TAMAKI v. TAMAKI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
STEPHANIE TAMAKI, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:23-cv-00312-LEW
)
ATSUSHI TAMAKI, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND REOPEN THE EVIDENCE,
AND VACATING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The matter is again before the Court on the question of service and the propriety of
concluding this matter by default judgment, following an evidentiary hearing, post-hearing
briefs, and the Supplemental Indicative Ruling dated March 20, 2026 (ECF No. 121). On
the basis of the Supplemental Indicative Ruling, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
remanded Defendant’s appeals “for the limited purpose of ruling on Defendant-Appellant’s
renewed motion to vacate.” Order of the Court (ECF No. 123).
A. 	Motion to Reconsider and Reopen Evidence (ECF No. 124)
Plaintiff asks that, before ruling on the motion to vacate, I reconsider anew the
propriety of the default judgment and hold another hearing to consider more evidence and
testimony from additional witnesses. 	In support of her request, Plaintiff argues that I
abused 	my 	discretion 	by 	reviewing 	and 	mentioning 	certain 	photographic 	evidence
submitted by Defendant in the context of his post-hearing brief. Plaintiff also claims that
post-hearing developments—a passing remark made after the hearing and an unsolicited
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affidavit filed by a non-party—militate in favor of another hearing. 	Plaintiff also raises
supplemental arguments that she believes undercut the findings I announced in the
Supplemental Indicative Ruling. Plaintiff seeks this relief in the context of Rule 59(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	See Mot. to Reconsider and Reopen the Evidence
(ECF No. 124).
Rule 59(e) is not applicable here. 	The Supplemental Indicative Ruling was a
procedural order. It does not constitute a judgment for purposes of Rule 59. The Amended
Default Judgment (ECF No. 26) remained in place even upon the issuance of the
Supplemental Indicative Ruling. 	Instead, Plaintiff’s Motion is governed by Rule 60(b),
which authorizes a motion for relief from an order or proceeding.1 Reconsideration of an
order or proceeding can be justified based on (1) “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect”; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud or similar misconduct; (4) a
basis to void the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the judgment and similar contingencies; or
(6) “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Plaintiff alleges that I committed a “manifest error of law” when I mentioned in the
Supplemental Indicative Ruling the photographic evidence that Defendant attached to his
post-hearing brief. Plaintiff does not offer any legal authority in support of this assertion.
In the Supplemental Indicative Ruling, I explain why I found cause for concern in process
server James Adams’s testimony that he encountered Defendant at his residence while
performing alternate, drop service there. Mr. Adams’s testimony was surprising, to say the
1 I presume that the deadline for filing the motion is the “reasonable time” period set in Rule 60(c) rather
than the 14-day period set in Local Rule 7(f), although I have some doubt on the matter.
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least, insofar as the Court had repeatedly considered the circumstances of service based on
representations made by process server Sam Rinaldi, who clearly had the lead on the
service of Defendant but never himself had testified about any such encounter. 	Nor did
Mr. Rinaldi corroborate Mr. Adams’s testimony at the hearing on the subject of Mr.
Adams’s alleged encounter with Defendant on the date of the drop service. Furthermore,
Mr. Adams testified that he had no recollection of any specifics concerning service on
Defendant when he was first contacted by Plaintiff’s counsel. 	Yet his testimony at the
hearing was truly incredible, near revelatory, offering such detail that I found it unlikely
that his version of events would not have come to the Court’s attention previously, such as
at the default judgment hearing or in the papers Plaintiff filed in opposition to Defendant’s
motion for relief from the default judgment. Mr. Rinaldi, the chief witness on the subject
of service, never said as much before the hearing or at it, and neither gentleman had any
contemporaneous note to support Mr. Adams’s remarkable assertion. Moreover, I find the
representation incongruous with the passage of time and the character of Mr. Adams’s
service work, which involves many service attempts at many abodes and businesses on a
daily basis. 	Finally, I am persuaded by Defendant’s testimony at the hearing that an
encounter with Mr. Adams at Defendant’s home during his attempt at drop service never
happened.
Concerning Plaintiff’s attribution of legal error, it is true that I also observed in the
Supplemental Indicative Ruling that Mr. Adams’s representation about attempting service
at both the front and side doors of Defendant’s residence was “somewhat odd given the
layout of the Tamaki residence.” In doing so, I referenced the challenged post-hearing
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photographic exhibits, but my remark to that effect was merely an observation in further
support of factual findings I had already drawn at the hearing for all the other reasons
related in the Supplemental Indicative Ruling. I did not place decisive weight on the post-
hearing exhibits but indicated instead that Mr. Adams’s remark about the side door was
odd—in effect, a curiosity. In any event, I am not persuaded that I committed a manifest
error of law in considering the exhibits. 	For example, I would have considered a timely
request by Plaintiff to supplement the record with argument and/or an affidavit from Mr.
Adams in rebuttal, had it been attempted.
Another post-hearing concern involves a filing made by a non-party, Austin Miller.
I place no weight on Mr. Miller’s affidavit since it is not in evidence. To the extent Plaintiff
argues that Mr. Miller’s representations warrant a new hearing based on the discovery of
“new evidence” under Rule 60(b), Mr. Miller’s existence as a witness—he is the partner of
one of Defendant’s daughters—has long been known to Plaintiff and her counsel. Plaintiff
could have subpoenaed Mr. Austin to testify at the hearing about any communications he
may have had with Defendant concerning service of process and the circumstances
surrounding the entry of default judgment. 	I decline to grant another hearing for that
purpose.
Yet another post-hearing concern involves a short exchange between Defendant and
Mr. Adams after the hearing. According to Plaintiff, Defendant asked Mr. Adams, “Where
do I know you from?” Plaintiff supposes that this was a genuine question that demonstrates
that the two men had in fact encountered each other at Defendant’s residence. Defendant
does not dispute having made the remark but indicates that he was being ironic, as in
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pointedly conveying that he did not know Mr. Adams at all. 	I do not find this “new
evidence” sufficiently probative of credibility to justify reopening the proceeding for new
testimony. 	Defendant already testified that he did not encounter Mr. Adams at the
residence and I find that testimony credible and Mr. Adams’s contrary testimony incredible
for the reasons I outlined.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Reopen the Evidence is denied.
B. 	Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 86)
In my Supplemental Indicative Ruling I recited the findings on which I would base
an order granting Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. 	I incorporate those
findings by reference. Based on those findings, I conclude that Plaintiff’s efforts to serve
Defendant by ordinary means did not fully exhaust all reasonable attempts before alternate
service was authorized, Defendant was not actually evading service, and service by
alternate means failed to provide Defendant with notice that this civil action was in fact
pending against him. Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that Defendant has a
viable defense to this action, relief from the default judgment is appropriate to accomplish
justice, and relief from default judgment is not unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiff. 	Default
judgment is a harsh imposition that undermines the goal of resolving disputes on the merits
and consequently is justified only in the most extreme cases. 	Universitas Educ., LLC v.
Granderson, 98 F.4th 357, 377 (1st Cir. 2024). 	In light of the service irregularities
excavated through a less-than-ideal prologue only now to arrive at the beginning, I vacate
the Amended Judgment and Order. .
Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment is GRANTED.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	and 	Reopen 	(ECF 	No. 	124) 	is 	DENIED.
Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF No. 86) is GRANTED. The Amended
Judgment and Order (ECF No. 26) is VACATED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 19th day of May, 2026.
/s/ Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge
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