Lundahl v. Bisignano et al

HOLLI LUNDAHL,
Plaintiff,
V.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
*
*
* 	Civil No. 26-3865-BAH
FRANK BISIGNANO ET AL.,
*
Defendants.
*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
* 	*
Plaintiff Holli ("Plaintiff') filed the above-captioned complaint pro se. 1 See ECF I. 	She
initially filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 3, but later paid the filing fee.
As such, her motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot.
While Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee, the Court still has inherent authority to ensure
that it retains subject matter jurisdiction over an action. See_ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over "obviously frivolous" claims. Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528,537 (1974) (quoting Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285,288 (1910));
see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307--08 (1989) (noting court
authority to dismiss frivolous claims exists even in the absence of a statutory provision providing
. such authority); Alexander v. Dep 't ofArmy, Civ. No. DLB-21-2285, 2021 WL 4417080, at *l (D.
1 This Court's Local Rules limit pleadings to forty pages in length and provide that "[i]n
extraordinary circumstances, parties may seek leave of Court to amend or supplement the initial
pleading with additional pages." 	See Loe. R. 103.1.d (D. Md. 2025). 	Plaintiff did not seek the
Court's leave to file additional pages, but the Court will not direct her to file an amended complaint
that complies with the Local Rules as the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous.
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 7

Md. Sept. 24, 2021) (collecting clses), ajf'd sub nom. Alexander v. Dep't of the Army, No. 21-
2131, 2021 WL 6101837 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 98 (2022). For a patently' 	•
frivolous complaint, "dismissal prior to service of process is permissible" as the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. 	Smith v. Kagan, 616 F. App'x 90 (4th pr. 2015) (mem.);
I
Chong Su Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., ,554 F. App'x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014); Ross v. Baron, 493 F.
App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012).' To determine if a claim is frivolous, this Court may "apply
common sense." Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951,954 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane).
'
First, the Court takes judicial notice that multiple federal and state courts, including the
'
Supreme Court of the ~nited States, have restricted Plaintiffs ability to file documents and cases
due to the volume of frivolous, vexatious, and harassing lawsuits she has filed, as well as her
documented abuse of the judicial' process. 	See, e.g., Lundahl v. Eli Lilly & Co., 544 U.S. 997
(2005) ("As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to
accept any further petitions in rioncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee
required by Rule 38(a) is paid and:petition submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1."); Lundahl v.
Nar Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (D. Idaho 2006) (imposing pre-filing restrictions on Plaintiff,
summarizing her history of vexatious litigation, and noting that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits "have
also imposed pre-filing restrictions on Plaintiff"); Johnson v. Stock, No. 03-4219, 2005 WL
1349963, at *2 (I 0th Cir. June 8; 2005) (noting that Holli Lundahl has "a lengthy and abusive
history of filing frivolous, prolix and vexatious actions and pleadings, both in this court and in
other state and federal courts"); Lundahl v. Hawkins, No. CIVA SA-09-CV-0588-X, 2009 WL
I
3617518, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2009) (imposing "a pre-filing injunction be entered against
Lundahl because her complaint is frivolous and because she has a history of vexatious litigation
' 	' 	' 	'
all over the United Statrs"). The instant complaint is no different.
' 	'
Ii 2
'
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 7

Plaintiff brings suit against Frank Bisignano, in his official capacity as Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration, against President Donald Trump, in his official capacity as
President of the United States, and against David Stone, as section chief of PACER, in his personal
capacity. See ECF I, at 1. Plaintiff contends that her "chief underlying claim [ ] is to expunge the
criminal conviction entered against Plaintiff, declare Plaintiff innocent and then for the Court to
order Defendant Bisignano to reimburse all of [Plaintiffs] SSDI payments owed [to her]." Id. at
2. Among other things, she seeks from President Trump "an executive order expunging Plaintiffs
2021 conviction for SSA fraud and finding Plaintiff innocent of the charges filed against her." Id.
at 78. 2
Plaintiff also alleges that "David Stone, Chief section officer over PACER[,] ... has for
several decades conspired with his employees and to the benefit of other government officials and
private party defendants to manipulate [Plaintiffs] password to PACER to prevent [Plaintiff] from
accessing same for illegal criminal and tortuous purposes." 	Id. at 6 ,r 5(3). 	Plaintiffs seventy-
nine-page complaint is replete with baseless allegations of conspiratorial manipulation of court
records by court staff, judges, and prosecutors, including the forgery of indictments against her.
See, e.g., id. at 31 ,r 50 ("As a tool to achieve this end, sitting judges would deny pro se litigants
like claimant the right to electronically file so that their record could be manipulated before filing.
Based thereon, the entire South Dakota court recused themselves from sitting on claimant's newly
2 The Court takes judicial notice of United States v. Holli Telford Lundahl, Crim. No. 20-00048-
NDF, ECF 335 (D. Wyo. entered Aug. 25, 2021) Qudgment and commitment order signed by
Judge Nancy D. Freudenthal reflecting a sentence of a total term of imprisonment of 36 months
for health care fraud and aggravated identity theft convictions) and United States v. Holli Lundahl,
Crim. No. 19-50156-LRR, ECF 271 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2021) Qudgment and commitment order
signed by Judge Linda R. Reade reflecting a sentence of a total term of imprisonment of 18 months
for theft of government priority and Supplemental Security Income benefits fraud). 	Plaintiffs
contentions in this complaint appear to center on the District of South Dakota conviction.
3
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 7

concocted criminal case 'that legally had no footing or teeth to it."); id. at 32151 ("HOLLI contends
that Judge Reade directly participa,ted in the alteration of courts records including ordering the US
Marshals Service to destroy the: courthouse surveillance tapes .... "); id. 	at 34 1 53 ("The
prosecutor and his team ... then forged a series of subpoenas purporting to have come from the
Rapid City federal grand jury .... "); id. at 36 1 54 (alleging that the "grand juries in fact never
I
met, never issued the subpoenas, and never is~ued any indictments because these grand juries did
not exist" so Plaintiffs "criminal case should have been dismissed with prejudice").
I
Plaintiff brings aclaim for:manda!hus relief
I
to compel [Bisignano] to· abide by these nondiscretionary laws cited to in this
complaint and pay Plaintiff all SSDI moneys due and owing Plaintiff in the amounts
of $595,681.05 pre-conviction and custody status; $67,395.84 after plaintiffs
release from false imprisonment, and; after President Trump issues an executive
order of expung~ment, an owed amount of$98,659.3 l seized while Plaintiff was in
illegal custody and as set forth on page 5 of this complaint supra. Plaintiff is also
entitled to a declaration of her rights under the Social Security Act from the outset.
I
Id. at 75 1 127. She also "petitions the district court to issue a binding declaration stating that the
President possesses the legal authority under Heck v. Humphrey [512 U.S. 477 (1994)] to issue an
expungement order and to honor s~ch expungment [sic] order that the president issues." Id. at 75-
76 1 128 (first brackets in original). 	Finally, she pleads a claim for relief against David Stone
"under the Larson-Dugan Doctrinb for CF AA [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] and SCA [Stored
Communications Act] violations.''. Id. at 76 (capitalization and spelling altered). Plaintiff alleges
that "Stone willfully and intentiorially engaged in direct violations under the CFAA by directing
the feeding of codes into Plaintiffs PACER account that blocked access to court and agency
I
records for any and all purposes." Id. at 741 123. She further alleges that he "abusively used his
facility 	that regularly 'receives and 	sends 	out electronic communications 	to 	willfully and
i
' 	4, 	I
I I
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 7

intentionally prevent Plaintiff's authorized access to his facility, i.e. PACER, and for criminal or
tortuous purposes in violation of 18 USC§ 270l(a)." id. at 74-75 ,r 123.
Upon review of the complaint, the Court finds it meritless and frivolous such that the Court
lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. The Court plainly cannot compel the President of
the United States to expunge or pardon a criminal conviction, which Plaintiff concedes is her "chief
underlying claim." See Sheppheard v. Morrisey, 143 F.4th 232, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2025) (noting
that the pardon power "is discretionary and federal courts have no ability to control an Executive's
decision in this arena"). 	The allegations against Bisignano, which appear to hinge on the
President's invalidation of her criminal conviction, see, e.g., ECF 1, at 78 (requesting "a binding
declaration that certain SSA laws were violated to bring about Plaintiffs criminal prosecution"),
are also frivolous. 	Plaintiffs fanciful allegations about the vast conspiracy leading to her
conviction, including that no grand jury returned the indictments on which she was convicted, also
warrant dismissal. 	See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that a finding of
"frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them").
And even assuming the allegations against Stone are not factually frivolous (i.e., that he
placed restrictions on her PACER account), these claims are legally frivolous. "A person violates
the 	CFAA by 	'intentionally access[ing] 	a computer without 	authorization or exceed[ing]
\
authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] ... information from any protected computer,' or
'intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such
conduct, caus[ing] damage and loss."' Richburg v. House of Ruth of Maryland, No. 25-CV-195-
ABA, 2026 WL 847804, at *13 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2026) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C),
(a)(5)(C)). 	Plaintiff appears to attempt to bring suit under § 1030(a)(5)(A) which prohibits an
5
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 7

individual from "knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such bonduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization,
'
to a protected cornputer!" See ECF 1, at 76 'ii 129. Allegations that an administrator of a program
'
placed restrictions on acertain a¢count, i.e., that someone "directed the feeding of codes into
Plaintiffs PACER ace.aunt," dol not meet the elements of a CFAA claim because alleged
'
wrongdoing does not involve acce,ss, unauthorized or not, to a computer or a protected computer.
See 18 U.S,C. § 1030(e)(l) (defining "computer"); id. § (e)(2) (defining "protected computer").
'
The Fourth Circuit also interprets '"without authorization' and 'exceeds authorized access'
literally and narrowly, ljmiting th~ terms' application to situations where an individual accesses a_
computer or information on a computer without permission." WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v.
Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 2d3 (4th Cir.12012). This cause of action plainly does not fit the facts alleged
here.
The Stored Communications Act claim suffers the same flaw. "To prevail under the federal
Stored Communications Act, [a plaintiff] must show that [the defendant]: '(I) accessed a system
'
through which electronib communication service is provided without authorization; (2) obtained a
wire or electronic communication fi:om the electronic storage system; and (3) acted intentionally."'
I
. 	'
Think Tank, Inc. v. ltegril]l, Inc:, Civ. No. MJM-22-1587, 2026 WL 884951, at *15 (D. Md. Mar.
31, 2026) (quotingSkapinetzv. cokst~rVMS.com, Inc., Civ. No. PX-17-01098, 2019 WL 2579120,
! 	.
at *3 (D. Md. June 24, 2019)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2701. Again, allegations that an administrator
of a program placed restrictions oh a certain account do not implicate electronic communication
I
I
or lack of authorization'. to access. such communication. 	This is especially true where, as noted
' 	'
above, multiple courts, including federal district and circuit courts, state courts, and the Supreme
6
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 7

Court of the United States, have ordered restrictions on Plaintiffs ability to file in their respective
courts.
The Court is mindful of its obligation to construe liberally a complaint filed by a self-
represented litigant. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 	Nonetheless, liberal
construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts
which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep 't ofSoc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387,391 (4th Cir.
1990); see also Beaudett v. City ofHampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)(stating a district
court may not "conjure up questions never squarely presented"). 	For the reasons stated above,
Plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed as frivolous. See Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th
Cir. 2001) ("On the question of frivolousness, a litigant's history of bringing unmeritorious •
litigation can be considered.").
Accordingly, it is this 16th day of October, 2026, by the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 3, is DENIED AS MOOT;
2. 	Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as
frivolous;
3. 	The remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and
4. 	The Clerk is directed CLOSE this case and MAIL a copy of this memorandum and
order to Plaintiff.
Isl
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
7
Case 1:26-cv-03865-BAH Document 10 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 7