McClain v. IDEXX Laboratories, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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LOVEY MCCLAIN, 	*
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Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No. 26-01090-SAG
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IDEXX LABORATORIES, INC., 	*
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Defendant. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lovey McClain, who is self-represented, filed this disability discrimination action
against her former employer, Defendant IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. (“IDEXX”). ECF 1. Several
motions are presently pending and ripe for disposition1 , and this Court has determined that no
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). They are addressed as follows:
IDEXX’s Motion to Set Aside Default (ECF 20)
This Court has reviewed the motion, the opposition (ECF 21), and the reply (ECF 25). The
Clerk of Court entered an order of default against IDEXX on July 23, 2026, ECF 11, 12, but
IDEXX learned of the default on September 10, 2026. It filed the instant motion one week later,
on September 17, 2026. ECF 20.
After the Clerk enters default, the Court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause.”
Fed. R. C. P. 55(c). The Fourth Circuit has stated that, when compared to the standard under Rule
60(b), the “good cause” standard in Rule 55(c) “is more forgiving of defaulting parties because it
does not implicate any interest in finality.” Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal,
1 One pending motion is not yet ripe for disposition. The motion to seal at ECF 22 will be
addressed separately when ripe.
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Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman
Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1967) (“Generally a default should be set aside where
the moving party acts with reasonable promptness and alleges a meritorious defense.”). Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit has “repeatedly expressed a strong preference that, as a general matter, defaults
be avoided and that claims and defenses be disposed of on their merits.” 	Colleton, 616 F.3d at
417. 	Thus, motions to set aside default “must be ‘liberally construed in order to provide relief
from the onerous consequences of defaults and default judgments.’” Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray,
Inc., 816 F.2d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir.
1969)). Because the Clerk has entered default against IDEXX but a default judgment has not been
issued, IDEXX’s motion to vacate is correctly considered pursuant to the more lenient standard of
Rule 55(c), rather than Rule 60(b).
Six factors are relevant to the analysis of this motion. “When deciding whether to set aside
an entry of default, a district court should consider whether the moving party has a meritorious
defense, whether it acts with reasonable promptness, the personal responsibility of the defaulting
party, the prejudice to the party, whether there is a history of dilatory action, and the availability
of sanctions less drastic.” Payne ex rel. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 204-05 (4th Cir.
2006). The decision to set aside a default “lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” Id.
at 204.
In this case, the parties agree that IDEXX was not properly served with the summons and
complaint before default was entered. IDEXX filed its motion to set aside default within one week
of its learning of the situation. Because no scheduling order has yet been set in this case, there will
be no prejudice to Plaintiff if the default is vacated. The “prejudice” factor is not satisfied where a
plaintiff faces “no disadvantage . . . beyond that suffered by any party which loses a quick victory.”
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Augusta, 843 F. 2d at 812. Plaintiff also has not expended attorney’s fees or costs because she is a
self-represented party. And IDEXX has no history of dilatory action. This Court therefore need
not assess to the parties’ dispute about whether IDEXX has proffered a meritorious defense. With
most of the relevant factors weighing in favor of setting aside default, and the strong preference of
the Fourth Circuit that defaults be avoided, the motion to set aside the default, ECF 20, is
GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Motions to Re-Serve IDEXX or to Re-Issue Summons, ECF 13 and 14
IDEXX’s counsel has agreed to accept service of the Complaint and Summons. ECF 20-4.
As a result, Plaintiff’s service-related motions, ECF 13 and 14, are DENIED AS MOOT. This
Court will set a deadline of November 16, 2026 for IDEXX to respond to the Complaint.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF 5)
A federal district court judge's power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), is
a discretionary one, and may be considered where an indigent claimant presents exceptional
circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1975). Exceptional circumstances exist
where a “pro se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it.” See Whisenant
v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory
appointment of counsel).
At this point, Plaintiff has evidenced the capacity to present the claims in her Complaint.
Accordingly, there are no exceptional circumstances at this time and her motion to appoint counsel
(ECF 5) is DENIED without prejudice.
Dated: October __, 2026 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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