Logan Christopher Hisaw

1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
In re:
Logan Christopher Hisaw,
Debtor
Case No. 25-50479
Chapter 11
Judge John W. Kolwe
Memorandum Decision
On April 28, 2026, the Court held a hearing to consider Confirmation of the
Debtor’s Third Amended Plan of Reorganization under Subchapter V of Chapter 11
(ECF #108).1 The United States Trustee (“U.S. Trustee”), A&D Mortgage, LLC and
Advancial Federal Credit Union objected to the Plan. At the inception of the hearing,
the Debtor informed the Court that the objections of A&D Mortgage and Advancial
had been resolved, thus leaving only the objection of the U.S. Trustee. The testimony
of 	the 	Debtor 	in 	support 	of 	confirmation 	was 	proffered, 	and 	the 	Plan 	with
1 The confirmation hearing was initially continued from April 28, 2026 to May 12, 2026, for the Court
to announce its ruling. The hearing was subsequently continued to June 2, 2026, at the request of the
Debtor. On June 2, 2026, the Court announced its ruling and this Memorandum Decision sets forth
the reasons in support of its ruling.
________________________________________
JOHN W. KOLWE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED June 5, 2026.
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 1 of 12

2
attachments, the Monthly Operating Reports and the Ballot Summary were admitted
into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated that the
requirements for confirmation had been met, with the exception of the issues raised
by the U.S. Trustee in its objection, which are: (1) whether the Plan may be confirmed
as a: (a) consensual plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a), or (b) nonconsensual plan under
§ 1191(b); (2) whether the Plan may include a temporary injunction against certain
creditors; (3) whether the Debtor may withhold a portion of his projected disposable
income each month for deposit into a savings account; and (4) whether a discharge
after three years is appropriate when the Plan period is five years. The Court took
these matters under advisement following the confirmation hearing and now rules as
follows.
Analysis
1(a). 	Is the Plan Confirmable under § 1191(a)?
The Plan includes 11 classes, seven of which are impaired. Five of those
impaired 	classes 	submitted 	ballots 	voting 	in 	favor 	of 	confirmation: 	Class 	1
(AmeriCredit), Classes 2 and 3 (American Bank), Class 6 (Kubota), and Class 8
(Caterpillar). The remaining two impaired classes did not return a ballot and thus
did not vote to either accept or reject the Plan: Class 7 (Ally Bank) and Class 10
(general unsecured creditors). The Debtor has requested that the Court confirm the
Plan as a consensual plan under § 1191(a) notwithstanding the silence of the two
nonvoting classes.
Section 1191(a) provides: “The court shall confirm a plan under this subchapter
only if all of the requirements of section 1129(a), other than paragraph (15) of that
section . . . are met.” 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a). One of the requirements of Section 1129(a)
is that “with respect to each class of claims or interests—(A) such class has accepted
the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
Finally, a class of claims accepts a plan if “such plan has been accepted by creditors
. . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the
allowed claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 2 of 12

3
plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). Taken together, to be considered a consensual plan, each
class of creditors must either vote to accept the plan or be unimpaired.
Here, five of the seven impaired classes voted to accept the Plan. But the other
two impaired classes did not vote to reject the Plan; they simply did not vote. Thus,
the question facing the Court is whether the Plan can be consensually confirmed
under § 1191(a) if an impaired class of creditors does not vote. The Debtor contends
it can and should be, relying on the holdings and reasoning of two cases: In re Franco’s
Paving LLC, 654 B.R. 107 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2023), and In re Hot’z Power Wash, 655
B.R. 107 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2023).
In Franco’s Paving, the court concluded that a non-voting impaired class
should be ignored in determining whether a plan has satisfied § 1129(a)(8), grounding
its decision, in part, on the computation set forth in § 1126(c) for determining whether
a class has voted to accept or reject a plan (both in number of claims and dollar
amount of claims):
The instant case raises the question of what occurs when
no creditors in a class vote either to accept or to reject a
plan. Mathematically, both computations become 0/ 0 = E
(where 	E 	is 	simply 	the 	quotient). 	Applying 	basic
mathematical principles, one must calculate E such that
0 × E = 0. The obvious answer is that E can be any number
and is therefore indeterminate or undefined. In practical
terms, the equation cannot be solved. Thus, the calculation
required by § 1126(c) cannot be performed. . . . The Court
finds 	that 	attempting 	to 	do 	what 	the 	laws 	of
mathematics prohibit is an absurd proposition and could
not have been intended when Congress enacted the current
version of § 1126. By implementing a denominator that
includes only votes actually cast in § 1126, it logically
follows that Congress presumed that at least one vote was
cast.
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 3 of 12

4
In re Franco’s Paving LLC, 654 B.R. at 109-10 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2023). The court
then cited to its equitable power “‘to administer the law according to its spirit, and
not merely by its letter,’”2 to conclude:
The Court finds that in making the change to § 1126 when
enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress presumed the
existence of at least one vote in each class. In a situation
where no votes are cast, the Court holds that the class
should 	not 	be 	counted 	for 	purposes 	of 	§ 	1129(a)(8).
Id. at 109-10.3
In agreeing with Franco’s Paving, the Hot’z Power Wash court stated:
[S]ince the application of the mathematical calculation in
§ 1126(c) is absurd as applied to a nonvoting class, and
because the Code is silent on the correct treatment of a
nonvoting class, this Court is left with only one option:
when an impaired class of creditors fails to cast a ballot,
that class will not be counted for purposes of whether
§ 129(a)(8) is satisfied.
Hot’z Power Wash, 655 B.R. at 118.
Both Franco’s Paving and Hot’z Power Wash found that Congress drafted §
1326 based on the presumption that at least one vote would be cast in each impaired
class. They then found, based on the mathematical impossibility that results when
there are no votes in a class, that a void existed in the law in those cases in which an
impaired class does not vote. They then turned to their equitable powers to fill that
perceived void by declaring that if there are no votes in a particular class, then that
class should not be counted for determining whether the plan is consensual. Both
Franco’s Paving and Hot’z Power Wash also based their decision on what they view
as Congress’s preference for a consensual plan, as reflected in the subchapter V
trustee’s duty to “facilitate the development of a consensual plan” under § 1183. See
2 Id. at 109 (quoting Johnson v. Norris, 190 F. 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1911) (itself quoting In re Kane, 127
F. 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1904))).
3 Franco’s Paving cited Truvillion v. King’s Daughter’s Hosp., 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1980) for the
proposition that “[w]hen faced with an ‘unusual case, certainly not contemplated in the statute,’ a court should read
the statute to align with congressional intent and ‘the statute's design.’” Id. (quoting Truvillion, 614 F.2d at 527).
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 4 of 12

5
11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(7); see also Franco’s Paving, 654 B.R. at 110; Hot’z Power Wash,
655 B.R. at 119.
If the Court adopts the reasoning of Franco’s Paving and Hot’z Power Wash, as
urged by the Debtor, the nonvoting classes can simply be ignored and the plan can
then be confirmed consensually since five impaired classes voted to accept the plan,
and there are no affirmative rejections.
The Court now turns to the U.S. Trustee’s objection, which stresses that the
Franco’s Paving and Hot’z Power Wash cases are outliers. According to the U.S.
Trustee, the majority, if not all, reported decisions other than Franco’s Paving and
Hot’z Power Wash, have held that each impaired class must affirmatively vote to
accept the plan, and that if any impaired class fails to vote, then the plan may not be
confirmed on a consensual basis. See, e.g., In re Thomas Orthodontics, S.C., No. 23-
25432, 2024 WL 4297032 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2024); In re Florist Atlanta, Inc., No. 24-
51980, 2024 WL 3714512 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2024); In re M.V.J. Auto World,
661 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2024); In re Sushi Zushi of Texas, LLC, 2025 WL
957792 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2025); and In re 5 Star Home Care, Inc., 2026 WL
1127906 (Bankr. D.S.C. April 24, 2026).
The Court has carefully considered each of these cases and finds them to be
persuasive, thus joining them in declining to adopt the Franco’s Paving and Hot’z
Power Wash approach to dealing with nonvoting classes. As these courts have found,
there is not a void or gap in the law, and the Code is not silent on this issue. Section
1129(a)(8) provides only two options with respect to each class of creditors: it must
either (A) accept the plan or (B) not be impaired under the plan. If there are no votes
within a class, then it cannot be said that the class has accepted the plan. And no
amount of arithmetic can change this simple conclusion, which is drawn directly from
the straightforward wording of the statute.
The arithmetic of § 1126(c) is intended to answer the
question: 	does 	this 	group 	of 	creditors 	agree 	with 	the
debtor’s plan? Dividing by zero or not, engaging in the
arithmetical exercise becomes futile where no creditors in
a class vote. The majority and numerosity provisions of the
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 5 of 12

6
statute need not be considered once the numerator in the
equation is determined to be “0” (i.e., no creditor voted).
There is no reason to consider an “absurd, unsolvable”
denominator 	because 	when 	no 	creditors 	in 	a 	class
affirmatively vote, the class cannot accept the plan, no
matter what the denominator may be.
* * * * *
[A] class either accepts the plan under § 1129(a)(8), or it
does not. Whether the individual creditors in the class have
accepted, 	rejected, 	or 	abstained, 	the 	Court 	need 	only
consider whether the class has “accepted”—if it hasn’t
accepted, the section is simply not met. The Debtor must
show the class accepts, not merely that the class “doesn’t
reject.” Nothing in the Code allows the Court to equate
abstention of a class with acceptance.
In re Sushi Zushi, 2025 WL 957792, at *3-4.
Simply put, if there are no votes cast within a class, then that class has not
accepted the plan and thus § 1129(a)(8) is not satisfied. Here, two classes did not
receive any votes. Thus, § 1129(a)(8) is not met, and the Plan is therefore not
confirmable as a consensual plan under § 1191(a).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	hereby 	sustains 	the 	U.S. 	Trustee’s 	objection 	to
confirmation as a consensual plan.
1(b). 	Is the Plan Confirmable under § 1191(b)?
Subchapter V also allows for a plan to be confirmed on a nonconsensual basis
under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(b), which provides:
Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of the
applicable requirements of section 1129(a) of this title,
other than paragraphs (8), (10), and (15) of that section, are
met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the
debtor, 	shall 	confirm 	the 	plan 	notwithstanding 	the
requirements of such paragraphs if the plan does not
discriminate 	unfairly, 	and 	is 	fair 	and 	equitable, 	with
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired
under, 	and 	has 	not 	accepted, 	the 	plan.” 	Thus, 	a
nonconsensual plan may be confirmed even without any
impaired class voting to accept the plan, provided that the
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 6 of 12

7
plan 	does 	not 	discriminate 	unfairly 	and 	is 	fair 	and
equitable with respect to each impaired class that has not
accepted the plan.
Additionally, under § 1191(c)(1), for a nonconsensual plan to be “fair and
equitable” with respect to secured claims, it must meet the chapter 11 requirements
of § 1129(b)(2)(A); as to other classes of claims or interests, the plan may be confirmed
nonconsensually 	if 	it 	meets 	the 	requirements 	of § 	1191(c)(2) 	and 	(3). 	Under
§ 1191(c)(2)(A), the plan must provide that all of the “projected disposable income of
the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5
years as the court may fix, beginning on the date that the first payment is due under
the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2)(A).
Section 1191(c)(3) requires that the Debtor show that he will be able to make, or that
there is a reasonable likelihood that he will make, all payments as proposed in the
plan, and that the plan provide appropriate remedies in the event of a default in
making payments.
The Debtor requested that his Plan be confirmed under § 1191(b) if it cannot
be confirmed under § 1191(a). Based on the record here, and subject to the Court’s
decisions below regarding the Debtor’s proposed use of a Savings Fund and changes
necessary to the discharge provision of the Plan, the Court finds that the plan may
be confirmed under § 1191(b). First, the plan does not discriminate unfairly. Second,
the plan is fair equitable as to secured creditors because the requirements of §
1129(b)(2)(A) are satisfied. Third, it is also fair and equitable to the unsecured
creditors because the Debtor is dedicating all of his projected disposable income to
plan payments over a five-year period. Also, Article 8.8 of the Plan includes
appropriate remedies in the event of a default, as required under § 1191(c)(3)(B).
Moreover, Article 9 of the Plan provides that if the Plan is confirmed under § 1191(b),
then discharge is delayed until the Court grants discharge after all payments are
made (subject to this Court’s finding, as discussed below, that discharge may not
occur until all plan payments have been completed). Finally, Article 9 also provides
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 7 of 12

8
that the property of the estate shall not vest in the Debtor until the case is dismissed,
or discharge is entered.
Accordingly, the Court finds the Plan can be confirmed under § 1191(b).
2. 	Is a Temporary Injunction Allowable under the Facts of this Case?
The Plan, as amended, seeks a temporary injunction on actions by creditors
against any guarantor, Insider, or Affiliate of the Debtor, as follows:
Consistent with and to the fullest extent permitted under
In re Eng’g Recruiting Experts, 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 2169
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sep. 2, 2025) (Burgess, J.), and In re
Miracle Rest. Grp., LLC, 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 1188 (Bankr.
E.D. La. May 13, 2025) (Grabill, J.):
Notwithstanding anything contained herein
to 	the 	contrary, 	neither 	the 	guarantors,
Insiders, nor the Affiliates of the Debtor shall
be discharged and released from liability, if
any, for Claims and debts arising under or in
connection with the Debtor or this Subchapter
V Case and/or otherwise addressed and/or
treated in this Plan. However, absent further
Court order upon notice and hearing, the
exclusive remedy for payment of any Claim or
debt addressed in this Plan, so long as the
Plan is not in default, shall be the Plan and
all parties classified in and under Article 4,
herein, are enjoined from taking any action
inconsistent 	herewith, 	including, 	but 	not
limited to, any action to prosecute or collect
any debt or Claim against any guarantor,
Insider, or Affiliate; provided however, that
all creditors shall retain the right to pursue
any third-party guarantor for any debts not
addressed in this Plan 	and 	the discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 1192 shall not apply to any
third-party 	guarantor. 	To 	the 	extent
necessary, 	any 	applicable 	statute 	of
limitations against collection from any third
party is specifically tolled from the period
from the Petition Date until the date upon
which the Debtor fails to cure any written
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 8 of 12

9
notice of default as set forth in the Plan and/or
any applicable loan documents.
See Third Amended Plan, p. 15 (ECF #108) (capitalized terms are defined in the Plan).
To be clear, this provision does not discharge guarantors, Insiders, or Affiliates, and
if the Debtor should ever default on the Plan, the injunction lifts to permit actions
against guarantors, Insiders, or Affiliates to proceed. This provision is aimed at
preventing creditors of the Debtor from pursuing those guarantors, Insiders, or
Affiliates so that the Debtor can devote maximum effort to successfully completing
the Plan.
The U.S. Trustee objects to the temporary injunction (ECF## 82 and 104),
asserting that the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit do not allow
non-consensual permanent third-party releases; and the U.S. Trustee also cites cases
that have held that temporary third-party releases (i.e., those that only apply until
the Debtor defaults on the Plan) are also not allowed. The U.S. Trustee’s Objections
do not discuss the cases the Debtor cites in the Plan, however.
The Court has examined the cases cited by the U.S. Trustee and the Debtor
and finds the Court’s reasoning in In re Miracle Rest. Grp., LLC, No. 24-11158, 2025
WL 1400915 (Bankr. E.D. La. May 13, 2025), persuasive. There, the court engaged in
a detailed analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale
Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995), which permitted non-consensual, non-debtor
releases and permanent injunctions. It further explained that Zale Corp. was not
affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (In re
Purdue Pharma), 603 U.S. 204, 227 (2024), or the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Highland
Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P. (In
re Highland Capital Management, L.P.), 132 F.4th 353 (5th Cir. 2025) (referred to as
Highland 	II 	in 	the 	Miracle 	opinion), 	which 	concerned 	permanent 	third-party
injunctions, effectively granting third parties the benefits of the Debtor’s discharge
on a permanent basis. After discussing Zale Corp., Purdue, and Highland II, as well
as other cases, the Miracle court concluded:
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 9 of 12

10
The Zale Corp. court noted supporting cases identifying examples of
“unusual circumstances” warranting temporary injunctions: Patton v.
Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Such circumstances usually
include when the debtor and the non-bankrupt party are closely
related or the stay contributes to the debtor’s reorganization.”); S.E.C.
v. 	Drexel 	Burnham 	Lambert 	Grp., 	Inc. 	(In 	re 	Drexel 	Burnham
Lambert Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In bankruptcy
cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided
the injunction plays an important part in the debtor’s reorganization
plan.”); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1003–06 (4th Cir.
1986) (stating that a § 105 injunction may be appropriate where
proceeding would have an adverse impact on the debtor’s ability to
reorganize or deplete property of estate).
Thus, although dicta, the Zale Corp. court clearly recognized that
circumstances may arise in a bankruptcy case justifying the issuance
of a temporary injunction of non-debtor actions through the plan
confirmation process. This Court finds that Zale Corp. continues to be
a valid legal proposition.
Miracle, 2025 WL 1400915, at *8.
This Court agrees with Miracle and also finds that Zale Corp. remains viable
post Purdue Pharma and Highland II. Thus, this Court holds that temporary third-
party injunctions may be allowable in a Chapter 11 plan provided the debtor shows
that the injunction is necessary to the viability of the plan.
Here, the temporary injunction is appropriately limited to non-bankrupt
parties who are closely related to the Debtor, and the injunction is important to the
Debtor’s reorganization. It also improves the likelihood of feasibility by allowing the
Debtor and closely related parties to work on completing the Plan payments without
being concerned about litigation around the periphery. It is also noteworthy that
creditors who may be affected by the injunction have voted to confirm the Plan.
Accordingly, the Court will permit the temporary injunction in this case and
thus overrules the U.S. Trustee’s objection on this point.4
4 Whether a proposed temporary injunction in a plan is acceptable depends on the circumstances and
facts of each case and thus should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 10 of 12

11
3. 	Is a Monthly Savings Account Allowable?
The Plan proposes to allow the Debtor to make monthly deposits into a savings
account (defined in the Plan as a “Savings Fund”) in the amount of $1,000 per month
during months 13 through 54 of the Plan and $2,000 per month during months 55
through 60. See Third Amended Plan, pp. 12-13. If allowed, by the end of the Plan the
Debtor will have accumulated over $50,000 in the Fund. The Plan states that this
provision is intended to be “consistent with the savings plans provisions permitted in
Chapter 13 cases in the Southern District of Texas.” Id. The Plan further states: “The
Debtor may request withdrawals from the Savings Fund to make payments under
this Plan and as a form of an ‘appropriate default remedy’ if this Plan is confirmed
under section 1191(b).” Id. Finally, the Debtor is authorized to retain these funds
upon completion of the plan, dismissal of the case, or conversion to chapter 7, except
as provided in § 348(f)(2). Id.
The U.S. Trustee objects to this provision on the grounds that the funds placed
into savings are “disposable income” under § 1192(d) that must be dedicated to
making plan payments under § 1191(c)(2). The U.S. Trustee argues that these funds
should be dedicated to paying unsecured creditors.
In theory, the inclusion of a savings provision makes some sense, as it could
provide a cushion to the Debtor if he comes upon hard times due to needed repairs to
equipment and similar expenses. To be allowed, however, at the very least the Debtor
must show that the funds to be deposited into the Savings Fund are “necessary for
the continuation, preservation, or operation” of the Debtor’s business, and thus
excluded from disposable income. See 11 U.S.C. § 1192(2)(d) (Disposable income does
not include income for the payment of expenditures necessary for the “continuation,
preservation, or operation of the business of the debtor.”). The Debtor has made no
such showing here. Moreover, the Debtor provides no analysis or discussion as to how
such a provision fits within the requirement that the Debtor dedicate all of his
“projected 	disposable 	income” 	to 	payments 	under 	the 	Plan, 	as 	required 	for
confirmation under § 1191(b) and (c)(2)(A).
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 11 of 12

12
Simply put, the Debtor has cited no statutory support for applying this novel
policy in this Chapter 11 case. Indeed, the proposed Savings Fund appears to conflict
with the statutory requirement for confirmation under § 1191(b) that the Debtor’s
projected disposable income be dedicated to making plan payments. Accordingly, the
Court sustains the U.S. Trustee’s objection on this issue and finds that the Savings
Fund provisions of the Plan should be deleted.
4. 	Is the Debtor entitled to a Discharge after Three Years?
The U.S. Trustee also objects to the proposal in the Plan that provides the
Debtor a discharge after only three years of payments, even though the Debtor’s
payment obligations continue for five years. See U.S. Trustee Objection, p. 6 (ECF
#104). Section 1192 of the Code provides, in part: “If the plan of the debtor is
confirmed under section 1191(b) of this title, as soon as practicable after completion
by the debtor of all payments due within the first 3 years of the plan, or such longer
period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix . . . the court shall grant the debtor
a discharge . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1192.
Since the Plan is being confirmed under § 1191(b), and since it provides for five
years of payments, the Court finds the U.S. Trustee’s objection has merit and is
therefore sustained on this issue. The Debtor shall amend the discharge provision of
the Plan (Article 9) to delay discharge until the end of the five-year Plan period.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court sustains the U.S. Trustee’s objections as
to consensual confirmation, the savings account provision, and discharge after three
years. The Court overrules the U.S. Trustee’s objection as to third-party injunctions.
The Court will enter an Order requiring the Debtor to amend the Plan in accordance
with this decision, which can be confirmed as a nonconsensual Plan under § 1191(b).
25-50479 - #139 File 06/05/26 Enter 06/05/26 15:41:37 Main Document Pg 12 of 12