USA v. Grayer

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	26-44-SDD-SDJ
LAWERENCE JMOND GRAYER
RULING
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Indictment filed by Lawrence Jmond
Grayer (“Defendant”).1 The Government filed an Opposition, 2 to which Grayer replied. 3
Grayer also filed a supplemental memorandum in further support of the Motion. 4 For the
reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case arises from a federal grand jury Indictment 5 dated April 22, 2026,
charging Grayer with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), which makes it a crime “for any
person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or
ammunition or receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce.” The Indictment states that Grayer was “under a bill of
information for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” when
he received a firearm which had been shipped and transported in interstate commerce. 6
A Louisiana felony bill of information filed on May 6, 2025, charged Grayer with producing,
1 Rec. Doc. 21.
2 Rec. Doc. 26.
3 Rec. Doc. 31.
4 Rec. Doc. 36.
5 Rec. Doc. 11.
6 Id.
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manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute tapentadol, a Schedule
II controlled substance. 7 The charges remain pending.
Grayer moves to dismiss the Indictment, lodging an as-applied constitutional
challenge to § 922(n). 8 He stresses the fact that the underlying charge supporting the
§ 922(n) case resulted from a bill of information rather than an indictment. Grayer argues
that disarmament of an individual under these circumstances is not consistent with the
historical tradition of firearm regulation in the United States, making the application of §
922(n) unconstitutional under the Second Amendment pursuant to the analysis articulated
by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. 9 Grayer
further 	argues 	that, 	under 	United 	States 	v. 	Hemani, 10 	a 	federal 	prohibition 	from
possessing firearms that attaches automatically—without the pre-deprivation procedural
protections that founding era analogues required—fails the historical tradition inquiry. 11
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that “a party may raise by
pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a
trial on the merits.” Courts may resolve any defects before trial where, as here, the
motion presents a question of law. 12
7 Rec. Doc. 26-3.
8 Rec. Doc. 21.
9 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
10 United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772 (2026).
11 Rec. Doc. No. 31.
12 See United States v. Fontenot, 665 F.3d 640, 644 (5th Cir. 2011).
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B. Discussion
1. 	Second Amendment Case Law
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 13 In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v.
Bruen, the Supreme Court advanced a two-step framework for Second Amendment
constitutional challenges. 14 The Court held:
When 	the 	Second 	Amendment's 	plain 	text 	covers 	an
individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects
that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation
by 	demonstrating 	that 	it 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	Nation's
historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court
conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second
Amendment's “unqualified command.” 15
Regarding the second step, “[t]his historical inquiry that courts must conduct will
often involve reasoning by analogy[.]” 16 And “whether a historical regulation is a proper
analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether
the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’” 17 This involves finding “a well-established and
representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day
regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough
to pass constitutional muster.”18
13 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
14 597 U.S. at 24.
15 Id. (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961)).
16 Id. at 28.
17 Id. at 28–29 (citing C. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 773 (1993)).
18 Id. at 30.
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In United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court further clarified the “historical
analogue” requirement. 19 The Court explained that its recent Second Amendment cases
“were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.”20 Rather, “the appropriate analysis
involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles
that underpin our regulatory tradition.” 21 The Court instructed that “[w]hy and how the
regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.” 22
In United States v. Quiroz,23 the Fifth Circuit applied the analysis set forth in Bruen
and Rahimi to reject a facial challenge to § 922(n), which prohibits firearm possession by
persons “under indictment”. The court did not address the first step of the Bruen analysis
but “assum[ed] arguendo that the plain text of the Second Amendment cover[ed]” the
defendant and his conduct. 24 On Bruen’s second step the Court found that § 922(n) is
consistent with the historical tradition of firearms regulation in this country. The court noted
that “[o]ur nation has a long history of disarming criminal defendants facing serious
charges pending trial.” 25 As outlined in Bruen and Rahimi, the court examined both “why”
and “how” the statute burdens the defendant’s Second Amendment rights. With respect
to the “why,” the Quiroz panel found the purpose of § 922(n) — “protect[ing] the public
from the danger of illegal firearm use by indictees”— relevantly similar to the historical
purpose of pretrial detention, which included “preserv[ing] ‘the safety of the people’ from
offenders awaiting trial.”26
19 United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 692.
22 Id.
23 United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713 (5th Cir. 2025).
24 Id. at 717 (citing United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808, 812 (6th Cir. 2024)).
25 Id. at 718.
26 See id. (quoting Anthony Highmore, A Digest of the Doctrine of Bail in Civil and Criminal Cases vii (1783)
(citing S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 2197-98 (1968).The court noted that “[p]retrial detention resulted in the
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Proceeding to the “how” metric, the court observed that § 922(n) “is a temporary
restriction on an individual’s Second Amendment rights when awaiting trial.” 27 The
statute’s restrictions are limited both temporally and as to scope, as “they apply only to
the period between indictment and trial” and “they do not bar the possession of
weapons—only their shipment, transport, or receipt.”28 The court compared these
restrictions to pretrial detention at the founding, which “was also a temporary restriction
on the constitutional rights of those who posed a threat to society but had not been proven
guilty.” 29 Pretrial detention necessarily included the loss of an array of liberties, including
access to weapons. 30 And although bail was commonly used to release individuals not
charged with a capital offense prior to trial, “many modern-day felonies were historically
capital offenses, meaning many modern-day indictees would historically have been
detained prior to trial.” 31 The court ultimately concluded that § 922(n) “‘fits neatly’ within
our nation’s historical tradition of protecting the public from criminal defendants indicted
for serious offenses.” 32
2. 	As-Applied to Grayer: Whether Quiroz tradition reaches a person
charged by Information
Beginning with step one of the Bruen analysis, the Court must determine whether
the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the individual’s conduct.33 The Government
complete deprivation of the criminal defendant's liberty and ipso facto restricted their access to weapons.”
Id.
27 Id. at 719.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 718-19. In this vein, the court noted: “In fact, because § 922(n) restricts only shipping, transporting,
and receiving firearms, whereas pretrial detention denied the mere possession of firearms, it could be said
that § 922(n) places a lesser burden on Second Amendment rights.” Id. (citing Gore, 118 F.4th at 815).
31 Id. at 719.
32 Id. at 723–24 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698).
33 Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 at 2.
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argues that the Second Amendment is not implicated in this case because § 922(n) “does
not implicate the right to ‘have’ arms or ‘carry’ them for protection; it merely restricts
shipping, transporting, or receiving them.”34 Here, Grayer is alleged to have been in
unlawful possession of a firearm. Laws making the possession of a firearm unlawful target
the core of what the Second Amendment protects: firearm possession. Accordingly, step
one of the Bruen analysis is satisfied, and the Court finds that the Second Amendment’s
plain text covers Grayer’s conduct.
With respect to step two of the Bruen analysis, the focus of Grayer’s argument is
that he was charged by bill of information rather than indictment. Importantly, although
the language of § 922(n) only mentions defendants “under indictment,” the statutory
definition of “indictment” “includes an indictment or information in any court under which
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may be prosecuted.” 35
Thus, the underlying Louisiana bill of information in this case meets the statutory definition
of “indictment.”36
Nonetheless, Grayer argues that the statute’s “equation of an information with an
indictment 	for 	federal-firearms-disability 	purposes” 	is 	“a 	modern 	creation 	with 	no
founding-era pedigree.” 37 Grayer acknowledges the holding in Quiroz but asserts that the
“historical tradition Quiroz identified—pretrial detention of indicted capital defendants,
with disarmament as its ipso facto consequence—operated entirely on charges the Fifth
Amendment required to be initiated by grand jury indictment.” 38 In other words, Grayer
34 Rec. Doc. 26, pp. 7–8.
35 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(14) (emphasis added).
36 The Louisiana bill of information charges Grayer with violating Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967(A). The
penalty for that offense includes imprisonment for a minimum of one year. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1).
37 Rec. Doc. 21-1, p. 4.
38 Id. at p. 6.
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argues that, “[b]ecause the Fifth Amendment foreclosed the founding generation from
charging serious offenses by information, no founding era tradition of information-based
pretrial disarmament could have emerged—and none did.” 39 Thus, Grayer concludes that
disarmament of an individual charged by bill of information is not supported by historical
tradition because “no founding-era defendant could simultaneously be (a) charged by
information and (b) subject to mandatory detention without bail. The category did not
exist.”40
The tradition identified by the Quiroz Court in upholding § 922(n) was the United
States’ “long history of disarming criminal defendants facing serious charges pending
trial.”41 The Court finds no support in Quiroz for the argument that this rationale is affected
by the instrument by which a modern-day defendant is charged. Grayer argues that a
Louisiana bill of information cannot justify disarmament under Bruen’s second step
because individuals could not be charged with capital offenses (resulting in mandatory
detention without bail) by information in the founding era. But the Government does not
need to produce a historical twin to justify the regulation. In describing the historical
tradition of pretrial detention, the Quiroz court spoke of “criminal defendants” in general:
Since the founding, the government has subjected criminal
defendants to temporary restrictions on their liberty, including
restrictions that affected their ability to keep and bear arms.
During the founding era, the government was empowered to
detain criminal defendants charged with serious crimes while
they awaited trial. Pretrial detention resulted in the complete
deprivation of the criminal defendant’s liberty and ipso facto
restricted their access to weapons. 42
39 Id. at p. 7.
40 Id. at p. 12.
41 Quiroz, 125 F.4th at 718.
42 Id. (citations omitted).
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The court described the modern purpose of § 922(n) as protecting the public from
illegal firearm use “by indictees,” but as the Government points out and as mentioned
above, 	the 	statutory 	definition 	of 	“indictment” 	specifically 	includes 	informations. 43
Considering the definition of indictment in 18 USC § 921(a)(14), the Court concludes that
the Quiroz Court’s analysis of temporary disarmament applies equally to persons charged
with felonies by Bill of Information.
The Fifth Circuit’s subsequent opinion in United States v. Kimble44 provides further
support for the Government’s position on the “why” prong of the Bruen historical analysis.
There, the court considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits
possession of firearms by convicted felons, as applied to a defendant with two felony
drug-trafficking convictions. The court upheld the conviction, holding that § 922(g)(1)’s
lifetime disarmament “is constitutional as applied to defendants with predicate felonies for
drug-trafficking offenses because of the intrinsic violence of the drug trade.” 45 The holding
was supported by the nation’s historical “tradition of disarming those whose past criminal
conduct evinces a special danger of misusing firearms,” and the fact that a defendant’s
record of drug trafficking “underscores that he is the sort of dangerous individual that
legislatures have long disarmed.” 46 The court recognized “that drugs and guns are a
dangerous combination,” highlighting the “inherent violence” of the drug trade. 47 Thus, the
43 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(14).
44 United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025).
45 Id. at 312.
46 Id. at 314.
47 Id. at 316–17 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993); United States v. Yanez Sosa,
513 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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court concluded that “Congress can categorically disarm individuals convicted of violent
felonies like drug trafficking,” which is “an inherently dangerous activity.”48
Taken together, Quiroz and Kimble support the constitutionality of § 922(n) as
applied to Grayer. The historical tradition identified in Quiroz—temporarily “disarming
criminal defendants facing serious charges pending trial” 49 —is directly applicable to
Grayer, who faces felony drug-trafficking charges. Grayer provides insufficient support for
the argument that a Louisiana felony bill of information should be treated differently than
a grand jury indictment in the context of this historical comparison. As the Government
puts it, “[t]he fact that charging procedures have changed since the founding era does not
mean 	that 	the 	principles 	underlying 	pretrial 	detention 	have 	changed.” 50 Although
informations were historically reserved for misdemeanors as opposed to more serious
offenses, 51 that is not the case today—a state felony bill of information is no less a
legitimate 	charge 	than 	a 	grand 	jury’s 	indictment.52 	It 	follows 	that 	the 	temporary
disarmament of a defendant charged with a felony, whether by information or grand jury
indictment, is sufficiently analogous to the historical tradition of pretrial detention of those
charged 	with 	serious 	crimes. 	Further, 	Kimble 	supports 	the 	conclusion 	that 	drug
trafficking 53 is the type of underlying charge that supports disarmament because of its
inherently dangerous nature. Although Kimble dealt with convictions rather than charges,
48 Id. at 317–18. The court also made clear that “[t]hat conclusion does not depend on an individualized
assessment that [the individual] is dangerous.” Id. at 318.
49 Quiroz, 125 F.4th at 718.
50 Rec. Doc. 26, p. 15.
51 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, ch. 23 (1769); R. Justin Miller,
Informations or Indictments in Felony Cases, 8 Minn. L. Rev 379 (1923-1924).
52 The United States Constitution “does not require the States to observe the Fifth Amendment’s provision
for presentment or indictment by a grand jury.” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972). See also
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
53 In this case, possession with intent to distribute Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance.
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the reasoning is directly analogous. Under Kimble, § 922(g)(1)’s permanent disarmament
of an individual convicted of drug trafficking passes constitutional muster; in this case,
922(n)’s temporary disarmament of an individual awaiting trial on felony drug-trafficking
charges is permissible.
By 	requiring 	“sufficiently 	similar” 	historical 	analogues 	as 	opposed 	to 	“dead
ringer[s],” the Supreme Court recognized that “the Second Amendment permits more than
just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” 54 Grayer in this case
is “facing serious charges” through an underlying felony bill of information. 55 Although the
mechanisms by which modern-day defendants may be charged with certain crimes are
not identical to the mechanisms used in the founding era, the principles supporting
disarmament of defendants awaiting trial remain the same. Thus, prohibiting an individual
from possessing a firearm due to felony drug-trafficking charges brought by bill of
information is sufficiently similar to the historical pretrial detention of individuals accused
of serious crimes.
3. 	Pre-Deprivation Procedural Protection that the Second
Amendment, Rahimi, and Hemani Require
Grayer relies on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Hemani, 56
arguing 	a 	federal 	firearm 	regulation 	that 	attaches 	automatically—without 	the 	pre-
deprivation 	procedural 	protections 	that 	founding 	era 	analogues 	require—fails 	the
historical-tradition inquiry. 57 Specifically, Grayer argues that in his case, the state court
54 Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 at 30; Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691–92.
55 Quiroz, 125 F.4th at 718.
56 Grayer submitted a new argument within his Response based on Hemani, which was published by the
Supreme Court the day after the Government submitted its Reply. Rec. Doc. No. 31. Grayer then submitted
a Supplement to his Response with supporting evidence: a transcript from his hearing in the Nineteenth
Judicial District. Rec. Doc. No. 36.
57 Rec. Doc. 31.
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did not make a probable cause finding of dangerousness on the record. Thus, Grayer did
not receive the requisite pre-deprivation procedural protections that he argues are
required by the Second Amendment per Rahimi and Hemani. 58
Grayer claims that there was no individualized judicial finding that he poses a
credible threat to any identified person. 59 As such, he challenges whether the federal
government can attach a federal firearm prohibition to a defendant whose only judicial
process was an information that does not determine whether Grayer posed any credible
threat and an initial appearance proceeding. 60 He acknowledges the initial appearance
proceeding consisted of the commissioner advising him of the charges against him and
his constitutional rights, setting bail, and imposing “standard-form pretrial conditions.” 61
Specifically, the state court commissioner advised Grayer that:
Total bail obligation is $30,000. Special conditions are random drug screens
for a period of 120 days, bail supervision through a court approved monitor
for an initial period of 120 days, GPS device because I'm ordering that you
to be placed on house arrest for an initial period of 120 days. You are not to
leave your place of residence except to attend court, school, work, or
appointments-- and no firearms.62
Grayer contends that his initial appearance in state court was devoid of any
credible threat-finding proceeding, which he argues is required before he can be deprived,
even temporarily, of his constitutional right to bear arms. However, caselaw does not
support the argument that the Second Amendment requires a pre-deprivation hearing in
temporary disarmament circumstances. In Hemani, the Court recognized that historical
habitual drunkard laws usually provided a pre-deprivation proceeding to determine if
58 Id.
59 Id. at 15.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Rec. Doc. No. 36-1, pp. 3-4.
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someone was truly incapacitated, whereas the modern day 18 USC § 922(g)(3)
automatically disarms drug users without individualized credible-threat proceedings.
Accordingly, the Hemani Court held that “affording the government that kind of ‘broad
power to designate any group as dangerous and thereby disqualify its members from
having a gun’ would risk allowing it to ‘quickly swallow’ the Second Amendment.”63
Hemani’s holding is that in § 922(g)(3)64 cases, there must be an individualized
credible threat finding prior to temporary disarmament. The Court declined to categorize
medical marijuana as categorically dangerous because doing so posed potential to afford
the government power to designate groups as dangerous at its own discretion, a broad
power it was not intending to grant the government.65 The Hemani Court acknowledged
that sometimes “an individual’s unlawful use of marijuana (or any other controlled
substance) may render him a danger to others,” but nonetheless declined to categorically
deem marijuana users as a whole to be categorically dangerous. 66
The defendant in Hemani was charged under § 922(g)(3), which prohibits “an
unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” to possess or receive any
firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. 67
This differs from the case at hand, where Grayer was indicted under § 922(n) for
possession of a firearm while under a bill of information for Intent to Distribute a Schedule
63 Hemani, 608 U.S. at 793 (citing Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 465
(2019)).
64 § 922(g)(3) provides it shall be unlawful for any person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any
controlled substance to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition, or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate commerce.”
65 Hemani, 608 U.S. at 793.
66 Id.
67 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)
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II Controlled Dangerous Substance. 68 An intent to distribute charge differs from an
unlawful user of a controlled substance charge. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held
that drug trafficking is an inherently dangerous activity due to the intrinsic violence of drug
trade.69 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court have both adhered to the
principle that drugs and guns are a dangerous combination. 70
In this case, the Nineteenth Judicial District charged Grayer pursuant to a bill of
information for a crime on May 6, 2025, and he was subsequently indicted on October 7,
2025, under § 922(n) for possession of a firearm while under indictment. Grayer argues
that, although he was under a bill of information, he did not have a requisite proceeding—
after being charged with Possession with Intent to Distribute Schedule II Controlled
Dangerous Substance and Possession of a Schedule II drug—to determine he posed a
credible threat to himself or others. 71 But such a hearing is not required as applied to
Grayer under Hemani.
Grayer was instructed by the commissioner during his initial appearance for the
charge 	of 	Possession 	with 	the 	Intent 	to 	Distribute 	“No 	firearms.”72 	He 	was 	then
subsequently indicted for the crime of possession of a firearm while under indictment (for
intent 	to 	distribute).73 	Grayer 	was 	under 	indictment 	for 	a 	crime 	that 	courts 	have
consistently determined to be inherently dangerous. There is a difference in instances
where a defendant is a recreational drug user and has not been adjudicated to pose a
68 Rec. Doc. No. 11.
69 See United States v. Mancilla, 155 F.4th 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Squire, 177 F.4th 614,
619 (5th Cir. 2025); Kimble, 142 F.4th at 316-17.
70 Kimble, 142 F.4th at 316; Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513
F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 2008).
71 Rec. Doc. No. 31.
72 Rec. Doc. No. 36-1, p. 4.
73 As established above, indictment and information are used interchangeably.
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credible threat to others and a charge of intended drug distribution, which courts have
uniformly found to be inherently dangerous.
The Court finds Hemani distinguishable. “[I]t is axiomatic that a statute may be
invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”74 Unlike
Hemaini, here, Grayer was charged with a dangerous crime, thus making the application
of § 922(n) to him a constitutional application. Accordingly, the Hemani framework as
applied to this Defendant is not an unconstitutional application of § 922(n) because this
Defendant is facing charges for a crime that has uniformly and broadly been determined
to be inherently dangerous.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Grayer’s Motion to Dismiss75 is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 15th day of October, 2026.
________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
74 See Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, 173 F.4th 576, 613 (5th Cir. 2026) (Oldham,
J., concurring); United States v. Texas, 97 F.4th 268, 313 (5th Cir. 2024) (Oldham, J., dissenting).
75 Rec. Doc. No. 17.
S
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