STATE OF MAINE v. BP PLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BP P.L.C., et al.,
Defendants.
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2:25-cv-00001-SDN
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to stay execution of the
order remanding this case to state court pending their appeal of that order (“the Remand
Order”), Defendants’ motion to alter or amend judgment in the Remand Order pertaining
to the award of attorneys’ fees to the State, and the State’s motion for said fees and
expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Following the State’s complaint against
Defendants in state court, Defendants removed this case to federal court on a theory of
federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The District Court then remanded
the case to state court, finding that Defendants had failed to satisfy the requirements of
the federal officer removal statute. The Court also granted the State’s request to recover
costs and expenses resulting from Defendants’ removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and
ordered the parties to reach an agreement on the amount or for the State to submit an
application for the same. Defendants now seek a stay of the Remand Order pending their
appeal, and an amendment to the prior order awarding fees to the State. Following the
parties’ apparent inability to reach an agreement on the amount of fees and expenses
owed, the State has now submitted its application for attorneys’ fees and expenses. For
the reasons that follow, both of the Defendants’ motions are DENIED, and the State’s
motion for fees and expenses as outlined in its application for the same is GRANTED.
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BACKGROUND
In November 2024, the State of Maine (the “State”) sued fourteen fossil fuel
companies and their national trade associations (the “Defendants”) in state court,
asserting various causes of action centered around Defendants’ alleged acts of knowingly
deceiving Maine consumers and the public about the effects of climate change. See ECF
No. 1-1. Specifically, the State alleges Defendants have known, at least since 1965, that the
“unrestrained use of fossil fuel products” would cause global warming and result in “wide-
ranging and costly consequences.” Id. at ¶ 61. Despite this knowledge, the Defendants
allegedly continued fossil fuel production while misleading the public regarding the
effects of climate change.1 See id. at ¶¶ 70–134. For example, the State alleges the
Defendants “made misleading statements to consumers . . . about climate change, the
relationship between climate change and fossil fuel products, and the urgency of the
problem.” Id. at ¶ 127. Additionally, another “key strategy” of Defendants’ efforts was to
“bankroll unqualified or unscrupulous scientists to advance fringe conclusions about
climate change” and to “fund[] dozens of think tanks, front groups, and dark money
foundations pushing climate change denial” on a national level. Id. at ¶¶ 128, 131.
Following the State’s suit, two of the Defendants removed the case to federal court
under the “federal officer removal statute,” 28 U.S.C. § 1442, arguing the charged conduct
was carried out under “federal direction, supervision, and control” and in performance of
“critical and necessary functions for the U.S. military to further the national defense.”
1 Regarding the effects of climate change, the State alleges that Defendants have injured citizens
of Maine in numerous ways, including “sea level rise, storm surge, extreme high tides and
attendant flooding;” “damages to Maine’s fishing and aquaculture industries;” “dangerously hot
days and accompanying emergency room visits for heat-related illnesses; increased transmission
of vector-borne diseases; reduced air quality; and the cascading social, economic, health, and
other consequences of these environmental changes.” Id. at ¶ 250.
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ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19. On September 29, 2025, the District Court remanded the case to state
court, finding that Defendants had failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1) by failing to “establish any connection between the Defendants’ federally
directed activities and their deceptive marketing practices and failures to warn.” ECF No.
84 at 9.
The federal officer removal statute permits any federal officer, or anyone “acting
under” that officer, to remove to federal court a civil action “for or relating to any act under
color of such office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). To warrant removal under § 1442(a)(1), the
removing party must establish: “(1) that it was acting under a federal officer’s authority,
(2) that the charged conduct was carried out for or relating to the asserted official
authority, and (3) that it will assert a colorable federal defense to the suit.” Gov’t of P.R.
v. Express Scripts, Inc., 119 F.4th 174, 185 (1st Cir. 2024) (quotation modified). In the
Remand Order, the Court found that Defendants failed to satisfy the second “nexus”
requirement of the statute by failing to demonstrate that the charged conduct regarding
Defendants’ acts of deceiving Maine consumers and the public about climate change
related to Defendants’ asserted official authority. ECF No. 84 at 8–10. Accordingly, the
Court held the evidence provided by Defendants of newly asserted federal activities “does
not purport to establish any connection between the Defendants’ federally directed
activities and their deceptive marketing and failures to warn,” as alleged by the State. Id.
at 9.2 The Court further granted the State’s request to recover costs and expenses under
2 The decision to remand rested primarily on Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C., 979 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2020), judgment vacated on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 2666 (2021) (mem.) (“Rhode
Island I”). In Rhode Island I, the State sued numerous oil companies, including several of the
same companies in the instant case, based on Defendants’ “misinformation” and “antiscience”
campaigns regarding the effects of climate change and their fossil fuel production activities. Id. at
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28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), finding that the Defendants’ basis for removal and federal jurisdiction
was improper. Id. at 15.3
Defendants now move for a stay of the Remand Order pending their appeal,
arguing that a stay would both preserve the meaningfulness of Defendants’ appellate
rights and prevent the inefficiencies of simultaneous litigation in multiple forums. See
ECF No. 90 at 1. In response, the State contends that Defendants cannot demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal, as prevailing would require the First
Circuit to overturn their own binding precedent and “depart from the unanimous
decisions from the courts of appeals across the country.” ECF No. 91 at 4. Defendants
further move to amend the prior judgment and deny the award of costs and expenses to
the State under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), arguing that the prior decision to award such fees
constitutes a manifest error of law. ECF No. 89 at 2.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Stay Execution of Remand
A stay of an order pending appeal is an “intrusion into the ordinary processes of
administration and judicial review” and thus relief is not granted as “a matter of right.”
Rhode Island v. Trump, 155 F.4th 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting New York v. Trump, 133
F.4th 51, 65 (1st Cir. 2025)). To obtain a stay pending appeal, courts consider four factors:
54, 60. Following Defendants’ removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the First
Circuit affirmed the district court’s subsequent remand to state court, holding there was “simply
no nexus” between the charged conduct of misinformation alleged by Rhode Island and “anything
the oil companies allegedly did at the behest of a federal officer.” Id. at 60.
3 In reaching this holding, the Court noted that “because federal officer removal is a complex and
evolving area of law,” the question of fees was a “close call.” ECF No. 84 at 15. However, the Court
also noted that “Defendants are highly resourced parties with highly skilled lawyers representing
them” who “presented slightly—and cleverly—revised versions of the same removal arguments,”
which have been unanimously rejected by federal courts across the country. Id. Accordingly, the
Court found it appropriate for the State to recover reasonable costs and expenses it incurred
because of Defendants’ “improper removal.” Id.
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“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;
and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (quoting
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). The first two factors—likelihood of success
and irreparable injury—“are the most critical.” Id. at 434.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Defendants contend they will succeed on appeal because they assert the Court
erred when determining the “nexus” requirement of the federal officer removal statute by
considering “only whether particular conduct that was the focus of Plaintiff’s briefing—
not Plaintiff’s lawsuit as a whole—related to acts Defendants undertook at the direction
of federal officers.” ECF No. 91 at 4. Instead, Defendants assert the proper scope of the
nexus inquiry is to consider the alleged injuries and requested relief stemming from the
conduct charged by Plaintiff, that is, the Defendants’ alleged acts of deceiving consumers
and the public about climate change. See id. at 4–5. Defendants further argue that the
Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Plaquemines Parish will provide a definitive
standard for the “relating to” prong of the nexus requirement of the federal officer
removal statute. Id. at 5; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, La., No. 24-
813 (U.S.), cert. granted, 2025 WL 1678985 (June 16, 2025).
However, aside from referencing the forthcoming Supreme Court decision and
reiterating that federal officer removal is a “complex and evolving” area of law,
Defendants make no attempt to distinguish this case from the First Circuit’s holdings in
Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C., 979 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2020), judgment
vacated on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 2666 (2021) (mem.) (“Rhode Island I”), and Rhode
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Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C., 35 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2022) (“Rhode Island II”), which
each squarely support remand and, as such, make appellate success unlikely. As explained
in greater detail in the Remand Order, the First Circuit in Rhode Island I concluded there
was “simply no nexus” between the charged conduct of the defendant oil companies’
“misinformation campaign about the harmful effects of their products” as alleged by
Rhode Island and “anything the oil companies allegedly did at the behest of a federal
officer.” Rhode Island I, 979 F.3d at 60.4 Because the conduct alleged by the State here is
nearly identical to the conduct at issue in the Rhode Island line of cases and because
Defendants have not provided any reason to believe it is likely the First Circuit would
overturn both prior decisions directly on point, they have failed to demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal.
The fact that there may be a forthcoming Supreme Court decision in Plaquemines
Parish does not alter this analysis. The Defendants have offered speculation built upon
speculation, guessing not only how the Supreme Court might rule, but how the First
Circuit might later interpret it. See ECF No. 90 at 6 (“If the Supreme Court agrees with . . .
petitioners’ arguments, this Court’s analysis . . . would need to be revisited.”); id.
(“Plaquemines Parish may clarify how to conduct the nexus analysis.”); id. at 7 (“Here,
the First Circuit may agree with . . . petitioner’s arguments or [may] be guided by a
decision from the Supreme Court.”) (emphasis added)). Indeed, even if the Supreme
Court adopts the petitioners’ position in Plaquemines Parish, the resulting decision
would not be “directly relevant” here. In Plaquemines Parish, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
4 In Rhode Island II, following remand from the Supreme Court, the First Circuit reviewed
numerous other grounds raised by defendants for removal, but affirmed its prior reasoning in
Rhode Island I regarding federal officer removal for Defendants’ alleged misinformation
campaign on the effects of climate change. See Rhode Island II, 35 F.4th at 53 n.6.
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remand of the case to state court after holding that petitioners’ wartime crude oil
production was “unrelated” to the contractually mandated refining of that oil into aviation
gasoline (“avgas”) in part because the operative government contract did not contain any
explicit directive pertaining to petitioners’ crude oil production. See Plaquemines Parish
v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 103 F.4th 324, 337–39 (5th Cir. 2024). While the petitioners now
advocate before the Supreme Court for a broader “connected or associated” nexus
standard, see ECF No. 90 at 6–7, that standard is functionally identical to the one already
applied in the Remand Order. See ECF No. 84 at 7 (noting a defendant satisfies the nexus
requirement by showing the “charged conduct” shares a “connection or association with
the asserted federally directed activities” (quotation modified)).
Unlike the Fifth Circuit’s holding, the decision to remand here did not hinge on the
absence of an explicit federal directive to engage in the charged conduct. Furthermore,
Plaquemines Parish is fundamentally distinguishable because the plaintiffs there sought
to impose liability based on oil production activities, rather than the deceptive conduct
and misinformation alleged by the State here. To demonstrate a likelihood of success,
“‘[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be better than negligible.’”
Bos. Parent Coal. for Acad. Excellence Corp. v. Sch. Comm. of City of Bos., 996 F.3d 37,
44 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). Accordingly, the Defendants have
failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal.
B. Irreparable Injury
Defendants next contend that, absent a stay of the Remand Order, they will suffer
irreparable harm by being forced to litigate their federal appeal simultaneously with state
court proceedings. See ECF No. 90 at 8–10. Defendants maintain the dual-track litigation
resulting from the denial of a stay creates a “concrete and substantial potential for
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inconsistent outcomes” between the federal and state court proceedings. Id. at 9
(quotation modified). Specifically, they argue if the First Circuit eventually determines
removal was proper, the need to reconcile the state court record would create a “rat’s nest
of comity and federalism issues” for this Court to untangle. Id. (citing Northrop
Grumman Tech. Servs., Inc. v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, No. 1:16-cv-534, 2016 WL 3346439,
at *4 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2016). In response, the State posits the Defendants’ alleged harm
of simultaneous litigation in two forums is “illusory” and does not constitute irreparable
injury. ECF No. 91 at 8.
The Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. The First Circuit has repeatedly
reversed remand orders while parallel state court proceedings were ongoing without
issue, noting the “long and storied history of comity and cooperation between state and
federal courts in this circuit.” Forty Six Hundred LLC v. Cadence Educ., LLC, 15 F.4th 70,
81 (1st Cir. 2021); see also Girouard v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 19-1197, 2022 WL
4592893, at *1 (1st Cir. Mar. 4, 2022). Although no formal procedural mechanism exists
to return a wrongly remanded case to federal court, the First Circuit has expressed full
confidence that, should the case not have been remanded, the district court can “enlist
the state court’s cooperation and restore the action to its own docket.” New Hampshire
v. 3M Co., 132 F.4th 556, 559 (1st Cir. 2025) (quotation modified). Should the First Circuit
determine the Remand Order was indeed issued in error, this Court is well-equipped to
retrieve the case and resolve any resulting legal complexities.
Furthermore, Defendants’ reliance on Providence Journal Co. v. FBI to argue “the
denial of a stay will utterly destroy the status quo, irreparably harming appellants” is
misplaced. 595 F.2d 889, 890 (1st Cir. 1979). In Providence Journal Co., a stay was
necessary because the surrender of confidential documents would have rendered the
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appeal moot; once confidentiality is lost, it is “lost for all time.” Id. Defendants face no
such irreversible consequence here. Litigation in two forums is a common consequence
of the removal statutes and does not constitute irreparable harm. See, e.g., City of Chi. v.
BP P.L.C., No. 24-cv-02496, 2025 WL 3089140, slip op. at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2025)
(noting that appellants challenging remand orders invariably litigate in two forums until
the appeal is resolved). Finally, a party is “not, of course, entitled to a stay pending appeal
without showing that their appeals have potential merit.” Providence Journal, 595 F.2d
at 890. Considering Defendants have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits, their claim of irreparable harm must also fail.
C. Injury to Plaintiff and Public Interest
Because the State is the opposing party, the third and fourth factors—harm to the
opposing party and the public interest—merge. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. Both factors
here weigh heavily against the issuance of a stay. As the State notes, further staying these
proceedings—which were initiated over a year ago—inflicts continued injury to the State
by delaying the resolution of its claims. Moreover, the public interest favors denying a
stay. A stay would continue to impede Maine’s ability to utilize the judicial system to
address and mitigate the calamitous effects of climate change alleged in the State’s
complaint. ECF No. 90 at 11; see ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 270, 404–19. Any potential procedural
inconvenience to the Defendants is significantly outweighed by the State’s and the public’s
interest in a timely adjudication of the complaint. Accordingly, having failed to establish
the four factors required for a stay pending appeal, the Defendants’ motion is denied.
II. 	Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
“The granting of a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.” Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006)
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(quotation modified). To secure relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),5 a
party must demonstrate either that previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that
the original judgment was premised on a manifest error of law or fact. See Ira Green, Inc.
v. Mil. Sales & Serv. Co., 775 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2014). Crucially, a Rule 59(e) motion
does not allow a movant to introduce evidence that was previously available. Mancini v
City of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 48 (1st Cir. 2018). Additionally, a party
may not use a motion to alter or amend judgment to “raise arguments which could, and
should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc.
v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, N.A., 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1990).
Defendants seek to alter or amend the award of fees to the State under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). Attorneys’ fees may be awarded under § 1447(c) where the removing party
“lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap.
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Defendants argue the award of fees to the State
constitutes a manifest error of law, asserting the Supreme Court’s decision to grant
certiorari in Plaquemines Parish “belies the notion that Defendants lacked an objectively
reasonable basis for removing on those grounds here.” ECF No. 89 at 5. Defendants
further maintain their decision to remove was reasonable because they presented
evidence regarding federal activities that was not considered by other courts previously
rejecting similar removal arguments. See id. at 3. In response, the State maintains that
the Court already considered the evidence raised by Defendants and found it established
no connection between the Defendants’ federally directed activities and their deceptive
marketing conduct charged in this lawsuit. ECF No. 92 at 4 (citing the Remand Order,
5 “A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
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ECF No. 84 at 15). The State further reiterates the irrelevance of Plaquemines Parish to
the instant case and argues the decision will have no bearing on the validity of Defendants’
decision to remove, nor provide any basis to conclude that Defendants had objectively
reasonable grounds to believe removal was appropriate. Id. at 4–5.
I find Defendants have not satisfied the high burden required to justify the
“extraordinary remedy” they seek under Rule 59(e). In the order awarding fees, the Court
noted 	that 	“Defendants 	are 	highly 	resourced 	parties 	with 	highly 	skilled 	lawyers
representing them” who “have presented slightly—and cleverly—revised versions of the
same removal arguments to at least a dozen federal courts across the country,” all of which
“have unanimously rejected the Defendants’ arguments and instead have granted
remand.” ECF No. 84 at 15. For similar reasons stated in the analysis of the motion to
stay, the award of fees to the State does not constitute a manifest error of law. Federal
case law across the country, including the First Circuit, is unambiguously clear:
Defendants’ removal arguments regarding their alleged misinformation and deceptive
conduct are without merit. See id. at 10 n.5 (collecting cases rejecting similar removal
arguments raised by Defendants here).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Plaquemines Parish does
not establish that Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal. As
discussed above, the legal issues and conduct alleged in that case are fundamentally
distinct from the misinformation-based conduct and claims at issue in this litigation. A
defendant seeking removal on grounds already rejected by the First Circuit—thereby
delaying litigation on the underlying complaint—is precisely the conduct § 1447(c) is
intended to address. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to alter or amend the prior
judgment is likewise denied.
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III. 	Application for Fees and Litigation Expenses
In granting the State’s request for fees and litigation expenses under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c), the Court ordered parties “to confer and attempt to reach an agreement on the
amount of costs and expenses” by October 24, 2025. ECF No. 84 at 15. If the parties were
unable to reach an agreement by that date, the Court ordered the State to “file an
application with this Court by November 21, 2025, specifying all costs and expenses
incurred and providing supporting documentation of the requested amount.” Id. The
State has filed its application, requesting $349,090.00 in fees and $2,826.59 in litigation
expenses. ECF No. 95-1 at 10. In response, Defendants assert the State’s request for fees
constitutes a “grossly excessive and unreasonable demand” and argue the State has failed
to explain why specialized out-of-state counsel and numerous in-state attorneys and
paralegals were necessary to challenge their decision to remove. ECF No. 98 at 3. For the
reasons stated above in the denial of Defendants’ motion to alter or amend judgment, I
find the State’s request for fees and expenses is reasonable and justified by the record.
The presumptive reasonable fee award is measured under the “lodestar method”
by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of attorney hours reasonably
expended on the litigation effort. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551
(2010); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Pérez-Sosa v. Garland, 22 F.4th
312, 321 (1st Cir. 2022). “The party seeking the award has the burden of producing
materials that support the request,” including “contemporaneous time and billing
records,” Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011), in addition to
evidence of the “prevailing rates in the community for comparably qualified attorneys,”
United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 847 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1988). In considering the
State’s evidence in support of its lodestar calculation and total fees and expenses sought,
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I am mindful that “[f]lexibility is a hallmark of the lodestar approach,” Matalon v.
Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 639 (1st Cir. 2015), and that the First Circuit has “refrained from
prescribing hard and fast rules for fee awards in order to ensure that district courts are
not left to drown in a rising tide of fee-generated minutiae,” id. (quotation modified). The
goal is not “auditing perfection” and the district court “may use estimates” in reaching a
reasonable fee award. Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 322 (quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838
(2011)). Nonetheless, “the order awarding fees . . . must expose the district court’s thought
process and show the method and manner underlying its decisional calculus.” Coutin v.
Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1997).
In support of its motion, the State has provided the Court with explanations and
rationales for each category of fee and expense sought as a result of Defendants’ removal
to federal court. For example, the State has sufficiently explained its need for hiring out-
of-state counsel to challenge Defendants’ removal, noting “(1) the State has limited
resources and lacks expertise in this type of litigation; (2) Defendants are extremely well-
resourced, litigious, and each is represented by multiple firms . . . ; and (3) there is no
firm in Maine with comparable expertise or experience” to out-of-state firms retained by
the State in conjunction with this litigation. ECF No. 95 at 2. Additionally, the State has
provided documentation regarding the local rates for State attorneys and the out-of-state
counsels’ rates. See id. at 4–6. Finally, the State has detailed its good-faith effort to
exclude 	from 	its 	fee 	request 	“hours 	that 	are 	excessive, 	redundant, 	or 	otherwise
unnecessary.” Id. at 8 (quoting Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. Supp. 804,
811 (D. Me. 1992); see id. at 9 (“Time entries were eliminated when they were not
exclusive to removal and remand, when attorneys performed administrative tasks to
assist paralegal staff, and when entries were otherwise vague or unclear. All three firms
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made efforts to cost-effectively staff the removal and remand litigation by utilizing
associates with lower billing rates, limiting partner review where feasible, and removing
duplicative time entries.” (quotation modified). I therefore find that the State’s requested
amount of fees and expenses is the product of “the number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Pérez-Sosa, 22 F.4th at 321.
Defendants object to the State’s calculation of fees and expenses as “grossly
excessive and unreasonable,” ECF No. 98 at 4, primarily on the basis that the Court’s
order granting the award of the fees was based in part on the premise that Defendants
had “recycl[ed] the same arguments repeatedly rejected by other courts,” ECF No. 84 at
15. Because the State’s counsel has appeared in many of these cases and thus has extensive
experience briefing the issues raised by Defendants’ removal, Defendants argue the State
has not met its burden of proof nor engaged in a good-faith effort to exclude all redundant
and unnecessary time entries from its calculation of fees and expenses. See ECF No. 98 at
4, 6–7. Defendants argue the Court should reduce the State’s requested fees by 25% as it
was “entirely unnecessary to use three separate law firms to prepare the remand briefing,
particularly given the Plaintiff’s primary argument for fees . . . was that these issues have
been extensively litigated . . . and decided multiple times before.” Id. at 9.
For the reasons already described at length by this Court and others, I find dubious
Defendants’ argument regarding the reasonableness or necessity of the State’s efforts to
challenge their decision to remove. Defendants cannot be allowed to remove this case to
federal court, on improper grounds, forcing the State to expend time and resources
challenging the Defendants’ removal, and then back the State into a corner by arguing its
efforts to retain counsel to adequately prepare, brief, and respond to Defendants’
arguments was somehow unnecessary or unreasonable. The fee-shifting provision
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contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) exists to deter or sanction conduct such as Defendants’
conduct before this Court now. Accordingly, I find the State is entitled to fees and
expenses equaling the product of a reasonable number of hours expended on this case at
a reasonable hourly rate, which the State has sufficiently enumerated.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Execution of the Remand
Order Pending Appeal, ECF No. 90, and Defendants’ Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment, ECF N0. 89, are DENIED. Additionally, the State’s Motion for Fees and
Litigation Expenses, ECF No. 95, is GRANTED, and I award the State costs totaling
$349,090.00 in fees and $2,826.59 in expenses.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 9th day of January, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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