GARCIA DE MELO v. STAMPER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
KAYO GARCIA DE MELO, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00152-JAW
)
DERRICK STAMPER, 	)
in his official capacity as 	)
Chief Patrol Agent of Houlton Sector, 	)
United States Border Patrol, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen without a bond hearing
violates due process, the court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus and orders the government to conduct an initial custody determination within
forty-eight hours of this order. 	If the government decides to continue detaining the
noncitizen, the court further orders the government to obtain an authorizing warrant
and to provide the noncitizen a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within
fourteen days of this order.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Kayo Garcia De Melo, a resident of Everett, Massachusetts, is a Brazilian
citizen who entered the United States on or around June 23, 2022. 	Pet. for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶¶ 1, 59, 61 (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). 	Upon
1 	For the purposes of Mr. Garcia De Melo’s petition and consistent with the parties’ stipulation,
the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in Mr. Garcia De Melo’s March 21, 2026 verified
petition and accompanying attachments. Min. Entry (ECF No. 8).
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entry, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) briefly detained Mr. Garcia De
Melo before releasing him on recognizance and issuing him a notice to appear. 	Id.
¶ 61, Attach. 1, Order of Release of Recognizance & Attach. 2, Notice to Appear. 	On
March 10, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Mr.
Garcia De Melo while on his way to a carpenter job in Maine. Pet. ¶ 60. He remains
in U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) custody at Fort Fairfield Station in Fort
Fairfield, Maine. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 61, 65; Min. Entry (ECF No. 8).
On March 21, 2026, Mr. Garcia De Melo filed a verified petition for writ of
habeas 	corpus, 	seeking 	his 	immediate 	release 	from 	immigration 	detention 	or,
alternatively, a bond hearing in Immigration Court. Pet. That same day, the Court
issued a seventy-two-hour emergency order, enjoining Respondents from transferring
Mr. Garcia De Melo outside the District of Maine. 	Emer. Order Concerning Stay or
Transfer of Removal (ECF No. 3) (Emer. Order).
At the teleconference of counsel on March 24, 2026, Respondents confirmed
Mr. Garcia De Melo was in their custody in Fort Fairfield, Maine when Mr. Garcia
De Melo filed his petition, clarifying there were no issues of personal jurisdiction or
venue for the Court to consider. 	Min. Entry. 	The parties also agreed that, for the
purposes of this order, there are no factual disputes for the Court to resolve in this
matter 	and 	stipulated 	to 	the 	facts 	in 	Mr. 	Garcia 	De 	Melo’s 	petition 	and 	its
accompanying attachments. The parties also agreed to forgo an evidentiary hearing
and oral argument, allowing the Court to resolve this matter on the parties’ briefing
only.
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That same day, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Mr. Garcia
De Melo’s petition should not be granted, and extended the Court’s March 21, 2026
no-transfer order pending further order of the Court, but authorizing Respondents to
remove Mr. Garcia De Melo outside the District of Maine if necessary for him to
attend a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. O.S.C. (ECF No. 9). On March
31, 2026, upon an opposed motion from Respondents, Mot. to Partially Lift No-
Transfer Order (ECF No. 11), the Court amended its no-transfer order to prohibit
Respondents from removing Mr. Garcia De Melo from the jurisdiction of the United
States or transfer him to a judicial district outside that of Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, or Rhode Island. 	Order (ECF No. 12). 	The Court further ordered
Respondents to provide Mr. Garcia De Melo reasonable access to counsel and that,
should it be necessary for Mr. Garcia De Melo to attend a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge while in Respondents’ custody, Respondents must bring him
before an Immigration Judge sitting inside one these four authorized judicial
districts. Id.
On March 26, 2026, Respondents filed their response to the order to show
cause, opposing Mr. Garcia De Melo’s petition. Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n
to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 10) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n). On April 3, 2026, Mr.
Garcia De Melo filed his reply. Pet’r’s Resp. to Resp’ts’ Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (ECF No. 13) (Pet’r’s Reply).
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II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Mr. Garcia De Melo alleges that his detention, as well as Respondents alleged
failure to conduct an initial custody determination and obtain a warrant, violates
federal law and his due process rights. Pet. ¶¶ 68-87. Mr. Garcia De Melo maintains
he is illegally categorized as a mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),
rather than a discretionary detainee under § 1226(a) who is entitled to a bond hearing
before an Immigration Judge. 	Id. ¶¶ 5-8, 27-58, 68-87. 	He argues Respondents’
failure to conduct an initial custody determination and issue a warrant within forty-
eight hours of his detention violates the INA and associated regulations, id. ¶¶ 68-
72, and that his denial of a bond hearing violates his Fifth Amendment due process
rights. Id. ¶¶ 73-81. He seeks, among other remedies, writ of habeas corpus ordering
his immediate release or, alternatively, an order requiring Respondents to provide
him a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge as soon as possible. Id. 17-18.
In their opposition, Respondents maintain Mr. Garcia De Melo is properly
categorized as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling
agency precedent. 	Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2. 	However, Respondents acknowledge that
“the caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s
interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Garcia De Melo’s petition is not
substantially distinguishable from that line of caselaw. Id.
In his reply, Mr. Garcia De Melo argues that Respondents have failed to show
cause why his petition should not be granted. Pet’r’s Reply. Consistent with the body
of caselaw within this District, combined with Respondents’ concession that Mr.
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Garica De Melo’s petition is not substantially distinguishable from that line of cases
and their failure to produce the warrant authorizing his arrest, Mr. Garcia De Melo
urges the Court to order him released pending a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge. Id. at 2-10. Should the Court not order his immediate release pending a bond
hearing, he maintains, in the alternative, he is still entitled to a bond hearing before
an Immigration Judge. Id. at 9-10.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.
Garcia De Melo’s habeas petition. 	“District courts are limited to granting habeas
relief ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442
(2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed
to relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always
been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting
Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). 	Furthermore, under habeas law,
jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically
present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over
this matter, because Mr. Garcia De Melo filed his habeas petition when he was in
custody in the District of Maine.
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B. 	The Merits
Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar
facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Garcia De Melo, and
he is therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to an
initial custody determination and, if denied release, a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge to review that initial custody determination.
1. 	Statutory Framework
a. 	Mandatory Detention under Section 1225(b)(2)
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281, 	287 	(2018) (plurality 	opinion). 	Relevant 	here 	is
§ 1225(b)(2).2 	Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
2 	Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV). Respondents assert only that Mr. Garcia de Melo is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), not § 1225(b)(1).
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(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”). 	As other courts have recognized, this language requires that “several
conditions must be met” to impose mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). 	Specifically, the
noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Id.; Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025).
b. 	Discretionary Detention under Section 1226(a)
By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary
hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). 	Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).
Section 	1226(a) 	thus 	“establishes 	a 	discretionary 	detention 	framework 	for
noncitizens.” 	Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 268 (D. Mass. 2025). 	However,
§ 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one exception: immigration authorities
“shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved in certain enumerated criminal
activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those criminal activities is at issue here.
Once 	arrested 	under 	§ 1226(a), 	immigration 	authorities 	make 	an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
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is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). 	If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	An immigration judge’s decision to
continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between
the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the
country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).
2. 	Applicable Statutory Basis for Detention
As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First
Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See
Mercado v. Francis, 811 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494, n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (explaining that
similarly situated petitioners “have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,
in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty
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different courts spread across the United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump,
No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting
DHS’s application of § 1225(b) mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally
released under § 1226(a)); Caiza v. Scott, 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
195270, at *7-8 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases).
The phrase “‘seeking admission’ is undefined in the statute but necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” 	Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211,
218 (D. Mass. 2025). 	As other courts to reach this issue have explained, ‘seeking
admission’ “contemplates that those arriving, i.e. those who appear at the border or
a port of entry, [who] must be inspected.” Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL),
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025); see also Walizada v.
Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *11 (D. Vt. Dec. 11,
2025) (same); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp. 3d 274, 308-311 (E.D.N.Y.
2025) (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 81-
94 (D.D.C. 2025) (same).
As a noncitizen continuously residing in the United States since June 23, 2022,
Mr. Garcia De Melo is not “seeking admission,” and he is therefore not subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	See Moraes v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00583-
JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234386, at *9-10 (D. Me. Dec. 2, 2025); Chogllo Chafla
v. Scott, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025). Rather, as a noncitizen “already in
the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings,” Mr. Garcia De Melo is
subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a), Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, and he
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is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10
F.4th at 41.
Therefore, any determination as to Mr. Garcia De Melo’s detention must be
conducted under the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a), which
“governs the process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have already entered
the United States pending their removal,” including expired parolees within the
United States pending the adjudication of their asylum claim. 	Tumba Huamani v.
Francis, No. 25-cv-8110 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288).
3. 	Detention without a Warrant
Mr. Garcia De Melo’s petition also challenges his detention on the grounds that
Respondents’ failure to conduct an initial custody determination and issue a warrant
authorizing 	his 	arrest 	violates 	the 	INA. 	Pet. 	¶¶ 68-72. 	He 	maintains 	that
Respondents’ failure to perform an initial custody determination or produce a
warrant authorizing his ongoing detention pursuant to § 1226(a) and associated
agency regulations renders his ongoing detention unlawful and therefore requires his
immediate release pending a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. 	Pet’r’s
Reply at 8-10.
Discretionary detention under § 1226(a) requires a warrant. See Jennings, 583
U.S. at 302; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 256-61 (D. Me. 2025)
(“[A]bsent a warrant a noncitizen may not be . . . detained under [§] 1226(a)”).
Although the INA provides limited exceptions for warrantless interrogations and
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arrests, in order to continue to detain a noncitizen under § 1226, federal law,
applicable 	agency 	regulation, 	and 	caselaw 	from 	this 	District 	Court 	require
immigration authorities to conduct an initial custody determination and obtain a
post-hoc warrant within forty-eight hours of initially detaining the noncitizen. 	See,
Makuiza v. Wesling, No. 2:26-cv-00044-LEW, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18216, at *3-12
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1357(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 287.3(d)). In other words,
“when arrests are made without a warrant, a custody determination must ordinarily
be made within 48 hours, accompanied by a notice to appear, and in the case of
continued custody a warrant will be issued post hoc.” Id. at *5-6, *7-13 (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.3(d)) (ordering § 1226(a) immigration detainee released after authorities failed
to conduct an initial custody determination and obtain a post-hoc warrant justifying
continued detention within forty-eight hours of warrantless arrest).
The Court agrees with Mr. Garcia De Melo that because he is subject to
discretionary detention under § 1226(a), Respondents are required by law to conduct
an 	initial 	custody 	determination 	within 	forty-eight 	hours 	of 	his 	detention,
accompanied by a post-hoc warrant. 	However, the Court does not agree that this
conclusion requires his immediate release. Instead, the Court concludes that the 48-
hour clock for Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination begins at the
date and time of this order. 	Unlike in Makuiza, in which the Government initially
detained the noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(a) but “neglected to” “justify[ ] its arrest
decision[ ],” id. at *3-4, 11, in this case, Respondents do not concede Mr. Garcia De
Melo is subject to § 1226(a) but rather maintain, consistent with controlling agency
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precedent, he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), which does not
require an initial custody determination or warrant. 	Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 1-2 (citing
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA Sep. 5, 2025)). 	Moreover, to
retroactively apply the Court’s § 1226(a) determination in this matter would place
Respondents 	in 	the 	untenable 	position 	in 	future 	cases 	presenting 	similar
circumstances, in which Respondents must decide whether to deliberately violate
controlling agency precedent in anticipation of a possible objection a detainee may or
may not raise in a future habeas petition not yet before this Court, and then further
guess how this Court might rule.
Rather, in this case, given that Respondents have maintained since his arrest
that Mr. Garcia De Melo is that subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2),
the forty-eight-hour custody determination clock begins to run at the time of this
Court’s determination that Mr. Garcia De Melo is subject to § 1226(a). Accordingly,
the Court will order Respondents to conduct an initial custody determination of Mr.
Garcia De Melo pursuant to § 1226(a), at which point they may either release him or
continue to detain him. If Respondents continue his detention, they must obtain an
authorizing warrant and, as the Court concludes below, later provide Mr. Garcia De
Melo a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.
4. 	Bond Hearing
Because Mr. Garcia De Melo is currently in the United States, he is “entitled
to the full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”
Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31 (D. Mass. 2025), which provides that he will
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not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST .
amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). 	As the petitioner,
however, Mr. Garcia De Melo bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance
of the evidence that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 	See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125776, at *8 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d
691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting authority)).
To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 	See
Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 261-
264 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to the detention of noncitizen held
pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test); Sampiao, 799 F. Supp 3d at 30, 34
(same). 	Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s 	interest, 	including 	the 	function 	involved 	and 	the 	fiscal 	and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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a. 	Private Interest
In his petition, Mr. Garcia De Melo asserts “the most elemental of liberty
interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690
(“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms
of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates
their due process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who
requires the government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
noncitizen poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the
evidence that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency
of their removal proceedings. 	See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. 	In this case,
Respondents have refused Mr. Garcia De Melo the bond hearing he is guaranteed
under § 1226(a) and have failed to meet their burden for his continued detention as
due process requires. Mr. Garcia De Melo has therefore clearly established the first
Mathews factor weighs in his favor.
b. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The 	second 	Mathews 	factor 	is 	“the 	risk 	of 	an 	erroneous 	deprivation 	of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk
of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing
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that Mr. Garcia De Melo presents any public safety or flight risk. 	Accordingly, the
second Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.
c. 	Government Interest
Finally, 	the 	third 	Mathews 	factor 	considers 	the 	“Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 	Id. 	Respondents do
not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Garcia De Melo’s continued
detention without a bond hearing. 	See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 263
(identifying 	governmental 	interest 	in 	favor 	of 	immigration 	habeas 	petitioners’
continued detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an
inapplicable statute”). 	In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without
a hearing. 	See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of
noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). 	Thus, the third Mathews factor
weighs against Respondents and in favor of Mr. Garcia De Melo.
The Court concludes that Respondents’ detention of Mr. Garcia De Melo
without a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates his due process
rights.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Kayo Garcia De Melo’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). 	The Court ORDERS Respondents to
conduct an initial custody determination of Mr. Garcia De Melo pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) and associated agency regulations within forty-eight hours of the time and
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date of this order. 	If Respondents release Mr. Garcia De Melo, the Court ORDERS
Respondents to return any of Mr. Garcia De Melo’s personal property in their
possession to him at the time of release. 	If Respondents continue Mr. Garcia De
Melo’s detention, the Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Mr. Garcia De Melo a
bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the
date of that custody determination. The Court further ENJOINS Respondents from
denying Mr. Garcia De Melo an initial custody determination or a bond hearing on
the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to him.
Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within twenty-
four 	hours 	of 	conducting 	his 	initial 	custody 	determination, 	stating 	whether
Respondents released or continued detaining Mr. Garcia De Melo, accompanied by
the grounds supporting their determination and the warrant authorizing continued
detention. 	If Respondents continue detaining Mr. Garcia De Melo, the Court
ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within five days of Mr. Garcia De Melo’s
bond hearing, stating whether Mr. Garcia De Melo has been granted bond, and, if his
request was denied, the reasons for that denial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 6th day of April, 2026
Case 1:26-cv-00152-JAW Document 14 Filed 04/06/26 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:
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