DOUGLAS et al v. LALUMIERE et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOEL DOUGLAS, et al., 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 2:20-cv-00227-JDL
)
SCOTT LALUMIERE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER ON ANDRE BELLUCCI’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Joel Douglas, Steven Fowler, and James Lewis (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring
this action against Scott Lalumiere and twenty-five other defendants (collectively,
“Defendants”), asserting seventeen claims arising out of an alleged scheme to defraud
the Plaintiffs and obtain control or ownership of their real estate properties for the
purpose of borrowing against the properties’ equity. 	In total, the Defendants have
filed thirteen motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”)
(ECF No. 11) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 	This order addresses Andre Bellucci’s
Motion to Dismiss the claims asserted against him under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2021), and
1 The following defendants have filed motions to dismiss: Androscoggin Savings Bank (ECF No. 37);
Camden National Bank (ECF No. 61); TTJR, LLC, LH Housing, LLC, and Eric Holsapple (ECF No.
65); LOSU, LLC and David Hirshon (ECF No. 70); Bangor Savings Bank and Robert Burgess (ECF
No. 98); Wayne Lewis (ECF No. 110); Machias Savings Bank (ECF No. 111); Coastal Realty Capital,
LLC, Michael Lyden, and Shawn Lyden (ECF No. 118); Andre Bellucci (ECF No. 147); BLR Capital,
LLC (ECF No. 197); F.O. Bailey Real Estate, LLC and David Jones (ECF No. 203); Russell Oakes (ECF
No. 223); and David Clarke (ECF No. 225). 	Only Defendants Scott Lalumiere, MECAP, LLC, and
Birch Point Storage, LLC have not filed a motions to dismiss.
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Maine tort and contract law (ECF No. 147). 	For the reasons that follow, I grant
Bellucci’s Motion to Dismiss and deny the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited Discovery.2
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges the following facts, which I treat as true for purposes of
ruling on this Motion to Dismiss.
The Complaint asserts that Scott Lalumiere and other defendants engaged in
three distinct but intertwined schemes to defraud the Plaintiffs. In the first scheme,
the Complaint alleges that Scott Lalumiere, funded by various banks and private
lenders, fraudulently induced several vulnerable individuals, including Plaintiffs
Steven Fowler and Joel Douglas, who lacked access to conventional credit, to enter
into unfavorable lease/buy-back agreements. Under the terms of the agreements, the
title of the victim’s property would be transferred to a corporate entity controlled by
Lalumiere with the victim, as the lessee, retaining a purchase option. The Lalumiere-
controlled entity would subsequently mortgage the property to banks and private
lenders, and, when the entity defaulted on its loan, the mortgagees foreclosed on the
property, frustrating the victim’s option to purchase.
In 	the 	second 	alleged 	scheme, 	Fowler 	entered 	into 	an 	agreement 	with
Lalumiere whereby he would provide labor and materials at a discounted rate to
renovate certain properties controlled by Lalumiere, with the understanding that
2 I recognize that Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison denied the Motion for Limited Discovery on
April 6, 2021 (ECF No. 213). His order expressly recognized, however, that the Plaintiffs’ request for
limited discovery should be revisited as part of the Court’s assessment of the Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, I have treated the earlier order denying the motion as a deferral of action on the motion.
Further, I have considered the merits of the motion and, for the reasons explained herein, I deny the
motion.
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Fowler could purchase the properties back upon the completion of the renovations.
However, 	Lalumiere 	frustrated 	Fowler’s 	right 	to 	purchase 	the 	properties 	by
defaulting on the mortgages, causing the mortgagees to foreclose on the properties.
In the third alleged scheme, several of the Defendants agreed to pay-off and
discharge Plaintiff James Lewis’s defaulted mortgage and to lend him money to make
improvements to his property in exchange for him deeding the property to a
corporation and making certain payments. 	After the title was transferred, they
refused to loan him the money and subsequently foreclosed on the property.
The Plaintiffs’ claims against Bellucci involve the third scheme noted above in
relation to one property: 57 Beach Street, South Portland, Maine. In December 2010,
Milk Street Capital, LLC—a Lalumiere-controlled entity—through Michael Lyden,
allegedly made promises to James Lewis that Milk Street Capital would pay-off his
defaulted mortgage and loan him money to make improvements in exchange for him
deeding the Beach Street property to a corporation to hold the title. 	Per the
agreement, James Lewis could continue to live at the Beach Street property so long
as he paid the mortgage. 	The Complaint fails to identify the specific mortgage to
which it refers. 	On December 12, 2010, James Lewis executed a transfer of the 57
Beach Street property to Lewis Plumbing and Heating, LLC. The Complaint alleges
that Coastal Realty Capital “refused to honor its promises to loan additional money
to Mr. Lewis for the necessary home improvements and never intended to loan
Mr. Lewis 	money 	for 	home 	improvements,” 	ECF 	No. 	11 	¶ 	115, 	although, 	on
September 19, 2014, Michael Lyden arranged for Coastal Realty Capital to loan
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James Lewis $125,000.3 Coastal Realty Capital subsequently foreclosed on the Beach
Street property. As alleged in the Complaint, Bellucci’s only involvement in this
scheme was offering to buy the Beach Street property from Lewis for $380,000 and
then revoking the offer days before the foreclosure sale.
The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Limited Discovery from Bellucci in connection
with their response to his Motion to Dismiss. 	On April 6, 2021, Magistrate Judge
John C. Nivison entered an order denying the Plaintiffs’ limited discovery request
without prejudice, stating that “[t]he Court will consider Plaintiffs’ [discovery]
requests as part of the Court’s assessment of each defendant’s motion to dismiss.”
ECF No. 213 at 2. 	The Plaintiffs did not file an objection. 	Below, I address the
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited Discovery as it relates to Bellucci’s Motion to Dismiss.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must
“accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader’s favor.” 	Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez,
711 F.3d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72
(1st Cir. 2011)). 	To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
53 (quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012)). Additionally,
a court may consider inferences “gleaned from documents incorporated by reference
3 The Complaint alleges that Milk Street Capital made the initial promise to loan James Lewis
money, but then alleges Coastal Realty Capital refused to honor the promise. The Complaint does not
explain how Milk Street Capital and Coastal Realty Capital are related, or how Coastal Realty Capital
is responsible for Milk Street Capital’s promise.
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into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.”
Id. (quoting Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)).
To assess the complaint’s adequacy, courts apply a “two-pronged approach,”
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011): First, the court
must “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels
and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements,” and second, the court
will “take the complaint’s well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as
true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor, and see if they plausibly
narrate a claim for relief,” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d
50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). 	To determine the plausibility of a claim is “a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although conclusory legal
statements may “provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” 	Id. 	The court must determine whether the factual allegations
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
In addition, the Plaintiffs’ fraud-related claims are subject to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that a complaint “state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.” 	To satisfy this requirement, the complaint must
set forth the “time, place and content of an alleged false representation.” 	Howell v.
Advantage Payroll Servs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-438-NT, 2017 WL 782881, at *6 (D. Me.
Feb. 28, 2017) (quoting Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1985)). 	The
Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are based in part on the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud,
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which 	“must 	satisfy 	the 	particularity 	requirements 	of 	Rule 	9(b).” 	Ahmed 	v.
Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 889 (1st Cir. 1997).
The Plaintiffs assert four claims against Bellucci: (A) the RICO claim, (B) the
fraud claim (C) the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and (D) the unjust
enrichment claim. 	The RICO claim includes a single count against the alleged
enterprise operating the conspiracy. 	The fraud claim stems from Lalumiere’s
representations to the Plaintiffs that they had an option to purchase 	certain
properties, and the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is based on
Bellucci’s unfulfilled offer to buy the Beach Street property. The unjust enrichment
claim stands for itself. I address each in turn.4
A. 	RICO (Count IV)
The Complaint asserts that Bellucci participated in a RICO conspiracy under
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d) (West 2021). 	“To prove a RICO conspiracy offense, the
[plaintiff] must show that ‘the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy, agreeing
with one or more coconspirators “to further the endeavor, which, if completed, would
satisfy all the elements of a substantive RICO offense.”’” United States v. Velazquez-
Fontanez, 6 F.4th 205, 212 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019)). 	It is not necessary to
4 The Complaint references Bellucci in Count XIII, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice, but does not
explicitly name him in the count. Bellucci addresses the unfair and deceptive trade practice claim
anyway, arguing that he was not involved in the alleged eviction at 33 Sanborn Lane on which the
claim is based. In their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs state that “Paragraph 236
is meant to provide notice as to the punitive damages requested as part of Paragraph 202” regarding
the fraud claim, and they do not press the unfair and deceptive trade practice claim against Bellucci.
ECF No. 164 at 14 n.4. 	Therefore, to the extent Count XIII asserts an unfair and deceptive trade
practice claim against Bellucci, I deem it abandoned.
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“prove 	that 	the 	defendant 	or 	his 	co-conspirators 	committed 	any 	overt 	act 	in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” 	United States v. Leoner-Aguirre, 939 F.3d 310, 317
(1st Cir. 2019).
Here, the Complaint alleges that Bellucci conspired to violate 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1962(a), which makes it unlawful to use or invest income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity under certain circumstances:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . in which
such person has participated as a principal . . . to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.
An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity.” 	18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (West 2021). 	“To establish a pattern of
racketeering, a plaintiff must show at least two predicate acts of ‘racketeering
activity’, as the statute defines such activity, and must establish that the ‘predicates
are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.’”
McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 788 (1st Cir. 1990)
(quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239). 	“Racketeering activity”
encompasses mail fraud under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2021), wire fraud under
18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2021), and money laundering under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956
(West 2021). 	18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1). 	A plaintiff asserting a § 1962(a) claim must
further prove that he was “injured ‘in his business or property by reason of’ the
defendant’s violation.” 	Compagnie De Reassurance D’Ile de France v. New England
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Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 91 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West
2021)).
The Plaintiffs’ theory for their RICO claim against Bellucci is that he conspired
with the Lalumiere Defendants5 to reinvest the income from a pattern of racketeering
activity back into the enterprise. 	The alleged racketeering activity was money
laundering and mail and wire fraud. 	Bellucci argues that the Complaint fails to
plausibly allege that he knowingly joined the overall conspiracy. For the reasons that
follow, I agree.
The Complaint’s RICO claims are based on Lalumiere’s alleged schemes
involving 661 Allen Avenue, 75 Queen Street, 33 Sanborn Lane, 181 St. John Street,
and 16 Old Ben Davis Road. However, the only allegation against Bellucci is that he
extended an offer to Lewis to purchase the Beach Street property, which is not
included in any of the RICO counts. The Complaint does not contain any facts that,
if proven, would establish whether and how the alleged Beach Street fraud scheme is
related to Lalumiere’s schemes. 	The Complaint alleges that Bellucci and others
“realized the proceeds” of Lalumiere’s fraud and “were informed of the fraudulent
conduct in late November 2019,” ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 174, 179, but, beyond these
conclusory allegations, the Complaint does not contain any allegation that Bellucci
knew anything about the Lalumiere Defendants, let alone their allegedly fraudulent
schemes.
5 This term refers to Defendant Scott Lalumiere and the corporate entities he controlled: Defendants
Birch Point Storage, LLC and MECAP, LLC.
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Without 	any 	further 	information, 	the 	Complaint 	fails 	to 	allege 	facts
establishing that Bellucci knew of Lalumiere’s fraud or knowingly agreed to facilitate
Lalumiere’s scheme. For these reasons, I dismiss the RICO count against Bellucci.6
B. 	Fraud Claim (Count VI)
The Complaint’s fraud claim is not premised on Bellucci’s offer to purchase the
Beach Street property from James Lewis. Rather, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Bellucci
liable for Lalumiere’s alleged misrepresentations to Douglas and Fowler that they
would be able to purchase the Queen Street, Allen Avenue, and Beach Street
properties. 	The Plaintiffs acknowledge that Bellucci was not a party to those
transactions, but they argue that the fraud claim “appropriately alleges a civil
conspiracy on which Maine law attributes liability.” ECF No. 164 at 14.
Under Maine law, fraud has the following five elements:
(1) A party made a false representation, (2) The representation was of a
material fact, (3) The representation was made with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false, (4) The
representation was made for the purpose of inducing another party to
act in reliance upon it, and (5) The other party justifiably relied upon
the representation as true and acted upon it to the party’s damage.
Thompson v. Cloud, 764 F.3d 82, 88 n.9 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Barr v. Dyke, 2012
ME 108, ¶ 16, 49 A.3d 1280, 1286-87). 	To prevail, a party must prove the five
elements by clear and convincing evidence. Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. Coulombe, 2016 ME
166, ¶ 26 n.7, 151 A.3d 7, 16 n.7. 	In Maine, civil conspiracy “is not a separate tort
6 The Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Bellucci knowingly joined Lalumiere’s conspiracy, and
for that reason alone, the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim against Bellucci fails. Therefore, I do not address
Bellucci’s additional argument that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a plausible pattern of
racketeering activity.
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but rather a rule of vicarious liability.” Spyderco, Inc. v. Kevin, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-309-
DBH, 2017 WL 6375965, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 12, 2017) (quoting Vincent v. Town of
Scarborough, No. Civ. 02-239-PH, 2003 WL 22757940, at *32 (D. Me. Nov. 20, 2003)).
Therefore, a claim of civil conspiracy “is only a way of obtaining vicarious liability
against someone who did not himself perform the tortious act.” 	Forbis v. City of
Portland, 270 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D. Me. 2003).
As a threshold matter, the fraud count in the Complaint does not assert any
theory of civil conspiracy. 	The count merely states that Bellucci and others
misrepresented that the Plaintiffs would ever regain title to their properties, the
misrepresentation was made with “actual malice” and with the intention that the
Plaintiffs 	would 	rely 	upon 	it, 	and 	the 	fraud 	cost 	the 	Plaintiffs 	“more 	than
$2,750,000.00 in damages.” ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 199-202. However, the Complaint’s only
nonconclusory allegation against Bellucci states that he offered to buy the Beach
Street property and then revoked his offer days before the foreclosure. The Complaint
does not assert that Bellucci’s offer was false, nor does it assert that Bellucci made
the offer with the intention that Lewis would rely upon it or that Lewis did, in fact,
rely upon it. Thus, the Complaint does not assert a plausible fraud claim if it is only
based on Bellucci’s withdrawn offer to buy the Beach Street property.
Even if the fraud count included allegations of civil conspiracy, I have already
explained that the Complaint fails to allege that Bellucci conspired with Lalumiere.
Bellucci was not involved in the Queen Street or Allen Avenue lease buy-back
transactions, and there is no allegation that he agreed to facilitate Lalumiere’s
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schemes. 	Thus, Bellucci cannot be held vicariously liable for Lalumiere’s alleged
misrepresentations.
Because the Complaint fails to allege that Bellucci made any fraudulent
misrepresentation or that he is liable for Lalumiere’s alleged misrepresentations, I
dismiss the fraud claim against Bellucci.
C. 	Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count XVI)
The Plaintiffs assert a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against
Bellucci based on the revocation of his offer to buy the Beach Street property from
Lewis just days before the foreclosure sale. 	The Complaint alleges that Bellucci’s
behavior was “so outrageous that it cannot be tolerated in civilized society,” caused
Lewis “severe emotional distress,” the resulting severe emotional distress was
reasonably foreseeable, and the distress was “so severe that no ordinary person could
be expected to endure it.” ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 250-54.
“Under Maine law, proof of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires
plaintiffs to show that (1) defendants were negligent; (2) plaintiffs suffered emotional
distress that was a reasonably foreseeable result of defendants’ negligent conduct;
[and] (3) and plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress as a result of defendants’
negligence.” Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 129 (1st Cir. 2000). Moreover,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated a special duty of care owed to the
plaintiff. Id. at 130; see Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 18, 784 A.2d 18, 25 (“[T]here
is no . . . general duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm to others.”). Maine
law “recognize[s] a duty to act reasonably to avoid emotional harm to others in very
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limited circumstances,” such as where “a special relationship exists between the actor
and the person emotionally harmed.” Curtis, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 19, 784 A.2d at 25; see
Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 130-31 (collecting cases where Maine has recognized special
relationships). However, an “ordinary business relationship” is usually not a special
relationship from which the duty of care will arise. Cheung v. Wambolt, No. Civ. 04-
127-B-W, 2005 WL 1331195, at *10 (D. Me. June 2, 2005), aff’d, 2005 WL 1586569
(D. Me. July 5, 2005).
The Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim fails for two
reasons. 	First, the Complaint does not contain any nonconclusory allegations that
would establish that Lewis suffered severe emotional distress. 	The Complaint does
not provide any facts about the “severe emotional distress” that Lewis allegedly
suffered as a result of Bellucci revoking his offer. 	Second, the Complaint does not
provide any factual information that might plausibly support the existence of a
“special relationship” between Bellucci and Lewis. 	The Complaint does not suggest
more than an “ordinary business relationship,” which “is not the kind of ‘unique
relationship’ from which a special duty of care will arise to avoid causing emotional
harm.” 	Cheung, 2005 WL 1331195, at *10. 	Therefore, I dismiss the negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim against Bellucci.
D. 	Unjust Enrichment Claim (Count XVII)
The Complaint asserts a claim for unjust enrichment against Bellucci based on
the alleged “extraction of equity from the homes at 661 Allen Avenue and 57 Queen
Street.” ECF No. 11 ¶ 255.
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A claim for unjust enrichment requires proof that “(1) [the complaining party]
conferred a benefit on the other party; (2) the other party had appreciation or
knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention of the benefit was under
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.” 	Knope v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2017 ME 95, ¶ 12,
161 A.3d 696, 699 (quoting Me. Eye Care Assocs., P.A. v. Gorman, 2008 ME 36, ¶ 17,
942 A.2d 707, 712).
The Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim cannot succeed because the Complaint
fails to allege any facts indicating that that a benefit was conferred on Bellucci. The
Complaint does not assert that Bellucci had any involvement in the Allen Avenue or
Queen Street transactions, nor does it assert an unjust enrichment claim arising from
the Beach Street transaction. 	Although the Plaintiffs allegedly suffered harm
through the frustration of their rights to purchase the two properties, the Complaint
fails to assert facts that would plausibly establish that a resulting benefit was
conferred on Bellucci. Relatedly, the Complaint does not allege that Bellucci had or
should have had “appreciation or knowledge” of the benefit received. 	There cannot
be an unjust enrichment without a “conferred benefit” or “knowledge of the benefit.”
In sum, the Complaint fails to plead facts which, if proven, would establish a
right of recovery based on unjust enrichment.
E. 	Motion for Limited Discovery
A dismissal is not automatic once the lower court determines that Rule 9(b)
has not been satisfied. 	New England Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290
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(1st Cir. 1987). 	Instead, after the Rule 9(b) determination, a “court should make a
second determination as to whether the claim as presented warrants the allowance
of discovery and if so, thereafter provide an opportunity to amend the defective
complaint.” 	Id. 	The plaintiff may have a right to limited discovery, to the extent
necessary to cure a Rule 9(b) defect about “the details of just when and where the
mail or wires were used.” 	Id. 	A court also has “some latitude” to allow discovery
“where a plausible claim may be indicated ‘based on what is known,’ at least where
. . . ‘some of the information needed may be in the control of the defendants.’”
Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Here, 	the 	Plaintiffs 	seek 	limited 	discovery 	from 	Bellucci 	to 	reveal
“communications between Andre Bellucci, Michael Lyden, Shawn Lyden, Coastal
[Realty] Capital, and Maine Capital Group and the other defendants” who were
allegedly involved in the conspiracy. 	ECF No. 165 at 3-4. 	Under the Plaintiffs’
theory, they believe that Bellucci had exclusive access to communications which are
necessary to prove the elements of fraud.
The decisions in Becher and Menard establish two possible grounds for
granting limited discovery. 	First, under Menard, where modest discovery may
“provide the missing link” to satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard, the court
may allow limited discovery “at least where . . . ‘some of the information needed may
be in the control of the defendants.’” 698 F.3d at 45 (quoting Pruell v. Caritas Christi,
678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012)). 	Here, however, the Complaint is not lacking a
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“missing 	link.” 	The 	Complaint 	does 	not 	plausibly 	suggest 	that 	Bellucci 	had
information that would provide the “missing link” needed to remedy its deficiencies.
Second, as discussed in Becher, a court may allow discovery as to “the details
of just when and where the mail or wires were used” in a “RICO mail and wire fraud
case.” 	829 F.2d at 290; see also Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997). Here, however, additional information as to how the conspiracy used the mail
or wires would not cure the Complaint’s failure to sufficiently allege that Bellucci
knowingly joined the conspiracy.
Neither Menard nor Becher offers a basis to grant limited discovery for the
Plaintiffs as against Bellucci. 	Thus, I deny the Motion for Limited Discovery as to
Bellucci.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Andre Bellucci’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 147) is GRANTED. The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) as to
Andre Bellucci is DISMISSED. 	The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Limited Discovery (ECF
No. 165) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2021
/s/ JON D. LEVY
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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