Trantham v. Ballard et al

ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RANDALL STEVEN TRANTHAM (#7700019228) 	CIVIL ACTION NO.
VERSUS 	23-75-SDD-EWD
BEN BALLARD, ET AL.
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the Clerk
of the U. S. District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the
attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY 	NO 	EXTENSION 	OF 	TIME 	SHALL 	BE 	GRANTED 	TO 	FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 10, 2026.
S
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RANDALL STEVEN TRANTHAM (#7700019228) 	CIVIL ACTION NO.
VERSUS 	23-75-SDD-EWD
BEN BALLARD, ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Randall Steven Trantham (“Trantham”), who is representing himself and who is
confined to the Livingston Parish Detention Center in Livingston, Louisiana, has filed a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”).1 Because Trantham failed to
exhaust state court remedies before filing his habeas Petition in federal court, it is recommended
that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice. There is no need for oral argument or for an
evidentiary hearing.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Trantham filed his Petition with this Court on or about January 30, 2023.2 He alleges that
he was arrested on October 22, 2019, and has been detained and awaiting trial since then.3
Trantham does not provide any information about the pending state criminal charges or whether a
trial has been scheduled. He asserts that under Louisiana state law, he should be released from the
detention center, presumably asserting that his right to a speedy trial under Louisiana Code of
1 Trantham used the standard form for a “Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person In
State Custody” to submit his Petition, but he acknowledged his Petition is actually filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He
explained that he used the §2254 claim form because it was the one that was available to him. R. Doc. 1, p. 10.
2 R. Doc. 1, p. 9. This Report uses the date Trantham’s Petition was placed in the prison mailing system as the filing
date pursuant to the “prison mailbox rule,” adopted by the Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71
(1988).
3 Doc. 1, p. 5.
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Criminal Procedure article 701 has been violated.4 He asserts he filed a motion to quash that is still
pending before the district court.5
Trantham urges he is being ignored by the state trial court.6 He maintains he is entitled to
be released since he has been detained for thirty-nine months without trial.7 He also contends he
has been denied effective assistance of counsel and access to a sufficient law library, including
books and the internet.8
II. LAW AND A NALYSIS
A. 	Trantham Failed to Exhaust State Court Remedies Before Filing His Federal
Habeas Petition
A suit by a prisoner challenging his incarceration while awaiting trial is properly brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final
judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.”9
The “purpose of this writ [filed pursuant to section 2241] is not to examine the validity of any
judgment, but merely to inquire into the legality of a detention.”10 To be eligible for pretrial habeas
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner must be “in custody” and must have exhausted his
available state remedies.11 Exhaustion in cases brought under § 2241 may be excused only under
4 R. Doc. 1, p. 1.
5 R. Doc. 1, p. 1. In the Petition, Trantham states, “For all I know they never sent it out.” Id. Presumably, Trantham is
alleging that prison officials may not have mailed his motion to quash to the district court.
6 R. Doc. 1, p. 6.
7 R. Doc. 1, pp. 1, 2, 5, and 9.
8 R. Doc. 1, pp. 5-9.
9 Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides in relevant part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; ....
10 Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1973), citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963).
11 Braden v. 30 th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 488–89 (1973); Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224.
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special circumstances, such as if the state remedies are either “unavailable or wholly inappropriate
to the relief sought, or where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be a patently futile
course of action.” 12
Although the statutory language of 28 USC § 2241(c) contains no express exhaustion
requirement, federal courts refrain from the exercise of their habeas jurisdiction if the issues raised
in a habeas petition may be resolved on the merits in the state courts or by some other state
procedure available to the petitioner.13 The judicially-created exhaustion doctrine of § 2241(c) was
crafted on grounds of comity to ensure that state courts are given a fair opportunity to hear and
consider the claims raised by an applicant before those claims are heard in federal court.14 This
exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of a federal habeas claim has been “fairly
presented” to the highest state court, either on direct review or on post-conviction attack .15
A state prisoner may not receive habeas corpus relief in federal court if he has not first
presented his claims to the state courts.16 Federal courts must dismiss a federal petition for writ of
habeas corpus that contains unexhausted grounds for relief.17 A district court may notice on its
own motion a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies.18
12 Montano v. Texas, 867 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 2017), quoting Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994).
13 Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225; Edge v. Stalder, 83 Fed.Appx. 648 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of a §
2241 habeas petition for failure to exhaust).
14 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); and see Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225.
15 Smith v. Quarterman, 515 F.3d 392, 400 and 402 (5th Cir. 2008) (The exhaustion of state court remedies requires
that one petitioning for federal habeas relief from a state court conviction must have provided the highest court of the
state with a fair opportunity to apply controlling federal constitutional principles to the same factual allegations before
a federal court may review any alleged errors); Bufalino v. Reno, 613 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1980).
16 Edge, 83 Fed.Appx. at 648, citing Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 303 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) and Dickerson, 816 F.2d
at 224.
17 See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 522; Thomas v. Collins, 919 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir. 1990); Bautista v. McCotter, 793
F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1986).
18 Kurtzemann v. Quarterman, 306 Fed.Appx. 205, 206 (5th Cir. 2009). The 14-day period for Trantham to file any
objections to this Report and Recommendation provides him with notice and an opportunity to respond to the
exhaustion issue.
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A 	federal 	court 	may 	divert 	from 	the 	rule 	requiring 	exhaustion 	only 	if 	“special
circumstances” exist.19 “‘Special circumstances’ are such that the federal court cannot await a final
ruling by state courts, because the integrity of a federal right is threatened.”20 “Three sets of
circumstances typically qualify as ‘special’: ‘(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated
by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum
where the constitutional issues can be raised.’”21 Thus, pretrial habeas relief is “generally not
available to consider a petitioner’s claim that a state is barred from trying him because it has
violated his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.”22 However, in Braden, the Supreme Court
drew a distinction between a petitioner attempting to derail a state proceeding, by seeking the
dismissal of an indictment, and a petitioner seeking “to enforce the state’s obligation to bring him
promptly to trial.”23 The Court held that habeas relief may be available for a petitioner seeking to
force the state to go to trial, whereas a petitioner seeking “the derailment of a pending state
proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court” is not
entitled to pretrial habeas relief.24 Federal courts thus distinguish between relief which would
19 Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225.
20 Vassar-El v. Orleans Par. Prison, No. 18-838, 2018 WL 4462544, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2018) (citations omitted).
21 Id., quoting Champer v. Florida, No. 14-1966, 2014 WL 7070079, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2014).
22 Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226.
23 Id., citing Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976)). The Braden Court found that the pre-trial petitioner
could seek habeas relief for a violation of his speedy trial rights if state remedies were exhausted, stating: “Petitioner
does not, however, seek at this time to litigate a federal defense to a criminal charge, but only to demand enforcement
of [Kentucky’s] affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 [89
S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607] (1969). He has made repeated demands for trial to the courts of Kentucky, offering those
courts an opportunity to consider on the merits his constitutional claim of the present denial of a speedy trial. Under
these circumstances it is clear that he has exhausted all available state court remedies for consideration of that
constitutional claim, even though Kentucky has not yet brought him to trial.”) Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-90; see Brown,
530 F.2d at 1283) (“[A]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution is of the first type, while
an attempt to force the state to go to trial is of the second. While the former objective is normally not attainable through
federal habeas corpus, the latter is, although the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies still must be met.”).
24 Braden, 410 U.S. at 493; Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226, quoting Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283; see also Atkins v. Michigan,
644 F.2d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 1981).
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dismiss a state court case on speedy trial grounds and an order requiring a prompt state trial.25
However, the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not generally qualify as a special
circumstance which eliminates the exhaustion requirement.26
Trantham seeks dismissal of the charges against him because he has been held in custody
for longer than Louisiana law allows without a trial. 27 Such relief is not attainable through federal
habeas corpus relief.28 Even were Trantham seeking to enforce his right to require the state to go
to trial, he has not established that he exhausted available state remedies before he filed his Petition
and Trantham has not pointed to any special circumstances to support a finding that state remedies
are unavailable to him, inappropriate to the relief sought, or futile. To the contrary, Louisiana law
provides a habeas remedy to pretrial detainees who wish to contest the legality of their custody.29
Additionally, La. Code of Crim. P. 701(D)(1) provides that the clock begins to run from the
defendant’s filing of a motion for a speedy trial (though it is not clear from Trantham’s filings
whether this was done).30
25 Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546.
26 Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 227.
27 R. Doc. 1, p. 9 (“Release me from all charges pertaining to my case as I have been held for 39 months on a 24 month
limitation as by Louisiana law, still without a trial….”).
28 See Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283.
29 See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 351, et seq.
30 La. Code Crim. P. art. 701(D)(1) (“[A]fter the filing of a motion for a speedy trial by the defendant and his counsel,
the time period for commencement of trial shall be as follows: (a) The trial of a defendant charged with a felony shall
commence within one hundred twenty days if he is continued in custody” …. ). The court may also suspend the time
for trial to begin if the defendant files a after a motion for speedy trial that requires a contradictory hearing. La. Code
Crim. P. art. 701(D)(3). Trantham alleges that he filed a motion to quash his indictment but has not heard back. R.
Doc. 1, p. 5. It is not clear whether Trantham filed a motion for speedy trial, as required under La. Code Crim. P. art.
701(D). 	Regardless, there are state remedies available to him. See also, State v. Bailey, 18-684 (La.App. 5 Cir.
12/12/18), 2018 WL 6565001 at *1 (unpublished) (ordering state district court to rule on motion to quash and motion
for writ of habeas corpus where the plaintiff sought mandamus relief and motions had been pending for over a year
without being set for hearing). This Report and Recommendation expresses no opinion regarding whether Trantham
is entitled to similar mandamus relief in the state court proceedings.
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Because Trantham is not entitled to federal habeas relief resulting in dismissal of the
pending state charges, and because he has not shown that he exhausted available state court
remedies to the extent he is seeking to force the state to try him, nor has he established that special
circumstances prevented him from doing so, his claim for relief should be denied and his Petition
dismissed, without prejudice.31
B. 	A Certificate of Appealability Should Be Denied
If the recommendation dismissing Trantham’s claim is adopted and should Trantham
pursue an appeal, a certificate of appealability should also be denied. An appeal may not be taken
to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or
judge issues a certificate of appealability.”32 Although Trantham has not yet filed a Notice of
Appeal, the Court may address whether he would be entitled to a certificate of appealability.33 A
certificate of appealability may issue only if a habeas petitioner has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.34 In cases where the court has rejected a petitioner’s
constitutional claims on procedural grounds, a petitioner must demonstrate that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of a denial of constitutional rights
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.”35 In this case, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the
31 Habeas dismissals should be without prejudice when state remedies have not been exhausted. Matherly v. State of
La., 3 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 1993); also see Chambers v. Cain, No. 13-71, 2013 WL 6054450, at *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 15,
2013).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a)
33 See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
35 Ruiz v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2006).
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ERIN WILDER-DOOMES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
procedural ruling that Trantham’s claims are unexhausted, such that a certificate of appealability
should be denied.
III. 	RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, filed by Petitioner Randall Steven Trantham, be DENIED as unexhausted and that this
proceeding be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, if Trantham seeks to pursue an appeal in this
case, a certificate of appealability be DENIED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on February 10, 2026.
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