DAVIS v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JULIE D., 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:24-cv-00445-KFW
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	)
Commissioner of 	)
Social Security, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
MEMORANDUM DECISION1
The 	Plaintiff 	in 	this 	Social 	Security 	Disability 	appeal 	argues 	that 	the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) committed reversible error by failing to make
findings about the time she would be off task at work because of her irritable bowel
syndrome (IBS) and interstitial cystitis. 	See Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 10). 	I agree
and vacate the Commissioner’s decision and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.
I. Background
The Plaintiff applied for benefits in 2019. 	See Record at 18. 	After her claim
was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels of review, the Plaintiff requested
a hearing before an ALJ. See id. 	That hearing took place in March 2023, following
which the ALJ issued a decision finding that the Plaintiff had the severe impairments
1 The parties have consented to me presiding over all proceedings in this action including the entry of
judgment. See ECF No. 7.
Case 1:24-cv-00445-KFW Document 20 Filed 03/20/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
of fibromyalgia, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, IBS, interstitial cystitis,
tachycardia, and status post right shoulder injury/osteoarthritis. 	See id. at 18, 21.
Considering those impairments, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(b) with various additional limitations, including that she must work
within one hundred feet of a bathroom throughout the workday. 	See Record at 24.
The ALJ determined that, although the Plaintiff could not perform any of her past
relevant work with such an RFC, she could perform other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy and was, therefore, not disabled. See id. at 32-34.
The Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision,
see id. at 1-4, making that decision the final determination of the Commissioner,
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
II. Standard of Review
A final decision of the Commissioner is subject to judicial review to determine
whether it is based on the correct legal standards and supported by substantial
evidence. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001).
Substantial evidence in this context means evidence in the administrative record that
a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support an ALJ’s findings. See Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019). 	If an ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, they are conclusive even if the record could arguably support a
different result. 	See Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 955 F.2d 765,
769 (1st Cir. 1991). 	But an ALJ’s findings “are not conclusive when derived by
Case 1:24-cv-00445-KFW Document 20 Filed 03/20/26 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.”
Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
III. Discussion
The Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s handling of the limitations stemming
from her IBS and interstitial cystitis2. 	See generally Plaintiff’s Brief. 	She argues,
among other things, that the ALJ was required to make findings about the frequency
of her need to use the bathroom after finding that her IBS and interstitial cystitis
symptoms required her to work within one hundred feet of a bathroom. Id. at 7 (citing
Hall-Grover 	v. 	Barnhart, 	No. 	03-239-P-C, 	2004 WL 	1529283, 	at 	*3 	(D. 	Me.
Apr. 30, 2004) (rec. dec.), aff’d, ECF No. 10 (D. Me. May 24, 2004)). 	In making this
argument, she also takes issue with the ALJ’s rejection of her testimony—and a
statement by her treating gastroenterologist—that she needs to use the bathroom up
to hourly for fifteen minutes at a time, see id. at 4-8, which the vocational expert (VE)
testified would preclude all employment, see Record at 70.
The Commissioner counters that the “fact that the ALJ acknowledged that
IBS” and interstitial cystitis “created some degree of restriction did not require h[im]
to 	accept 	Plaintiff’s 	professed 	degree 	of 	limitation.” 	Commissioner’s 	Brief
(ECF No. 11) at 5-6 (quoting King v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-11157, 2015 WL 1130586, at *9
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2015). 	The Commissioner further argues that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s and her gastroenterologist’s
2 “Interstitial cystitis . . . is a condition that causes pain in the bladder and a need to urinate frequently
and urgently.” Interstitial Cystitis, MedlinePlus, https://medlineplus.gov/interstitialcystitis.html (last
updated December 6, 2025).
Case 1:24-cv-00445-KFW Document 20 Filed 03/20/26 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
statements about the frequency with which she would need to use the bathroom, and
that the Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving additional limitations beyond
her need for bathroom proximity. Id. at 6-8.
The Plaintiff has the better argument.
In limiting the Plaintiff to work within one hundred feet of a bathroom, the
ALJ accepted that the Plaintiff would need ready access to a bathroom because of her
IBS and interstitial cystitis symptoms. While the ALJ was certainly not required to
accept the Plaintiff’s and her gastroenterologist’s statements about the frequency and
duration of her bathroom use, he nevertheless had an obligation to make “an
affirmative, alternative finding as to how much time the [P]laintiff would need to be
away from her work station for bathroom breaks” and to reconcile that amount of
time with the VE’s testimony about how much time off-task employers would
tolerate.3 	Hall-Grover, 	2004 	WL 	1529283, 	at 	*3; 	see 	also 	Binder 	v. 	Colvin,
No. 5:12-CV-271-D, 2013 WL 1686306, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2013) (rec. dec.)
(“When an ALJ finds that a claimant has an impairment that requires [her] to have
access to a bathroom, the ALJ should make specific findings concerning the frequency
and duration of [the claimant’s] bathroom usage.”), aff’d, 2013 WL 1694678 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 18, 2013); Taylor v. Astrue, No. 7:11-CV-162-FL, 2012 WL 3637254, at *11
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2012) (rec. dec.) (“While the court finds the ALJ’s credibility
determination with respect to Claimant’s allegations of excessive bathroom breaks
supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ nevertheless failed to address the VE’s
3 The VE here testified that employers would tolerate an employee being off task a total of one hour
during an eight-hour workday. See Record at 70.
Case 1:24-cv-00445-KFW Document 20 Filed 03/20/26 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
testimony that a person needing to take an excessive number of unscheduled
bathroom breaks has the potential to be problematic. Given the ALJ made no findings
regarding to what extent Claimant required unscheduled bathroom breaks, nor
question[ed] the VE as to his definition of excessive, there is simply no way to
conclude, in light of the VE’s testimony, that the ALJ’s step-four finding is supported
by 	substantial 	evidence.” 	(cleaned 	up)), 	aff’d, 	2012 	WL 	3639623 	(E.D.N.C.
Aug. 22, 2012); Davis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:10-CV-30, 2011 WL 442118, at *1
(N.D. W. Va. Feb. 2, 2011) (“[W]hen a claimant has a specific need to have a bathroom
at ready access, the ALJ should make specific findings regarding the frequency and
duration of necessary usage and include such findings in the claimant’s residual
functional capacity.”); Brueggen v. Barnhart, No. 06-C-0154-C, 2006 WL 5999614,
at *7 (W.D. Wisc. Dec. 15, 2006) (rec. dec.) (remanding for an ALJ to “make a specific
finding concerning the frequency and duration of plaintiff’s bathroom usage” where
the ALJ failed to explain “how she reconciled plaintiff’s need to use the bathroom at
will with the VE’s testimony concerning the degree to which such bathroom use is
generally tolerated by employers”), aff’d, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2476 (W.D. Wisc.
Jan. 8, 2007).
The Commissioner argues that it would be unreasonable to require the ALJ to
make an affirmative finding about the frequency and duration of the Plaintiff’s
bathroom breaks where there is no specific evidence on that issue apart from the
evidence the ALJ supportably discounted. See Commissioner’s Brief at 5-6. But this
argument ignores the ALJ’s Step 5 burden to assess the vocational impact of the
Case 1:24-cv-00445-KFW Document 20 Filed 03/20/26 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
bathroom proximity limitation he found was warranted by the evidence, see Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987), and it overstates the complexity of assessing
the frequency and duration of bathroom breaks in the absence of specific evidence,
see, e.g., Dussault v. Astrue, 674 F. Supp. 2d 337, 345 (D. Mass. 2009) (a case cited by
the Commissioner holding that an ALJ permissibly “used his common sense” when
making findings about the duration of bathroom breaks for a claimant with IBS
where there was no specific evidence on the issue).
At bottom, the ALJ’s failure to resolve whether the Plaintiff’s bathroom breaks
would exceed the amount of time off-task tolerated by employers leaves his Step 5
finding unsupported by substantial evidence and, therefore, remand is required.
See Hall-Grover, 2004 WL 1529283, at *3-5.4
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and the
case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this decision.
Dated: March 20, 2026
/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge
4 The Commissioner cites two cases for the proposition that an ALJ may impose a bathroom proximity
limitation without making additional findings about the frequency and duration of bathroom breaks,
see Commissioner’s Brief at 6-8, but I am not swayed by either. To the extent King, 2015 WL 1130586,
at *9, squarely addressed this issue, it is against the weight of authority from this Court and others.
And although Teresa A. M. v. Saul, No. 2:19-cv-00292-LEW, 2020 WL 2850224, at *8-9 (D. Me.
June 1, 2020) (rec. dec.), aff’d, (D. Me. June 13, 2020), affirmed an ALJ’s bathroom proximity
limitation without corresponding frequency and duration findings, the limitation was discussed only
in the context of an ALJ’s weighing of a medical opinion and no reference was made to Hall-Grover or
other similar cases.
Case 1:24-cv-00445-KFW Document 20 Filed 03/20/26 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>