Jones et al v. Perdue Farms Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
STEPHEN JONES, et al. 	*
*
Plaintiffs, 	*
* 	Civil Case No.: SAG-25-02445
v. 	*
*
PERDUE FARMS INC., et al. 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Stephen Jones and Richard Renshaw (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action
pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) against Defendants Perdue
Farms Inc., Perdue Agribusiness LLC, and Perdue Foods LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF
4. Defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them, or in the alternative to
strike the complaint in part, or in the alternative to stay the case, ECF 19, which Plaintiffs jointly
opposed, ECF 23. Defendants then jointly filed a reply. ECF 27. This Court has reviewed the
filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons
explained below, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The following facts are derived from Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, ECF 4, and are
assumed to be true for purposes of this motion.
Defendant Perdue Agribusiness LLC and Defendant Perdue Foods LLC, which are both
subsidiaries of Defendant Perdue Farms Inc., own and operate an agribusiness facility located in
Salisbury, Maryland (the “Salisbury Facility”). Id. ¶ 30. A small stream, Peggy Branch, originates
at the Salisbury Facility, and another stream that eventually discharges into Peggy Branch, Middle
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Neck Branch, borders it. Id. ¶¶ 4, 40. Plaintiffs each reside within one mile of the Salisbury Facility
on property adjacent to Peggy Branch. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) are a category of chemical compounds that
include 	perfluorooctanoic 	acid 	(“PFOA”), 	perfluorooctane 	sulfonic 	acid 	(“PFOS”), 	and
perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (“PFHxS”). Id. ¶ 38. PFAS are resistant to biodegradation and
remain in the environment and the human body long after their disposal, consumption, or
absorption. Id. ¶ 64. PFAS are associated with various health risks to humans and adverse effects
on the environment. Id. ¶¶ 67, 74.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are disposing of solid waste containing PFAS at the
Salisbury Facility and that those chemicals are contaminating the area’s groundwater and surface
water. Id. ¶ 2. Specifically, they allege that Defendants spray irrigate the site with wastewater
containing PFAS, store contaminated wastewater in lagoons on site, excavate and dispose of
contaminated soil and dredge spoil without a permit, and dispose of foam used for fire suppression
that contains PFAS. Id. ¶¶ 44–45, 50–51.
Testing of the groundwater at the Salisbury Facility revealed PFAS levels significantly
above the safe drinking water levels promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”). Id. ¶ 48. Groundwater flows west from the Salisbury Facility toward Plaintiffs’
residences and has contaminated private wells in the area, including Plaintiffs’. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
Testing of the drinking well water at Plaintiffs’ properties has revealed concentrations of PFOA,
PFOS, and PFHxS well above the respective maximum contaminant level for each chemical
promulgated by the EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Id. ¶¶ 22–24. In total, water from
112 wells in the area contain at least one PFAS chemical in an amount that exceeds the safe
drinking water level promulgated by the EPA for that chemical. Id. ¶ 57.
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In addition to affecting their drinking well water, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct
harms their “recreational, aesthetic, and/or commercial interests.” Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs further allege
that PFAS harm aquatic life, such as fish and shellfish, and that the concentrations of PFOA and
PFOS in Middle Neck Branch and Peggy Branch are approximately one thousand times greater
than the level the EPA has deemed safe for human consumption of fish and shellfish. Id. ¶¶ 8, 84–
85.
The Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) implements RCRA in Maryland
and has commenced an ongoing investigation into PFAS contamination at the Salisbury Facility.
Id. ¶¶ 31, 47.
The following facts are derived from declarations filed in connection with the instant
motion and appear to be undisputed. Defendants have supplied free bottled water to both Plaintiffs
since late 2024. ECF 19-4 ¶¶ 3–5. Defendants have also offered to install point of entry treatment
(“POET”) systems on private wells in the affected area to treat the well water. ECF 19-2 ¶¶ 3–4.
Such a system has been installed on Plaintiff Jones’s well, while Plaintiff Renshaw has declined
the offer to have a POET system installed on his well. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Periodic testing of Plaintiff
Jones’s well water since installation of the POET system has shown non-detectible levels of the
tested PFAS. Id. ¶ 8. Defendants have agreed to maintain the POET system through 2029 and have
made no commitments past that time. ECF 23-2 ¶¶ 17–18. POET systems cannot protect users
from contamination that has already passed the point of entry and been absorbed into piping. Id.
¶ 20.
Before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs sent a notice of intent to sue letter as required under
§ 6972(b)(1)(A). ECF 1-2.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant is permitted to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs.
Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a
defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of
law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Whether a
complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant
with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable
inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon
Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs.,
Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). But if a complaint provides no more than “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to the citizen suit provision of RCRA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972. Section 6972(a)(1)(A) permits a plaintiff to bring suit based on an alleged “violation of
any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become
effective pursuant to [RCRA].” Section 6972(a)(1)(B), in turn, permits a plaintiff to bring suit
against a person who has contributed to “the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
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transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”
Plaintiffs bring Counts I, II, and III under § 6972(a)(1)(A). Count I alleges a general
violation of RCRA’s prohibition on open dumping found in 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). ECF 4 at ¶¶ 86–
94. Counts II and III allege more specific violations of that open dumping prohibition as
implemented 	by 	regulations. 	Id. 	¶¶ 95–110. 	Count 	IV 	alleges 	imminent 	and 	substantial
endangerment under § 6972(a)(1)(B). Id. ¶¶ 111–17. Plaintiffs seek civil penalties and declaratory
and injunctive relief in the form of an order that Defendants eliminate and remediate the allegedly
unlawful conduct and its effects on the public and the environment. Id. ¶¶ 118–24.
A. Notice
Defendants first argue that Counts I, II, and III must be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed
to provide sufficient notice of the alleged violations before filing suit. At least sixty days before
filing a suit based on § 6972(a)(1)(A), the plaintiff must give the alleged violator notice of the
alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). The “notice and 60–day delay requirements
are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit under the RCRA citizen suit provision.”
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989). In considering an “identical” statutory
notice requirement under the Clean Water Act, the Fourth Circuit concluded that courts must
construe the notice requirements as “strict and specific” but avoid an “overly technical application”
of them. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 400–01 (4th
Cir. 2011).
Notice before filing a § 6972(b)(1)(A) suit must include “sufficient information to permit
the recipient to identify” (1) “the specific permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or
order which has allegedly been violated”; (2) “the activity alleged to constitute a violation”; (3)
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“the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation”; (4) “the date or dates of the
violation”; and (5) “the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.” 40
C.F.R. § 254.3(a). Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the notice only with respect to the first
and fourth requirements, which this Court will address in turn.
In the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff may satisfy “the date or dates of the violation” requirement
by alleging ongoing violations. Sherrill v. Mayor of Balt., 31 F. Supp. 3d 750, 769 (D. Md. 2014),
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Goldfarb v. Mayor of Balt., 791 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Potomac Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Marcella M. Klinger, LLC, Civ. No. JKB-13-801, 2013 WL
5505397, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2013)). Plaintiffs’ notice alleged ongoing violations: “Perdue has
disposed and released, and is continuing to dispose and release Forever Chemicals into the
environment through at least five major pathways.” ECF 1-2 at 3. The notice therefore satisfies
“the date or dates of the violation” requirement.
As for the “the specific permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which
has allegedly been violated” requirement, the notice here alleged that Defendants’ actions
“constitute[] Open Dumping in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6945 and its implementing regulations.”
ECF 1-2 at 6. The complaint, however, cited more specifically to two of those implementing
regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-3(c) and 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4(a). Defendants argue that the notice
had to cite to those specific implementing regulations, while Plaintiffs counter that their reference
to § 6945 sufficed.
Some courts have concluded that citing to the open dumping provision alone suffices. See,
e.g., Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Del. Ostego Corp., 450 F. Supp. 2d 467, 480–81 (D.N.J.
2006). Others have concluded that a plaintiff must cite a regulation implementing the open
dumping provision. See, e.g., Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 2011). Defendants
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also direct this Court to Blumenthal Power Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., in which a court in this
district concluded that a notice that cited generally to all of RCRA’s hazardous waste provisions
was insufficient. No. 94CV2612, 1995 WL 1902124, at *4 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 1995). However, the
court stated in dicta that the notice “needed to refer to specific sections of RCRA.” Id. The notice
here did so in referring to the open dumping provision in § 6945.
Although no controlling precedent squarely addresses this issue, the parties agree that the
purpose of the notice is to “give[] the alleged violator ‘an opportunity to bring itself into complete
compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’” Hallstrom, 493 U.S.
at 29 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987));
see also Gaston Copper Recycling, 629 F.3d at 400 (“Notice given by a citizen plaintiff under the
Clean Water Act thus must provide the alleged violator with enough information to attempt to
correct the violation and avert the citizen suit.”).
Accordingly, this Court will consider whether the notice alleged each violation with
sufficient specificity to provide Defendants an opportunity to correct them. As noted above, the
complaint alleges a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4(a), which provides, in pertinent part, “A
facility or practice shall not contaminate an underground drinking water source beyond the solid
waste boundary.” The notice alleged that “Perdue discharges the PFAS contaminated wastewater
to Peggy’s Branch, a small stream originating at the Perdue Plant that leaches the Forever
Chemicals into the soil and groundwater, negatively impacting downgradient drinking water wells
and surface water quality.” ECF 1-2 at 3. The notice therefore made clear that Plaintiffs alleged
contamination of “underground drinking water source[s] beyond the solid waste boundary” in the
form of PFAS contamination of downgradient drinking water wells. Thus, even without citing
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§ 257.3-4(a), the notice alleged conduct that violates that regulation and provided Defendants with
sufficient information to correct that alleged violation.
The complaint also alleges a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 257.3-3(c), which provides, “A
facility or practice shall not cause non-point source pollution of waters of the United States that
violates applicable legal requirements implementing an areawide or Statewide water quality
management plan that has been approved by the Administrator under section 208 of the Clean
Water Act, as amended.” The complaint further identifies several state statutes and regulations
allegedly violated by Defendants’ discharge of non-point source pollutants without a discharge
permit. See ECF 4 ¶ 100. Although the notice did not reference an areawide or statewide water
quality management plan or the state statutes and regulations implementing it, in substance, it
alleged the same conduct that violates those legal requirements. Specifically, the notice alleged
that Defendants are polluting waters by discharging pollutants without a permit to do so. ECF 1-2
at 2, 3, 6. That allegation provided Defendants with sufficient information to correct the alleged
violation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs provided sufficient notice before filing this lawsuit.
B. Standing
Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs lack standing. Standing requires a plaintiff to show
(1) injury in fact, (2) that is caused by the conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely redressable
by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). A
defendant may challenge standing at the motion to dismiss stage either facially or factually.
Wikimedia Found. v. NSA, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017). A facial challenge asserts that the
facts in the complaint, even if true, fail to establish standing, whereas a factual challenge asserts
that the facts in the complaint that pertain to standing are not true. Id. In a factual challenge, the
court may look beyond the complaint. Id.
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1. 	Facial Challenge
In their facial challenge, Defendants contend that the complaint fails to allege injury
particular to Plaintiffs based on harms to the environment. “The relevant showing for Article III
standing is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000). For example, in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., the plaintiffs adequately pled standing by alleging that
the defendant’s conduct interfered with their ability to participate in specific activities, such as
fishing, hiking, and birdwatching, in the affected area. Id. at 182–83. In contrast, allegations that
a defendant’s conduct has interfered with a plaintiff’s general interests, unaccompanied by more
specific facts, will not suffice to plead standing. See Richardson v. Mayor of Balt., Civ. No. RDB-
13-1924, 2014 WL 60211, at *4 (D. Md. Jan 7, 2014). For example, in Richardson v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, the plaintiffs alleged:
The Plaintiffs live near the Middle Branch of the Patapsco River (the “River”).
They regularly use and recreate on and around the River and desire to do so in the
future. The quality of the River and the water system of which it is a part directly
affects 	the 	agricultural, 	health, 	recreational, 	aesthetic, 	property, 	and/or
environmental interests of the Plaintiffs.
Id. The court concluded that these allegations, which described “neither the nature nor type of
planned use,” were conclusory and failed to plead standing. Id.
Plaintiffs’ allegations are nearly identical to those in Richardson. Plaintiffs similarly allege
that they live near Peggy Branch but do not allege with any specificity the nature or type of their
use of it (aside from drinking water, which this Court addresses below regarding Defendants’
factual challenge). Instead, they merely allege that Defendants’ conduct harms their “recreational,
aesthetic, and/or commercial interests.” This general allegation, particularly its use of “and/or,”
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like in Richardson, fails to describe with sufficient specificity how Plaintiffs use or plan to use the
affected area and what injury they suffer as a result.
This Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they possess
standing to seek relief based on harms to the environment. Accordingly, if Plaintiffs wish to pursue
such relief, they must seek leave to amend their complaint.
2. 	Factual Challenge
In their factual challenge, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing with respect to any
relief relating to their drinking water because Defendants have offered Plaintiffs POET systems to
decontaminate their drinking water and have supplied them with bottled water. More specifically,
Defendants contend that Plaintiff Jones lacks standing because he has accepted installation of a
POET system that has lowered the PFAS in his drinking water to non-detectable levels, and
Plaintiff Renshaw lacks standing because he has refused installation of such a POET system.
Although some courts have concluded that a defendant’s offer of a full refund of all of a
plaintiff’s alleged losses before a lawsuit commences deprives the plaintiff of standing, an offer of
less than “complete relief” does not defeat standing. See Johnson v. Bobcat Co., 175 F. Supp. 3d
1130, 1137–38 (D. Minn. 2016) (collecting cases); cf. Greisz v. Household Bank (Ill.), N.A., 176
F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that after a lawsuit commences, refusal of an offer of
complete relief moots a claim, while refusal of an incomplete offer does not). Here, Defendants
have offered Plaintiffs less than “complete relief.” Defendants have committed to maintaining any
installed POET system only through 2029, and even while maintained, POET systems cannot
protect users from contamination that has already passed the point of entry and been absorbed into
piping. ECF 23-2 at ¶¶ 17–18, 20. Plaintiffs’ requested relief includes remediating “all offsite
impacts to groundwater,” relief that is greater than the temporary and incomplete offers that
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Defendants have made. ECF 4 at ¶ 118. Thus, Defendants’ remediation efforts have not deprived
Plaintiffs of standing with respect to relief related to their drinking water.
C. Count I
Turning now to the merits, Defendants first contend that Count I should be dismissed
because it merely duplicates Counts II and III. Count I alleges a violation of RCRA’s open
dumping prohibition under 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). Counts II and III both allege violations of
regulations implementing that prohibition on open dumping. Indeed, both counts describe the
allegedly violative conduct in terms of the open dumping prohibition. See ECF 4 at ¶¶ 97, 105 (“A
facility or practice violates the RCRA open dumping prohibition if it . . . .”). Thus, Count I is
merely a general description of Counts II and III, rather than a cause of action independent of them.
However, Rule 8 expressly permits a party to plead in the alternative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2).
Although this Court agrees with Defendants that Count I is duplicative, it perceives no reason to
dismiss the claim on that basis at this stage. The motion to dismiss Count I will be denied.
D. Count II
Defendants next contend that Count II must be dismissed. This claim alleges a violation of
40 C.F.R. §257.3-3(c), which prohibits causing “non-point source pollution of waters of the United
States that violates applicable legal requirements implementing an areawide or Statewide water
quality management plan that has been approved by the Administrator under section 208 of the
Clean Water Act, as amended.” The complaint alleges that Maryland has adopted an applicable
areawide or Statewide water quality management plan and that Defendants have violated several
Maryland statutes and regulations by discharging PFAS into Peggy Branch and Middle Neck
Branch without a discharge permit. See ECF 4 ¶¶ 98, 100. Defendants contend that these
allegations are insufficient because Plaintiffs have not specified a water quality management plan
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or explicitly alleged that the statutes and regulations cited constitute “legal requirements
implementing an areawide or Statewide water quality management plan” under 40 C.F.R. §257.3-
3(c).
This Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately pled this claim. The complaint
contains both factual allegations (that Defendants are discharging pollutants into waters of the
United States without a discharge permit) and the specific legal requirements allegedly violated
by that conduct (the Maryland statutes and regulations). Furthermore, the complaint makes clear,
even if implicitly, that Plaintiffs allege that those statutes and regulations constitute “legal
requirements implementing an areawide or Statewide water quality management plan.” The
allegations in the complaint therefore gave Defendants sufficient notice of the facts underlying the
claim and the legal basis for relief. If Defendants believe that that legal basis for relief is flawed
because the Maryland statutes and regulations do not constitute “legal requirements implementing
an areawide or Statewide water quality management plan,” they may argue, later in the proceeding,
that the claim fails for that reason. However, Plaintiffs have not failed to state the claim by failing
to include a legal argument to the contrary in their complaint. Accordingly, this Court will deny
the motion to dismiss Count II.
E. Count III
Defendants next argue that Count III must be dismissed. Count III alleges a violation of 40
C.F.R. § 257.3-4(a), which prohibits “contaminat[ing] an underground drinking water source
beyond the solid waste boundary or beyond an alternative boundary.” “Contaminate” within the
meaning of this regulation means:
[I]ntroduce a substance that would cause: (i) The concentration of that substance in
the ground water to exceed the maximum contaminant level specified in appendix
I, or (ii) An increase in the concentration of that substance in the ground water
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where 	the 	existing 	concentration 	of 	that 	substance 	exceeds 	the 	maximum
contaminant level specified in appendix I.
40 C.F.R. § 257.3-4(c)(2). Appendix I does not list a maximum contaminant level (“MCL”) for
any of the PFAS alleged in the complaint. 40 C.F.R. § 257, App. I. Defendants argue that because
no PFAS are listed in appendix I, they cannot constitute substances that “contaminate” within the
meaning of § 257.3-4(a).
This Court agrees. The text of § 257.3-4(c)(2) is clear that contamination requires
concentration of a substance beyond its MCL in appendix I. If no MCL is listed in appendix I, as
none is for any PFAS, then contamination within the meaning of § 257.3-4(a) cannot occur. See
Living Lands, LLC v. Cline, 657 F. Supp. 3d 831, 845 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 21, 2023) (rejecting claim
based on chemical not listed in appendix I because defendant “cannot have caused an exceedance
of an MCL that does not apply”). Although Plaintiffs argue that the EPA has promulgated MCLs
for PFAS, those MCLs are not delineated in appendix I, so they cannot support a claim of
contamination under its plain meaning in § 257.3-4(a). Thus, this Court must dismiss Count III.
F. 	Count IV
Defendants also seek to dismiss Count IV, which alleges imminent and substantial
endangerment under § 6972(a)(1)(B). To satisfy the imminence requirement under this provision,
there must exist a present threat, even if harm from the threat may not manifest until later. Meghrig
v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1996). Defendants note that many courts have concluded
that contamination, including in drinking water, alone does not constitute imminent and substantial
endangerment. See Courtland Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., Civ. No. 2:18-cv-01230, 2023 WL
6331069, at *98 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 28, 2023) (collecting cases). More specifically, allegations of
contaminated drinking water cannot support an imminent and substantial endangerment claim if
plaintiffs do not also allege that they are actually drinking the water. Warren v. Matthey, Civ. No.
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15-01919, 2016 WL 215232, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2016) (collecting cases and concluding that
“conclusory” allegation that contaminated drinking water posed an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the plaintiffs’ health was insufficient given that the plaintiffs had failed to allege
that they were drinking the water).
Plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that they are currently drinking the contaminated
water. Furthermore, although Plaintiffs allege harm to the surrounding environment as a result of
the contamination, this Court has already concluded that they lack standing to bring claims based
on that alleged environmental harm. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim for
imminent and substantial endangerment. Because this Court will dismiss Count IV, it need not
address Defendants’ request in the alternative to strike certain allegations from that count.
G. Motion to Stay
Finally, Defendants ask in the alternative that this Court stay this lawsuit pending
completion of the ongoing MDE investigation. This Court recently denied a nearly identical
motion for a stay in another case based on the same alleged conduct by Defendants at the Salisbury
Facility. See Chaney v. Perdue Farms Inc., Civ. No. SAG-24-02975, 2025 WL 2323227, at *6 (D.
Md. Aug. 12, 2025). This Court reasoned that that case would proceed to discovery, during which
this Court was unlikely to make any rulings that might conflict with any determinations made by
MDE during its investigation. Id. This Court also noted that both the timing of the MDE
investigation and the scope of any potential relief from it remained unclear. Id. The same reasoning
applies to this case. Although Defendants seek to distinguish Chaney by noting that the plaintiffs
in that case had requested certain forms of relief, such as medical monitoring, that would not result
from the MDE investigation, it remains true that the scope of potential relief from the MDE
investigation remains unclear. This Court perceives no persuasive reason to prevent this case from
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proceeding to discovery while awaiting the completion, at an unknown time in the future, of an
investigation that may not ultimately duplicate the relief requested in this case. This Court will
therefore deny the motion to stay at this juncture, but Defendants may re-raise it if appropriate as
both this case and the investigation proceed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, strike, or stay, ECF 19, will
be granted in part and denied in part. Counts III and IV will be dismissed, and the case will proceed,
without a stay, as to Counts I and II and relief relating to Plaintiffs’ drinking water only. A separate
Order follows.
Dated: January 8, 2025 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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