Shirk v. King

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN
CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6500 Cherrywood Lane
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
Telephone: (301) 344-3593
January 12, 2026
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE: Deangelo S. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security1
Civil No. TJS-25-417
Dear Counsel:
On February 1, 2025, Plaintiff Deangelo S. petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). ECF No. 1. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 12 &
14. These motions have been referred to the undersigned with the parties’ consent pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 301.2 Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos.
12, 14 & 15), I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. This Court must uphold the
decision of the agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed the
proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th
Cir. 2015). Following its review, this Court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner,
with or without a remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991).
Under that standard, I will deny both motions and remand the case for further proceedings. This
letter explains my rationale.
Deangelo S. filed his application for DIB on September 1, 2021. Tr. 18. He alleged a
disability onset date of July 29, 2021. Id. His application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration. Id. He requested a hearing and thereafter appeared before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on April 23, 2024. Id. In a written decision dated June 24, 2024, the ALJ found that
Deangelo S. was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. 18-34. Deangelo S. now seeks
review of the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ evaluated Deangelo S.’s claim for benefits using the five-step sequential
evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found that Deangelo S.
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 29, 2021. Tr. 21. At step two, the ALJ
found that Deangelo S. suffers from the following severe impairments: irritable bowel syndrome,
anorectal Crohn’s disease, perianal fistula, prolapsing hemorrhoids, recurring proctitis, status/post
fistulotomy with seton placement, depression, and anxiety. Tr. 22. At step three, the ALJ found
that Deangelo S.’s impairments, separately and in combination, failed to meet or equal in severity
any listed impairment as set forth in 20 C.F.R., Chapter III, Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1 (“Listings”).
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. He is
therefore substituted as the defendant in this matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 This case was originally assigned to Judge Douglas R. Miller. On January 8, 2026, it was
reassigned to me.
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Tr. 22-23. In considering Deangelo S.’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ made two
separate findings. For the period of July 29, 2021, through February 1, 2023, the ALJ found that
he retained the RFC to:
Perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant can
remember and carry out simple instructions and occasionally interact with the
public, coworkers, and supervisors. He must be able to miss two days of work a
month due to the need for medical care and treatment.
Tr. 23.
The ALJ found that as of February 2, 2023, medical improvement had occurred, and
Deangelo S. retained the RFC to:
Perform light work as defend in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant can
remember and carry out simple instructions and occasionally interact with the
public, coworkers, and supervisors.
Tr. 29.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Deangelo S. was unable to perform past relevant
work. Tr. 25, 32. At step five, the ALJ determined that as of February 2, 2023, Deangelo S. was
able to perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy. Tr. 32. In making this
finding, the ALJ considered testimony provided by a vocational expert (“VE”) as well as the
claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Deangelo
S. was disabled for the period of July 29, 2021, through February 1, 2023, but that his disability
ended on February 2, 2023. Tr. 33. Deangelo S. challenges the ALJ’s finding that his disability
ended on February 2, 2023.
Deangelo S. argues that the ALJ did not comply with Mascio, 780 F.3d at 632. After a
careful review of the ALJ’s opinion and the evidence in the record, I agree. The ALJ did not
adequately explain why Deangelo S.’s moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace
could be accommodated by the limitations contained in the RFC, or why no limitations were
necessary. Accordingly, I conclude that the ALJ’s decision does not comply with Mascio and will
remand this case on that basis for further explanation.
In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit held that “an ALJ does not account ‘for a claimant’s
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the [claimant] to simple, routine
tasks or unskilled work.’” 780 F.3d at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d
1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011)). This is because “the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the
ability to stay on task.” Id. Where an ALJ finds that a claimant has limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace, the ALJ is required to incorporate these limitations into the claimant’s RFC
or explain why they do not “translate into [such] a limitation.” Id.
As part of the step three analysis, the ALJ found that Deangelo S. has moderate limitations
in the functional area of concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. Tr. 28 (“The next functional
area addresses the claimant’s ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. For this criterion the
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claimant has moderate limitations.”). Notably, the ALJ also rejected the opinions of psychology
consultants that Deangelo S.’s limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace were
no more than mild. Tr. 31. Despite the ALJ’s finding that Deangelo S. had moderate limitations in
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the ALJ incorporated no limitations into the
claimant’s RFC to account for these limitations, or explain why they do not “translate into [such]
a limitation.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638.
The ALJ’s post-February 2, 2023 RFC formulation limits Deangelo S. to light work, with
the additional limitations that he can remember and carry out only simple instructions and only
occasionally interact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors. These limitations address
Deangelo S.’s ability to handle complexity and to interact with others, but they do not address his
limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. And the ALJ’s opinion contains no
explanation about why restrictions to account for these difficulties are unnecessary.
Without an explanation by the ALJ, the Court is left to speculate on how the RFC
adequately accounted for Deangelo S.’s difficulties in these areas. If the RFC limitations are meant
to address Deangelo S.’s difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace, the absence of any
explanation makes it impossible for this Court to conduct the necessary review. Alternatively, if
the ALJ did not believe limitations were necessary to account for Deangelo S.’s difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, the decision does not say so. Without the
necessary explanation by the ALJ, the Court is unable to determine whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Mascio requires more than what the ALJ’s decision provides.
The Commissioner cites Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 121 (4th Cir. 2020) to support
its argument that the ALJ’s decision complies with Mascio. Shinaberry is distinguishable from
this case. In Shinaberry, the ALJ explained why the claimant’s moderate limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace did not translate into a limitation in the RFC. Id. at 121-22
(“Here, the ALJ discussed in detail the psychological evaluations . . ., as well as Shinaberry’s adult
function report, and sufficiently explained why the mental limitation to simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks accounted for [the claimant’s] moderate limitations in concentration, persistence,
and pace.”). In contrast, the ALJ’s decision here does not explain why Deangelo S.’s moderate
difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace do not translate into a limitation in the RFC.
Without a clear and specific explanation as to how the RFC accounts for Deangelo S.’s
difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace (or why no such limitations are necessary), the
Court is unable to properly review the ALJ’s decision. See Laura G. v. Kijakazi, No. BAH-22-
1380, 2023 WL 1865618, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2023) (“After an ALJ has made a step three finding
that a claimant suffers from moderate CPP difficulties, the ALJ must either include a
corresponding limitation in the RFC or explain why no such limitation is necessary. . . . The ALJ
did neither, so remand is required.”); Chad H. v. Kijakazi, No. BAH-22-1241, 2023 WL 2837524,
at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 2023) (same); Kimberli H. v. Kijakazi, No. MJM-22-2850, 2023 WL
8479510, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 7, 2023) (remanding the case because “the ALJ failed to provide
adequate explanation and support for her decision that Plaintiff was moderately limited in
concentration, persistence, and pace; failed to include this limitation in the hypothetical posed to
the vocational expert, or explain this omission; and failed to account for this limitation in the RFC
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assessment, or explain its omission”). Accordingly, this case will be remanded for further
proceedings.
For the reasons set forth herein, both parties’ motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos.
12 & 14) are DENIED. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g). the Commissioner’s
judgment is REVERSED IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Timothy J. Sullivan
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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