USA v. SIROIS et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:21-cr-00175-LEW
)
LUCAS SIROIS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants 	)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ (Lucas Sirois, Lakemont LLC, Sandy
River Properties LLC, and Spruce Valley LLC) Motion for Leave to Supplement Pending
Motions for New Trial (ECF No. 735) and on Defendant Lucas Sirois’ Motion for Release
Pending Sentencing (ECF No. 745). For the reasons below, the motions are DENIED.
A. Motion for Leave to Supplement
The jury returned its guilty verdict on November 18, 2025, see ECF No. 699, and
Defendants filed a motion for a new trial on December 12, 2025, see ECF No. 714, after
requesting and receiving two enlargements of time, see ECF Nos. 704, 712. 	Nearly two
months later, Defendants acquired new representation (Attorney Parlatore) and now seek
to supplement the pending motion for new trial to add Sixth Amendment claims based on
the conduct and performance of trial counsel (Attorneys Postow and Ehrenberg).
Under Rule 33, a motion for a new trial must be filed within 14 days of the verdict,
unless the motion is based on “newly discovered evidence.” 	See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b).
However, the Court may extend time to file such a motion “after the time expires if the
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party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1)(B); see also
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 advisory comm. notes, 2005 amendment (“Further, under Rule
45(b)(1)(B), if for some reason the defendant fails to file the underlying motion for new
trial within the specified time, the court may nonetheless consider that untimely underlying
motion if the court determines that the failure to file it on time was the result of excusable
neglect.”).
In response to Defendants’ motion to supplement their pending Rule 33 motion, the
Government argues only that Defendants’ claims are not based on newly discovered
evidence, and therefore are subject to the shorter of Rule 33’s two deadlines. 	See Gov’t
Resp. at 3-7 (ECF No. 743). The Government has not addressed whether Defendants have
demonstrated “excusable neglect” for failing to raise those claims timely.1 Fed. R. Crim.
P. 45(b)(1)(B).
To evaluate “whether a party has cleared the ‘excusable neglect’ hurdle” in the
context of a Rule 33 motion, courts consider the four Pioneer factors: (1) the reason for the
delay and whether it was within the reasonable control of the defendant; (2) the length of
the delay and any potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the risk of prejudice to the
Government; and (4) whether the defendant acted in good faith. United States v. French,
No. 1:12-cr-00160, 2015 WL 70121732, at *4 (D. Me. Nov. 12, 2015) (citing Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. LP, 507 U.S. 380 (1993) and Graphic Comms. Int’l Union,
Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001)); accord
1 If the Government is taking the view that “excusable neglect” is not the applicable standard, it has not
offered any argument to substantiate that position.
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United States v. Munoz, 605 F.3d 359, 367-73 (6th Cir. 2010), United States v. Boesen, 599
F.3d 874, 879-80 (8th Cir. 2010).
With respect to the first factor, to the extent that the thrust of Defendants’
supplemental motion is that Attorneys Postow and Ehrenberg misbehaved or otherwise
performed deficiently, I can understand how their continued representation of Defendants
was an impediment to bringing those claims in a timely Rule 33 motion. See Munoz, 605
F.3d at 371 (holding that the allegedly ineffective counsel’s “continued representation of
[the defendant] during the window for timely filing a Rule 33 motion was a valid reason
for the delay, and that the delay was not fairly within [the defendant’s] control.”). “[I]t is
axiomatic that ‘an attorney . . . is unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against
himself.” Id. at 370 (quoting Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003)).
Although Defendants represent that the second factor, the length of the delay and
its impact on proceedings, also weighs in favor of allowing supplementation, I am not
persuaded. 	Defendants’ Rule 33 motion came under advisement weeks ago, in early
January. Moreover, during the months that have passed since the conclusion of trial, the
Government, Defendants, and U.S. Probation have been diligently preparing for sentencing
in this matter—not only of Lucas Sirois and his businesses, but of his various codefendants
as well. In addition to seeking to supplement the pending Rule 33 motion, Defendants also
ask to “[a]djourn any sentencing proceedings pending resolution” of the supplemented
motion. Mot. at 19. And the Government and Defendants agree that resolving Defendants’
Sixth Amendment claims would require additional discovery (which will no doubt
necessitate judicial resolution of additional disputes between the parties), an evidentiary
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hearing, and, in all likelihood, additional post-hearing briefing. 	Allowing Defendants to
supplement their motion for a new trial would delay sentencing considerably, perhaps for
several months.
I consider the remaining factors to be either neutral or in favor of Defendants.2 But
because of the danger that allowing supplementation at this stage would almost certainly
delay proceedings for some prolonged period, I am not inclined to permit Defendants’
untimely filing. Indeed, even if the claims outlined in the Motion for Leave to Supplement
had been timely presented, I would still deny them without prejudice to post-conviction
challenges given the nature of the claims.
“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is customarily raised in a petition for
postconviction relief.” United States v. Lema, 577 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 2009). Although
this custom does not bar consideration of such claims in the context of a motion for a new
trial, see, e.g., United States v. Baptiste, 8 F.4th 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2021), at this stage in the
proceedings, I believe that a collateral attack would be the more appropriate vehicle for
Defendants’ 	newly 	proposed 	right-to-counsel 	claims. 	I 	recognize 	that 	deferring
consideration of Defendants’ Sixth Amendment claims to post-conviction proceedings is
not without consequences, and it is not a decision that I have made lightly. Adjudicating
those of Defendants’ claims that are based on allegations of fraud and conflicts of interest
would call for the development of a new record.3 Without prejudicing a future petition for
2 The Government, having failed to address the “excusable neglect” standard altogether, has not made any
showing of prejudice. And I have no reason to believe Mr. Sirois has not acted in good faith.
3 Given the personal involvement of both Mr. Parlatore and Mr. Dion in the factual basis underlying these
claims, I also harbor some concern that new counsel would have to be retained to undertake the development
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post-conviction relief on these grounds, it seems to me unlikely that proceeding to trial
with the team of private attorneys that Defendants selected would result in a violation of
Defendants’ right to the counsel of their choice—particularly where the unavailability of
Defendants’ first choice of attorney is alleged to be the result of the machinations of private
actors, and not the Government or the Court. Additionally, Defendants’ allusions to trial
counsel’s conflict of interest concerning transactional matters outside the purview of the
prosecution does not promise a finding that trial counsel were less than motivated to secure
an acquittal at trial. 	Lastly, Defendants’ ineffective assistance claims premised on the
existing trial record do not appear promising, either, based on my observations of counsel’s
performance at trial and the highly deferential standard that applies, including the need for
a showing that a deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 	See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 689 (1984); United States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 246
(1st Cir. 2012). For these reasons, I decline to delay sentencing and final judgment in this
case in favor of a prolonged detour concerning right-to-counsel claims that, based on
Defendants’ initial proffer, are unlikely to bear fruit and are in any event better relegated
to post-conviction proceedings.
B. Emergency Notice of Post-Filing Interference with Defendant’s Right to Counsel
of such a record. See United States v. Steele, 733 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The decision to interrupt
the prejudgment proceedings to inquire into the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may
depend on, among other things, whether the court would need to relieve the defendant’s attorney, or in any
event, to appoint new counsel in order to properly adjudicate the merits of the claim.”) (quoting United
States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2010)).
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Days after filing the above Motion for Leave to Supplement, Defendants filed what
they styled as an “Emergency Notice of Post-Filing Interference with Defendant’s Right to
Counsel” 	(ECF 	No. 	738), 	informing 	the 	Court 	of 	various 	of 	Attorney 	Postow’s
communications with Attorney Parlatore and Lucas Sirois’ father, Robert, allegedly aimed
at pressuring Attorney Parlatore and Lucas Sirois into withdrawing that motion. 	This
“Emergency Notice” would not be worthy of separate comment except that, in that filing,
Defendants request that I order Mr. Postow to cease contact with Mr. Sirois, his family
members, and his associates (and grant any other just and appropriate relief).4 	I do not
believe that such an order, or any other relief, is an appropriate exercise of this Court’s
authority or resources. 	Lucas Sirois is now represented by Mr. Parlatore, the attorney of
his choice. 	Robert Sirois is represented by his own capable counsel (not Mr. Parlatore)
who is charged with protecting his interests in this tribunal. Counsel are again reminded
that the grievances they raise before this Court should be closely tethered to a legal issue
relevant to the criminal matter at hand. I want no part in whatever other complaints Lucas
Sirois or Attorney Parlatore may choose to pursue in the appropriate forum, which is
decidedly not this Court.
C. Motion for Release Pending Sentencing
Finally, Defendant Lucas Sirois has requested he be released pending sentencing.
See Mot. for Release Pending Sentencing (ECF No. 745). As Mr. Sirois awaits sentencing
for offenses that carry a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more under the
4 Defendants also ask that I consider Mr. Postow’s behavior as evidence supporting the Motion for Leave
to Supplement.
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Controlled Substances Act, his present detention is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a),
which requires such detention “unless . . . the judicial officer finds that there is a substantial
likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2).
Defendant points to the Sixth Amendment arguments outlined in his Motion for Leave to
Supplement to make the showing that his motion for a new trial is substantially likely to
be granted. Because I have denied leave to file that supplemental motion, it cannot serve
as the basis for Defendant’s release pending sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Supplement Pending Motions for New Trial (ECF
No. 735) is DENIED, without prejudice to a petition for postconviction relief on those
grounds. 	Defendant Lucas Sirois’ Motion for Release Pending Sentencing (ECF No. 745)
is DENIED.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 23rd day of February, 2026
/s/ Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge
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