Rogers v. State of Louisiana t, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ASHLI ROGERS 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	25-251-SDD-EWD
STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.
RULING
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant, the State of Louisiana
(“the State”).1 Plaintiff, Ashli Rogers, filed an Opposition, 2 to which Defendant filed a
Reply. 3 For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Ashli Rogers (“Plaintiff”), filed this lawsuit in state court on behalf of her
minor son, G.J.4 Plaintiff alleges that G.J. was physically attacked and injured by an
instructor referred to as “Sergeant Canefield” while G.J. was enrolled in the Louisiana
Youth Challenge Program (“YCP”).5 Plaintiff asserts federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for excessive force and unreasonable seizure, as well as state law claims for battery
and vicarious liability. 6 Named as defendants in the Petition are the State of Louisiana,
Sergeant 	Canefield, 	and 	“Unidentified 	Members 	of 	the 	Military 	Police.”7 	However,
according to the State, neither Sergeant Canefield nor any members of the military police
have been served with this lawsuit.8
1 Rec. Doc. 5.
2 Rec. Doc. 8.
3 Rec. Doc. 9.
4 Rec. Doc. 1-2, pp. 2–6.
5 Id.
6 Id. at pp. 4–6.
7 Id. at p. 2.
8 Rec. Doc. 5-1, p. 2, n.6.
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The State moves to dismiss, primarily arguing that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction 	because 	Plaintiff’s 	exclusive 	remedy 	lies 	in 	the 	Federal 	Employees’
Compensation Act (“FECA”).9 The State alternatively seeks dismissal for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).10
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and FECA
“FECA 	provides 	compensation 	for 	a 	federal 	employee's 	personal 	injuries
‘sustained while in the performance of his duty.’”11 FECA includes an exclusivity provision
which reads as follows, in relevant part:
The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof
under this subchapter or any extension thereof with respect to
the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of
all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to
the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents,
next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover
damages 	from 	the 	United 	States 	or 	the 	instrumentality
because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding,
in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or
judicial proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute
or under a Federal tort liability statute.12
Based on this provision, courts note that “FECA is the exclusive remedy for a federal
employee's injuries if those injuries are within the statute's coverage.”13
The State points out, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that under 32 U.S.C. § 509,
G.J. as a participant in the YCP is “considered an employee of the United States for the
purposes of” FECA. 14 For this reason, the State argues that FECA is the exclusive remedy
9 Id. at pp. 2–4.
10 Id. at pp. 4–7.
11 White v. United States, 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a)).
12 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c).
13 Smith v. Nicholson, 516 F. Supp. 2d 832, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
14 32 U.S.C. § 509(i)(1)(A).
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for G.J.’s alleged injuries, divesting this Court of jurisdiction. 15 Plaintiff disagrees, arguing
that FECA is inapplicable altogether because none of the defendants in this lawsuit are
federal employees. 16 In reply, the State expresses that it “has never asserted either that
itself or any of the unserved defendants are or should be considered a federal
employee.” 17 Rather, the State asserts that “[r]egardless of whether the State or any other
defendant is or is not a federal employee,” FECA is the exclusive remedy because of
G.J.’s statutory status as a “federal employee.”18
FECA’s 	exclusivity 	provision 	specifically 	restricts 	the 	“liability 	of 	the 	United
States.”19 Thus, the Supreme Court has noted that section 8116(c) “prohibits actions
against the United States,”20 meaning that “the United States’ liability for work-related
injuries under FECA is exclusive.” 21 But this Court finds no support in the statute or
interpreting caselaw for the argument that the State is a beneficiary of such exclusivity.
Other courts applying the exclusivity provision of FECA have done so in actions against
the United States or instrumentalities thereof, as opposed to actions against individual
states or state actors.22
15 Rec. Doc. 5-1, pp. 2–4.
16 Rec. Doc. 8, pp. 2–8.
17 Rec. Doc. 9, p. 1.
18 Id. at p. 2.
19 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c).
20 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193 (1983).
21 United States v. Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. 167, 169 (1984). See also, e.g., Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195,
197 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that “section 8116(c) provides that FECA is the exclusive remedy against the
United States for an injury within its coverage.”); Eubank v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 626 F.3d 424,
427 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Eubanks, however, could not assert a claim against the United States because
they elected to receive FECA benefits, and FECA is the exclusive remedy against the United States for
their claims based on David Eubank's death.”); Noble v. United States, 216 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir.
2000) (“Where a federal employee brings an action against the United States and there is a substantial
question as to whether FECA provides the employee's exclusive remedy for the alleged injury, the district
court must ... hold the action in abeyance pending a coverage determination by the Secretary [of Labor].”).
22 See, e.g., Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1979); Lobell v. Johanns, No. CV 05-950,
2006 WL 8434099, at *4 (M.D. La. Oct. 30, 2006); White v. United States, 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998);
T.W. v. United States, No. CV-09-BE-1639-S, 2009 WL 10703052 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 1, 2009); Zellars v. United
States, No. CIV.A. 05-1670, 2006 WL 1050673 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2006).
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In sum, although YCP participants are considered “employees of the United
States” for purposes of FECA coverage under 32 U.S.C. § 509, the Court finds that this
does not expand the exclusivity of FECA to immunize the State from suit. Accordingly, the
State’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be denied.
B. Failure to State a Claim
The State next moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). When deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” 23 The Court may consider “the complaint, its proper
attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of
which a court may take judicial notice.” 24 “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” 25
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” 26 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” 27 However, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the
23 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
24 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
25 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (internal citations and brackets omitted).
27 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 28 In order
to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility
that the defendant has acted unlawfully.” 29 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-
pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’” 30 On a
motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” 31
1. 	§ 1983 Claims
First, the State seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims brought pursuant
to § 1983 because a state is not considered a suable “person.”32 In response, Plaintiff
conclusorily argues that her allegations against Sergeant Canefield and unidentified
members of the military police are sufficient to survive dismissal. 33
The Supreme Court has held that “a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a § 1983
claim for money damages might be asserted.” 34 Accordingly, the § 1983 claim against the
State will be dismissed. 35
2. 	Vicarious Liability
Under Louisiana law, an employer is liable for acts of its employee when they are
committed in the course and scope of his employment. 36 The “course” of employment
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting Southland Sec.
Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
31 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
32 Rec. Doc. 5-1, p. 5.
33 Rec. Doc. 8, p. 9.
34 Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)).
35 The State is the only party moving to dismiss. This Ruling does not address any potential claims against
Sergeant Canefield or any other individual defendant.
36 LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216, 217–18 (La. 1974).
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refers to the time and place of the conduct, while the “scope” of employment refers to the
employment-related risk of injury. 37 “An employer is not vicariously liable merely because
his employee commits an intentional tort on the business premises during working
hours.”38 	Generally, 	“an 	employee’s 	conduct 	is 	within 	the 	course 	and 	scope 	of
employment if the conduct is of the kind that the employee is employed to perform, occurs
substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is activated at least in
part by a purpose to serve the employer.”39
When 	determining 	whether 	an 	employer 	could 	be 	vicariously 	liable 	for 	an
intentional tort committed by its employee, courts look to the following nonexclusive
factors: (1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment rooted, (2) whether it was
reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee’s duties, (3) whether it occurred
on 	the 	employer’s 	premises, 	and 	(4) 	whether 	it 	occurred 	during 	the 	hours 	of
employment.40 Ultimately, an employer may only be liable for the intentional tort of its
employee if the tortious conduct was “so closely connected in time, place, and causation
to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the
employer’s 	business, 	as 	compared 	with 	conduct 	instituted 	by 	purely 	personal
considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interest.”41 Essentially, once it is
established that the employee acted within the course of his employment, the employer’s
vicarious liability hinges on whether the “purpose of serving the employer’s business
actuated the employee to any appreciable extent.”42
37 Benoit v. Capitol Mfg. Co., 617 So. 2d 477, 479 (La. 1993).
38 Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. 1996) (quoting Scott v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 415
So.2d 327, 329 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982)).
39 Crawford v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 10-805-M2, 2011 WL 3206196, at *2 (M.D. La. July 26, 2011).
40 Id.
41 Baumeister, 673 So. 2d at 996; Crawford, 2011 WL 3206196, at *2.
42 Crawford, 2011 WL 3206196, at *2 (citing Johnson v. Littleton, 37 So. 3d 452 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010)).
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Although it concedes that the alleged incident occurred on property owned by the
State, the State argues that “there is no allegation to show an employment-related
connection to the alleged incident other than location.” 43 In response, Plaintiff argues that
“[b]ased on the facts as alleged, it is surely feasible that [Sergeant] Canefield’s acts were
committed in the course and scope of his employment as an officer with YCP and the
National Guard.”44
Plaintiff alleges as follows in her Petition:
On November 19, 2023, Defendant [Sergeant] Canfield [sic]
and Cadet G.J. got into a verbal argument. Once G.J. felt that
Canfield [sic] was angry, G.J. walked away to go back into his
barracks. 	Canfield 	[sic] 	followed 	G.J. 	into 	the 	barracks,
Canefield 	attacked 	G.J. 	from 	behind, 	striking 	him 	with
punches and attempted a chokehold until another cadet broke
up the attack and threw Canefield into the barracks wall. 45
As mentioned above, the State concedes that the location of the alleged incident
weighs in Plaintiff’s favor on the vicarious liability question. However, the Court finds that
the Petition contains insufficient factual information as to any of the other factors. Aside
from the allegation that the attack by Sergeant Canefield was preceded by “a verbal
argument,” there is no explanation of why the incident happened or whether it may have
been employment rooted. The State cites Bailey v. Pinnacle Polymers, LLC, 46 which the
Court finds instructive. In Bailey, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reasoned:
Here, the allegations of Bailey's petition satisfy the time and
place factors because the intentional act is alleged to have
occurred on the premises of Pinnacle and during Williams’
work hours. However, the petition does not allege any facts
explaining why Williams intentionally struck Bailey in the face
and head, although the petition does state that the altercation
43 Rec. Doc. 5-1, p. 7.
44 Rec. Doc. 8, p. 10.
45 Rec. Doc. 1-2, p. 3, ¶ 6.
46 24-490 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/2/25), 412 So. 3d 1063.
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was abrupt and unprovoked. The petition does not allege the
nature and scope of Williams’ employment duties and how his
intentional tortious conduct was incidental to those duties.
Consequently, there are no facts alleged that would support a
finding that the intentional act … was primarily employment
rooted 	or 	reasonably 	incidental 	to 	the 	performance 	of
Williams’ duties. Absent these allegations, the petition fails to
state sufficient facts to support the imposition of vicarious
liability on Pinnacle for Williams’ intentional act.47
Similarly here, although the attack allegedly occurred on State property during the
YCP, Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that the argument and ensuing fight
were employment rooted. For this reason, the Motion will be granted as to the claim
against the State for vicarious liability.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion 48 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
The Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.
The Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. The § 1983 claim
and the state law claim for vicarious liability against the State are dismissed without
prejudice. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this Ruling to amend to cure any
deficiencies, if possible.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ____ day of _____________, 2026.
________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
47 Id. at 1072–73 (citing cases).
48 Rec. Doc. 5.
4th March
S
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