POWELL v. POWELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SARAH LEYLA POWELL, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00641-JAW
)
ADRIAN MAURICE POWELL, JR., 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES, COSTS, AND TRAVEL
EXPENSE
In this international custody dispute over two minor children under the Hague
Convention, the court granted a mother’s petition for an order allowing her to return
to Germany with her children and for enforcement of the custody order of a German
court. Having prevailed, the mother moves for the court to order that the respondent,
her former husband and father of the children, pay attorney’s fees, costs, and travel
expenses. Finding that the treaty provides that a prevailing petitioner is entitled to
attorney’s fees and costs, the court grants the motion, reducing only the request for
expert witness reimbursement.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 22, 2025, Petitioner Sarah Leyla Powell initiated this action
pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986), as implemented
by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9011
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(formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601 et seq.). Verified Pet. for Return of Children to Germany
and for Issuance of Show Cause Order (ECF No. 1) (Pet.).
Ms. Powell filed her verified petition requesting an order directing the return
of her two minor children (the children), N.P. and Z.P. to Germany, Pet., and asked
for expedited consideration of the petition and the issuance of an order to show cause
against 	the 	Respondent 	Adrian 	Maurice 	Powell, 	Jr. 	See 	Mot. 	for 	Expedited
Consideration of Verified Pet. for Return of Children to Germany and Issuance of
Show Cause Order (ECF No. 3).
On January 16, 2026, the Petitioner filed her trial brief, Pet’r’s Pre-Hearing
Brief (ECF No. 26), and on January 16, 2026, the Respondent filed his answer, Resp’t’s
Answer 	and 	Affirmative 	Defenses 	(ECF 	No. 	27), 	his 	amended 	answer 	and
counterclaim 	for 	reasonable 	attorney’s 	fees 	and 	costs, 	Resp’t’s 	Am. 	Answer,
Affirmative Defenses (ECF No. 28), and his trial brief. 	Resp’t’s Pre-Hearing Brief
(ECF No. 29). 	The Petitioner opposed Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees and
costs arguing that ICARA only provides an award of fees to prevailing petitioners.
Answer to Countercl. at 1 n.1 (ECF No. 31).
The Court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on January 22-23, 2026,
after which the parties filed post hearing briefs and responses, labeled as replies, but
the Court did not allow further reply. Min. Entry (ECF No. 50); Min. Entry (ECF No.
52); Resp’t’s Post-Trial Brief (ECF No. 60); Pet’r’s Post-Trial Brief (ECF No. 61); Pet’r’s
Reply to Resp’t’s Post-Trial Brief (ECF No. 62); Resp’t’s Reply Brief (ECF No. 63).
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On March 2, 2026, the Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
granting the petition and ordering the children to return to Germany, Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF No. 74). That same day, the Petitioner
collected her children’s passports from the Clerk, Receipt for Return of Passport (ECF
No. 67), and on March 4, 2026, the Clerk entered judgment on behalf of the Petitioner.
J. (ECF No. 68).
Before the Court is the Petitioner’s March 9, 2026 motion for attorney’s fees,
costs, and travel expenses, Mot. for Att’y’s Fees, Costs and Travel Expense (ECF No.
69) (Pet’r’s Mot.), which Petitioner submitted alongside the declarations of her
attorney, Bradley Morin, id., Attach. 1, Decl. of Bradley C. Morin Regarding Att’y Fees
and Costs (Morin Decl.), and herself. 	Id., Attach. 2, Decl. of Sarah Leyla Powell
(Powell Decl.). 	On March 23, 2026, the Respondent objected. 	Resp’t’s Obj. to Pet’r’s
Mot. for Att’y Fees, Costs and Travel (ECF No. 70) (Resp’t’s Opp’n.). 	On March 30,
2026, the Petitioner replied. 	Pet’r’s Reply to Resp’t’s Opp’n to Mot. for Att’y’s Fees,
Costs and Travel Expense (ECF No. 71) (Pet’r’s Reply).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	The Petitioner’s Motion
Citing 	the 	provision 	of 	ICARA 	stating 	that 	a 	prevailing 	petitioner 	is
presumptively 	entitled 	to 	fees, 	the 	Petitioner 	moves 	this 	Court 	to 	order 	the
Respondent to pay her attorney’s fees and costs along with travel expenses and costs
for her expert witness. 	Pet’r’s Mot. at 1. 	“Petitioner has submitted an affidavit of
counsel and itemization of attorney’s fees and costs to enable the Court to determine
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a reasonable fee award” based on the lodestar—the product of the number of hours
worked and a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 2.
B. 	The Respondent’s Opposition
The 	Respondent 	asks 	the 	Court 	to 	deny 	the 	Petitioner’s 	request 	or,
alternatively, significantly reduce the award. 	Resp’t’s Opp’n at 5. 	He argues that
while ICARA provides that “a prevailing petitioner is presumptively entitled to fees,
that presumption is expressly limited by equitable considerations, and courts retain
broad discretion to reduce or deny an award where equity requires.” Id. at 1 (citing
caselaw). The Respondent asks the Court to reduce the fee imposed because (1) the
Respondent lacks the ability to pay the requested amount due to changed financial
circumstances; (2) the Respondent acted in good faith; (3) the Respondent was
motivated by concern for the children; and (4) the amount requested is excessive. Id.
at 2-4
C. 	The Petitioner’s Reply
The Petitioner argues that the Respondent has not made the case to avoid
mandatory 	fee 	shifting 	under 	ICARA 	nor 	adequately 	demonstrated—through
affidavits or finance statements—that the award amount is clearly inappropriate.
Pet’r’s Reply at 1. 	In addition to challenging the Respondent’s ability to pay, she
challenges Respondent’s “good faith” assertion, arguing that Respondent “withheld
the children’s passports from Leyla with the specific intent of preventing her return
to Germany.” 	Id. at 4. 	Further, the Petitioner maintains that the fees were not
excessive or unreasonable and, further, that the Respondent failed to articulate what
aspect of the fees he disputed. Id. at 4-5.
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III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under ICARA’s fee-shifting provision, when a petitioner prevails, ICARA
declares the Court:
shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on
behalf of the petitioner, including court costs, legal fees, foster home or
other 	care 	during 	the 	course 	of 	proceedings 	in 	the 	action, 	and
transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the
respondent establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate.
22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). 	The purposes underlying the fee-shifting provisions “are to
restore the applicant to the financial position he or she would have been in had there
been no removal or retention, as well as to deter” wrongful removal or retention “in
the first place.” 	Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,511 (Mar. 26, 1986).
Courts 	evaluate 	two 	issues: 	“first, 	whether 	the 	claimed 	expenses 	are
‘necessary,’ and second, whether an order against the respondent would be ‘clearly
inappropriate.’” De Souza v. Negri, No. CIV.A. 14-13788-DJC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19802, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2015) (citing Whallon v. Lynn, No. 00-cv-11009-RWZ,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6501, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2003)). The burden of proof to
establish necessity is upon the Petitioner, while the Respondent has the burden to
prove the award is clearly inappropriate. Id.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
The Court addresses the necessity of Petitioner’s proposed attorney’s fees and
expenses and then determines whether the Respondent has shown that the award is
“clearly inappropriate.”
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A. 	The Petitioner’s Proposed Attorney’s Fees, Litigation Expenses,
Travel Expenses, and Expert Expenses
1. 	Attorney’s Fees
a. 	Reasonable Hourly Rate and Hours Expended
Attorney’s fees must be reasonable. 	Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986). 	To calculate a reasonable award,
federal courts use the “lodestar” method—multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by
the reasonable number of hours expended on litigation. Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v.
Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983)). It is the duty of the Petitioner to demonstrate that the fees are reasonable,
supported by documentation like affidavits, invoices, and verifications that the
proposed hourly rate is reasonable. Id.
The Petitioner requests $59,581.00 in legal fees and $1,735.24 in costs related
to the Hague Convention proceedings for a total of $61,316.24 in legal fees and costs.
Morin Decl. ¶ 11. 	Attorney Morin, who has practiced law since 2006, billed 139.5
hours at $295 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11. His partner, attorney Joshua Narey, who has
practiced law since 2025, billed 82.3 hours at $225 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 5, 11. Paralegal
services were billed at $120 per hour. Id. at ¶ 6.
Attorney Morin stated that he believes these rates to be reasonable, and
similar to rates for comparable work done for his clients and by other attorneys with
similar experience levels. Id. ¶ 7. Attorney Morin explained that though usually only
one attorney works on a case, he needed to enlist Attorney Narey given the expedited
timeline and lack of familiarity with the Hague Convention issues. 	Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
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Attorney Morin also explained the ways he cut billing: trying to charge only for one
attorney when two conferred; omitting copying costs; and offering a discounted rate
to prepare the motion for fees, costs, and expenses. Id. ¶ 12; Pet’r’s Mot. at 3 n.1.
Unlike some attorney’s fee disputes, there is no legitimate controversy about
the Petitioner’s attorneys’ hourly rates. As just noted, Attorney Morin filed his own
sworn declaration that his and Attorney Narey’s hourly rates are not only reasonable
but are commensurate with the hourly rates of other similarly experienced counsel
in his region. In his response, the Respondent did not challenge the hourly rates for
either Attorney Morin or Attorney Narey, and therefore the Court accepts the hourly
rates of both counsel as the first step in performing the lodestar analysis. TD Bank,
N.A. v. Estate of Woodman, No. 2:17-cv-00163-JAW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103940,
at *5 (D. Me. Jun. 21, 2019).
Proceeding to the next step under the lodestar analysis, the Court observes
that the Respondent made only a generalized objection to “extensive research,
drafting, 	and 	internal 	communications 	that 	go 	beyond 	what 	was 	reasonably
necessary to litigate a Hague Convention petition.” 	Resp’t’s Opp’n at 4. 	But Mr.
Powell offered no specifics and failed to object to any particular entry that he proposed
was unwarranted or excessive. He merely asserts that the “any fee award should be
substantially reduced.” Id.
In light of the Respondent’s nonspecific objections to the Petitioner’s attorney’s
fees, the Court performed its own independent review as to whether the bill contains
“necessary expenses incurred . . . during the course of proceedings.” 	22 U.S.C.
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§ 9007(b)(3). 	The Court finds that the Petitioner’s submitted attorney’s fees were
“necessary” and awards the fees in full.
b. 	Fees for Fees
“[T]he court has the obligation to determine whether the requested fees and
costs were ‘necessary’ to secure the children’s return.” 	Aldinger v. Segler, 157 F.
App’x 317, 318 (1st Cir. 2005). 	Beginning on March 4, 2026 and running though
March 8, 2026, there are several entries related to drafting the motion for fees and
reviewing bills, totaling to $420. 	Morin Decl. at 21. 	These charges—known as fees
for fees—occurred after the children were returned do not relate to the return of the
children.
Courts have disallowed fees incurred after the return of the children. See, e.g.,
Salvidar v. Rodela, 894 F. Supp. 2d 916, 938 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2012) (“The Court will
also disallow 0.6 hours spent by [Petitioner’s counsel] on certain tasks undertaken
after the child had been returned to Mexico”); Schwaneberg, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23263, at *5 (“Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees incurred defending the contempt motion
were not related to the return of [the child], who had been returned to South Korea
months prior”). 	In view of this restriction, the Court reviewed Bourque, Clegg,
Causey & Morin’s itemized bill and found no entries for substantive legal work on the
case after March 2, 2026 and therefore has not reduced the bill based on this issue.
As an exception to the general rule, courts have allowed for reasonable fees
after the children were returned for proceeding with a fee application by the
prevailing party. 	See e.g., Moss v. Moss (In re SKM), No. 13 CIV. 4167 (ALC), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207584, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2014) (stating “Courts have
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held that fees generated after the children had been returned are not recoverable
since they were not necessary for their return” but concluding that the time billed for
preparing the motion for costs is recoverable). 	This is consistent with the First
Circuit’s approval of fees for attorney’s fee application under other fee-shifting
statutes. 	See e.g. Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st Cir. 2008)
(allowing fees incurred in the pursuit of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Brewster v.
Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1993).
Some courts balk at awarding fees for pursuing attorney’s fees. 	As one court
has said of such charges, “it would be unreasonable to require Respondent to pay this
portion of the bill. 	The Court therefore excludes those hours from Petitioner’s
attorneys’ fee award.” Pacheco v. Martinez, No. 2:24-CV-02638-TLP-TMP, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 190318, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2025); Idkeidek v. Idkeidek, No. 2:25-
CV-02903-TLP-CGC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71479, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2026)
(same quote).
However other courts have allowed fees for fees but reduced what they
considered excessive awards. 	See e.g., Saldivar v. Rodela, 894 F. Supp. 2d 916, 939
(W.D. Tex. 2012) (reducing fees for fees by 64% and noting “the Court believes that
33.3 hours is excessive, and thus, the Court will award fees for fees for 12.0 hours”);
In re SKM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207584, at *15-16 	(awarding fees for fees but
“reduce[ing] the requested 35.6 hours spent preparing a motion for costs to 12 hours).
Similarly, courts have sometimes reduced the hourly rate counsel are allowed to
charge for preparing the application for attorney’s fees. 	Brewster, 3 F.3d at 494
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(“[B]ecause litigating a fee petition is typically an uncomplicated exercise, fees for
such work are often calculated at lower rates than those deemed reasonable for the
main litigation”).
Here, Attorney Morin anticipated the Brewster hourly rate reduction issue and
reduced their hourly rates to $100 for proceeding with the attorney’s fee application.
Pet’r’s Mot. at 3 n.1. By the Court’s calculation, Attorneys Morin and Narey spent 4.2
hours preparing the attorney’s fee petition. See Morin Decl. at 21 (entries from March
4, 2026 through March 8, 2026). The Court does not consider the $420 requested for
preparing the motion for fees excessive, especially considering that counsel charged
the Petitioner a reduced rate for $100 per hour. Pet’r’s Mot. at 3 n.1. In addition, Mr.
Powell has not specifically objected to the assessment of the fees related to the
attorney’s fee application.
2. 	Litigation Expenses
As for the $1,735.24 in costs related to the Hague Convention proceedings, the
Court awards the full amount. 	These fees include a filing fee, the cost of service of
process, a subpoena witness fee, a translation fee, a transcript fee, and parking fees.
Morin Decl. at 22. In other words, they are “courts costs” and “legal fees” associated
with the action. 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3).
3. 	Travel Expenses
The Petitioner submitted a declaration and supporting documentation showing
that she spent the equivalent of $2,481.89 on tickets to return with her children to
Germany. 	Powell Decl. ¶ 2. 	The Court awards this amount in full. 	See 22 U.S.C.
§ 9007(b)(3) (“Any court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an action brought
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under section [22 U.S.C. § 9003] shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses
incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including . . . transportation costs related
to the return of the child, unless the respondent establishes that such order would be
clearly inappropriate”). 	The award, on balance, both returns the Petitioner to the
financial position she would have been but for the Respondent’s wrongful retention
of the children and deters such conduct from happening again.
4. 	Expert Expenses
The Petitioner seeks $4,318.03 as compensation for the equivalent value, in
Euros, which she paid to her German attorney—Andreas Hanke—for his testimony
and preparation for the trial. 	Powell Decl. ¶ 4. Although there is no accompanying
invoice, the Petitioner claims that Attorney Hanke charged 300 euros per hour for
12.45 hours of work. Id.
However, the Court is not convinced, based on the record before it, that the
Petitioner has sustained her burden to prove necessity for the entire submitted fee.
Dr. Hanke’s compensation was discussed at length during the evidentiary hearing.
Tr. of Proceedings Volume I of II at 26:11-30:13 (ECF No. 56) (Tr. Vol. I). Dr. Hanke’s
testimony on his rate and total hours differs from what the Petitioner provides in her
declaration, supporting the motion. 	Compare Tr. Vol I at 26:11-30:13 (discussing a
rate and hours worked), with Powell Decl. (stating a different rate and more hours
worked). 	The Court is concerned that the 12.45 hours includes work beyond
testimony and preparation for the hearing held before this Court.
During 	the 	hearing, 	Dr. 	Hanke, 	mindful 	that 	German 	law 	considers
compensation privileged, hesitated to answer questions on compensation. 	The
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Respondent’s attorney first asked Dr. Hanke “[h]ow much have you charged the
petitioner for your services?” and Dr. Hanke answered “I think that falls under client-
attorney privilege.” Tr. Vol. I at 26:11-13.
After an exchange between the lawyers, the Respondent’s attorney narrowed
her question—excluding work for the Petitioner unrelated to his preparation and
testimony before the Court. 	The Respondent’s attorney explained that Rule 26
requires expert witnesses “to provide a statement of the compensation to be paid for
the study and testimony in this case” and while her initial “question was about all
funds charged to the petitioner for the services” she was willing to “revise [her]
question limited to compliance with FRCP 26.” 	Id. at 27:3-12. 	The Petitioner’s
attorney agreed that the original question concerned “all the work being done in
Germany.” 	Id. at 27:13-16. 	The Court made it clear, explaining “[t]he issue
here . . . is not what [Dr. Hanke] charged the client generally but only what [he is]
charging the client for preparation for this testimony as an expert and for [his]
testimony here today, which is different than the earlier question.” Id. at 27:19-28:3.
Dr. Hanke then testified about his rate,1 which he said was 350€ per hour plus
a 19% VAT.2 	Dr. Hanke explained that he worked a total of five hours and 20
minutes, prior to and in preparation for testifying. Id. 28:4-22; 29:23-30:4. Assuming
1 	In her motion, the Respondent explains that Dr. Hanke “ended up charging a lower hourly
rate than he testified at trial.” Pet’r’s Mot. at 3 n.3.
2 	The transcript says “VIT”, but the Court believes Dr. Hanke was referring to VAT or Value
Added Tax, which is assessed at a standard rate of 19%.
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that Dr. Hanke testified for close to 40 minutes, the Court rounds his total hours for
his testimony and preparation for trial to six.
However, in calculating her expert expenses, the Petitioner states that Dr.
Hanke charged her for 12.45 hours of work. Powell Decl. ¶ 4. In light of the exchange
during the hearing and Dr. Hanke’s testimony under oath before this Court, the Court
is concerned that the other approximately 6.45 hours charged to the Petitioner has to
do with other work he has done for her in Germany, which would not be chargeable
under the Hague Convention. At the 300€ per hour rate provided in the Petitioner’s
declaration, the Court concludes that for the six hours of preparation and testimony
related to his trial testimony, Dr. Hanke charged 1,800 Euros, the equivalent to
$2,080.98 at the relevant exchange rate. 	See Powell Decl. at 9 (exchange rate
provided).
B. 	Whether the Respondent has Shown That the Award is “Clearly
Inappropriate”
The Respondent has not met his burden to show that the award is “clearly
inappropriate.” 	Although 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has 	not 	addressed 	the 	“clearly
inappropriate” language, courts have identified circumstances that render the award
of fees “clearly inappropriate” under ICARA. See 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). “The first is
when a fee award imposes such financial hardship that it significantly impairs a
respondent’s 	ability 	to 	care 	for her children . . . [a]nd the 	second is 	when 	the
respondent had a good-faith belief that removing the children was lawful or otherwise
justified.” 	Pacheco, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190318 at *14 (citing cases). 	The
Respondent argues both here.
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First, the Respondent argues that “he does not have the financial ability to
satisfy such an award” and that his “financial circumstances have materially
declined, including a significant decrease in income following losing his business.”
Resp’t’s Opp’n at 2. 	In response, the Petitioner argues that his failure to produce
evidence on his ability to pay is alone a reason to deny him relief. Pet’r’s Reply at 1
(citing De Souza, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19802 at *10 (“[A]lthough their opposition to
de Souza’s motion is based largely upon their financial condition, they provide no
supporting documentation or evidence of same”). The Petitioner also argues that the
Respondent has a strong earning capacity in his insurance job. Pet’r’s Reply at 2.
Although the Court is sympathetic to the Respondent, his difficult financial
situation alone does not render the award inappropriate. 	See Gamboa v. Williams,
No. 4:24-cv-3020, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78479, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2025)
(“While 	the 	Court 	is 	sympathetic 	to 	Respondent’s 	financial 	difficulties, 	those
assertions 	alone—without 	any 	evidence 	that 	would 	render 	the 	award 	clearly
inappropriate—do not overcome the presumption that the award should be granted”).
Indeed, the twin aims of ICARA—to restore the Petitioner to the financial position
she would have been in had there been no wrongful retention and to deter such
wrongful retention in the first place—would be frustrated if the Court excused the
Respondent from a duty to pay on the mere assertion of financial difficulty. 	Kufner
v. Kufner, No. CIV.A. 07-046 S, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166615, at *7 (D.R.I. Feb. 3,
2010) (“Obviously, a finding that denies or substantially reduces an award of fees and
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costs to a party who prevails in establishing wrongful removal under ICARA does not
further either of these purposes”).
In addition, as the Court intimated at the hearing, the Court is impressed with
Mr. Powell. 	Although the parties did not introduce much background information
about Mr. Powell, he is a veteran, having served in the United States Air Force. Tr.
Vol. I at 72:2-5. Mr. Powell is entrepreneurial, having started an ice cream business
in Maine that, according to him, was bringing in “[a]round $20,000 every month.” Tr.
of Proceedings Vol. II of II at 224:7-10 (ECF No. 57) (Tr. Vol. II). Although he closed
the ice cream business, he has been selling life insurance and bringing in about
$3,400 per month. 	Id. at 224:11-14. 	In view of the Court’s favorable impression of
Mr. Powell’s abilities, he has not sustained his burden to demonstrate that an award
of attorney’s fees to Ms. Powell would be “clearly inappropriate.”
Second, the Respondent argues that he acted in good faith bringing his children
and the Petitioner to the United States. Resp’t’s Opp’n at 3. The Petitioner counters
that this Court’s order, returning the children to Germany, makes plain that the
Respondent “withheld the children’s passports from Leyla with the specific intent of
preventing her return to Germany with the children” and that “there was significant
power imbalance between” the Petitioner and the Respondent, with the Respondent
holding all the power. Pet’r’s Reply at 4. The Court agrees with the Petitioner—the
Respondent did not have a good faith belief that retaining the children’s passports
was permissible, especially considering he told the Court he intentionally did not
return the passports to prevent the Petitioner from taking the kids back to Germany.
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Tr. Vol. II at 260:4-11. 	That is, even if he acted in good faith and in the children’s
best interest in initially bringing them to the United States, he did not do so when
improperly retaining their passports.
Finally, 	the 	Respondent 	argues 	that 	the 	Petitioner’s 	requested 	relief 	is
excessive, including “impermissible block billing, and charges for litigation strategy
and duplication of effort, rather than work necessary to secure return under the
Hague Convention.” 	Resp’t’s Opp’n at 4. 	The Petitioner disagrees, emphasizing
instances where her attorneys struck charges and defended the amount of research
required to prepare the case. 	Pet’r’s Reply at 5. 	The Court reviewed Mr. Powell’s
general objections to the attorney’s fees and the itemized bill, and in the absence of
any specific objection, the Court concludes that Ms. Powell has sustained her burden
to establish that she is entitled to an order compelling Mr. Powell to pay the
submitted fees, and the Court further concludes that Mr. Powell has not sustained
his burden to demonstrate that the awarding of fees would be clearly inappropriate.
C. 	Summary
Although the Petitioner’s attorneys have not been paid, beyond a retainer,
Morin Decl. at ¶ 13, the statute provides that the attorneys for the prevailing party
must be paid for their time, research, advocacy, and incurred expenses. 	If the
Petitioner had the funds to pay the attorneys, perhaps she would have already paid
them and be seeking reimbursement from the Court. 	As it stands, the Petitioner
seeks reimbursement for the costs she herself incurred—the flights and the expert
counsel—and her attorneys seek reimbursement for their services rendered, directly
from the Respondent.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
The Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount
asserted, except for the total amount of the German attorney’s charges for expert
testimony. The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Petitioner’s motion
for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Travel Expense (ECF No. 69) and ORDERS the
Respondent to pay Petitioner a total of $65,879.11. This payment includes attorneys’
fees in the amount of $59,581.00, $1,735.24 in litigation expenses, $2,481.89 in travel
expenses, and $2,080.98 for the Petitioner’s expert. 	The Court denies only that
portion of the expert witness fees and expenses request as exceeds $2,080.98.
The Respondent shall make the attorney’s fee and litigation expenses award
payable to the Petitioner’s counsel. The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner directly
for the $2,481.89 in travel expenses and for the $2,080.98 in expert witness fees. Any
partial payment shall be made first to Ms. Powell, and, once her reimbursement
award has been fully satisfied, payments shall be made to Bourque, Clegg, Causey &
Morin, LLC.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 21st day of April, 2026
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