USA v. Hoang

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VERSUS
TAI DUC HOANG
CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 23-5-JWD-EWD
RULING AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Suppress (Doc. 20) filed by Defendant
Tai Duc Hoang (“Defendant” or “Hoang”). The Government filed a Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress (“Opposition”) (Doc. 22). The Court held a hearing on October 14, 2025. (Doc.
62.) The parties then filed post-hearing briefs. (Docs. 71, 72.) The Court has carefully considered
the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared
to rule. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was paroled on April 26, 2021, (Doc. 20-2 at 1), and was, at all relevant times,
under the supervision of Agent Lane Linton (“Linton”) of the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole, (Doc. 20-1 at 2; Doc. 22 at 1). Condition
Nine of Defendant’s certificate of parole stated: “I agree to visits at my residence or place of
employment by my Parole Officer at any time. I also agree to searches of my person, property,
residence, and/or vehicle, when reasonable suspicion exists that I am or have been engaged in
criminal activity.” (Doc. 20-3 at 1, ¶ 9.) Defendant signed this certificate on April 26, 2021, and
again on April 28, 2021. (Id. at 1; see also Doc. 68 at 30–31.)
On July 27, 2022, Linton and Agent Jacob Drummond (“Drummond”)—also with the
Division of Probation and Parole—met Defendant and his girlfriend, Chanka Edwards
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(“Edwards”), at Defendant’s home (“the Wynnewood Residence”), located at 8943 Wynnewood
Street. (Doc. 20-4 at 2.) Linton advised Defendant that the agents “were there to conduct a
residence check.” (Id.) Shortly after entering the Wynnewood Residence, Linton “moved toward
the kitchen area” and “opened the oven,” where he found three firearms. (Id.) The agents detained
Defendant and Edwards and contacted Supervisor Cass Mitchell, who in turn contacted the Baton
Rouge Police Department (“BRPD”). (Id.) While waiting for BRPD, the agents continued
searching the Wynnewood Residence. (Id.) Their initial search yielded “narcotics, firearms, [drug]
paraphernalia, and currency.” (Doc. 20-1 at 1.) BRPD subsequently obtained a search warrant and
discovered and seized additional contraband. (Doc. 20-4 at 3.)
On February 9, 2023, Defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury for one count of
possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
and one count of possession of firearms by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(Doc. 1 at 1–2.) He was arrested on these federal charges on March 1, 2023. (Doc. 10 at 1.) He
now moves to suppress all evidence seized, arguing that the agents searched his home “in violation
of his limited right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.” (Doc. 20-1 at 9; accord Doc. 71 at 11.)
II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
A. Initial Briefs
1. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 20)
Defendant recites the following facts: Linton made contact with Defendant outside of the
Wynnewood Residence on July 27, 2022. (Doc. 20-1 at 2.) At the time, Defendant was
accompanied by Edwards. (Id.) Defendant and Linton waited outside of the residence for
Drummond. (Id.) Upon Drummond’s arrival, Linton informed Defendant that the agents “were
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there to do a residence check.” (Id.) The agents, Defendant, and Edwards then entered the
residence, where the agents “cleared the couch.” (Id.) While Defendant and Edwards sat on the
couch, Linton “moved to the kitchen.” (Id.) At roughly the same time, Drummond allegedly
“discovered a foregrip for an AR-15 style rifle.” (Id.) With this discovery, Linton advised
Defendant that “he would continue to search the residence.” (Id. (emphasis added).) He opened
the oven and “discovered three firearms.” (Id.)
Defendant argues that Linton conducted a warrantless search of Defendant’s home and
that, as a consequence, “the Government bears the burden of proving the legality of the search.”
(Id. at 3–4; see also id. at 3 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir.
1993)).) Defendant concedes that individuals on probation or parole have a diminished expectation
of privacy, including in their homes. (Id. at 4–5 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)).) He notes, however, that the Fifth Circuit has
held that the Government must still establish “reasonable suspicion that [a] probationer is engaged
in criminal activity.” (Id. at 6 (quoting United States v. LeBlanc, 490 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir.
2007)).) He proposes that the rule should be the same for parolees. (Id. at 6–7 (citing United States
v. Sharp, 40 F.4th 749, 753 (6th Cir. 2022)).) Accordingly, “any search of [Defendant’s] home . . .
require[d] reasonable suspicion” beforehand. (Id. at 7.) Defendant contrasts a search with a
“residence check,” which can be suspicionless. (Id. (citing La. R.S. § 15:574.4.2(A)(2)(i)).)
Here, Defendant says, Linton searched the Wynnewood Residence. (Id. at 7–8.) But his
report “contain[ed] no indication that he had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to
entering.” (Id. at 8 (referencing Doc. 20-4 at 1–3).) In the alternative, Defendant argues that, even
if Linton’s initial entry was for the purpose of a residence check, it “at some point transformed
into a search.” (Id.) In particular, “the opening of the oven is a search by any definition.” (Id.)
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Thus, “[i]f Agent Linton did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to opening
the oven, then the search w[as] in violation of Mr. Hoang’s Fourth Amendment rights.” (Id. at 9.)
2. Government’s Opposition (Doc. 22)
The Government responds that, before entering the Wynnewood Residence, Linton had
learned “that Hoang, an individual under his supervision, was potentially recently involved in
criminal activity” in Texas. (Doc. 22 at 1.) Relatedly, Linton knew that Defendant had recently
been “arrested in Marksville, LA, for possession of marijuana.” (Id.) Prior to the residence check
at issue here, Linton had made “three previous attempts to visit [Defendant] at his home,” all of
which were “unsuccessful.” (Id. at 1–2.)
The Government also notes that, shortly after entering the Wynnewood Residence on July
27, 2022, agents spotted a rifle foregrip “on a video game machine” near the front door. (Id. at 2.)
Further, Linton “advised that . . . he could smell the strong odor of marijuana” upon entry. (Id.)
Thus, he began a search. (Id.) As he moved into the kitchen, the smell of marijuana “became
stronger.” (Id.) Only at that point did Linton open the oven and discover the firearms hidden
therein. (Id.)
As a condition of his parole, Defendant agreed to “visits at [his] residence or place of
employment by [his] Parole Officer at any time.” (Id. at 3 (quoting Doc. 22-1 at 1, ¶ 9).) He
likewise agreed to “searches of [his] . . . residence . . . when reasonable suspicion exist[ed] that
[he] [was] or ha[d] been engaged in criminal activity.” (Id. (quoting Doc. 22-1 at 1, ¶ 9).) The
Government does not dispute that Linton eventually conducted a search of the Wynnewood
Residence. (Id.) Thus, “[t]he only question before the Court is the reasonableness of said search in
conjunction with the [residence check].” (Id.) The Government contends that, upon entering the
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Wynnewood Residence in order to conduct a residence check, the agents “observed the firearm
foregrip” and therefore had reasonable suspicion “immediately.” (Id. at 4.)
Alternatively, the Government says, the agents had “ample reasonable suspicion” prior to
entering Defendant’s home. (Id.) Linton was aware that Defendant may have been involved in
criminal activity in Texas and that he had been arrested in Marksville. (Id.) “[I]n the month prior
to the home visit and search in question, the defendant admitted to Agent Linton his inability to
pass a drug screen.” (Id.) And following Defendant’s arrest in Marksville, “Linton tried numerous
times to visit the defendant at his home[,] to no avail.” (Id.) “[B]ased on the totality of the
circumstances and his experiences with the defendant,” Linton had reasonable suspicion before
entering the Wynnewood residence. (Id.; see also id. (citing United States v. Williams, 880 F.3d
713, 720 (5th Cir. 2018)).)
B. Suppression Hearing
At the hearing on October 14, 2025, the Court heard testimony from Agent Carroll “Trey”
Landry (“Landry”), Drummond, and Linton. (Doc. 62 at 1; Doc. 68 at 2.)
1. Landry’s Testimony
Landry, a special agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(“ATF”), testified that, on July 27, 2022, he was called out to the Wynnewood Residence after the
search had already taken place. (Doc. 68 at 4–5.) Landry explained that a rifle foregrip is not, “[i]n
and of itself” illegal, but rather is “just a gun part,” which anyone can easily purchase and which
“even a prohibited person can possess.” (Id. at 11–12.) He also speculated that the foregrip could
attach to “a pellet gun or an airsoft gun.” (Id. at 12.) However, Landry opined that—had he been
the one to discover the foregrip—it would have been “a red flag” to him, because it is “immediately
recogniz[able] . . . as a gun part” and because it functions to “help [a person] fire a rifle more
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accurately.” (Id.; see also id. at 14 (Question: “[I]f you were to come across [a rifle foregrip] in
the possession of a prohibited person[,] would you find that suspicious?” Answer: “For sure.”).)
2. Drummond’s Testimony
Next, Drummond testified that, if a parole officer “anticipate[s] that [he] may find
evidence” during a residence check, then he will “usually ask [another officer] to assist him.” (Id.
at 15.) Drummond had previously accompanied Linton on “[m]ore than five”—“probably” more
than ten—checks of parolees’ residences. (Id. at 20–21.) Prior to the residence check on July 27,
2022, Linton informed Drummond that: (1) “Mr. Hoang was arrested recently by another police
department” for “misdemeanor drug possession,” (2) Defendant had been “a victim of a robbery”
in Marksville, and (3) “there could be a chance” that the Wynnewood Residence contained
evidence of criminal activity. (Id. at 21–22; see also id. at 27–28.)
When Drummond arrived at the Wynnewood Residence on July 27, 2022, he observed
Linton, Defendant, and Edwards “standing in the driveway.” (Id. at 16.) The agents, Defendant,
and Edwards entered the residence together. (Id.) Linton instructed Defendant and Edwards to sit
on the couch. (Id.) Meanwhile, Drummond “observed a vertical foregrip attachment for a rifle on
the video game machine to the left-hand side of the doorway.” (Id. at 16–17, 22–23.) He informed
Linton of the rifle foregrip, at which time Linton “walked to the back of the house to begin looking
around.” (Id. at 17.) In the kitchen—specifically, in the oven—Linton found three firearms. (Id. at
17–18.) Drummond agreed that Linton began searching the Wynnewood Residence “based on
finding th[e] [rifle] foregrip.” (Id. at 27.) Although the foregrip “[was] not illegal,” Drummond
testified that he found it “suspicious,” especially because Defendant could not legally possess
firearms. (Id. at 28.)
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Drummond further testified that he noticed “[a] faint odor of marijuana” upon entering the
Wynnewood Residence. (Id. at 16, 28.) He acknowledged that Linton’s report did not mention the
smell and opined that he “would have included” the detail had he authored the report. (Id. at 23.)
But he also stated that he and Linton “probably” discussed the odor while at the residence. (Id.)
After finding the three firearms, the agents contacted their supervisor, who eventually
contacted BRPD. (Id. at 17–18; see also id. at 46, 49, 64.) Body-worn camera footage shows
Drummond pointing out the foregrip to BRPD officers. (See id. at 19.) Drummond testified that
“generally between two and four” BRPD officers respond to a call. (Id. at 24.) Here, however,
there were “at least five or six or seven.” (Id. at 26.) According to Drummond, these officers
“arrived as time went on,” because BRPD was continuing to discover evidence. (Id. at 26–27.)
3. Linton’s Testimony
Linton testified that, when visiting the Wynnewood Residence on January 3, 2022, he
“could smell the odor of burnt marijuana.” (Id. at 32–33.) Defendant admitted that he and Edwards
“had been smoking marijuana in the house.” (Id. at 33.) On that occasion, Linton did not conduct
a search. (Id.) Subsequently, on June 3, 2022, Defendant requested permission to travel to Houston,
Texas. (Id. at 33–34.) Another officer informed Defendant that he “needed to pass a drug screen.”
(Id. at 34.) Defendant again admitted to drug use but nevertheless received the travel permit. (Id.)
On June 6, 2022, the Tunica/Biloxi Police Department (“Tunica/Biloxi”) called Linton in
order to inform him that officers had arrested Defendant and Edwards in Marksville for
“possession of marijuana” (i.e., simple possession). (Id. at 34–35.) Defendant had not told Linton
“that he was . . . going to and staying in Marksville.” (Id. at 36.) Based on the call, it was Linton’s
understanding that Edwards had reported that she and Defendant “were being robbed by someone
with a semi-automatic weapon,” (id. at 35), that Tunica/Biloxi officers had arrived on scene and
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had chased a suspect, that the suspect had “tripped on an AC unit next to the . . . cabin” where
Defendant and Edwards were staying, and that officers had subsequently located 2.5 pounds of
marijuana “under/near an AC unit,” (id. at 68).
Linton received a second phone call from Tunica/Biloxi on June 6, 2022. (Id. at 35.) An
officer advised that surveillance footage of the Marksville incident showed “that there were some
suspicious people [who] had been looking around” and “searching under” Defendant’s vehicle.
(Id. at 35, 56–57.) Officers had also located another two pounds of marijuana hidden near
Defendant’s rental cabin. (Id. at 35.) Tunica/Biloxi suggested to Linton “that Mr. Hoang may be
involved in a larger drug trafficking/drug smuggling operation.” (Id.; see also id. at 57 (“It just
didn’t seem . . . like a regular armed robbery [to Tunica/Biloxi].”).) Linton did not review the
surveillance footage, nor did he receive any incident reports or witness statements. (Id. at 59.)
On June 16, 2022, Linton left Defendant a voicemail and sent Defendant a text. (Id. at 36.)
He did not recall receiving a response. (Id.) On June 22, 2022, Linton tried to visit the Wynnewood
Residence, but “there was no answer or contact there.” (Id.) Later that same day, however, Linton
met Defendant at the parole office. (Id.) Linton instructed Defendant to forward docket information
concerning the Marksville incident. (Id. at 37.) He did not recall receiving that information. (Id. at
37–38.) On July 11, 2022, Linton attempted a second residence check, again without success. (Id.
at 38.) On July 26, 2022, Linton went to the Wynnewood Residence for the third time since the
Marksville incident. (Id.) When no one answered the door, Linton called Defendant, who said that
he was in Lafayette. (Id.) Defendant had not told Linton of this trip ahead of time. (Id. at 38–39.)
Linton ordered Defendant to return to Baton Rouge “immediately.” (Id. at 39.)
Finally, on July 27, 2022, Linton requested Drummond’s assistance, voicing his suspicion
that “there m[ight] be something in [Defendant’s] residence.” (Id. at 39–40; see also id. at 58
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(“[F]rom our past experience, we expected to find possibly some drugs . . . and possibly a
weapon.”).) Shortly after Linton arrived at the Wynnewood Residence, Defendant “drove up . . .
in a black Dodge Charger Hellcat,” which Linton had not seen before. (Id. at 40–41; see also id.
at 44 (explaining that this “very expensive[-]looking vehicle” was suspicious because, to Linton’s
knowledge, Defendant only worked part-time for his family, which “operated some nail salons”).)
While standing in the driveway, Defendant explained to Linton that the vehicle belonged to
Edwards. (Id. at 60–61; see also id. at 61 (“As far as I know, [Edwards] didn’t work.”).)
When Drummond arrived, the agents, Defendant, and Edwards entered the Wynnewood
Residence. (Id. at 41–42.) Linton informed Defendant that the agents were “there to do a residence
check.” (Id. at 42.) He instructed Defendant and Edwards to sit on the couch. (Id.) As he “started
to move towards the kitchen,” Drummond pointed out the rifle foregrip. (Id.) Upon questioning,
Defendant told Linton that the foregrip was there “when [he and Edwards] moved in[to] the
house.” (Id. at 43; see also id. at 61–62 (“He lived there for a while. If the foregrip came with the
house, why didn’t he throw it away?”).) Linton testified that he then entered the kitchen and opened
the oven because, “through experience and from . . . other officers, other agencies,” he had learned
that it was a “common place” where people “hide weapons, hide other illegal things.” (Id. at 45.)
Linton also testified that “[t]here was a smell of marijuana in the house,” (id. at 42), which
became “stronger” as he entered the kitchen, (id. at 47). He stated that the smell is “not uncommon”
in parolees’ homes—and that he had previously noticed it in Defendant’s home. (Id. at 47–48; see
also id. at 32–33.) Partly because he “wasn’t really surprised” by the smell, he unintentionally left
it out of his report. (Id. at 48.) Linton acknowledged, however, that officers’ “narrative notes [about
encounters] include the important information,” and that there was no mention of an odor of
marijuana in his “very lengthy narrative entry” for July 27, 2022. (Id. at 51.) He reiterated that the
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omission was “an oversight” and that, in retrospect, he would add the detail. (Id. at 52–53.) Linton
claimed that the smell was one source of reasonable suspicion. (Id. at 53–55.) BRPD’s report of
the incident corroborated Linton’s testimony about the smell. (Id. at 66–67.)
Linton was unequivocal that, when he went to the Wynnewood Residence on July 27, 2022,
he planned to conduct a search. (Id. at 54.) He testified that the bases for the search were, inter
alia, Defendant’s use of controlled substances, “[t]he contact with the police department in
Tunica/Biloxi, the fact that [Defendant] had been arrested [for] possession of marijuana, . . . the
statement from [Tunica/Biloxi] that they believed that [Defendant] may be involved in a larger
drug trafficking/drug smuggling operation,” Defendant’s traveling to Lafayette “without
permission,” “that fancy brand new car,” the odor of marijuana, and the rifle foregrip. (See id. at
54–56, 61, 64; see also id. at 62 (“[A]s we kept moving forward, [it] seemed like there w[ere] more
and more reasons to be suspicious . . . .”).) Linton explained that, while not illegal, the foregrip
“raise[d] suspicions” that Defendant had a firearm. (Id. at 62.) According to Linton, the search
“was based on the totality of the circumstances.” (Id. at 71.)
C. Post-Hearing Briefs
1. Defendant’s Post-Hearing Brief (Doc. 71)
Defendant emphasizes that, during the hearing, Linton acknowledged that Tunica/Biloxi
had arrested Defendant for misdemeanor drug possession, that officers did not find Defendant in
possession of a large amount of marijuana, that Defendant had been the victim of a robbery, and
that Defendant “could have been the victim of a larger gang-related activity.” (Doc. 71 at 5
(emphasis omitted) (citing Doc. 68 at 58); see also id. at 6 (citing Doc. 68 at 69).) Linton also
testified that he had not reviewed surveillance footage or reports of the Marksville incident. (Id. at
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5–6.) Defendant underscores Linton’s testimony that, when he went to the Wynnewood Residence
on July 27, 2022, “he was planning on doing ‘a search.’” (Id. at 5 (quoting Doc. 68 at 54).)
Defendant argues that the agents’ testimony “narrows the legal issues in this case.” (Id. at
7.) Specifically, the hearing established that Linton and Drummond searched the Wynnewood
Residence. (Id.) Although both agents testified, at various points, that they initially went to the
residence in order to conduct a residence check, (see id. at 8 (citing Doc. 68 at 15, 39, 42)), Linton
eventually conceded that, from the outset, he planned to conduct a search, (id. (citing Doc. 68 at
54–55)). Thus, the agents needed reasonable suspicion, meaning that they needed to “be able to
point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant[ed] a belief . . . that a condition of parole ha[d] been or [wa]s being
violated.” (Id. at 8–9 (quoting United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982)).) According
to Defendant, the agents lacked reasonable suspicion. (Id.)
Defendant contrasts the instant case with Griffin v. Wisconsin, where the Supreme Court
held that a probation search was “justified by a police tip . . . that ‘there were or might be guns in
Griffin’s apartment.’” (Id. at 9 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871 (1987)).) Here,
Tunica/Biloxi “did not tell Agent Linton that they suspected that Mr. Hoang had weapons or drugs
in his residence.” (Id.) Rather, they opined that he “may be involved in a larger drug
trafficking/drug smuggling operation.” (Id. (quoting Doc. 68 at 54–55).) And they only charged
Defendant with simple possession. (Id.) Defendant adds that Linton himself “was not sure what he
expected to find at Mr. Hoang’s residence” when he and Drummond went to search it on July 27,
2022. (Id. at 10 (citing Doc. 68 at 22).)
According to Defendant, Linton’s “additional reasons” for the search are unpersuasive.
(Id.) Defendant notes that he explained to Linton that the car which he was driving on July 27,
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2022, belonged to Edwards. (Id.) He also points out that Linton’s report did not mention “a faint
odor of marijuana” in the home. (Id.) Only BRPD’s Street Crimes Unit documented the smell of
marijuana. (Id.) Defendant argues that this “now defunct” unit “lack[s] . . . credibility,” but
regardless, their report conflicts with Linton’s testimony at the hearing. (Id.) Finally, Defendant
contends that the rifle foregrip was not a source of reasonable suspicion, because Defendant could
legally possess it. (Id. at 10–11.) Thus, Defendant says, the search of the Wynnewood Residence
“was not supported by reasonable suspicion.” (Id. at 11.)
2. Government’s Post-Hearing Brief (Doc. 72)
The Government reiterates that Linton and Drummond “conducted a residence check and
subsequent search” of the Wynnewood Residence. (Doc. 72 at 1.) One of Defendant’s parole
conditions authorized residence checks “at any time,” as well as “searches of [Defendant’s] person,
property, residence, and/or vehicle, when reasonable suspicion exist[ed] that [he] [was] or ha[d]
been engaged in criminal activity.” (Id. at 3–4 (quoting Doc. 22-1 at 1, ¶ 9).) The Government
contends that, “[e]ven in the absence of any reasonable suspicion, Agent Linton was authorized to
enter the defendant’s home in connection with the home visit.” (Id. at 4 (citing LeBlanc, 490 F.3d
at 368–69).) This residence check “immediately resulted in reasonable suspicion”: Upon entry, the
agents “observed the firearm foregrip . . . and smelled marijuana.” (Id.) In particular, the smell of
marijuana “not only supports a finding of reasonable suspicion, but . . . was also enough to
establish ‘probable cause.’” (Id. at 5 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304,
1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).) Although Linton did not include the smell of marijuana in his
report, he “was candid with the [C]ourt and acknowledged that he should have included it.” (Id.
(citing Doc. 68 at 47–48).) Both Drummond and BRPD corroborated this detail. (Id. (citing Doc.
68 at 66–67).)
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But even before entering the Wynnewood Residence, Linton had reasonable suspicion,
because he “was aware of the defendant’s recent arrest as well as [his] potential involvement in
drug trafficking.” (Id. at 4.) Additionally, in the month preceding the residence check, Defendant
“admitted to Agent Linton his inability to pass a drug screen.” (Id. at 4–5.) And following the
Marksville incident, Linton attempted numerous visits to the Wynnewood Residence. (Id. at 5.)
Finally, the Government notes that, on July 27, 2022, Defendant arrived at the Wynnewood
Residence in a “‘very expensive looking vehicle’ that Agent Linton had not seen him driving
before.” (Id. (quoting Doc. 68 at 44); see also id. (citing Williams, 880 F.3d at 720).) “This was
suspicious given the defendant’s part-time employment at family run nail salons.” (Id. (citing Doc.
68 at 44).)
Given the totality of the circumstances, the Government argues that Linton had reasonable
suspicion to search the home. (Id. at 6.) “[E]ven in the absence of reasonable suspicion, a home
visit was certainly justified[,] and reasonable suspicion developed upon entry into the home.” (Id.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures” by law
enforcement. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Individuals on parole, however, have a “significantly
diminished” “reasonable expectation of privacy” due to their “knowing agreement to the parole
condition[s] imposed in accordance with state law.” United States v. Meaux, 797 F. App’x 892,
892 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing La. R.S. § 15:574.4.2(A)(2)(i) (2015); Samson, 547 U.S.
at 852; Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 119–20).
In Griffin, the Supreme Court concluded “that a warrantless, non-consensual search of a
probationer’s home on the basis of less than probable cause” can be “reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2004)
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(cleaned up) (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 880). Likewise, in United States v. Knights, the
Court “upheld a warrantless search which was conducted pursuant to the terms of the defendant’s
state probation where law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
occurring.” United States v. Anderson, 620 F. App’x 365, 366 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing
Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 121). In addition, the Court has held that “the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson, 547
U.S. at 857; see also United States v. Taylor, 482 F.3d 315, 319 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Samson,
547 U.S. at 850).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant’s Status as Parolee
“[P]arolees enjoy even less of the average citizen’s absolute liberty than do probationers.”
United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 850).
The Supreme Court has specifically “upheld the warrantless non-consensual search of a
probationer’s home based upon,” inter alia, tips from other law enforcement officers. Keith, 375
F.3d at 349 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870–71); see also Williams, 880 F.3d at 719–20 (citing
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879–80) (explaining that, per Griffin, “tips given to a probation officer from
other law enforcement officers are sufficient to support reasonable suspicion to conduct a search
of a probationer”). In making this determination, the Court “found that a warrant requirement
would ‘interfere to an appreciable degree’ with the ability of the probation system to adequately
supervise probationers by ‘mak[ing] it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to
evidence of misconduct’ and ‘reduc[ing] the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious
searches would otherwise create.’” Keith, 375 F.3d at 349 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876).
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At all relevant times, Defendant was on parole, (Doc. 20-2 at 1)—more specifically, under
Linton’s supervision, (Doc. 20-1 at 2). Defendant signed a certificate of parole on April 26, 2021,
and again on April 28, 2021. (Doc. 20-3 at 1.) Condition Nine of that certificate read: “I agree to
visits at my residence . . . by my Parole Officer at any time. I also agree to searches of my . . .
residence . . . when reasonable suspicion exists that I am or have been engaged in criminal
activity.” (Id. at 1, ¶ 9.)
Defendant argues that Linton and Drummond conducted a search, not a residence check.
(Doc. 20-1 at 7–8; Doc. 71 at 7–8.) Indeed, Linton himself testified that, when he arrived at the
Wynnewood Residence, he planned to conduct a search. (Doc. 68 at 54.) The Government
responds that Linton and Drummond initially conducted a residence check, which graduated to a
search after the agents smelled marijuana and saw the rifle foregrip. (Doc. 22 at 2–3; Doc. 72 at
3–4.) The Court need not resolve whether, from the moment they entered the Wynnewood
Residence, the agents were engaged in a residence check or a search. Assuming, arguendo, that
the agents were, from the outset, conducting a search, the Court nonetheless finds that they had
the requisite reasonable suspicion. (See also Doc. 22 at 4; Doc. 72 at 4–5.)
B. Reasonable Suspicion
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.4.2 provides that a parolee must agree “to searches of
person, property, residence, or vehicle, when reasonable suspicion exists that criminal activity has
been engaged in while on parole.” La. R.S. § 15:574.4.2(A)(2)(i). The statute “does not state that
the criminal activity must have taken place at the property, residence, or vehicle to be searched,
nor does it set a time limit on the criminal activity other than ‘while on parole.’” United States v.
Quinn, No. 24-3, 2025 WL 2943091, at *9 (M.D. La. Oct. 17, 2025) (deGravelles, J.) (citing La.
R.S. § 15:574.4.2(A)(2)(i)). Nor does Condition Nine of the parole certificate impose such
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limitations. (See Doc. 20-3 at 1, ¶ 9); see also Meaux, 797 F. App’x at 893 (citing Knights, 534
U.S. at 118–20; Samson 547 U.S. at 852) (“The [parole] condition itself is a ‘salient circumstance’
in determining the reasonableness of the search.” (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118)).
The Fifth Circuit has articulated the “reasonable suspicion” standard for a situation like
this one: Reasonable suspicion “requires no more than that the authority acting be able to point to
specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant a belief . . . that a condition of parole has been or is being violated.” Scott, 678
F.2d at 35; accord Bates v. Normand, 703 F. Supp. 3d 775, 788 (W.D. La. 2023); Dimes v. Tanner,
No. 19-13712, 2021 WL 3146292, at *7 (E.D. La. June 22, 2021). Bases for reasonable suspicion
include tips from other law enforcement officers, as well as the supervising parole officer’s
familiarity and history with the individual on parole. See, e.g., Meaux, 797 F. App’x at 892–93;
Williams, 880 F.3d at 715–16, 718, 720 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879–80); see also Griffin, 483
U.S. at 879 (“The [probation] agency . . . must be able to proceed on the basis of its entire
experience with the probationer, and to assess probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life,
character, and circumstances.”).
In order to search the Wynnewood Residence, Linton needed reasonable suspicion that
Defendant “[was] or ha[d] been engaged in criminal activity.” (Doc. 20-3 at 1, ¶ 9); see also
Anderson, 620 F. App’x at 366 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 121) (explaining that, in Knights,
the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search because “law enforcement had reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was occurring”). Even before entering the residence on July 27,
2022, Linton had reasonable suspicion. First, during a residence check on January 3, 2022, Linton
smelled marijuana; at the time, Defendant admitted that he had been smoking marijuana inside the
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residence. (Doc. 68 at 32–33.) And when Defendant requested a travel permit on June 3, 2022, he
admitted to another officer that he would fail a drug screen, if administered. (Id. at 33–34.)
Second, after traveling to Houston, Defendant stopped in Marksville without informing
Linton. (Id. at 36.) While there, he and Edwards were robbed “by someone with a semi-automatic
weapon.” (Id. at 35, 68.) On June 6, 2022, Tunica/Biloxi informed Linton that officers had arrived
on scene and had chased a suspect, that officers had recovered 2.5 pounds of marijuana near where
Defendant was staying, and that officers had arrested Defendant for simple possession of
marijuana. (Id. at 34–35.) Later that same day, Tunica/Biloxi informed Linton that officers had
located another two pounds of marijuana near where Defendant was staying and that surveillance
footage of the incident showed “that there were some suspicious people [who] had been looking
around” and “searching under” Defendant’s vehicle. (Id. at 35, 56–57.) Tunica/Biloxi suggested
to Linton “that Mr. Hoang may be involved in a larger drug trafficking/drug smuggling operation.”
(Id. at 35; see also id. at 57 (“It just didn’t seem . . . like a regular armed robbery [to
Tunica/Biloxi].”).)
The fact that Linton did not review surveillance footage or reports of the Marksville
incident, (id. at 59), does not affect whether the information and opinions provided by
Tunica/Biloxi contributed to Linton’s reasonable suspicion, see, e.g., Scott, 678 F.2d at 35 (“Where
the parole officer discovers or is apprised of such facts, we think that he will seldom be found at
fault in acting upon them . . . .” (emphasis added)). Linton also knew that Defendant was on parole
after being convicted of felony drug-distribution. (See Doc. 68 at 40.) The Fifth Circuit has
regularly found reasonable suspicion based, in whole or in part, upon similar circumstances. See,
e.g., Meaux, 797 F. App’x at 892–93 (finding probable cause based, in part, on “a tip . . . from
detectives with the Crowley Police Department that [the parolee] was the suspect in a recent armed
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robbery” and the supervising officer’s own “knowledge of [the parolee’s] history of armed robbery
charges and simple robbery convictions”); Scott, 678 F.2d at 35 (“What we have said disposes of
the suggestion that the action of Scott’s parole officer was somehow invalid because the facts upon
which she acted came to her via a postal inspector, rather than as a result of her own
investigations.”); Keith, 375 F.3d at 351 (“Agent Myers was acting on information received by the
police from a person engaged in the retail business in the same rural community where the
defendant lived, who knew the defendant and knew of the defendant’s prior involvement in
building and detonating bombs.”).
Third, Linton had considerable difficulty making contact with Defendant after the
Marksville incident. In particular, Linton went to the Wynnewood Residence on June 22, July 11,
and July 26, 2022, in order to conduct a residence check. (Id. at 36–39.) All three visits were
unsuccessful. (Id.) Immediately after the third attempt, Linton called Defendant, who—for the first
time—informed Linton that he had traveled to Lafayette without permission. (See id. at 38–39, 56
(“[H]e was not supposed to be there and didn’t notify [Linton] that he had left . . . .”).)
Based on the totality of the circumstances, (see id. at 71)—Defendant’s multiple
admissions of drug use, the Marksville incident, Defendant’s arrest for simple possession of
marijuana, Tunica/Biloxi’s suggestion that Defendant “may be involved in a larger drug
trafficking/drug smuggling operation,” Linton’s knowledge of Defendant’s conviction for felony
drug-distribution, the three unsuccessful visits to the Wynnewood Residence after the Marksville
incident, and Defendant’s traveling to Lafayette without notice or permission, (see id. at 54–56,
61, 63–64)—Linton had reasonable suspicion that Defendant “[was] or ha[d] been engaged in
criminal activity,” (see Doc. 20-3 at 1, ¶ 9). The “very expensive[-]looking vehicle” which
Defendant was driving on July 27, 2022, heightened Linton’s suspicion because, to his knowledge,
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JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Defendant worked part-time at family-owned nail salons, and Edwards “didn’t work.” (Id. at 40–
41, 44, 55, 60–61; see also id. at 62.) Thus, before Linton entered the Wynnewood Residence on
July 27, 2022, he had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had been or was engaged in criminal
activity, in violation of the conditions of his parole. Because Defendant was on parole, no more
was needed. See Scott, 678 F.2d at 35. Linton’s search of the Wynnewood Residence was valid.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 20) is DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 5, 2026.
S
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