Bowman v. City of Flint et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DEANGELO BOWMAN,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 21-cv-12845
v. 	Honorable Linda V. Parker
TERRY VANKEUREN, JR. and
NOAH PILLSBURY,
Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS INTERVIEW
This civil rights action arises from Plaintiff Deangelo Bowman’s seizure and
arrest by City of Flint police officers on October 3, 2020. Remaining to be tried is
Mr. Bowman’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Officers Terry
Vankeuren, Jr. and Noah Pillsbury (collectively “Defendants”). The trial is set to
begin on December 9, 2025.
In the parties’ proposed Final Pretrial Order, Mr. Bowman objected to the
admissibility of evidence arising from an Internal Affairs (“IA”) investigation by
the City of Flint Police Department after Mr. Bowman filed a complaint with the
police department complaining about the subject incident. During that
investigation, Flint Police Department Lieutenant Ronald Dixon interviewed Mr.
Bowman. There is an audio recording and transcript of the interview. Mr.
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Bowman recently filed a “supplemental brief” concerning the admissibility of this
evidence, which is essentially a motion in limine.1 (See ECF No. 93.) Mr.
Bowman argues that his statements during the interview should not be admitted at
trial. (See id.)
Mr. Bowman contends that the statements constitute hearsay, which cannot
be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Mr. Bowman also contends that
Defendants should not be allowed to use his prior statements for impeachment
purposes because the statements’ “probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.” (Id. at PageID.1750 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).)
Mr. Bowman maintains that “[t]he IA interview is massively prejudicial to [him]”
because he “was not represented by counsel and was subject to a monumentally
biased interview by the employer of the instant Defendants at a City of Flint Police
Station.” (Id. at PageID.1750-71.) Further, Mr. Bowman argues, “he was never
Mirandized, advised that he could have counsel present, or that the interview
would later be used against him in civil litigation.” (Id. at PageID.1751.) With the
IA interview excluded, Mr. Bowman asks the Court to strike Lieutenant Dixon and
Flint Police Department Officer Chimene Hill as witnesses, as they were not
1 The parties’ deadline to file motions in limine was July 18, 2025. (See ECF No.
69.) While Mr. Bowman’s “motion” is untimely, the Court nevertheless will
address his challenge to this evidence to avoid an interruption during trial to
address it.
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present at the scene of the subject incident and their only involvement was with the
IA investigation.
In response, Defendants indicate that they already agreed not to introduce
the IA report, the audio of Mr. Bowman’s interview, or the transcript of the
interview at trial. (ECF No. 94 at PageID.1892.) Defendants agree not to mention
the IA investigation. (Id.) They have removed Officer Hill from their witness list
and plan to call Lieutenant Dixon only if necessary to impeach Mr. Bowman with
his statements during the IA interview. As a result, if Mr. Bowman’s previous
statements are used against him, the jury will not know that they were made as part
of an IA interview or investigation or that the investigation occurred. Defendants
argue that Mr. Bowman’s statements during the interview are admissible for
impeachment purposes if he testifies inconsistently at trial.2
Standard of Review
District courts have broad discretion over matters involving the admissibility
of evidence at trial. See United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 494 (6th Cir. 1991).
“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine
rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent
2 In their response brief, Defendants also indicate that Mr. Bowman’s statements,
made under oath during his plea hearing in the criminal matter arising from his
arrest, also are admissible for impeachment purposes. (ECF No. 94 at
PageID.1892.) As those statements are not the focus of Mr. Bowman’s brief, the
Court does not address their admissibility here.
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authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41
n.4 (1984). “A ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or
advisory, opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court.”
United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994). A court may therefore
alter its ruling during trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42. Motions in limine may
promote “evenhanded and expeditious management of trials by eliminating
evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Indiana Ins. Co. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Jonasson v. Lutheran
Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Discussion
The Federal Rules of Evidence preclude the admissibility of “[i]rrelevant
evidence[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 402. “The rules regarding relevancy, however, are
quite liberal.” Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1998). Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, “[e]vidence is relevant . . . if it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;
and . . . the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401
(emphasis added). The Court is not “permitted to consider the weight or
sufficiency of the evidence in determining relevancy and ‘even if [it] believes the
evidence is insufficient to prove the ultimate point for which it is offered, it may
not exclude the evidence if it has even the slightest probative worth.’” Robinson,
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149 F.3d at 512 (quoting Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir.
1992)).
Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Evidence is inadmissible if there is a
danger of unfair prejudice, not mere prejudice. See Robinson, 149 F.3d at 514-15
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 403). “Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn’t
material.” Id. at 515 (quoting Koloda v. Gen. Motors Parts Div., Gen. Motors
Corp., 716 F.2d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1983)) (additional citation omitted).
Hearsay also is generally inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. A witness’
prior, out-of-court, statement constitutes hearsay if it is offered for the truth of the
matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801. However, an opposing party’s statement
may be used against that party and is not hearsay if inter alia it “was made by the
party in an individual or representative capacity[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).3
To be admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A), the statements do not have to be
adverse to the party’s interests when made. Estate of Shafer v. C.I.R., 749 F.2d
3 The proponent must provide adequate proof to support a finding that the
statement was made by the party. See Cervetto v. Powell, No. 1:14CV-00075, 2016
WL 6582992, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2016) (quoting 5-801 Weinstein & Berger,
Weinstein’s Fed. Evid. § 801.30[3] (2016)). Lieutenant Dixon is the witness who
can authenticate the statements at issue.
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1216, 1219 n.3 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Mr. Bowman’s statements
during the IA interview are admissible under this rule.
The Court is not convinced that the statements, as a general matter, are
excludable under Rule 403 due to the circumstances under which they were made
(i.e., without Mr. Bowman being read his Miranda rights, without the assistance of
counsel, and without Mr. Bowman being advised that they could be used at a civil
trial). Mr. Bowman cites no caselaw suggesting that his statements to police are
inadmissible in this civil proceeding due to the lack of such warnings or
information. These warnings were established by the Supreme Court as a
“prophylactic measure” to be provided to persons—and then only persons “in
custody”— “to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self-
Incrimination Clause.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (citing
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467 (1966). The Fifth Amendment protects against the use of an
individual’s statements at only his or her criminal trial.4 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-
67. “Because this is a civil case, rather than a criminal prosecution of [Mr.
Bowman], the admission of [his] statements to the police in this case do not violate
the Fifth Amendment, regardless of any voluntariness or Miranda issues.” Alley v.
4 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
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Cnty. of Pima, No. CV-15-00152, 2024 WL 1908965, at *9 (D. Ariz. May 1, 2024)
(citing Chavez, 538 U.S. ta 766-73) (denying the plaintiff’s motion in limine to
exclude his non-Mirandized statements to the police after hotel fire in his § 1983
action alleging wrongful conviction for the murder of individuals killed in the fire);
see also Hughey v. Easlick, No. 19-10368, 2022 WL 15523071, at * (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 26, 2022) (allowing for the admission of police report containing the
plaintiff’s statements, which was prepared following the plaintiff’s arrest for
speeding, in her § 1983 action where she claimed the officers used excessive
force).
Mr. Bowman’s other asserted reasons for excluding his statements under
Rule 403 are vague and conclusory. The Court is uncertain what Mr. Bowman
means when he claims it was “a monumentally biased interview.” If he was
confused or misled by a question because of the way it was asked, he can explain
this to the jury at trial. If Mr. Bowman believes his answers need explanation or
clarification which he was not able to provide during the interview, his counsel can
provide him with the opportunity to do so at trial, as well.
For these reasons, the Court rejects Mr. Bowman’s request to preclude
Defendants from offering his IA interview statements against him at trial. As
Lieutenant Dixon is the appropriate witness to authenticate those statements, the
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Court will not strike him as a witness.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Linda V. Parker
LINDA V. PARKER
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: December 4, 2025
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