Campbell v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. et al

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DYLAN CAMPBELL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 23-2-SDD-RLB
HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC., ET AL.
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the
Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served
with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 10, 2026.
S
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DYLAN CAMPBELL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 23-2-SDD-RLB
HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC., ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (R. Doc. 159) and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (R. Doc. 160). The motions are opposed. (R. Doc. 162; R. Doc.
163). Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. (R. Doc. 173).
I. Background
On or about November 14, 2022, Dylan Campbell (“Plaintiff”) initiated this personal
injury action in the 19th Judicial District Court, East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, naming as
defendants Helmerich & Payne, Inc. (“H&P Inc.”), Helmerich & Payne Management, LLC
(“H&P Management”), GeoSouthern Energy Corporation (“GeoSouthern”), Huckaby Four JS,
LLC (“Huckaby”), Jaqueline Huckaby Woodson (“Woodson”), and SWN Production
(Louisiana), LLC (“SWN”). (R. Doc. 1-2 at 1-8, “Petition”). Plaintiff, who worked as a
derrickman on a drilling rig for H&P Inc. and H&P Management (collectively, the “H&P
Defendants”), alleged that on or about November 13, 2021, he suffered injuries resulting from a
“well explosion and fire in Red River Parish, Louisiana.” (Petition ¶ 14). Plaintiff further alleged
that the “subject well is operated, managed and maintained by Defendant GeoSouthern,” which
is also “responsible for . . . implementing and overseeing safe practices, policies and procedures
at the subject location.” (Petition ¶ 15). Plaintiff further alleged that SWN owned the subject well
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and Huckaby and Woodson (collectively, the “Huckaby Defendants”) “owned the land on which
the subject well was located.” (Petition ¶ 16).
Plaintiff asserted that all of the Defendants were liable for the explosion and resulting
injuries to Plaintiff based on various acts and omissions. (Petition ¶ 19). Finally, Plaintiff alleged
that while he “seeks damages far in excess of $75,000,” the “case is not removable [to federal
court] because (1) complete diversity is lacking because Plaintiff and certain Defendants are
residents of Louisiana; and (2) multiple Defendants are forum defendants in Louisiana.” (Petition
¶ 11).
On January 3, 2023, Defendants (with the exception of GeoSouthern) removed this
action, asserting that the Court can exercise diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (R.
Doc. 1). With respect to diversity of citizenship, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff is a citizen of
Louisiana and the following defendants are diverse: H&P, Inc. (Delaware and Oklahoma); H&P
Management (Delaware and Oklahoma); GeoSouthern (Texas); and SWN (Delaware and Texas).
(R. Doc. at 4-5). Defendants further asserted that while the Huckaby Defendants are both citizens
of Louisiana (and, therefore, non-diverse defendants), they were improperly joined as defendants
in this action and their citizenship must be ignored for the purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction. (R. Doc. 1 at 5).
On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed his first Motion to Remand, arguing that the Court
lacks diversity jurisdiction in light of the addition of the non-diverse Huckaby Defendants. (R.
Doc. 19). While this motion was pending, the district judge dismissed without prejudice all
claims against H&P, Inc. and H&P Management (collectively, the “H&P Defendants”) pursuant
to a Notice of Rule 41(a)(1)(A) dismissal and joint Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss. (R. Doc.
24).
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On August 31, 2023, the district judge denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, dismissing
Plaintiff’s claims against the Huckaby Defendants without prejudice, on the basis that they were
improperly joined as defendants for the purpose of destroying complete diversity. (R. Doc. 29;
see R. Doc. 28). After that ruling, SWN and GeoSouthern1 were the sole defendants named in the
Petition remaining in this action.
On January 2, 2024, the Court issued a Scheduling Order providing, among other things,
that the deadline to amend the pleadings and add new parties was set for March 1, 2024 and the
deadline to complete non-expert discovery for November 1, 2024. (R. Doc. 34).
On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed his first Motion to Amend (R. Doc. 40) and second
Motion to Remand (R. Doc. 41). In the proposed amended pleading, Plaintiff sought to name
various defendants without identifying their citizenship for the purpose of determining continued
exercise of diversity jurisdiction. (R. Doc. 40-2 at 1-5). With respect to the underlying incident,
Plaintiff sought to allege the following:
On the date of the incident, Plaintiff was draining the flare line between the gas
buster and the flare stack because the flare had gone out. As Plaintiff opened the
drain valve, located at the 90-degree elbow under the flare stack, the flare line
discharged a mixture of water and volatile material which was then ignited by the
flare igniter. Suddenly and without warning, a fiery explosion ensured, and
Plaintiff was covered with burning material all over his body.
(R. Doc. 40-2 at 7).2 Plaintiff further sought to allege that Larry Ruble and William A. Lipps
were hired by SWN and other proposed defendants “as company men to direct, supervise, and
oversee well operations.” (R. Doc. 40-2 at 10).3 In relevant part, Plaintiff sought to allege that
1 GeoSouthern, which was not served prior to removal, has not made an appearance in this action. Plaintiff removed
GeoSouthern as a defendant in his Second Amended Complaint. (R. Doc. 48; see R. Doc. 49).
2 This allegations is included in Paragraph 12 of the Second Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 48 at 4) and Paragraph 14
of the proposed Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 159-3 at 5-6).
3 This allegations is included in Paragraph 19 of the Second Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 48 at 6) and Paragraph 21
of the proposed Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 159-3 at 8).
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these “company men” . . . “knew or should have known about rainy conditions, flare equipment,
flare line, and re-lighting protocol after a flare goes out” and should, therefore, be held liable for
failing to warn Plaintiff or otherwise rectify the issues that caused the explosion in the course of
supervising Plaintiff and the equipment at the site. (See R. Doc. 40-2 at 11-12).4
On May 30, 2024, the Court ruled on Plaintiff’s first Motion to Amend and his second
Motion to Remand. (R. Doc. 47). With respect to the various proposed defendants whose
citizenships were not identified, the Court denied leave to amend without prejudice to seek
amendment by identifying the citizenship of the proposed defendants. (R. Doc. 47 at 7). More
importantly, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to name the proposed diverse defendants Mr. Ruble
and his company Larry Ruble Consulting, LLC (the “Ruble Defendants”) and Iron Horse Tools,
Inc. (“Iron Horse”), but denied leave to amend to name the non-diverse defendants Mr. Lipps
and his company William A. Lipps, Inc. collectively, the “Lipps Defendants”). (R. Doc. 47 at 8-
16). Having concluded that amendment to name the Lipps Defendants was improper after
consideration of the appropriate Hensgens factors and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), the Court also denied
Plaintiff’s second Motion to Remand as moot given the proper continued exercise of diversity
jurisdiction. R. Doc. 47 at 16-17).
In denying amendment to name the Lipps Defendants, the Court first noted that Plaintiff
had already sought to preclude removal by adding non-diverse defendants, who were ultimately
found to be improperly joined as defendants. (R. Doc. 47 at 9-10; see R. Doc. 29; R. Doc. 28).
Considering the higher standard for amendment under Hensgens, the Court concluded that the
amendment appeared to be futile because even if Plaintiff could properly allege the Lipps
Defendants held the proper duties to Plaintiff, the proposed amendment still failed to allege that
4 This allegations is included in Paragraphs 22-23 of the Second Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 48 at 7-8) and
Paragraphs 26-27 of the proposed Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 159-3 at 10).
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Mr. Lipps was personally involved in the underlying incident. (R. Doc. 47 at 10-15). In reaching
this conclusion, the Court considered the contents of a Daily Drilling Report attached to the
proposed amended pleading, which indicated that Mr. Ruble (not Mr. Lipps) was the consultant
on duty at the time of the incident. (R. Doc. 47 at 13-14) (citing R. Doc. 40-2 at 446-448). The
Court also considered an Incident Field Report attached to the proposed amended pleading that
referenced Mr. Ruble as the “GEP rig consultant” on duty at the time, with no reference of Mr.
Lipps. (R. Doc. 47 at 13-14) (citing R. Doc. 40-2 at 447-448). Finally, the Court considered a
sworn declaration by Mr. Lipps in support of a finding that he had no personal involvement in
the underlying incident. (R. Doc. 47 at 14-15) (citing R. Doc. 46-2 at 2).
In the foregoing ruling, the Court noted that “Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any
documents or testimony obtained in discovery controverting the sworn representations submitted
by Mr. Lipps.” (R. Doc. 47 at 15). Nevertheless, the Court did “not reach the merits of whether
Plaintiff has any potential possibility of recovery against the Lipps Defendants,” but instead
found that the “absence of factual and legal support for any such claim supports a conclusion that
Plaintiff is seeking to add them as non-diverse defendants for the purpose of destroying complete
diversity.” (R. Doc. 47 at 15).
The Court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to amend the pleadings, consistent with the
foregoing ruling. (R. Doc. 47 at 18). On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Second Amended
Complaint” directly into the record, naming as defendants SWN, GEP Haynesville, LLC
(“GEP”),5 the Ruble Defendants, and Iron Horse. (R. Doc. 48).6
5 The Second Amended Complaint does not identify the citizenship of GEP. (See R. Doc. 48 at 2). Instead, the
Second Amended Complaint also attaches evidence that SWN acquired GE through merger. (R. Doc. 48 at 5) (citing
R. Doc. 48-4). GEP subsequently sought dismissal of all claims against it as a separate business entity in light of this
merger agreement. (R. Doc. 114). This motion has been terminated pending resolution of the instant motions. (R.
Doc. 196).
6 This amended pleading is in fact the first amended complaint filed into the record. To avoid confusion, however,
the Court will identify this amended pleading as the Second Amended Complaint.
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On December 2, 2024, Iron Horse Tools filed an Unopposed Motion to Amend
Scheduling Order given its late entry as a defendant in this action. (R. Doc. 82). The Court
granted the motion, setting, among other things, a new deadline to amend the pleadings and join
other parties on January 20, 2025 and a new deadline to complete non-expert discovery by April
1, 2025. (R. Doc. 83).
On May 29, 2025, in the context of also resolving a Motion to Quash Depositions (R.
Doc. 116), Motion to File Cross Claim (R. Doc. 119), and Motion for Rule 35 Examination (R.
Doc. 128), the Court granted Plaintiff’s Partially Opposed Motion to Amend Scheduling Order
(R. Doc. 127), extending, in pertinent part, the non-expert discovery deadline to July 1, 2025 for
the sole purpose of completing depositions. (R. Doc. 146). The Court did not reopen the deadline
to amend the pleadings.
On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motions: his second Motion to Amend (R.
Doc. 159) and third Motion to Remand (R. Doc. 160). In short, Plaintiff argues that discovery
establishes that it is proper to allow him to file an untimely amendment naming the non-diverse
Lipps Defendants as defendants after reconsideration of the appropriate Hensgens factors and 28
U.S.C. § 1447(e). (R. Doc. 159). Plaintiff again seeks remand on the basis that the addition of the
non-diverse Lipps Defendants would destroy diversity jurisdiction. (R. Doc. 160).
II. Law and Analysis
A. Legal Standards
Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the modification of a
scheduling order deadline upon a showing of good cause and with the judge’s consent. The Fifth
Circuit has explained that a party is required “to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be
met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.” Marathon Fin. Ins. Inc., RRG v.
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Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting S&W Enters., LLC v. Southtrust
Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)). In determining whether the movant has
established “good cause” for an extension of deadlines, the Court considers four factors: (1) the
party’s explanation for the requested extension; (2) the importance of the requested extension;
(3) the potential prejudice in granting the extension; and (4) the availability of a continuance to
cure such prejudice. See Leza v. City of Laredo, 496 Fed. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Amendments to pleadings are generally governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under Rule 15, after the period for amendment as a matter of course elapses, “a
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave” and the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
The rule “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v.
Diamond & Gem Trading U.S.A. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999). Although leave to
amend should not be automatically granted, “[a] district court must possess a substantial reason
to deny a request for leave to amend[.]” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994
(5th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). The Court may consider several factors when determining
whether to grant leave to amend, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the
amendment. . . .” See Rhodes v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
“It is within the district court’s discretion to deny a motion to amend if it is futile.”
Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The
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“futility” of amendments to a complaint is measured by whether “the amended complaint would
fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted” under “the same standard of legal
sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 873 (citations omitted).
Since joinder of a nondiverse defendant after removal would destroy diversity
jurisdiction and require remand, a court has discretion to permit or deny joinder. See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(e) (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the
action to the State court.”). When an amendment seeks to add a nondiverse party that would
destroy jurisdiction altogether in a removed action, the court must balance the factors as set forth
in Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). The court should “scrutinize that
amendment more closely than an ordinary amendment” and should generally consider four
factors to determine whether the amendment is appropriate: “[1] the extent to which the purpose
of the amendment is to defeat federal jurisdiction, [2] whether plaintiff has been dilatory in
asking for amendment, [3] whether plaintiff will be significantly injured if amendment is not
allowed, and [4] any other factors bearing on the equities.” Id. at 1182. If the court permits the
addition of a nondiverse defendant, it must remand the action to the state court. Id.
B. Analysis
1. Rule 16(b)(4)
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether to consider Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend, given that it was filed after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired on January 20,
2025. (See R. Doc. 83). Unless Plaintiff has established good cause to modify the deadline to
amend, Plaintiff’s attempt at amendment must be denied as untimely.
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Having considered the record, the Court finds good cause pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4) to
allow Plaintiff to seek untimely amendment. Plaintiff has explained that he is now seeking leave
to amend to name the Lipps Defendants based on deposition testimony obtained in late June
2025, as well as his own expert’s more recent analysis of the duties of the company men at
issue.7 While Plaintiff should have been more diligent in filing a renewed motion to amend
seeking to name the Lipps Defendants, the Court finds his explanation sufficient for the purposes
of establishing good cause to modify the deadlines to allow Plaintiff to seek amendment. There is
no dispute that Plaintiff seeks amendment in light of discovery indicating that he can now raise a
valid claim against the Lipps Defendants despite the heightened scrutiny on the Hensgens
analysis. There can be no dispute that the amendment is important to Plaintiff given that he seeks
to add a party who he alleges is directly responsible for his alleged injuries. Finally, the district
judge has continued the trial in this action without date. (See R. Doc. 197). Accordingly, a
continuance of the deadlines up to the trial date is available to the extent necessary to cure any
resulting potential prejudice to the opposing parties.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds good cause to extend the deadline to amend the
pleadings to allow Plaintiff to seek amendment.
2. Rule 15(a)(2) and the Hensgens Factors
Having concluded that there is good cause to deem the instant motion timely filed, the
Court must again face the issue of whether to allow amendment to name the non-diverse Lipps
Defendants to this action, which would destroy diversity jurisdiction and require remand. Given
the information obtained by Plaintiff during discovery and submitted in support of his motion,
7 With respect to expert testimony, Plaintiff relies upon an undated report from Benjamin Gibson supplementing his
previous April 15, 2025 report (R. Doc. 159-10) and a July 15, 2025 report from Eugene Sweeny. (R. Doc. 159-11).
The Court has not considered this expert testimony for the purposes of determining whether to allow amendment.
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the Court concludes that evaluation of the Hensgens factors weigh in favor of allowing Plaintiff
to name the Lipps Defendants as non-diverse defendants in this action and remanding this action.
As discussed above, Plaintiff previously sought to name two sets of “company men”
defendants in this action – the diverse Ruble Defendants and the non-diverse Lipps Defendants –
over a year prior to the filing of the instant motions. The Court allowed Plaintiff to name the
Ruble Defendants, whose presence would not destroy diversity jurisdiction, but declined to allow
Plaintiff to name the Lipps Defendants, whose presence would destroy diversity jurisdiction. In
doing so, the Court emphasized the lack of any factual information in the record in support of a
finding that Plaintiff could recover against the Lipps Defendants, particularly given that the
evidence (both attached to the pleadings and external to the pleadings) supported a finding that
Mr. Ruble (and not Mr. Lipps) was the company man on site at the time of the explosion.
Plaintiff now argues that additional discovery – primarily obtained in the form of
deposition testimony – supports a finding that he has a viable claim against the non-diverse
Lipps Defendants. While Plaintiff’s proposed allegations against the Lipps Defendants remain
largely the same,8 Plaintiff has emphasized testimony indicating that Mr. Lipps was on duty the
night before the incident and was responsible for informing Iron Horse of condensation on the
flare stacks that allegedly resulted in the explosion.
With respect to the first Hensgens factor – the plaintiff’s purpose for amendment – courts
will consider “(1) whether the plaintiff knew the identity of the non-diverse defendant when the
state court petition was filed and (2) whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim against the
nondiverse defendant.” Casey v. B H Mgmt. Servs. Inc., No. 18-00947, 2021 WL 6077623, at *3
(W.D. La. Apr. 22, 2021) (citing cases). While it is unclear whether Plaintiff was aware of any
8 Defendants agree that Plaintiff’s instant proposed allegations against the Lipps Defendants are “largely identical”
to Plaintiff’s previous proposed allegations against the Lipps Defendants. (R. Doc. 162 at 8-9; see R. Doc. 163 at 1).
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potential claim against the Lipps Defendants prior to filing the original Petition, there is no
dispute that Plaintiff has been aware of the Lipps Defendants at least since he first sought to
name them as defendants on February 28, 2024. (See R. Doc. 40). The Court denied that attempt
at amendment largely because Plaintiff sought amendment after naming improperly joined
defendants and failing to obtain a remand.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s desire to obtain remand remains a motivation for
seeking amendment to name the Lipps Defendants. As with the first attempt at amendment,
Plaintiff has emphasized the Lipps Defendants’ lack of diversity and has filed a
contemporaneous Motion to Remand, underscoring that a purpose of this proposed amendment is
to destroy diversity jurisdiction and obtain remand. See Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort
Wayne, Ind., No. 09-1596, 2010 WL 1491422, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2010) (“Plaintiffs
amended their complaint and contemporaneously filed their motion to remand. The timing of
these two acts suggests that the purpose of the amendment was to defeat jurisdiction.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s original proposed First Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 40-2) and the instant
proposed Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 159-3) contain virtually identical allegations with
respect to the Lipps Defendants. Indeed, Plaintiff again seeks to allege (albeit without emphasis
this time) that “the express addition of the William A. Lipps defendants deprives this federal
court of diversity-based subject matter jurisdiction and requires remand of the case to Louisiana
state court, which enjoys plenary subject matter jurisdiction.” (R. Doc. 159-3 at 5).
That said, Plaintiff has submitted additional information in support a finding that Plaintiff
should be allowed to amend the pleadings to name the Lipps Defendants. Again, a district court
faced with an amendment to add a non-diverse party, which would require remand, “should
scrutinize that amendment more closely than an ordinary amendment.” Hensgens, 833 F.2d at
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1182. Developments in this litigation since Plaintiff’s first attempt to name the Lipps Defendants
now support a finding that Plaintiff’s primary purpose is to identify an alleged joint tortfeasor,
not to destroy diversity jurisdiction.9
Foremost, in seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against them, the Ruble Defendants
argued that “Plaintiffs’ amendment of the Complaint with respect to the addition of the Lipps
Defendants compels dismissal of the claims against the Ruble Defendants because of the
congruency of the allegations against both sets of defendants.” (R. Doc. 95 at 8) (citing 59, 66-1,
at 3-11). In other words, the Ruble Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because they were virtually identical to the proposed claims
against the Lipps Defendants.
In rejecting this argument, and denying the sought Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the district
judge emphasized that amendment was denied with respect to the Lipps Defendants pursuant to
the heightened scrutiny required by the Hensgens analysis. The district judge noted that the
denial of amendment with respect to the Lipps Defendants placed significant emphasis on other
factors, including supporting evidence that Mr. Lipps was absent at the time of the incident. (R.
Doc. 95 at 10). In contrast, pursuant to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and strict review of the
pleadings, the district judge concluded that “Plaintiff adequately alleges the Ruble Defendants
supervised his work, . . . were personally involved in the events leading to the incident[, and]
9 As with the Plaintiff’s first attempt to name the Lipps Defendants in this action, Defendants respond by arguing
that amendment should be denied by considering the “improper joinder” doctrine. (R. Doc. 162 at 6-8; R. Doc. 163
at 1). The Fifth Circuit has stated that the “improper joinder” doctrine, which permits courts to ignore (for
jurisdictional purposes) those non-diverse parties on the record in state court at the time of removal,” does not apply
in the context of determining whether to allow post-removal joinder of a non-diverse party. Cobb v. Delta Exports,
Inc., 186 F.3d 675, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing cases). Nevertheless, some courts have applied an “improper
joinder” analysis in the context of a post-removal motion to join a non-diverse defendant. See, e.g., Valenti v.
Coburn Supply Co., No. 19-571, 2020 WL 4679544, at *3-4 (M.D. La. July 28, 2020) (citing Smallwood v. Central
R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4680147 (M.D. La.
Aug. 12, 2020). Regardless, there is no dispute that the Court may consider evidence outside of the record for
considering the Hensgens factors in their totality.
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were involved in instructing Plaintiff to do the task he was undertaking at the time of his injury.”
(R. Doc. 95 at 13) (citing R. Doc. 48, at 6-8, 25-36, ¶¶ 18-25, 39-44).
Plaintiff now seeks to allege virtually identical claims against the Lipps Defendants. (See
R. Doc. 159-3 at 7-11, 36-47, ¶¶ 20-29, 49-56). Based solely on the proposed allegations, and
with the benefit of the denial of the Ruble Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on virtually
identical allegations, the Court concludes that Plaintiff raises equally plausible claims against
both sets of company men – the Ruble Defendants and the Lipps Defendants. Plaintiff’s
allegations against both sets of company men are the same: they supervised Plaintiff’s work; they
were personally involved in the events leading up to the incident; and they instructed Plaintiff to
do the task he was undertaking at the time of his injury. (See R. Doc. 95 at 12-13). The district
judge found these allegations to be sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim for relief against
the Ruble Defendants. Accordingly, virtually identical allegations brought against the Lipps
Defendants would also survive a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis based solely on the allegations in the
pleadings.10 This weighs in favor of finding that the sole purpose of amendment is not simply to
destroy diversity jurisdiction. See Schindler v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 05-0082, 2005 WL
1155862, at *3 (E.D. La. May 12, 2005) (“[W]hen a plaintiff states a valid claim against a
defendant, it is unlikely that the primary purpose of bringing those defendants into a litigation is
to destroy diversity jurisdiction.”) (citing cases). Given the district judge’s ruling with respect to
the Lipps Defendants, the Court would find no substantial basis to deny amendment pursuant to
Rule 15(a)(2).
10 Iron Horse appears to argue that Plaintiff’s proposed allegations against the Lipps Defendants fail to state a claim
and would be subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See R. Doc 163 at 3-4). Again, Plaintiff proposed to
raise virtually identical claims against the Lipps Defendants that were previously raised against the Ruble
Defendants. None of the Defendants addresses how these claims would fail Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny in light of the
district judge’s ruling against the Ruble Defendants. (See R. Doc. 95).
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The Court will, however, consider additional evidence in the record to determine whether
Plaintiff is raising a viable claim in light of the heightened scrutiny required by Hensgens. To be
clear, in its previously ruling, the Court denied Plaintiff leave to amend the pleadings to name the
Lipps Defendants, by considering documents attached to the proposed pleading – including a
Daily Drilling Report and Master Service Agreement between GEP Haynesville, LLC and Larry
Ruble Consulting LLC – pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that
is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). (R. Doc. 47 at 13-14).
These documents demonstrated that while both Mr. Ruble and Mr. Lipps were both consultants
at the time of the incident, Mr. Ruble was the specific “GEP rig consultant” on duty at the time
of the well explosion. (R. Doc. 47 at 14). In addition, the Court considered a sworn declaration of
Mr. Lipps in support of a finding that he had no personal involvement in the underlying incident.
(R. Doc. 47 at 14-15) (citing R. Doc. 46-2 at 2). It was in this context that the Court reviewed the
uncontroverted sworn declaration, noting that while the Court “does not reach the merits of
whether Plaintiff has any potential possibility of recovery against the Lipps Defendants, the
absence of factual and legal support for any such claim supports a conclusion that Plaintiff is
seeking to add them as non-diverse defendants for the purpose of destroying complete diversity.”
(R. Doc. 47 at 15).
Plaintiff’s renewed motion makes it clear that he is seeking to allege claims against the
Lipps Defendants based on Mr. Lipps’ acts or omissions while on duty at the site prior to the
explosion. Plaintiff submits a SWN daily drilling report from November 9, 2021 that lists Mr.
Lipps as a present consultant, noting that there was condensation on the flare line. (See R. Doc.
159-4 at 14).11 Plaintiff now asserts that this was an “early warning sign for risk of explosion”
11 Defendants point out that this November 9, 2021 drilling report – as well as other drilling reports for November 3,
2021 through November 17, 2021 – were produced to Plaintiff on February 20, 2024, which is prior to the filing of
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that would have been known by Mr. Lipps, which “should have been a major red flag that the
vent line and flare stack were not set up properly.” (R. Doc. 159-2 at 7).
Moreover, Plaintiff submits testimony from Iron Horse’s corporate representative (Jason
Campbell) (R. Doc. 159-6, “Campbell Dep. Tr.”), SWN’s corporate representative (Sean Burke)
(R. Doc. 159-5, “Burke Dep. Tr.”), H&P’s rig manager (William Mouser) (R. Doc. 159-8,
“Mouser Dep. Tr.”), and Mr. Ruble (R. Doc. 159-7, “Ruble Dep. Tr.”). Mr. Mouser testified that
the company men – Mr. Lipps and Mr. Ruble – were on site to conduct safety inspections and to
coordinate what needed to be fixed on the site. (See Mouser Dep. Tr. 14:23-15:24, 18:11-18).
Mr. Campbell confirmed that the company men – Mr. Lipps and Mr. Ruble – were responsible
for identifying any hazards, including a low point between the vent line and flare stack, and both
carried the same responsibilities to report to Iron Horse of any such hazards regardless of
whether they worked the day or night shift. (See Campbell Dep. Tr. 151:15-154:5). Mr. Burke
and Mr. Campbell both confirmed that there was no evidence that either of the company men –
Mr. Lipps and Mr. Ruble – reported condensate buildup in the flare stack to Iron Horse prior to
the incident. (See Campbell Dep. Tr. 215:5-217:19; Burke Dep. Tr. 89:23-90:4; see also Ruble
Dep. Tr. 242:4-12). Mr. Burke further testified that both company men had the “exact same
obligation” to inform Iron Horse of condensation in the flare stack. (Campbell Dep. Tr. 87:06-
88:02; 128:08-129:02).
The foregoing testimony clarifies that Mr. Lipps, while not on duty during the explosion,
plausibly committed acts or omissions in violation of a duty to identify hazards resulting in the
Plaintiff’s previous motion seeking to name the Lipps Defendants. (R. Doc. 162 at 10; R. Doc. 163 at 1). The Court
recognizes, however, that the deposition testimony discussed below emphasizes the significance of Mr. Lipps’
inspections prior to the underling explosion. Plaintiff’s first motion to amend was not supported by any information
identifying Mr. Lipps as in any way involved with predicate inspections that would have any bearing on the
explosion at issue. (See R. Doc. 40).
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explosion.12 Given this discovery, the Court can no longer conclude that Plaintiff lacks a viable
claim against the Lipps Defendants under the heightened scrutiny of the Hensgens factors.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the primary purpose of seeking amendment is to identify a
possible joint tortfeasor, not solely to obtain remand of this action.
With respect to the second Hensgens factor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not
been dilatory in seeking amendment. Foremost, the Court has already observed that the record
supports a finding that Plaintiff did not learn the identity of the Lipps Defendants or the Ruble
Defendants until discovery was obtained on January 19, 2024. (R. Doc. 47 at 16).13 Accordingly,
this is not an action where Plaintiff was not diligent in seeking amendment after learning of the
identity of the proposed non-diverse defendants. Furthermore, as discussed above, the Court has
found good cause pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4) to conclude that Plaintiff sought amendment
diligently after obtaining additional information in discovery. The second Hensgens factor
weighs in favor of allowing amendment.
The remaining Hensgens factors are either neutral or favor amendment and remand. In
determining whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced by denying leave to amend, the Court
12 Iron Horse emphasizes that Mr. Ruble also testified that Todd Carter (another daytime company man) took over
for Mr. Lipps on certain days prior to the November 13, 2021 explosion. (See R. Doc. 163 at 11-14). Iron Horse
speculates that Plaintiff is not seeking to name Mr. Carter as a defendant “presumably because he is a Texas citizen”
and would not destroy diversity. (R. Doc. 163 at 11). Throughout its opposition, Iron Horse focuses on the potential
liability of Mr. Carter, who Iron Horse claims is “the only other company man who could have personally been
responsible for a supervisory role while Plaintiff was working.” (R. Doc. 163 at 4, 6, 11). The Court is not resolving
any disputes regarding liability for the purposes of considering the Hensgens factors. Instead, the Court is
concluding that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence obtained in discovery to support a finding that Plaintiff’s
primary purpose is to name a non-diverse alleged tortfeasor, not solely to destroy diversity and obtain remand.
13 “Courts have held that a plaintiff's failure to join a non-diverse defendant to an action prior to removal when such
plaintiff knew of a non-diverse defendant's identity and activities suggests that the purpose of the amendment is to
destroy diversity jurisdiction.” Schindler v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., No. 05-0082, 2005 WL 1155862, at *3
(E.D. La. May 12, 2005); see also Darr v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 16-232, 2016 WL 5110267, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug.
31, 2016) (“When analyzing the first Hensgens factor, courts within the Fifth Circuit frequently look at whether the
plaintiff knew or should have known the identity of the party to be joined and the facts underlying the claim against
that party when the state court complaint was filed.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-232-JWD-EWD,
2016 WL 5110480 (M.D. La. Sept. 20, 2016) (citing cases).
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considers “whether the already named diverse defendant would be unable to satisfy a future
judgment14 and whether the plaintiff could recover against the proposed nondiverse defendant.”
Cooper v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 18-1033, 2019 WL 13234722, at *4 (M.D. La.
July 16, 2019) (citations omitted). Additionally, “considerations of cost, judicial efficiency and
possible inconsistency of results militate in favor of not requiring plaintiff[s] to prosecute two
separate claims in two forums when both arise from the same set of facts and circumstances.”
Joseph v. Fluor Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. La. 2007) (quotation omitted). Similarly,
the fourth Henges factor requires courts to analyze other equitable factors, including whether
granting amendment would deprive a diverse defendant of a properly invoked federal forum or
result in parallel state court proceedings. Agyei v. Endurance Power Prods., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d
764, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
The Court previously concluded that the third and fourth Hensgens factors weigh in favor
of denying amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that Plaintiff had “not
submitted any evidence obtained in discovery indicating that Mr. Lipps was on duty (or even on
the work site) at the time of the incident” and would “not be significantly injured by a denial of
amendment because he may still seek to recover against the Lipps Defendants in another action.”
(R. Doc. 47 at 16).
The Court has reconsidered this position in light of the additional discovery presented by
Plaintiff, which supports a finding that Plaintiff is essentially raising the same claims against the
Lipps Defendants and Ruble Defendants regardless of which company man was on site at the
time of the underlying incident (i.e., the explosion). Given that Plaintiff has now demonstrated
that his claims against the Lipps Defendants are viable – and there are serious issues of fact
14 There is no indication that the already named diverse defendants would be unable to satisfy a judgment in this
case.
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regarding what information was known and communicated between the two company men and
the other defendants – the Court finds that requiring parallel judicial proceedings would increase
costs, lead to judicial inefficacies, and may produce conflicting results. The Court recognizes that
soon after the instant motions were filed, the parties had begun to prepare for trial by submitting
dispositive and evidentiary motions. But the district judge has since continued trial without date
and those dispositive and evidentiary motions remain unresolved. (See R. Doc. 197).
Accordingly, remanding this action will not result in any undue hardship on the already named
diverse defendants.
After remand, the parties will obtain a new trial date and have the opportunity to resubmit
their dispositive and evidentiary motions in State court. Remand of this action will not result in
significant increases in the parties’ costs in this litigation or prejudice any party with respect to
the trial date. While the Court recognizes the diverse defendants’ “interest in retaining the federal
forum,” the factual developments in this action make it clear that allowing amendment to name
the Lipps Defendants would minimize “ the danger of parallel federal/state proceedings with the
inherent dangers of inconsistent results and the waste of judicial resources.“ See Hensgens, 833
F.2d at 1182. Accordingly, the third and fourth Hensgens factors are either neutral or weigh in
favor of amendment and remand.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (R.
Doc. 159) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (R. Doc. 159-3) be
entered into the record.
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RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (R. Doc. 160)
be GRANTED, and this action be REMANDED to the 19th Judicial District Court, East Baton
Rouge Parish, Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 10, 2026.
S
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