 32-37 collectively seek the production of
policies and procedures, whether contained in training manuals or otherwise, on various topics:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
antidiscrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation training provided to you
for your current employment role.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
policies and procedures for housing inmates next to or near known enemies in the
Louisiana prison system.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
policies and procedures for transferring inmates to and from facilities with known
enemies in the Louisiana prison system.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
policies and procedures related to “shakedowns” in the Louisiana prison system.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 35:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
policies and procedures related to “administrative segregation” in the Louisiana
Prison System.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 36:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
policies and procedures taken to return an inmate’s personal property, including
whether there would be an instance where an officer would refuse to return an
inmate’s personal property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
Any and all documents, training materials, handbooks, guides, etc. containing all
policies and procedures taken when an inmate reports missing personal property.
(R. Doc. 113 at 3-7). Defendants objected to these requests on the basis that they are “overly
broad, vague, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of this case,” further stating
that any responsive documents would be in the possession, custody, or control of the DPSC. (R.
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Doc. 113 at 3-7). Each Defendant refers Plaintiff to the production of his responsive “Training
Record.” (R. Doc. 113 at 3-7).
In reply, Plaintiff concedes that the production of DPSC policies after the parties’
November 26, 2025 appear to be “responsive to Request for Production Nos. 32-35, 37, and
partially to No. 36.” (R. Doc. 121 at 1). Plaintiff does not, however, identify any additional
responsive documents or information (in light of Plaintiff’s counsel’s review of this
supplemental production or the parties’ discovery conference) that have not been obtained and
produced by Defendants. Plaintiff also does not reference any other discovery – including the
referenced Training Records or deposition testimony – indicating that any sought policies and
procedures have not been produced.
That said, there is no dispute that responsive policies and procedures are relevant to the
claims and defenses in this action. The Court will narrow these discovery requests to all training
materials or handbooks containing policies and procedures regarding prisoner management in
effect at Hunt between February 2019 – June 2022. This limited set of policies and responses
falls within the scope of discovery.
Within 7 days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall produce any and all documents,
as limited above, in their actual possession, custody, or control. Defendants shall specify whether
any known responsive documents are held by the DPSC that Defendants cannot produce based
on their objection of lack of “control” over DPSC documents. If so, Plaintiff may immediately
seek such documents from the DPSC by Rule 45 subpoena and file an appropriate notice into the
record.
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2. Requests for Production Nos. 1 and 10
Plaintiff’s Requests for Production Nos. 1 and 10 collectively seek the production of
“[a]ny and all” correspondences and communications related to Plaintiff (for the past ten years)
or the subject matter of this lawsuit in general:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:
Any and all correspondence or writings you authored or received, including but
not limited to emails, text, and memos related to Plaintiff from the past ten years.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:
Any and all text messages, emails, social media messages, or other
communications regarding, relating to, or referencing in any way to the incidents
that is the subject of this lawsuit.
(R. Doc. 113 at 2-3).3 Defendants objected to these requests on the basis that they are irrelevant
and “overly broad, vague, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of this case,”
noting that the requests fail “to identify any reasonable documents or information sought” related
to the underlying incidents that “occurred on or around February 2019 – June 2022.” (See R.
Doc. 113 at 2-3).
Rule 34(b) provides that a request for production or inspection “must describe with
reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected” or produced. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 34(b)(1)(A). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places the party upon
reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D.
567, 575 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). “Therefore, the party
requesting the production of documents must provide sufficient information to enable the party
to whom the request is directed to identify responsive documents.” Id. “The goal is that the
3 Plaintiff lists the discovery requests and responses at issue in his Motion to Compel as required by Local Rule 37.
Plaintiff notes that identical discovery was issued to each of the individual Defendants, who provided responses and
objections that “are nearly identical except each contains a specific reference to the responding Defendant.” (R. Doc.
113 at 2 n.1).
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description be sufficient to apprise a man of ordinary intelligence which documents are
required.” Id. “All-encompassing demands that do not allow a reasonable person to ascertain
which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A).” Id.;
see also McCoy v. SC Tiger Manor, LLC, No. 19-723-JWD-SDJ, 2021 WL 1321303, at *4
(M.D. La. Apr. 8, 2021) (sustaining objections based on overbreadth, vagueness, ambiguousness,
undue burden, and inappropriate shifting of burden to determine the documents referenced in
requests for certain “documentary evidence” in violation of Rule 34(b)(1)(A)).
Neither party outlines what counsel discussed regarding these particular document
requests at the discovery conference. Both of these document requests seek, in part, information
outside of the scope of discovery. Request for Production No. 1, while limited to the particular
communications by each Defendant related to Plaintiff, includes an arbitrary and expansive 10-
year temporal period. Request for Production No. 10, while ostensibly limited to the “subject of
this lawsuit” is neither limited in time nor custodians.
Despite having held a discovery conference, Plaintiff fails to identify any reasonable
subset of communications limited in time or subject matter. Indeed, in seeking the opportunity to
obtain responses to these discovery requests to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff solely states that he seeks “Defendants’ communications about Mr.
Woodberry.” (R. Doc. 100-1 at 6). Even after being provided an opportunity to address
Defendants’ objections, Plaintiff offers no articulable basis for seeking virtually every
communication about him made in the past ten years. Plaintiff has made no attempt to narrow
these requests, including any limitation to particular custodians or search terms with respect to
electronically store information.
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That said, the Court recognizes the importance of relevant communications involving the
individual Defendants regarding the specific issues raised in the Complaint. Accordingly, the
Court will require Defendants to conduct a diligent search and produce all responsive
correspondence (including emails) pertaining to the incidents detailed in Plaintiff’s complaint for
the periods between February 2019 – June 2022. With respect to emails, a search for Plaintiff’s
surname (Woodberry) in each Defendants’ work email account for the applicable time period
will satisfy this requirement.
Within 7 days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall produce all communications, as
limited above, in their actual possession, custody, or control. Defendants shall specify whether
any known responsive communications are held by the DPSC that Defendants cannot produce
based on their objection of lack of “control” over DPSC documents. If so, Plaintiff may
immediately seek such communications from the DPSC by Rule 45 subpoena and file an
appropriate notice into the record.
3. Requests for Production Nos. 25 and 26
The final two requests seek the production of unedited body camera footage. The first
request is overly broad and fails to make any rational attempt at limiting the sought camera
footage to any particular claims or incidents detailed in the Second Amended Complaint:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 25:
Copies of all unedited body camera footage, unedited surveillance tape
recordings, unedited photographs, or other unedited picture media from five
minutes before any incidents up until five minutes after any incidents involving
Plaintiff within the past ten years.
Plaintiff has offered no reasonable limitation on the foregoing request, which literally includes
all video and photographs of Plaintiff over the past ten years. The Court will sustain Defendants’
objections based on overbreadth with respect to this document request.
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Finally, Plaintiff seeks an unedited version of a video that has already been produced in
this litigation:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 26:
Copies of unedited footage of “HCC 22E095 fight” video without the edited blue
screen frames.
RESPONSE TO PRODUCTION NO. 26:
Defendant objects to this request to the degree it assumes that such a version of
the video does or has ever existed. Without waiving such objection, Defendant
does not have in her possession, custody, or control the requested documents or
information. Upon information and belief, such records are maintained by the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and have not been edited.
Defendant therefore refers Plaintiff to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections for any responsive information or documents. Defendant further
refers Plaintiff to Mr. Anthony LaCour, an employee of the Louisiana Department
of Public Safety and Corrections whose work involves the installation and
maintenance of the surveillance cameras at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center and
whom Plaintiff’s counsel was made aware of and referred to for questions relating
to alleged editing of surveillance footage on June 30, 2025, during the deposition
of Defendant.
(R. Doc. 113-4 at 11).
Again, Plaintiff does not raise any specific arguments regarding this video in support of
this motion. It appears that the video is a recording of the April 21, 2022 attack referenced in the
Second Amended Complaint. (See R. Doc. 79 at 15-17). Plaintiff specifically referenced this
video in seeking the opportunity to obtain discovery to respond to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment: “Elayn Hunt surveillance videos of the April 21, 2022 incident involving
Plaintiff and Depton Jones produced with Defendants’ initial disclosures contain interrupted
segments with blue screens. When defendants were asked about the cause of the blue screens
during their depositions, their answers varied.” (R. Doc. 1001-1 at 6). The Court has confirmed
that the underlying videos filed conventionally into the record contain periods of blue screen
interruptions. (See R. Doc. 99). It is unclear whether these blue screen interruptions reflect the
state of the actual recordings or involved some sort of editing.
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RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Within 7 days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall produce any and all versions of
the videos responsive to Request for Production No. 26 in their actual possession, custody, or
control. In their supplemental response, Defendants shall specify whether any known versions of
the videos without blue screen interruptions are held by the DPSC that Defendants cannot
produce based on their objection of lack of “control” over DPSC documents. If so, Plaintiff may
immediately seek versions of the videos without blue screen interruptions from the DPSC by
Rule 45 subpoena and file an appropriate notice into the record.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (R. Doc. 113)
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The parties shall bear their own costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants must provide supplemental productions
and responses consistent with the body of this Order within 7 days of the date of this Order.
Plaintiff must immediately notify the Court of any necessary Rule 45 subpoena.
IT IS FURTHHER ORDERED that the Court will issue a separate Amended
Scheduling Order.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 21, 2026.
S
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