Suire v. Chakri

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAVID M. SUIRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
LT. SAID CHAKRI, Maintenance Supervisor,
Defendant.
Civil Action No.: SAG-25-2626
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, David M. Suire, who is currently incarcerated at Maryland Correctional Training
Center (MCTC), brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lt. Said Chakri
for events that occurred while Suire was incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Institute at
Jessup (MCI-J). ECF No. 15.
Suire originally filed suit against the Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services (DPSCS), Lt. “Shockery” (later corrected to Chakri), Robert Cangilio, Warden Tanya
Parker, and Samuel George. ECF No. 1. The Court dismissed DPSCS pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2) and directed Suire to amend his Complaint. ECF No. 5. In his First Amended
Complaint, Suire voluntarily dismissed Defendants Parker and George. ECF No. 8. The Court
again directed Suire to amend his Complaint using the Court’s form. (ECF No. 14). Suire filed a
Second Amended Complaint that names Lt. Chakri as the sole Defendant. ECF No. 15.
Pending before the Court is Lt. Chakri’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) and his Motion to Seal exhibits “B” and “C”. ECF No. 24.
Also pending before the Court is Suire’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint for a fourth
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time to name as additional Defendants the warden of MCTC, Cleveland Friday, Centurion Group
Inc., Dr. Jahed, and Molly Nicholes. ECF No. 26. The motion is opposed. ECF No. 27.
This matter is now ripe and ready for review. For the reasons discussed below, Lt. Chakri’s
Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22), will be
granted in part and denied in part. The Motion to Seal (ECF No. 24) will be granted.1 The Court
appoints counsel to represent Suire. Subject to the appointment of counsel, Suire’s Motion for
Leave to Amend (ECF No. 26) will be denied without prejudice.
I. 	Complaint Allegations
Suire alleges that on April 1, 2025, while incarcerated at MCI-J and working in the
maintenance department, he was ordered by maintenance supervisor, Lt. Chakri, to change a
“busted” sprinkler head in abandoned Building “A.” ECF No. 15 at 4. Suire states that he advised
Lt. Chakri that an outside contractor should be called to perform the task because it would set off
the alarm system and the fire department would respond. Id. Lt. Chakri told Suire that another
incarcerated individual, Steven Jackson, had turned off the system, and he could not wait on the
“red tape” of an approval. Id. He ordered Plaintiff to get it done. Id. When Suire removed the
sprinkler head, “stale water and rust busted out of the system with extreme pressures” and Suire
tripped on some old beds and metal boxes, injuring his right leg. Id.
Suire states that Lt. Chakri’s response to his injury was “well you had your shower for the
day.” Id. Suire also states that he asked Lt. Chakri why he lied to him about the water being off
and adds that Jackson did not even know how to turn it off. Id. In response, Lt. Chakri’s advised
Suire to submit a sick call. Id. at 5. Suire saw the doctor, id., who found injuries to his right ankle,
1 	The Motion to Seal is unopposed and, appears to meet the requirements of Local Rule 105.11.
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foot, knee, leg, and Achilles tendon. Id. Suire states that the injury has limited his earning capacity.
Id. at 10.
Suire’s Second Amended Complaint includes additional allegations that he was exposed to
other hazardous conditions during his maintenance job at MCI-J from August of 2024 through July
of 2026. Id. at 4-8. He states that he was exposed to high voltage when he was made to change out
electrical motors and capacitors, work which he asserts was only appropriate for licensed
contractors. Id. He states that this work put him at risk of death. Id. Suire adds that he was directed
to perform electrical work without the legally required “lock-out” system in place because the keys
could not be located. Id. at 6-7.
Suire states that he also performed work on the kitchen plumbing that was not conducted
safely and caused him to suffer burns. Id. at 5. He was made to cut down drains that resulted in
raw sewage draining “into the local bays and streams!” Id. Suire also states that he was directed
to snake a sewer line that was full of medical waste, including used needles that exposed him to
infectious disease. Id. Suire lists incidents when he was directed to work in a manhole without
confined space training (id. at 7) and was asked to adjust the head pressure on two boilers. Id.
Suire alleges that Lt. Chakri had full knowledge of the dangerous conditions to which Suire
was exposed although Suire told Lt. Chakri on multiple occasions that outside contractors should
be used (id. at 6), and Defendant Chakri “did these acts deliberately with no regards for [Suire’s]
health or safety.” Id. at 8.
Suire states that Lt. Chakri initiated a plot to fire him once he learned that Suire had suffered
a “real injury” from changing the sprinkler head. Id. at 8. He states that Lt. Chakri falsely claimed
that Suire was “high,” so Suire requested drug testing and submitted Administrative Remedy
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Requests (ARPs) to no avail. Id. Suire also states that Lt. Chakri arranged for another incarcerated
individual to threaten him. Id. at 8-9.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the factual allegations of a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim. 	However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those
elements.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A
fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Id. (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Accordingly, “the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 (emphasis in original). A court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted), and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citations omitted); see
also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir. 2015). At the same
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time, the Court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.”
Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Defendant’s motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Motions styled in this manner
implicate the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	See
Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011).
Conversion of a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) is
permissible where plaintiff has “actual notice” that the motion may be disposed of as one for
summary judgment. See Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th
Cir. 1998). When the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for summary
judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties are
deemed to be on notice that conversion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) may occur; the Court “does
not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261.
Because Lt. Chakri filed a motion styled as a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment, Suire was on notice that the court could treat the motion as one for summary
judgment and rule on that basis. Accordingly, the Court will review the claims against Lt. Chakri
under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) standard and will consider the exhibits filed in support of the
dispositive motion.
The Court informed Suire that he may file an opposition and advised him of the
consequences of failing to do so. ECF 25. Suire has filed an opposition. ECF No. 28. Because
Suire’s complaint is verified, its factual assertions may also be considered in opposition to
defendants’ motion. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(c)(1)(A).
The Court is mindful that Suire is a self-represented litigant. A federal court must liberally
construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious
cases. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But liberal construction does not mean a
court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim. See Weller
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). A court cannot
assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION
Lt. Chakri asserts that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent Suire
has sued him in his official capacity; the complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim for
deliberate indifference because Suire fails to allege a serious injury or that Lt. Chakri knew about
and disregarded a serious risk to Suire’s health or safety; the retaliation claim should be dismissed
because Suire has failed to show that his termination was caused by the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right; and the complaint should be dismissed because Lt. Chakri is
entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Official Capacity
Suire has sued Lt. Chakri in his official and individual capacities. ECF 15 at 8. Lt. Chakri
has asked the Court to dismiss the official capacity claim against him on grounds of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. ECF No. 22 at 8-9.
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and
departments are immune from citizen suits in federal court absent state consent or Congressional
action. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims against
state employees acting in their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh Amendment
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immunity because a suit against the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself.
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985). 	The State of Maryland has not waived such
immunity for claims brought pursuant to § 1983. 	To the extent that Suire has asserted a claim
against Lt. Chakri in his official capacity, Lt. Chakri is immune from suit for actions taken in his
official capacity and that claim is dismissed
B. 	Deliberate Indifference
Lt. Chakri seeks dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint, asserting that Suire’s
allegations of exposure to risk of harm to his health and safety are insufficient to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. ECF No. 22.
Generally, conditions which “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” may amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 	Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981). 	However, conditions which are merely restrictive or even harsh, “are part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id.
In order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a
prisoner must prove two elements - that ‘the deprivation of [a] basic
human need was objectively sufficiently serious,’ and that ‘subjectively
the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’
Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). “These
requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition
imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called ‘punishment,’ and absent severity, such
punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and unusual.”’ Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1991)).
“Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630,
634 (4th Cir. 2003). 	Demonstration of an extreme deprivation proscribed by the Eighth
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Amendment requires an allegation of “a serious or significant physical or emotional injury
resulting from the challenged conditions, Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993),
or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s exposure to
the challenged conditions.” De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
33–35 (1993)); see also Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003).
To establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be evidence that a known
excessive risk of harm to the inmate’s health or safety was disregarded. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at
298–99. In other words, “the test is whether the guards know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious
danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown v. N.
Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605,
607 (7th Cir. 2002)). Conduct is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment unless it transgresses
bright lines of clearly established pre-existing law. See Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298
(4th Cir. 1992).
Lt. Chakri first argues that Suire’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim should
be dismissed because the alleged injuries to his leg are not serious enough. ECF No. 22 at 11-12.
But Lt. Chakri fails to recognize the disjunctive nature of the standard:
a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged
conditions, or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the
prisoner’s exposure to the challenged conditions.
De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634 (emphasis added). Here, Suire has alleged that he was exposed to the
risk of serious bodily injury and death during his work assignments, including electrocution,
suffocation, burns, and exposure to infectious disease. With respect to the sprinkler head incident
on April 1, 2025, Suire has alleged that he was exposed to risk of serious bodily harm from high
water pressure under the conditions in which he was directed to perform his work assignment. The
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Court need not analyze the seriousness of Suire’s injuries because he is not required to allege an
injury at all to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for exposure to a substantial risk of
serious harm.
Lt. Chakri next argues that Suire cannot establish the subjective element of the standard
because “there is nothing about these allegations that show that, in ordering Plaintiff to perform
maintenance tasks per his job assignment, Chakri knew that the ‘plaintiff inmate faced serious
danger to his safety and Chakri could avert the danger easily.’” ECF No. 22 at 12. This argument
fails to acknowledge Suire’s allegations regarding the apparent nature and level of risk exposure
Suire described in his work assignments. The argument also fails to acknowledge that Suire has
alleged that he was repeatedly exposed to substantial harm and possible death, Suire warned Lt.
Chakri that the tasks should be performed by licensed contractors, and that Lt. Chakri knew he
was assigning these tasks to incarcerated individuals, including Suire, who lacked the relevant
experience. These allegations plausibly state a claim that Lt. Chakri had a culpable state of mind.
As for the April 1, 2025 sprinkler head incident, Suire alleges in detail that Lt. Chakri knew
that he was exposing Suire to harm. Suire alleges that Lt. Chakri began the task by verbalizing a
desire to cut corners and avoid the “red tape” that would be required to do the job correctly. Suire
then alleges that Lt. Chakri sent an inmate who did not know how to shut off the water to perform
that task. He alleges that he asked Lt. Chakri why he lied about the water being shut off and he
also alleges that Lt. Chakri’s response to his injury was to joke that he “had [his] shower for the
day.” ECF No. 15 at 4.
Suire has stated a claim for deliberate indifference to his health and safety under the Eighth
Amendment. Moreover, Lt. Chakri has failed to supply any support for a conclusion that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
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In his opposition, Suire argues that he has made attempts to gather relevant documents without
success. ECF No. 28 at 2. Suire contends that discovery is necessary and available to establish his
claim, such as contracts, policies and procedures, work orders, and fact witness depositions. Id. at
1, 4. Suire contends that he can demonstrate with discovery that the work Lt. Chakri directed him
to perform was against DPSCS written policy and points out the Fourth Circuit requires that
discovery be permitted when the non-moving party has not had the opportunity to access
information essential to his opposition. Id. at 1-4.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has warned against granting summary judgment where “the
district court [is] aware of a potential need for discovery” and a pro se plaintiff has made a request
for discovery (regardless of the form of that request). Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 196 (4th
Cir. 2025). Many 	factual questions remain before Suire’s 	Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim can be resolved and no discovery has been conducted in this matter.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Governor Wes Moore announced just a few
months after the events alleged in Suire’s Second Amended Complaint that the State of Maryland
was closing MCI-J.2 The press release, dated September 29, 2025, states in part:
MCI-J has long outrun its facility lifespan and we refuse to kick the
can 	further 	down 	the 	road…Over 	the 	years, 	prolonged
underinvestment in routine and preventative maintenance have
contributed to building and infrastructure degradation across the
facility…the physical plant is in need of extensive repairs….facility
plumbing, 	electrical 	systems, 	and 	roofing 	are 	past 	life 	cycle
expectancy…After careful evaluation, the decision to close MCI-J
is a fiscally responsible step for our state.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (the court may properly
take judicial notice of matters of public record). Under the circumstances, genuine issues of
2 	https://governor.maryland.gov/news/press-releases/governor-moore-announces-plan-
close-maryland-correctional-institution-jessup
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material fact exist and factual discovery is warranted before summary judgment can appropriately
be considered on Suire’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
B. Retaliation
Suire states that after he was injured changing the sprinkler head, Lt. Chakri “knew he
messed up, so he started plotting to fire me; said I was getting high, so I requested a drug test by
sick call, ARP and letters to Adm dept. for testing to no avail.” ECF No. 15 at 8. It is unclear
whether Suire is asserting a separate claim here. In any event, Lt. Chakri argues that Suire has
asserted a retaliation claim and it should be dismissed. ECF No. 22 at 14-16.
“The First Amendment right to free speech includes not only the affirmative right to speak,
but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that right.”
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000). To establish a retaliation claim
for exercising First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in
protected First Amendment activity; (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected the
First Amendment rights; and (3) there was a causal relationship between the protected activity and
the defendants' conduct. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d
474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005).
While “the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the
constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large,” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229
(2001) “incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional protections” id. at 228. “[A]
prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” 	Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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has held that an inmate’s “right to file a prison grievance free from retaliation” is protected by the
First Amendment. Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2017).
Lt. Chakri attached documents to his motion that demonstrate Suire was fired from his
maintenance job on April 8, 2025. ECF No. 22-6 at 6. This is seven days after Suire has alleged
he was injured changing the sprinkler head. ECF No. 15 at 4. Ten days after Suire was terminated,
on April 18, 2025, Suire filed an ARP stating:
On Monday 4-7-2025, I came to work at Maintenance Dept. II Elect. Went to C
Building with my escort Sgt. George went into cell 107 & 214 repaired lights and
wires burnt out by its smoking was told afterwards to take off 20 mins like I was
high! I was not so I asked, if you think I’m high drug test me. I got fired.
Id. at 4. On April 25, 2025, Suire filed another ARP complaining that he went to the maintenance
department on April 16, 2025, to speak to Lt. Chakri and another officer about the manner of his
termination and its reason. Id. at 9-10.
The two ARPs in the record were filed after Suire was fired, so he cannot show that he was
fired because he filed those ARPs. Suire has not identified any constitutional protected activity
that occurred prior to his termination that could have been the basis of a retaliation claim. Summary
judgment is granted for any First Amendment retaliation claim; to the extent Suire made one. See
Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming the dismissal of a prisoner’s
retaliation claim where the claim failed to demonstrate that the allegedly retaliatory acts were
punishment for the exercise of a constitutional right).
Lt. Chakri also argues that Suire does not state a constitutional claim for the loss of his
prison job in the maintenance department. ECF No. 22 at 14. The Court agrees. See Altizer v.
Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 813–15 (4th Cir. 1978) (“the classifications and work assignments of
prisoners in such institutions are matters of prison administration, within the discretion of the
prison administrators, and do not require fact-finding hearings as a prerequisite for the exercise of
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such discretion”); Bennett v. Wolfe, No. CV JKB-16-4069, 2018 WL 999917, at *7 (D. Md. Feb.
20, 2018), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 230 (4th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases) (“Bennett has no constitutional
right to prison employment and has no liberty interest in being assigned to a specific job”); Green
v. Wilson, No. CV PWG-15-3866, 2018 WL 3629970, at *7 (D. Md. July 31, 2018) (“Mr. Green
has no constitutionally protected right to a prison job or to remain in a particular job once
assigned”); see also Clark v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 316 F. App'x 279,
281 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming the District Court’s conclusion that prisoners do not have a
constitutionally protected right to work while incarcerated).
C. Qualified Immunity
Lt. Chakri alternatively argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 22 at 17.
This argument also fails. 	Government officials sued in their individual capacity may invoke
qualified immunity. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Sept. 23,
2013). “Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages in a § 1983 action
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 231, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim,
there must be a showing that (1) the government official violated a federally protected right of the
plaintiff; and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, in that a
“reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. Because one
of the purposes of qualified immunity is to “protect public officials from the ‘broad-ranging
discovery’ that can be ‘peculiarly disruptive of effective government,’” the United States Supreme
Court has “emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest
possible stage of a litigation.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citations
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omitted). If the Court determines that the government official took actions that a reasonable officer
could have believed were lawful, then the official is entitled to dismissal before discovery. Id.
Suire alleges that Lt. Chakri exposed him to a substantial risk of harm in his prison work
assignments from August of 2024 through July of 2026. By that point, the Supreme Court had
ruled generally in Farmer that a prison condition that creates a “substantial risk of serious harm”
can violate the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. Also, by that time, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits had all ruled
specifically that subjecting an inmate to dangerous work conditions at his prison job can constitute
an Eighth Amendment violation. See Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Rhodes v.
Michigan, 10 F. 4th 665, 679- (6th Cir. 2021); Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 2004);
Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2017); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir.
1994); Franklin v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 160 F. App'x 730, 736 (10th Cir. 2005). A consensus
among courts that provide persuasive authority can support a finding that a rule is clearly
established law. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999); Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855
F.3d 533, 538–39 (4th Cir. 2017). Based on these decisions, reasonable correctional personnel
could not have believed that exposing an inmate to a risk of serious injury or death in his work
assignment was lawful. Lt. Chakri is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Suire’s Eighth
Amendment claim.
II. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Lt. Chakri’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22), is granted in part and denied in part. The claims against Lt.
Chakri in his official capacity are dismissed with prejudice. Summary judgment is granted for the
claims against Lt. Chakri for retaliation. Lt. Chakri’s motion is denied in all other respects to allow
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Suire to pursue discovery. Lt. Chakri’s Motion to Seal (ECF No. 24) is granted. Counsel shall be
appointed to represent Suire in this matter. Because of the appointment of counsel, Lt. Chakri’s
Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 26) is denied without prejudice.
A separate Order follows.
_____________________________
Date 	Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
/s/
October 16, 2026
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