USA v. LAPIERRE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES LAPIERRE,
Defendant.
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2:25-cr-00102-SDN-1
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant James Lapierre’s motion to
dismiss for outrageous government conduct and his request for a Franks hearing. Mr.
Lapierre seeks relief based on alleged false statements made by law enforcement officers
in an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint charging him with attempted sex
trafficking of a minor. See ECF No. 1-1. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Lapierre’s motion
to dismiss and request for an evidentiary Franks hearing are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2025, Mr. Lapierre was arrested as part of a federal “sting operation”
conducted in South Portland, Maine. As part of the operation, Mr. Lapierre allegedly
responded to multiple online advertisements, posted by undercover law enforcement
officers, offering commercial sexual activity with a minor female and drove to the
provided location where officers apprehended him.1 The following day, the Government
sought a criminal complaint, supported by an affidavit written by Special Agent Eric
Tracy. Magistrate Judge Wolf granted the application for the complaint, finding probable
1 My prior Order denying Mr. Lapierre’s motions to dismiss and motion to suppress provides a more
thorough factual background. ECF No. 58 at 2–4.
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cause that Mr. Lapierre had attempted to engage in commercial sexual activity with a
purported minor. ECF No. 1. Mr. Lapierre now challenges Agent Tracy’s affidavit,
specifically Agent Tracy’s declaration therein that, upon arriving at the hotel:
The defendant parked his vehicle and approached [the undercover officer] who
was standing in front of the hotel room. The defendant confirmed he was there for
the minor female. He said he had the money but didn’t want to give the money
until he saw the minor female. The defendant was provided a hotel key to the hotel
room and approached the door of the hotel room.
ECF No. 1-1 at 4.
On July 9, 2025, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Lapierre with
one count of Attempted Sex Trafficking of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1),
(b)(2), and 1594(a). ECF No. 26. Following the indictment, Mr. Lapierre filed several
initial motions with the Court: a motion to dismiss for entrapment (ECF No. 28), a motion
to dismiss for selective prosecution (ECF No. 29) and related motion for discovery (ECF
No. 51), and an amended motion to suppress evidence of his arrest based on insufficient
probable cause (ECF No. 41). On November 17, 2025, the Court held an evidentiary
hearing on these initial motions and heard testimony from Maine State Police Detective
Dezarae Roberts2—one of the undercover officers who communicated with Mr. Lapierre
online and the officer who engaged in face-to-face contact with him upon his arrival to
the hotel. ECF No. 55. According to her testimony, Mr. Lapierre never stated he “didn’t
want to give the money until he saw the minor female,” as stated in Agent Tracy’s affidavit.
ECF No. 1-1 at 4; see ECF No. 82 at 34:18–36:6; 37:24–38:17. Detective Roberts further
testified that she walked away from Mr. Lapierre after providing him the hotel key and
2 At the time of her testimony, Detective Roberts went by Detective Fillmyer and is referred to as such in
the official transcript. She will be referred to as Detective Roberts in this Order. See ECF No. 71 at 1.
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was thus unaware whether Mr. Lapierre approached the hotel room door or not. See id.
at 49:2–12.3
On December 19, 2025, following the evidentiary hearing, I denied each of Mr.
Lapierre’s then-pending motions to dismiss and motion to suppress. ECF No. 58. In
denying the motion to suppress, I ruled the “totality of circumstances and the facts known
to officers at the time of Mr. Lapierre’s arrest support a finding of probable cause that Mr.
Lapierre had committed the crime of attempted sex trafficking of a minor.” Id. at 9.
Specifically, 	my 	finding 	of 	probable 	cause 	was 	supported 	by 	evidence 	that 	“law
enforcement observed Mr. Lapierre continue to engage in conversation with undercover
chatters and negotiate prices for the commercial sexual activity, drive to the hotel, and
speak with who he believed to be the victim’s older sister regarding the intended sexual
activity, all after learning of the purported minor’s age.” Id. at 10.
Mr. Lapierre has now filed his third motion to dismiss, this time for “outrageous
government conduct” and violation of his due process rights, based on the alleged “false
statements” contained in Agent Tracy’s affidavit. ECF No. 66 at 1–2. Mr. Lapierre
additionally requests an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978), which establishes the right to an evidentiary hearing upon a preliminary showing
“that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,” and that such statement was
necessary to the ultimate finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56. In
response, the government argues both that Mr. Lapierre has failed to establish that Agent
3 I previously found the video exhibit depicting Mr. Lapierre’s arrest inconclusive as to whether Mr. Lapierre
approached the hotel room door before being apprehended; regardless, that ambiguity is not determinative
of my conclusion regarding probable cause. See ECF No. 58 at 3 n.3.
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Tracy either knowingly or recklessly included a false statement in his arrest affidavit and
that the challenged statement is not necessary to the finding of probable cause. See ECF
No. 71 at 7–11. The government further contends that Mr. Lapierre’s challenge to the
initial complaint is now moot: because the grand jury issued a True Bill on the Indictment,
the grand jury has independently established probable cause, superseding Agent Tracey’s
original affidavit in support of the complaint. See id. at 12.4
On February 6, 2026, the Court held a conference of counsel with the parties and
ordered them to provide supplemental briefing on whether an evidentiary hearing on Mr.
Lapierre’s motion for a Franks hearing was warranted. ECF No. 77. The parties each filed
their supplemental briefs by February 20, 2026. See ECF Nos. 83, 84. Of note, Mr.
Lapierre’s supplemental brief does not directly address the standard for an evidentiary
hearing 	under 	Franks 	and 	instead 	restates 	many 	similar 	arguments 	regarding
entrapment already rejected in my Order denying his motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Franks Hearing
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks, a defendant must make a
“substantial preliminary showing” that both (1) “a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
warrant affidavit,” and (2) “the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
4 The government additionally argues there is no federal authority which establishes Franks applies to
affidavits filed in support of arrests and criminal complaints, in addition to search warrants pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 71 at 7. However, the First Circuit has previously concluded that
“[a]lthough Franks dealt with an affidavit in support of a search warrant, the same principles apply to an
application in support of an arrest warrant where the application serves the same function as an affidavit.”
United States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d 60, 68 n.3 (citing United States v. Laurent, 607 F.3d 895, 903 (1st Cir.
2010)). Accordingly, Mr. Lapierre may appropriately challenge the affidavit supporting his arrest and
criminal complaint under Franks.
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probable cause.” United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 155–56). An attack on a warrant affidavit “must be more than conclusory and
must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.” United States v. Graf,
784 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). The defendant’s
preliminary showing must satisfy both prongs of the Franks standard by a preponderance
of the evidence. See United States v. Leonard, 17 F.4th 218, 224 (1st Cir. 2021).
In his motion to dismiss, Mr. Lapierre alleges the affidavit contained multiple false
statements of fact, namely that Mr. Lapierre: (1) confirmed he was there for the minor
female, (2) stated that he didn’t want to give money to the undercover officer before seeing
the minor female, and (3) approached the purported minor’s hotel room after being
provided a key by the officer. See ECF No. 66 at 1. Mr. Lapierre indicates Detective
Roberts testimony contradicted these statements. Regarding the first alleged false
statement, however, Detective Roberts testified that upon meeting at the hotel, while
posing as the purported minor’s older sister, Mr. Lapierre confirmed he was there for the
minor female. ECF No. 82 at 35:7–11. Regarding the second statement, Detective Roberts
testified she did not recall having a conversation with Mr. Lapierre about not giving
money until he saw the minor female, and instead that Mr. Lapierre stated he wanted to
have further conversation with Detective Roberts (the supposed older sister) in her hotel
room. Id. at 35:12–15. Finally, as to the third statement, Detective Roberts stated she did
not see whether Mr. Lapierre approached the hotel room after she provided him with the
key and walked away. Id. at 49:7–12. For multiple reasons, I find that Mr. Lapierre’s
showing is insufficient to justify an evidentiary Franks hearing.
First, Mr. Lapierre’s challenge to the veracity of the affidavit in support of the
criminal complaint is untimely, as the grand jury has already found probable cause to
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charge him with the same crime. The indictment charging Mr. Lapierre with attempted
sex trafficking of a minor thus supersedes any alleged defect in the original criminal
complaint. See Denton v. United States, 465 F.2d 1394, 1395 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Calzada, No. 23-50838, 2024 WL 3103326, at *1 (5th Cir. June 24, 2024); see also
United States v. Sole, No. 23-cr-00015, 2025 WL 26690, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2025)
(defendant’s challenge to arrest affidavit under Franks raised following grand jury
indictment 	was 	untimely 	because 	indictment 	“obviates 	any 	need 	for 	a 	criminal
complaint”) (quotation modified)). Although the indictment against Mr. Lapierre is fatal
to his position, I will go on to consider the merits of his argument for a Franks hearing.
Second, the determination of any alleged inconsistency between Detective Roberts’
and Agent Tracey’s version of events is ultimately a credibility assessment reserved for
the jury. I find Mr. Lapierre has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that any such inconsistencies constitute intentional and knowing misrepresentation or a
“reckless disregard for the truth” on the part of Agent Tracy, as required by Franks. Mr.
Lapierre will be permitted to cross-examine both witnesses at trial; at this stage, however,
he has not proven the first prong of the Franks standard by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Third, even if Mr. Lapierre could satisfy the first prong of the Franks standard, he
cannot demonstrate any alleged false statements in the affidavit were critical to either the
initial or my subsequent finding of probable cause. In the Order denying Mr. Lapierre’s
motion to suppress, I noted an assortment of facts known to officers at the time of Mr.
Lapierre’s arrest established probable cause. See ECF No. 58 at 10. Additionally, I found
the 	text 	message 	communications 	between 	undercover 	officers 	and 	Mr. 	Lapierre
demonstrated Mr. Lapierre’s “awareness of the purported minor’s age and intent to
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engage in sexual activity with the minor.” Id. at 9. This finding of probable cause does not
rest upon whether Mr. Lapierre stated he did not want to give the money until he saw the
minor, nor whether he approached the hotel room door after being provided the key.
Accordingly, Mr. Lapierre cannot establish either prong of the Franks standard by a
preponderance of the evidence so as to justify an evidentiary hearing.
II. 	Outrageous Government Conduct
Mr. Lapierre further requests relief in the form of a dismissal of the indictment
based on alleged outrageous government conduct prior to and during the undercover
operation leading to his arrest. ECF No. 66 at 3. Mr. Lapierre bases this claim on the
alleged false statements contained in the affidavit, as well as general allegations regarding
the government’s attempt to entrap him, including that undercover officers sent him
pictures of the purported minor and made false representations about the minor’s
extensive experience with commercial sexual activity. See id. at 2–3.
The doctrine of outrageous government conduct is reserved solely for “the most
appalling and egregious situations.” United States v. Guzman, 282 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.
2002); see also United States v. Luisi, 482 F.3d 43, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) (“While the doctrine
is often invoked by criminal defendants, it has never yet been successful in this circuit.”).
Because the law “frowns on the exoneration of a defendant for reasons unrelated to his
guilt or innocence,” the dismissal of charges based on outrageous conduct is utilized
sparingly. United States v. Anzalone, 221 F. Supp. 3d 189, 193 (D. Mass. 2016) (quoting
Guzman, 292 F.3d at 59). The dismissal of an indictment based on outrageous
government conduct is proper only where the conduct is “so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to
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obtain a conviction.” United States v. Djokich, 693 F.3d 37, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973)).
For many of the reasons already stated, the alleged government conduct here does
not rise to the level of the “appalling and egregious” threshold required for dismissal of
the indictment. The crux of Mr. Lapierre’s argument is that the government’s undercover
operation amounted to impermissible entrapment, which I have already ruled is—subject
to the evidence presented at trial—a question of fact reserved for the jury. See ECF No. 58
at 6. Nothing alleged by Mr. Lapierre at this stage demonstrates the principles of due
process should prevent the government’s prosecution of this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Lapierre’s motion to dismiss for outrageous
government conduct and for an evidentiary Franks hearing, ECF No. 66, is DENIED.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 10th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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