Coleman v. Boston Retirement System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
RORY M. COLEMAN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil No. 26-10894-LTS
)
BOSTON RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 13)
October 13, 2026
SOROKIN, J.
Rory M. Coleman, who is self-represented in this matter, sued the Boston Retirement
System (“BRS”) after the agency denied his application for certain retirement benefits. BRS
moved to dismiss, and Coleman opposed. The Court has carefully considered the parties’
briefing and concluded that oral argument is unnecessary to resolve the issues presented. For the
reasons explained below, BRS’s Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
The Court draws the following factual allegations from Coleman’s complaint, Doc. No.
1, and accepts those allegations as true for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss. See
Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000). Coleman is gay. Doc. No. 1
at 5. In 2006, he joined the Navy’s Delayed Entry Program (“the DEP”). Id. at 3–5. Later that
year, he withdrew from the DEP to work as a police officer for the Boston Police Department.
1 Citations to “Doc. No. 	” reference items appearing on the Court’s electronic docketing
system (“ECF”); pincites are to the page numbers in the ECF header.
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Id. at 5. Coleman alleges that he withdrew from the DEP because the federal government
discriminated against gay people at the time through the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and
Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), which criminalized homosexual
conduct. Id. at 5–6. Since then, Coleman has worked as a police officer in Boston. Id. at 7.
In 2024, Massachusetts enacted the Honoring, Empowering, and Recognizing Our
Servicemembers and Veterans Act (“HERO Act”), 2024 Mass. Acts ch. 178. Id. Among other
provisions, the HERO Act allows veterans who qualify for Massachusetts public-employee
retirement systems to purchase up to four years of creditable service toward their retirement
based on prior military service. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 4(1)(h); Doc. No. 1 at 7. The
HERO Act defines “veteran” as any person who served at least 180 days of active duty whose
last discharge or release was under honorable conditions, any person who served at least 90 days
of active duty which included at least one day of wartime service, or any person who has been
awarded certain campaign badges. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 1; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7(43).
In August 2025, Coleman submitted an application for creditable service under the
HERO Act to BRS, the entity which administers retirement benefits for City of Boston
employees. Doc. No. 1 at 2, 7. In that application, Coleman “identified himself as LGBTQ and
explained that he was unable to serve in the military despite his willingness and desire to do so,
due to laws that prohibited his service based on sexual orientation.” Id. at 2–3. Upon receiving
Coleman’s application, BRS “requested a DD-214 discharge form,” which is a form given to
veterans upon discharge from active military duty. Id. at 3. In response, Coleman explained that
he “was denied military service under the [UCMJ] due to policies that criminalized [his]
identity.” Id. Coleman elaborated that he was “seeking equitable access to the buyback
opportunity that [his] similarly situated heterosexual peers were afforded.” Id.
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On September 5, 2025, BRS denied Coleman’s application for creditable service because
he had not served in the military and therefore did not qualify as a veteran under the HERO Act.
Id. The letter denying Coleman’s application added: “[BRS] recognizes the unfairness of your
situation. Unfortunately, we are bound by Massachusetts General Law and cannot grant you the
relief you seek. We would urge you to consider appealing this decision or perhaps seeking
legislative redress.” Id. As instructed, Coleman appealed to the Division of Administrative Law
Appeals, raising both constitutional and statutory claims. Id. at 3–4. The Division dismissed
Coleman’s appeal on October 10, 2025. Id. at 3. In doing so, the Division explained that his
constitutional claims could not “be entertained by an administrative tribunal.” Id.
On November 30, 2025, Coleman filed an objection raising his dismissed statutory claims
with the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (“CRAB”). Id. at 4. And on February 17, 2026,
Coleman filed the lawsuit now pending in this Court, alleging several constitutional claims
against BRS. In laying out the relevant “discriminatory legal framework” for these claims,
Coleman’s complaint noted that Massachusetts, like the federal government, had “criminalized
homosexual conduct” pursuant to “sodomy and unnatural acts statutes” which dated to as early
as 1641. Id. at 6. And, Coleman added, “Massachusetts remains the only state in New England
that has not formally repealed these statutes, though they are unenforceable under Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).” Doc. No. 1 at 6. Similarly, Coleman’s memorandum of law in
support of his complaint highlighted that “Massachusetts has not banned the gay and trans panic
defense.” Doc. No. 2 at 8.
Coleman’s complaint brought several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1 at
8–12. Count I asserted that BRS’s denial of his HERO Act application violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteen Amendment. Id. at 8–10. Coleman noted that BRS had
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denied his application “based on his non-veteran status.” Id. at 9. But, Coleman argued, his
“non-veteran status [was] the direct result of unconstitutional sex-based discrimination” by the
federal government through its prior “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and Article 125 of the
UCMJ. Id. Coleman therefore concluded that BRS had “perpetuate[d] that discrimination” by
“[a]pplying the HERO Act to deny benefits to [him] while granting benefits to veterans.” Id.
Coleman also added that “BRS’s own acknowledgement of ‘the unfairness of [Plaintiff’s]
situation’ demonstrate[d] that its denial serve[d] no legitimate governmental purpose.” Id.
Count II contended that BRS’s denial of Coleman’s HERO Act application violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 10. Specifically, Coleman “was
excluded from military service” because of UCMJ Article 125, which “criminalized the same
conduct” that the Supreme Court has concluded qualifies for “substantive due process
protections.” Id. As a result, Coleman argued that, by denying his application, BRS had
“convert[ed] that unconstitutional exclusion into permanent economic harm.” Id.
Count III alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause for
what Coleman termed the “Veteran Preference Cascade.” Id. at 10–11. Coleman elaborated that
“Massachusetts maintains a comprehensive system of veteran preferences in public
employment,” education, housing, and benefits, including “civil service examination
preferences,” “promotional preference points” in the Boston Police Department, HERO Act
creditable-service purchases, and transfer eligibility for the Boston Fire Department. Id. at 11.
But Coleman argued that “[t]he class of ‘veterans’ eligible for these preferences was artificially
and unconstitutionally constructed through decades of federal policy that categorically excluded
LGBTQ individuals from military service.” Id. As a result, Coleman concluded that
Massachusetts’s “application of veteran preference statutes to a class of ‘veterans’ artificially
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constructed through unconstitutional discrimination, without remedy for those excluded, violates
the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. 	In connection with these claims, Coleman’s complaint sought
numerous forms of relief, including declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages,
nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 11–12.
BRS has moved to dismiss all of Coleman’s claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. No. 13. Under Rule 12(b)(1), BRS argues that Count
III must be dismissed because Coleman’s alleged injuries stemming from the Massachusetts
“Veteran Preference Cascade” are not fairly traceable to BRS. Id. at 1. BRS also argues that
Coleman’s claims are not ripe in federal court because his statutory claims remain pending
before CRAB. Doc. No. 14 at 6. In the alternative, BRS contends that the Court should stay this
action pending resolution of Coleman’s CRAB proceedings. Id. Finally, under Rule 12(b)(6),
BRS contends that the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety because Coleman has not
stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. at 6–12. Coleman has opposed BRS’s
motion. Doc. No. 15.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) requires the Court to dismiss a complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). Conversely, “dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint
fails to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element
necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513
F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Though this Court “must be mindful of the
challenges faced by pro se litigants and construe their arguments liberally,” it need not “conjure
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up unpled allegations.” Vieira v. De Souza, 22 F.4th 304, 311 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation
modified).
Similarly, Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal if the Court “lack[s] . . . subject-matter
jurisdiction.” The standard of review is substantively identical to a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). See Lab. Rels. Div. of Constr. Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Healey, 844 F.3d 318, 326–27
(1st Cir. 2016). If a plaintiff “lacks Article III standing to bring a matter before the court, the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of the underlying case.” Dubois v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1281 (1st Cir. 1996). To have standing to bring a suit, “the
plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation modified).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court first assesses whether Coleman states a claim upon which relief can be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6). He does not. Then, the Court briefly explains why Coleman also lacks
standing under Rule 12(b)(1). Both shortcomings require dismissal.
A. 	Failure to State a Claim
In short, Coleman’s complaint does not “state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court begins with the Equal Protection claims in Counts I and III
before turning to the Due Process claim in Count II.
1. 	Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause bars a state from “deny[ing] to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
But this “does not take from the States all power of classification.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979). “Indeed, most laws classify, and many affect certain groups
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unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the
class described by the law.” Id. at 271–72. If “the basic classification is rationally based,”
however, “uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional
concern.” Id. at 272. Instead, “[p]roof of . . . discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
To be sure, certain protected classifications “in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy” and therefore require a heightened state justification. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. For
instance, classifications based upon gender or sex require the state to show that “the challenged
classification serves important government objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citation modified).
Conversely, a state’s classification based on veteran status alone does not require a
heightened government justification. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274–76. Indeed, such a
classification is “neutral on its face,” even if a “panoply” of “assertedly discriminatory federal
laws” may have “prevented all but a handful” of members in certain groups, such as women or
gay people, “from becoming veterans” in the past. Id. As a result, a state’s veteran classification
needs only have a rational basis unless the plaintiff can otherwise demonstrate that it was
motivated by “discriminatory intent.” See id. at 276.
Here, to the extent Coleman contends that the classification by veteran status in the
HERO Act itself violates the Equal Protection Clause, that claim fails. Section 4(1)(h) of the
HERO Act only classifies based on whether an applicant completed qualifying veteran service.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 4(1)(h). The provision makes no reference to gender, sex, sexual
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orientation, or any other arguably protected class. Because the provision is “neutral on its face,”
Coleman must show that its enactment was motivated by “discriminatory intent.” Feeney, 442
U.S. at 274. This Coleman cannot do. He has not provided any evidence to plausibly indicate
that the Massachusetts State Legislature intended to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation when it passed the HERO Act in 2024. Though Massachusetts has not yet repealed
laws enacted in 1641 and 1879 which criminalized homosexual conduct, Doc. No. 15 at 8,
Coleman concedes that intervening Supreme Court precedent has barred their enforcement since
2003, Doc. No. 1 at 6 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). Failure to repeal laws
that are unenforceable now does not generally suggest that Massachusetts acted with
discriminatory intent in passing other laws, and certainly not in passing the HERO Act in
particular. If anything, the fact that the Massachusetts Senate unanimously voted to repeal these
acts in 2024 suggests the opposite—that it is unlikely the Senate intended to discriminate by
sexual orientation when it passed the HERO Act that same year. See Doc. No. 1 at 7.
Coleman also cites the fact that “Massachusetts has not banned the use of the LGBTQ
‘panic’ defense in its courts” as evidence of discriminatory intent. Doc. No. 15 at 7–8. But
whatever the merits of legislation banning this defense in criminal proceedings, Massachusetts’s
failure to enact that legislation has no bearing on its intent with respect to defining eligibility for
service-credit purchases under the HERO Act. Coleman’s remaining evidence exclusively
concerns the federal government—not Massachusetts—and is irrelevant to the state’s intent.
Absent a showing of discriminatory intent, the veteran classification in section 4(1)(h)
need only have a rational basis. Coleman’s complaint does not explain why providing retirement
benefits to qualifying veterans lacks a rational basis. Nor can the Court perceive any plausible
reason why that would be so, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a similar
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Massachusetts preference for veterans had a rational basis. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277–78.
This being the case, Coleman fails to plausibly allege that the veteran classification in section
4(1)(h) of the HERO Act violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Coleman also has not demonstrated that BRS’s denial of his application violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Section 4(1)(h) of the HERO Act offers qualifying veterans the
opportunity to purchase service credit. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 4(1)(h). Coleman concedes
that he is not a qualifying veteran. See Doc. No. 15 at 7. BRS’s straightforward application of
the HERO Act—denying veteran service credit to someone who is not a veteran—is therefore
“neutral on its face.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
As a result, Coleman must demonstrate that BRS’s facially neutral denial was
nonetheless motivated by “discriminatory intent.” Id. Coleman again fails to allege any facts
which make this remotely plausible. He does not allege that BRS has selectively applied the
HERO Act or otherwise treated similarly situated individuals differently. To the extent Coleman
argues that the failure of the Massachusetts State Legislature to pass or repeal certain criminal
laws demonstrates BRS’s discriminatory intent in denying his application, Doc. No. 15 at 7–8,
this falls well short. As discussed above, this evidence has little relationship to the
Massachusetts State Legislature’s intent in passing the HERO Act. Its relationship to BRS—an
agency which administers retirement benefits and has no connection to the criminal laws
Coleman cites—is still more attenuated. So, too, with respect to the federal government’s prior
discriminatory policies towards gay servicemembers. Simply put, these policies have zero
bearing on BRS’s intent in denying Coleman’s application.
Without evidence of discriminatory intent, BRS’s denial only needs to have a rational
basis. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274. Denying Coleman’s application for benefits because he did not
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meet the statutory criteria for those benefits indisputably clears this bar. Coleman nonetheless
asserts that “BRS’s own denial letter acknowledg[ing] the unfairness of his situation” inherently
demonstrates that BRS lacked a rational basis for its denial. Doc. No. 15 at 9 (citation modified).
But the mere fact that BRS expressed sympathy for the unfairness of Coleman’s situation in no
way undermined the agency’s rational basis for denying his application as the HERO Act
required. As a result, Coleman also fails to state a claim that BRS’s denial of his application
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court therefore ALLOWS BRS’s Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I and III. One
claim remains.
2. 	Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving
any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1. “The Due Process Clause has both procedural and substantive components. The former
ensures that government, when dealing with private persons, will use fair procedures. The latter
safeguards individuals against certain offensive government actions, notwithstanding that
facially fair procedures are used to implement them.” Harron v. Town of Franklin, 660 F.3d
531, 535–36 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation modified).
The Court “examines procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks
whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the
second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
sufficient.” Id. at 537 (citation modified). “To have a property interest in a [government]
benefit, a person . . . must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.” Bd. of Regents of
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rather, a person must “have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it.” Id. To the extent that Coleman’s complaint can be understood to raise a
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procedural due process claim, this claim fails at step one. Coleman has no legitimate claim to
creditable service under the HERO Act because—as he concedes—he does not qualify as a
veteran under that act.
Coleman’s complaint also does not raise a cognizable substantive due process claim. To
be sure, Coleman is correct that substantive due process protects “intimate personal autonomy
from governmental interference” in a number of respects, Doc. No. 1 at 10, including the use of
contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), private sexual conduct, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644
(2015). The problem is that BRS’s denial of Coleman’s HERO Act application has nothing to do
with these protections. BRS denied Coleman retirement benefits because he was not a veteran
and therefore did not meet the statutory criteria for the benefits he sought. BRS did not interfere
with Coleman’s intimate personal autonomy in any sense, let alone in a manner that implicates
substantive due process.
The Court therefore ALLOWS BRS’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count II. Though the
foregoing analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) is straightforward and clearly compels dismissal, the
Court turns briefly to one more set of issues implicated by Coleman’s claims.
B. 	Standing
It appears from the record that lack of standing also compels dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1). For instance, Count III of Coleman’s complaint alleges that “the comprehensive
system of veteran preferences in Massachusetts public employment” violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Doc. No. 1 at 10–11. Insofar as this count challenges not just section 4(1)(h)
of the HERO Act, but also state civil service exams, Boston Police Department promotion
policies, and Boston Fire Department transfer procedures, BRS is not the proper defendant
because it neither is responsible for—nor has the ability to redress—these claims. For that
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matter, Coleman also has not demonstrated that any of his injuries—under any count—are “fairly
traceable” to BRS. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. Instead, the discrimination of which Coleman
complains was perpetuated by the federal government, not by BRS or even the state of
Massachusetts more broadly. See Doc. No. 1 at 4–6. This, too, is a fatal defect in Coleman’s
claims against BRS.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, BRS’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) is ALLOWED.2 	The
Clerk shall enter a judgment of dismissal with each side to bear its own fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge
2 Because Coleman’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety, the Court does not address BRS’s
argument that Coleman’s claims are not ripe or, in the alternative, that a stay is necessary, in
light of his ongoing CRAB proceedings. Doc. No. 14 at 6. The Court notes that Massachusetts
law provides for judicial review in the appropriate superior court of “a final decision of any
agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30A, § 14. As part of that review,
Massachusetts courts can consider constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Fine v. Contributory Ret.
App. Bd., 518 N.E.2d 1151, 1152–53 (Mass. 1988) (assessing state and federal Equal Protection
Clause challenge to CRAB’s retirement classification).
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