KAMIN v. SN SERVICING CORPORATION

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MARCY KAMIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SN SERVICING CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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2:25-cv-00499-SDN
ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND
Before me is Plaintiff Marcy Kamin’s Motion to Remand this case to state court.
ECF No. 9. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
I. 	Factual Background1 and Procedural Posture
In August 2025, Ms. Kamin sued Defendant SN Servicing Corporation (“SN
Servicing”) in Cumberland County Superior Court. See ECF Nos. 1 at 2, 1-1. Ms. Kamin,
on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated borrowers, alleges SN Servicing violated
the Maine Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 32 M.R.S. § 11001 et seq., and breached
Maine’s mortgage servicer duty of good faith, 14 M.R.S. § 6113.2 See ECF No. 1-1. These
allegations stem from Ms. Kamin’s 2015 bankruptcy discharge of her mortgage debt and
SN Servicing’s purported subsequent systematic practice of pursuing improper deficiency
judgments, charging post-foreclosure late fees, and issuing false statements to discharged
borrowers. See id. at 7–15.
1 These facts are drawn from the Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, and the parties’ filings at ECF Nos. 1, 9, 12, 13.
2 While the Complaint and subsequent filings refer to Maine’s mortgage servicer duty of good faith statute
as “9-A M.R.S. § 6113,” the provision at issue is “14 M.R.S. § 6113.” See 14 M.R.S. § 6113.
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In September 2025, SN Servicing timely removed the case to this Court based on
diversity jurisdiction, contending complete diversity of citizenship exists between the
parties and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. See ECF No.
1 at 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In October 2025, Ms. Kamin filed a motion to remand,
arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy
does not exceed the jurisdictional minimum and SN Servicing, by omitting its principal
place of business from its Notice of Removal, insufficiently pleaded corporate citizenship
for diversity purposes. See ECF No. 9 at 2–3.
II. 	Discussion
On a motion to remand, courts consider whether removal was appropriate.
Removal is appropriate only where the case originally could have been brought in federal
court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and ordinarily
may only hear cases involving a federal question or diversity of citizenship. See id. §§ 1331,
1332; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (federal courts
“possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”). Here, SN Servicing
premises removal on diversity jurisdiction, which requires the parties be “citizens of
different states” and the amount in controversy to exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
A corporation is deemed a citizen of: (1) every state in which it is incorporated; and
(2) the state where it has its principal place of business. Id. § 1332(c). In its response to
Ms. Kamin’s Motion to Remand, SN Servicing identified its principal place of business as
Louisiana, thereby adequately alleging corporate citizenship. See ECF No. 12 at 3. Because
SN Servicing is an Alaskan corporation with a principal place of business in Louisiana and
Ms. Kamin is a citizen of Maine, the parties are “citizens of different states.” See id.; 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c). Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction hinges on whether the amount
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in controversy is satisfied. As the removing party, the burden is on SN Servicing to
“establish the requisite amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Finley v. George Weston Bakeries Distrib., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D. Me. 2007)
(collecting cases applying the preponderance standard); see Violette v. Interbake Foods,
LLC, No. 1:22-CV-00052, 2022 WL 1590772, at *2 (D. Me. May 19, 2022) (“[D]istrict
courts in this circuit . . . ‘require[] the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence’ that the 	amount 	in 	controversy 	exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.”)
(quoting Doughty v. Hyster New England, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 217, 219 (D. Me. 2004)).
Because this is a putative class action, the amount in controversy for jurisdictional
purposes must be established by a single plaintiff and cannot be aggregated across the
class. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969). Further, “when a statute mandates
or allows payment of [attorney’s] fees,” such fees may be included as part of the amount-
in-controversy determination but are calculated only in regard to the named plaintiff’s
fees and may not be aggregated across class members. Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001).
Here, Ms. Kamin seeks actual and statutory damages and attorney’s fees under
both 32 M.R.S. § 11054 and 14 M.R.S. § 6113. See ECF No. 1-1 at 16–17. Each statute allows
for actual damages for emotional distress, out-of-pocket expenses, informational injury,
time lost, and opportunity costs. See 32 M.R.S. § 11054(1)(A); 14 M.R.S. § 6113(4)(A).
Similarly, 	both 	statutes 	specifically 	provide 	for 	attorney’s 	fees. 	See 	32 	M.R.S. 	§
11054(1)(D); 14 M.R.S. § 6113(4)(C). Turning first to statutory damages under 32 M.R.S.
§ 11054, the Maine Fair Debt Collection Practices act permits, in the case of a class action,
“[s]uch amount for each named plaintiff as may be recovered” for actual damages and
“[s]uch amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a
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minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 and 1% of the net
worth of the debt collector.” 32 M.R.S. § 11054(1)(C). Shifting to statutory damages under
14 M.R.S. § 6113, recovery is permitted for up to “$15,000 for a pattern or practice of the
mortgage servicer’s violating the duty of good faith.” 14 M.R.S. § 6113(4)(B).
Based on this requested relief, Ms. Kamin, the named plaintiff, contends the
amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. ECF No. 9 at 2. She correctly notes the
Court assesses the amount in controversy based on her individual claims for damages and
argues SN Servicing has failed to demonstrate how her relatively modest statutory claims
satisfy the jurisdictional threshold. Id. SN Servicing responds that the amount in
controversy is met because Ms. Kamin “is seeking statutory damages under 32 M.R.S.A.
§ 11054 of the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the [company’s] value,” which it asserts exceeds
$75,000. ECF Nos. 12 at 4, 12-1 at 1. This argument is incorrect.
SN Servicing seemingly rests removal solely on the statutory damages available in
class actions under 32 M.R.S. § 11054, improperly attributing to the named plaintiff
damages that are available only to the other class members. Under the statute, the
amount equal to the “lesser of $500,000 and 1% of the net worth of the debt buyer” is
recoverable by “all other class members,” while the named plaintiff is entitled only to
actual damages. 32 M.R.S. § 11054(1)(C) (emphasis added). SN Servicing does not address
the amount of actual damages or attorney’s fees Ms. Kamin seeks.
Ms. Kamin’s pleadings assert only that the “modest” amounts recoverable under
each statute do not permit an amount-in-controversy determination exceeding the
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold. See ECF No. 9 at 2, 13 at 1. On the record before me, SN
Servicing has not met its burden to show the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See
Sabina v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, No. 2:14-CV-160, 2014 WL 5489447, at *4 (D. Me.
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Oct. 29, 2014) (analyzing the amount in controversy in a class action context and
explaining 	the 	“controlling 	question 	. 	. 	. 	is 	whether 	such 	a 	result 	is
reasonably probable, not merely possible” (quotation modified)).
Because SN Servicing failed to meet its burden of establishing the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000, this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the case and must remand. See id. (“When the existence of
jurisdiction is ambiguous, the limited nature of federal jurisdiction calls upon me to
resolve the ambiguity in favor of remand.”).
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Kamin’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 9, is
GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is hereby REMANDED to the state court from which
it was removed.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 21st day of January, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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