Jones v. Hood et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CORNELIUS JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES OVERTON HOOD, et
al.,
Defendants.
__________________________/
Case No. 24-11164
Terrence G. Berg
United States District Judge
Curtis Ivy, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND (ECF No. 49)
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s latest attempt to amend his
complaint. On September 23, 2025, the Court denied a separate motion to amend
because Plaintiff did not attach the proposed amended pleadings to his motion as
required under Local Rule 15.1. (ECF Nos. 44, 46). Afterward, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint on September 25, 2025 without a correlative motion; notably,
Plaintiff signed those proposed pleadings on May 1, 2024. (ECF No. 47). Four
days later on September 29, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file the pleadings
at ECF No. 47.1 (ECF No. 49). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is
DENIED.
1 Plaintiff has also submitted several filings which he has labeled as a “Notice,” with
some resembling pleadings without a related motion and others indicating compliance with Local
Rules. (ECF Nos. 51, 52, 53, 56). Other filings are entitled “Notice of Motion” which are
seemingly designed to inform the Court that Plaintiff has submitted a filing. (ECF Nos. 55, 57).
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 1 of 9

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
For starters, Plaintiff did not attach his proposed pleadings to his motion to
amend as this Court’s Local Rules require, see E.D. Mich LR 15.1—a defect that
affected Plaintiff’s last motion to amend. Apart from this procedural defect,
Plaintiff’s motion fails on its merits.
Plaintiff wishes to add factual allegations and legal claims “for the just
resolution of this case.” (ECF No. 49, PageID.276). That said, Plaintiff’s
proposed pleading is light on factual allegations. Plaintiff alleges that he and Paula
M. Watkins entered into trust agreements and property transactions with
Defendants Charles Overton Hood, Bank of America, and Samuel Jackson.2 (ECF
No. 47, PageID.270). He did not specify the role these Defendants played in the
alleged agreements and transactions, which involved several properties in Chicago,
Illinois. (Id. at PageID.270-71). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “knowingly
and intentionally concealed, mismanaged, or fraudulently manipulated trust assets
and property interests.” (Id. at PageID.271). Plaintiff did not specify which
Defendant did what or what precisely Defendants did.
2 Plaintiff originally sued Hood, Jackson, and Lasalle Bank. (ECF No. 1). Lasalle Bank
is now Bank of America, N.A. (ECF No. 11; ECF No. 29, PageID.179 n.1). The Court
dismissed Jackson and Lasalle Bank (e.g., Bank of America) without prejudice for lack of
personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 50).
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 2 of 9

3
Plaintiff lodges four claims against Defendants, namely (1) breach of
contract, (2) violations of civil and federal law, (3) fraud, and (4) concealment and
mismanagement of trust assets. (Id.). In turn, Plaintiff asks for a combination of
compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID.272).
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Governing Standard
Plaintiff moves to amend his pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2). Leave to amend the complaint should be freely given “when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But this does not mean that all
motions to amend are automatically granted. Courts consider several factors when
assessing a motion to amend, specifically “the delay in filing, the lack of notice to
the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failures to cure
deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and
futility of amendment.” Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel Supply, Inc., 246 F.3d
593, 605 (6th Cir. 2001). Amendment of a complaint is futile when the proposed
amendment “‘cannot withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Beydoun v.
Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v.
Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 520 (6th Cir. 2010)).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 3 of 9

4
allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (concluding that a plausible claim
need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than
“labels or conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action”). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility of an
inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” 16630 Southfield
Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Court holds pro se complaints to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Yet
even in pleadings drafted by pro se parties, “‘courts should not have to guess at the
nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976-77
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 951, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
“[C]ourts may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented .
. . nor may courts construct the Plaintiff’s legal arguments for him. Neither may
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 4 of 9

5
the Court ‘conjure up unpled allegations[.]’” Rogers v. Detroit Police Dep’t., 595
F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (Ludington, J., adopting report and
recommendation of Binder, M.J); see also Evans v. Mercedes Benz Fin. Servs.,
LLC, No. 11-11450, 2011 WL 2936198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 21, 2011) (Cohn,
J.) (“Even excusing plaintiff’s failure to follow Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b), pro se
plaintiff must comply with basic pleading requirements, including Rule
12(b)(6).”).
B. 	Discussion
Plaintiff’s motion to amend is denied because the proposed amendment
would be futile—that is, the proposed claims do not state plausible claims for
relief.
Count I of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment for breach of contract simply
states that “Defendants violated the terms of trust and property agreements.” (ECF
No. 47, PageID.271). Under both Illinois and Michigan law, a breach of contract
claim requires the plaintiff to establish the existence of a valid contract, show that
Defendants breached the terms of that contract, and the alleged breach resulted in
damages. See Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Sols., Inc., 215 N.E.3d 871,
877 (Ill. 2022);3 Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc., 848 N.W.2d 95, 104
(Mich. 2014) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff only alleged in a conclusory manner the
3 Illinois law includes another element—substantial performance by the plaintiff.
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 5 of 9

6
existence of contract between the parties. He also did not allude to any contractual
provisions or explain how each Defendant violated the provisions. Put simply,
Plaintiff did not plead factual allegations from which the Court can reasonably
infer a breach of contract.
Count II only alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated federal law. But
Plaintiff did not identify the federal statutes Defendants violated. Perhaps Plaintiff
relies on statutes identified in his original complaint. (ECF No. 47, PageID.270
(attempting to incorporate Plaintiff’s original complaint into the proposed
pleadings)). But under Local Rule 15.1, a motion to amend cannot incorporate any
prior pleading by reference. And in any event, Plaintiff did not allege a violation
of federal law in his original complaint. Plaintiff cannot prevail on alleged
violations of federal law without identifying the statutes at issue and alleging how
Defendants may have violated those provisions. Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiff has failed to do so in Count II of his
proposed pleadings.
Count III alleges fraud. Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants engaged in
deliberate misrepresentation and concealment.” (Id. at PageID.271). This claim is
deficient for several reasons. To allege fraud, a plaintiff must do so with
particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Farnsworth v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 569 F.
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 6 of 9

7
App’x 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2014). This means that, “a plaintiff, at a minimum, must
allege the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation on which he or
she relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the
injury resulting from the fraud.” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health
Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Bledsoe II”) (citation modified).
This particularity requirement also prohibits plaintiffs from relying on “group
pleading”—that is, referring to Defendants collectively without specifying what
each Defendant did. See United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Clarksville Pain Inst.,
LLC, No. 3:20-cv-00309, 2025 WL 727901, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2025);
United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 643 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[E]ach defendant named in the complaint is entitled to be apprised of the
circumstances surrounding the fraudulent conduct which he individuals stands
charged.”) (“Bledsoe I”) (citation modified).
Plaintiff has only alleged fraud, mismanagement, and concealment without
providing any details on each Defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct. Count III
therefore lacks the particularity required and is futile as a result. See Farnsworth,
569 F. App’x at 430; Yaldoo v. Homecomings Fin., LLC, 2009 WL 3388377, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 2009) (“If plaintiffs fail to allege facts in keeping with the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), plaintiffs fail to state a claim on which relief
may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).”) (citation modified).
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 7 of 9

8
The final count in Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is for the concealment
and mismanagement of trust assets. (ECF No. 47, PageID.271). But Plaintiff did
not allege any more than this. Simply reiterating the name of the cause of action is
not enough to state a plausible claim for relief, let alone satisfy the pleading
requirement under Rule 8(a)(2). There is simply no basis from which the Court
can reasonably infer the violation of law Plaintiff alleges here.
In all, the allegations in the proposed pleadings consist of no more than
“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” which are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As a
result, Plaintiff’s proposed claims are futile.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s original complaint remains the operative complaint. (ECF No. 1). To
avoid confusion, the proposed amended pleadings at ECF Nos. 45 and 47 are
STRICKEN from the record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The parties here may object to and seek review of this Order, but are
required to file any objections within 14 days of service as provided for in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) and Local Rule 72.1(d). A party may not assign as
error any defect in this Order to which timely objection was not made. Fed. R.
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 8 of 9

9
Civ. P. 72(a). Any objections are required to specify the part of the Order to which
the party objects and state the basis of the objection. When an objection is filed to
a magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive motion, the ruling remains in
effect unless it is stayed by the magistrate judge or a district judge. E.D. Mich.
Local Rule 72.2.
Date: November 5, 2025 	s/Curtis Ivy, Jr.
Curtis Ivy, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that this document was served on counsel of
record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System or by First Class
U.S. mail on November 5, 2025.
s/Sara Krause
Case Manager
(810) 341-7850
Case 2:24-cv-11164-TGB-CI ECF No. 58, PageID.<pageID> Filed 11/05/25 Page 9 of 9