WU v. STAMPER et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
CHAOYI WU,
Petitioner,
v.
DERRICK STAMPER,
Chief Patrol Agent,
Houlton Sector, U.S. Border Patrol,
et al.,
Respondents.
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1:26-cv-00090-SDN
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Mr. Wu’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus requests this Court immediately
release Mr. Wu because he is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
Respondents contend Mr. Wu is subject to mandatory detention as a parolee whose parole
has expired under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). After considering the parties’ arguments, the
Court GRANTS Mr. Wu’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2026, Petitioner Chaoyi Wu filed a verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”). ECF Nos. 1, 3.
According to the verified petition, Mr. Wu is a Chinese national who entered the
U.S. near Hidalgo, Texas, in early November 2021. ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 8 at 3. On
November 4, 2021, he was placed into expedited removal proceedings and ordered
removed. Id. at 3–4; ECF No. 1-1 at 2. On November 12, 2021, the Government paroled
him into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 212(d)(5)(A) for humanitarian purposes related to
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the Covid-19 pandemic. ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 1-1 at 3; ECF No. 8-1 at 4. Mr. Wu’s parole
was valid for one year, until November 12, 2022, 	at which point it automatically
terminated. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. As one of the conditions of his parole, he was required to
notify Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) of any changes in address from his
original home address in Staten Island, New York. Id. at 4. Following the expiration of his
parole on November 12, 2022, the Government took no action to re-detain Mr. Wu for
over three years. During this period, Mr. Wu built a life in the United States, married an
American citizen, and filed an asylum claim which remains pending. ECF No. 16 at 7.
On February 18, 2026, Mr. Wu was among a group of individuals at a home in
South Paris, Maine, who called emergency services to assist a person attempting suicide.
ECF No. 11 at 2. Upon arrival, local police requested Mr. Wu’s identification. ECF No. 1 at
5. Despite the life-saving nature of the call, once Mr. Wu’s noncitizen status was disclosed,
police chose to contact U.S. Border Patrol (“USBP”). Id. USBP subsequently took Mr. Wu
into custody, characterizing him as a “flight risk” based on an alleged failure to update his
address.1 ECF No. 1 at 9. This assessment, however, relied on a purported statement from
1 While this Court does not oversee the Executive Branch’s immigration enforcement priorities, those
priorities provide necessary context for the discretionary nature of this detention and the Government’s
interest in it, matters relevant to the Mathews due process factors discussed below. Recent Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) guidance emphasizes focusing enforcement on individuals who pose a tangible
threat to public safety. See DHS Press Release, Making America Safe Again: The State of DHS (Feb. 24,
2026), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/02/24/making-america-safe-again-state-dhs-under-president-
trump-and-secretary-noem [https://perma.cc/Z2KK-XJDV] (characterizing DHS policies as those that
promote “the safety and security of American citizens first and foremost” and that federal resources are
prioritized to remove “dangerous illegal” noncitizens). Mr. Wu’s history in the United States does not reflect
this stated concern; to the contrary, his conduct suggests a commitment to civic responsibility and the
preservation of life. Furthermore, the decision to re-detain a noncitizen at the scene of an emergency call
risks a “chilling effect” that discourages others from seeking life-saving aid. See Sarah Rahal & Jason
Laughlin, Immigrant Families Are Shying Away from Medical Care, Boston Globe (Jan. 12, 2026),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2026/01/12/metro/immigrant-ice-hospital-appointment-massachusetts
[https://perma.cc/L6C8-9RA3] (reporting that stepped-up enforcement has led families to forgo
emergency care even in critical situations); Chinwe Anyanwu, The Chilling Effect of ICE Raids on
Emergency Medicine, ACEP Now (Jan. 10, 2026), https://www.acepnow.com/article/the-chilling-effect-
of-ice-raids-on-emergency-medicine [https://perma.cc/BY3E-HWP3] (noting that enforcement during
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Mr. Wu that he “liv[ed]” at the South Paris residence—a statement obtained without the
assistance of a translator despite Mr. Wu’s limited English proficiency. See ECF No. 8-1
at 3.
Later that day, ICE issued a warrant of removal/deportation, Form I-205,2 against
Mr. Wu. ECF No. 8-2. He currently is in the custody of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) at Fort Fairfield Station in Maine. ECF No. 8 at 1.
On February 26, 2026, the Court held oral argument on Mr. Wu’s petition and
ordered supplemental briefing. ECF No. 12. Mr. Wu argues his detention is unlawful
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he has a protected liberty
interest not to be re-detained without notice and an opportunity to be heard. ECF No. 16
at 13. Respondents contend Mr. Wu’s detention is proper because he became subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 when his parole automatically terminated in
2022. ECF No. 8 at 8–11. Alternatively, Respondents assert he is validly mandatorily
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 pursuant to his final order of removal, which requires a
ninety-day mandatory detention after a final order of removal is issued. Id. at 11–12. In
his reply and supplemental briefing, Petitioner argues his detention is only valid under
8 U.S.C. § 1231, 	which would entitle him to immediate release because he has an
medical emergencies leads to “disruptions of care” and “secondary injuries from delayed care”). This
outcome is fundamentally at odds with the public interest, as it creates a risk to public safety by incentivizing
individuals to avoid emergency services. Under these circumstances, the decision to re-detain an individual
with no criminal record departs from, and likely counter-produces, the asserted focus on public safety and
security.
2 The I-205 warrant is not factually correct; it asserts Mr. Wu is removable based on a final order from an
immigration judge, whereas his actual expedited removal order was issued by a CBP agent at the border.
See ECF No. 11 at 2; ECF No. 8-2. The parties agree, however, that both the warrant and its errors are
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. See Rodrigues De Oliveira v. Joyce, No. 2:25-CV-00291, 2025 WL
1826118, at *4 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (noting the similar I-200 warrant “is a fascinating tool that is all but
self-executing, issued to ICE agents by ICE agents without a neutral third-party to review its integrity”).
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established liberty interest that arose from his previous release on parole. ECF No. 11 at
5; ECF No. 16 at 14.
ANALYSIS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, district courts possess the primary authority to adjudicate
habeas corpus challenges to the federal detention of noncitizens. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 483–84 (2004); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (“We note at the outset
that the primary federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers jurisdiction upon
the federal courts to hear these cases.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3))). “The burden of
proof of showing deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention is on the petitioner.”
Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009).
I. 	Applicable Statutory Provision
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an “applicant[] for admission” is defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories,
those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (plurality). Relevant here is section 1225(b)(2).3 Under this
section, if an immigration officer inspects a noncitizen at the border and it is undisputed
“that a[] [noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted,” section 1225(b)(2) requires that the noncitizen be detained for removal
3 The final order of removal states Mr. Wu was expedited removed under section 1225(b)(1). See ECF No.
1-1 at 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“the officer shall order the [noncitizen] removed from the United States
without further hearing or review”). But the parties’ briefing indicates Mr. Wu should be evaluated under
section 1225(b)(2), which applies to noncitizens who have been paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)
(permitting the Attorney General to designate for expedited removal only those noncitizens who have not
been admitted or paroled and have not been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-
year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”). The Court assumes for
the purposes of this Order that Mr. Wu is subject to section 1225(b)(2).
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proceedings under section 1229a. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The parties do not dispute
that Mr. Wu was, at the time he entered the United States, an applicant for admission
subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2). See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020).
Mr. Wu’s notice of parole states he was paroled from immigration custody
pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). ECF No.
1-1 at 3. Section 212(d)(5)(A) empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to “parole [a
noncitizen] into the United States temporarily under such conditions as [s]he may
prescribe.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 216 (D.
Mass. 2025). Immigration parole employs a so-called “legal fiction” where noncitizens are
physically located inside the country but are “‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if
stopped at the border.’” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 at 139 (quoting Shaughnessy v. U.S.
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“[P]arole of such
[noncitizen] shall not be regarded as an admission of the [noncitizen] . . . .”). A noncitizen
ensnared within this legal fiction has “only those rights regarding admission that
Congress has provided by statute.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 at 140.
The core of this dispute, however, is not whether the Government could have
detained Mr. Wu in 2021, but whether it may summarily re-detain him in 2026 after a
four-year period of law-abiding, peaceful presence in the country.
As Petitioner 	points out, Thuraissigiam 	is distinguished in several material
respects. There, the noncitizen was “apprehended just 25 yards from the border,” had not
effected a full entry into the country, and was never paroled or conditionally released. Id.
at 107. “[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those [noncitizens]
who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United
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States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,
187 (1958).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that noncitizens “who have
established connections in this country have due process rights.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107; see also Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (recognizing that noncitizens “who have once
passed through our gates, 	even 	illegally, 	may 	be 	expelled only 	after proceedings
conforming to . . . due process of law”). In sum, “[l]iberty interests may spring from lives
lived, connections fostered, and promises made or implied.” Destino v. FCI Berlin,
Warden, No. 25-CV-374, 2025 WL 4010424, at *7 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025).
Mr. Wu’s parole automatically terminated on November 12, 2022, pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e). See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) (“Parole shall be automatically terminated
without written notice . . . at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized.”).
Upon termination, the noncitizen “shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the
time of parole.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That means the noncitizen “shall forthwith
return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for
admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The regulation additionally
provides that “[a]ny further inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235
[8 U.S.C. § 1225]” of the INA and “[i]f the exclusion, deportation, or removal order cannot
be executed within a reasonable time, the [noncitizen] shall again be released on parole
unless in the opinion of the [DHS official] the public interest requires that the [noncitizen]
be continued in custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (“An arriving
[noncitizen] remains an arriving [noncitizen] even 	if paroled pursuant to section
212(d)(5) of the Act, and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked.”).
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The Government contends the automatic expiration of Mr. Wu’s parole returned
him to the status under which he was previously held—section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory
detention framework. ECF No. 8 at 10. As such, according to the Government, Mr. Wu’s
parole necessitates his mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2). Petitioner argues
he is no longer subject to the section 1225(b) framework because he possesses a protected
liberty interest in his freedom, and that any authority for his detention must come instead
from 8 U.S.C. § 1231. ECF No. 16 at 10. Answering this question requires the Court to
determine if Mr. Wu is “seeking admission” such that he is subject to mandatory detention
under section 1225(b)(2)(A).
As Respondents see it, Mr. Wu should be treated as if he were still stopped at the
border, having never effected entry into the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). As
other courts have explained, however, the phrase “seeking admission” in section 1225(b)
“plainly refer[s] to a process that occurs upon physical entry at the border, not an
interminable implicit statutory status.” Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805
F. Supp. 3d 48, 90 (D.D.C. 2025) (quotation modified).
By being paroled into the interior of the country, Mr. Wu was transformed from an
individual “seeking admission” into an individual residing in this country who is no longer
“arriving.” See, e.g., Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-CV-10029, 2025 WL 3654098, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (“It would try any plain understanding of the term arrival to
classify an individual like [petitioner] who has lived and worked in the United States for
over a year prior to his re-detention as an arriving [noncitizen].”); Coal. for Humane
Immigrant Rts., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 90–91 (“[A] noncitizen ‘arriving’ in the United States
would be one who is in the process of reaching his or her destination (the United States)
and making an appearance here. It would not naturally be read to refer to someone who
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previously reached the United States via a port of entry, underwent inspection at that port
of entry, and then was paroled into the United States (beyond their original destination)
for an indefinite period of time.”); Walizada v. Trump, No. 25-CV-00768, 2025 WL
3551972, at *12 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (finding that although petitioner “was, at one time,
an ‘arriving [noncitizen]’ who was paroled into the United States,” the expiration of his
parole did not revert him back to being an applicant for admission). This interpretation
comports with this Court’s prior reasoning in Chogllo Chafla that section 1225(b) is
inapplicable to noncitizens who have resided continuously in the country for more than
two years. Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025).
While the expiration of humanitarian parole returns a noncitizen to the “custody
from which he was paroled,” it does not function as a temporal loophole that requires
summary physical custody years after the fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Aviles-Mena
v. Kaiser, 	No. 25-CV-06783, 2025 	WL 2578215, 	at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 	5, 2025)
(“[T]ermination of parole does not generally require treating noncitizens as if they had
never been paroled in the first place.”). Instead, a more judicious reading of section
1182(d)(5)(A) suggests that a noncitizen whose parole has expired should be treated
similarly to the “vast majority of undocumented immigrants currently living in this
country who are not subjected to expedited removal.” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar,
No. 25-CV-6065, 2025 WL 3314420, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). Once parole is
revoked, the law requires that the individual be treated “in the same manner as that of
any other applicant for admission.” 	Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 	371, 385 (2005)
(emphasis removed). When a final order of removal already has been issued, that
“manner” is governed specifically by the post-ninety-day removal-period provisions of
8 U.S.C. § 1231. See id. at 386.
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Respondents’ own actions support this interpretation. If, as the Government now
contends, section 1182(d)(5)(A) mandated Mr. Wu’s immediate return to custody upon
expiration of his parole in 2022, it can provide no explanation for the three-year delay in
his arrest. During that interval, Mr. Wu did not live in hiding; indeed, he actively engaged
with the immigration system by applying for asylum. Furthermore, the Government’s
decision to issue a new warrant following Mr. Wu’s arrest at the scene of the 911 call, see
ECF No. 8-2, indicates an understanding that he is subject to discretionary, rather than
mandatory, detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (requiring mandatory detention without
issuance of a warrant). Accordingly, because Mr. Wu is not subject to the mandatory
detention framework of section 1225(b), the Court analyzes his current custody through
the lens of 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Section 1231, which governs noncitizens subject to a final order of removal,
mandates detention of the noncitizen during the ninety-day removal period. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the
[noncitizen]. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney
General release 	a[] [noncitizen] who has been 	found inadmissible . . . .”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A) (When a noncitizen is 	ordered removed, “the Attorney General shall
remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within a period of 90 days . . . .”). But the
Government’s authority to detain a noncitizen under this section is not indefinite.
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to immediate release for two reasons: (1) having been
released into the community for four years, he has developed a protected liberty interest
in his freedom from restraint, ECF No. 16 at 12–13; and (2) the statutory ninety-day
removal period prescribed by section 1231 expired long ago, in 2022, id. at 14. The Court
finds this argument legally sound.
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Numerous district courts have recognized that an individual possesses an imputed
liberty interest once the Government has exercised its discretion to release them into the
community. As a court in the Eastern District of California recently observed, the initial
decision to release an individual creates “an implicit promise” that the individual’s liberty
will be revoked only upon a failure to comply with the conditions of release. Omer G. G.
v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-01471, 2025 WL 3254999, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)); see Ji v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-01186, 2026
WL 485287, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026) (“To the extent Respondents argue that
Petitioner shall ‘return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled,’ based
on this automatic termination, the Court disagrees because the Government created a
liberty 	interest 	in 	allowing 	Petitioner’s 	continued 	release 	despite 	the 	automatic
termination.”); Piurbeev v. Rose, No. CV 26-910, 2026 WL 499907, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
23, 2026) (“[Petitioner] asserts, and the Court agrees, that the grant of discretionary
parole and [petitioner’s] release from the CBP custody in January 2023 makes it so that
he is no longer ‘seeking admission’ within the meaning of § 1225(b). He therefore cannot
be detained absent a bond hearing.”); Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130,
1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“When he was released from his initial detention on parole,
Petitioner took with him a liberty interest which is entitled to the full protections of the
due process clause.”).
The law compels the same conclusion here: the grant of discretionary parole in
2021 established a protected liberty interest for Mr. Wu that persisted beyond the parole’s
automatic termination. Having “passed through our gates” and lived as a member of the
community for over four years, Mr. Wu is no longer “seeking admission” in the sense of a
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stranger at the border; he is an individual entitled to the full protections of the Due
Process Clause. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
Furthermore, the statutory ninety-day removal clock has long since expired. The
statute itself provides that the removal period begins on the latest of the following: “[t]he
date the order of removal becomes administratively final”; “if a court orders a stay of the
removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court’s final order”; or “[i]f the [noncitizen] is
detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the [noncitizen] is
released from detention or confinement.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Because the latter two
subdivisions are inapplicable here, the ninety-day removal period began on the date Mr.
Wu’s removal order became final: November 4, 2021. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B); see ECF
No. 1-1 at 2. Because he was not removed within that window, any subsequent detention
must be discretionary rather than mandatory. See Hall v. Nessinger, No. 25-CV-667,
2026 WL 18583, at *1 (D.R.I. Jan. 2, 2026); Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson, No. SA-25-CV-
886, 2025 WL 3534806, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 3532179 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025) (finding that when a noncitizen “was
previously detained, then released on supervised release, . . . his 90-day removal period
has long expired”). Consequently, the Government’s authority to detain Mr. Wu, if it
exists at all, must be analyzed under section 1231.
II. 	Due Process: The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test
The Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “‘It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law’ in the context of removal
proceedings.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam) (quoting Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). To determine if a due process violation has occurred,
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the Court applies the three-factor test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). See Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2021). The three
factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 28
(quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
First, the Court finds Mr. Wu has amply demonstrated an infringement of his
rights. See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 262–64. Mr. Wu asserts “the most
elemental of liberty interests”—the right to be free from physical restraint. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). This interest is heightened by the fact that the
Government previously 	found him to be neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community when granting his initial parole. See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 262;
ECF No. 1-1 at 3; 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation here is
substantial. The Government’s current justification for detention—an alleged failure to
update a home address—is based on a contested police report involving an individual with
limited English proficiency who was provided no translator. See ECF No. 8-1 at 3. In the
absence of a hearing, the Government risks permanently depriving an individual of liberty
based on a linguistic misunderstanding occurring at the scene of a life-saving emergency.
The “probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards” in this case is
large. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Finally, the Government’s interest in detaining Mr. Wu,
a Good Samaritan with no criminal record and deep community ties, is minimal. As
explained above, the “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens imposes significant societal
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costs, 	including, here, the erosion 	of public trust in 	emergency services 	and the
consequent chilling effect on those in need of aid. See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at
263–64; 	Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (noting that “unnecessary detention” of
noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). Accordingly, all three Mathews factors
weigh in Mr. Wu’s favor.
CONCLUSION
Upon a finding of a constitutional violation, a district court “may” grant a writ of
habeas corpus and “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a),
2243. Release from detention is the “typical remedy” for “unlawful executive detention.”
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 	(2008). Here, Mr. Wu’s immediate release is
appropriate to remedy his unconstitutional detention.
Petitioner’s verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. ECF No. 1.
The Court ORDERS Petitioner’s release from detention on or around 10 p.m. on March
4, 2026, subject to any existing conditions established by his humanitarian parole. The
Court further ORDERS the Respondents not to re-detain Petitioner absent a showing of
changed circumstances and an opportunity to be heard. This Order does not prevent the
Respondents from pursuing removal efforts in accordance with the law.
S O ORDERED.
Dated this 4th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGE
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