Mazur v. Garrison et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARY GREENE MAZUR,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 24-cv-13193
v.
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
JEFFREY GARRISON, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
OPINION & ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (Dkt. 44),
(2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (Dkt. 45), AND (3) GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS (Dkts. 36, 37)
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Curtis Ivy Jr.’s Report and
Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss
(Dkts. 36, 37). R.&R. at PageID.425 (Dkt. 44). Plaintiff Mary Greene Mazur filed an objection.
(Dkt. 45). The Defendants1 filed responses (Dkts. 48, 49).2 The Court reviews de novo those
portions of the R&R to which a specific objection has been made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court (i) adopts the recommendation in the R&R in its
entirety, (ii) overrules Mazur’s objections, and (iii) grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
1 The Village of Pinckney, Chief of Police Jeffrey Garrison, and Officers Raymond Prater and
Ashley Sloat are the Pinckney Defendants. R.&R. at PageID.424. Livingston County, and county
prosecutors Erica Parker and Rolland Sizemore are the Livingston Defendants. Id.
2 Also included in the briefing is Mazur’s Response to Livingston’s motion (Dkt. 39), Mazur’s
Response to Pinckney’s motion (Dkt. 40), Livingston’s Reply (Dkt. 41), and Pinckney’s Reply
(Dkt. 42).
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The full relevant factual background is set forth in the R&R. R.&R. at PageID.426–429.
According to the amended complaint, Mazur was a member of the Cherokee Nation of Indians
(Nation). Am Compl. ¶ 5 (Dkt. 23). On November 15, 2023, Pinckney police officer Raymond
Prater pulled Mazur over for an alleged speeding violation. Id. ¶ 15. Mazur produced her tribal
identification, insurance information, and her vehicle registration from the Nation. Id. ¶ 16. Below
are photographs Prater took of Mazur’s tribal identification and license plate.
Identification at PageID.212 (Dkt. 39-1).
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License Plate at PageID.228 (Dkt. 36-2).
Prater asked Mazur about her tribal license plate because he was unfamiliar with it. Id. ¶
17. Mazur explained that the Nation owned her car and gave Prater a document which she alleged
showed that the FBI acknowledged the validity of her license plate and tribal identification. Id. ¶
18. Prater released Mazur without a citation but told Mazur he was going to “look into Cherokee
Nation.” Id. ¶ 19. Prater later submitted a police report that alleged Mazur had a fraudulent license
plate. Id. ¶ 20.
On January 1, 2024, Mazur attempted to cross the border from Canada into the United
States, but she was stopped and taken into custody on an outstanding warrant for forgery of a
registration plate, operating an unregistered vehicle, operating with expired insurance, and
operating without a license on a person. Id. ¶ 21, 27. The warrant listed police officer Ashley
Sloat and Chief of Police Jeffrey Garrison as the complaining witnesses and Prater as the
complainant. Id. ¶ 22. Mazur was held in the Livingston County jail for approximately 24 hours.
Id. ¶ 26.
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Mazur’s first appearance was on January 9, 2024. Id. ¶ 28. At her initial appearance she
met assistant county prosecutor Erica Parker. Id. She explained to Parker her membership in the
Nation and showed Parker documents demonstrating her membership and that the Nation held title
to her vehicle. Id. ¶ 29. She also showed Parker her current valid insurance policy. Id. Parker
allegedly disregarded the evidence that Mazur showed her and proceeded with the prosecution.
Id. ¶ 30. Mazur contacted Parker at least three more times with additional information
demonstrating her relationship with the Nation and how to verify Mazur’s assertions. Id. ¶ 31–33.
One of these pieces of information was “clear instructions on how to track and verify the Shipper
Export [Declaration] from Michigan to the Cherokee Nation of Indians in Tennessee.” Id. ¶ 31.
Prater testified at Mazur’s probable cause hearing on January 29, 2024 and explained the
steps he took to investigate Mazur’s license plate. Id. ¶ 34–35. Mazur alleges that Prater testified
that he confirmed that the “vehicle title had been exported” and that he had “erroneously sought
confirmation from” Tennessee. Id. ¶ 36. Prater allegedly conceded that it was possible that the
reason he could not find the title registered in Tennessee is because it was registered to the Nation.
Id. Prater also admitted that he did not know where else to look to verify Mazur’s statements and
he did not follow up on the information that she provided to him. Id. ¶ 37. The judge ultimately
found no probable cause had been established, and the case was dismissed without prejudice. Id.
¶ 38.
Mazur brought suit against all the Defendants for malicious prosecution (Count I) and
discrimination (Count V) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at PageID.141–146. She also brought claims
against all Defendants for conspiracy to deprive person of rights and property (Counts VI and VII)
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. She brought claims against the Village of Pinckney, Livingston
County, as well as individual Defendants Prater, Garrison, Sloat, and Sizemore for false
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imprisonment (Count II), denial of substantive due process (Count III), and denial of procedural
due process (Count IV). Id.
As set forth in the R&R, all Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. R.&R.
at PageID.425. The magistrate judge recommended granting both motions to dismiss because
Mazur did not adequately plead a Monell claim under the ratification, inadequate training, or
custom of tolerance theories. Id. at PageID.432. The R&R also recommended dismissing the
claims against the individual defendants because these claims were brought against the individual
defendants in their official capacities which is duplicative of the claims against the Village of
Pinckney and Livingston County. Id. at PageID.436–438.
Mazur makes eight objections to the R&R. Obj. at PageID.441–450. Each one lacks merit.
II. ANALYSIS3
Mazur first objects to the R&R’s use of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell
Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) as the relevant standard of review for deciding motions
to dismiss. Obj. at PageID.441–442. Mazur argues that instead of the standard articulated in Iqbal
and Twombly, the Court should use the standard articulated by the Second Circuit in Anderson
News, LLC v. American Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162 (2d. Cir. 2012). Id. at PageID.442. Mazur’s
argument does not make sense because, in Anderson News, the Second Circuit articulates the
Iqbal/Twombly standard in analyzing the motion to dismiss at issue in the case. Id. at 181–182;
184–185. Regardless, the R&R articulates the correct standard of review, Iqbal and Twombly, in
analyzing the motions to dismiss. The Court overrules this objection.
3 When analyzing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “may consider the Complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits
attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are
central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426,
430 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court will, therefore, consider photos of Mazur’s tribal identification
card and her license plate, which were attached to the briefing.
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Mazur’s second, third, and fourth objections attack the R&R’s recommendation that she
did not state a viable Monell claim under the ratification theory. Obj. at PageID.443–447; R. &R.
at PageID.432. Under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to succeed on a
municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that her constitutional rights were violated and
that a policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving force” leading to the violation. Miller
v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010). At the pleading stage, Mazur may establish
that the municipality has an unconstitutional policy or custom by alleging facts that show “(1) the
existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision
making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or
supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (explaining that Monell liability may be established by the
act of a single official “where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal
policy with respect to the action ordered”).
To plausibly plead a claim of ratification under Monell, Mazur must show “an illegal policy
or custom by demonstrating that an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal
actions.” Alsaada v. City of Columbus, 536 F. Supp. 3d 216, 270 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (citing Lipman
v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726, 747 (6th Cir. 2020)). Mazur can show the ratification by such an official
in one of two ways: (i) by the official’s “affirmative approval of a particular decision made
by a subordinate,” or (ii) by the official’s “failing to meaningfully investigate and punish
allegations of unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at 270–271 (citing Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,
988 F.2d 649, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) and Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 882 (6th Cir. 2020)).
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In objection two, Mazur asserts that the R&R “grossly misrepresented the facts in the
amended complaint” when it claimed that “[t]he only relevant allegation [related to ratification] is
that Chief of Police Defendant Garrison was on (sic) of the signatories to the criminal complaint.”
Obj. at PageID.443. She asserts that another allegation included in the amended complaint is that
“Garrison signed a request for felony warrant and a request for two felony charges for which he
lacked firsthand knowledge of the incident but nonetheless affirmed [he] examined the contents of
the complaint and that the allegations were true … .” Id. Mazur argues that this fact “easily
draw[s]” inferences that Garrison was an individual with final decision-making authority who
ratified illegal actions and was a policy maker who failed to meaningfully investigate the acts of a
subordinate. Id.
The Court disagrees for two reasons. First, Mazur’s argument that Garrison’s signature on
the complaint “easily draws” the inference that he was “an official with final decision-making
authority” is conclusory and therefore insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Furthermore, nowhere in the amended complaint does Mazur actually allege that Garrison
was an official with final decision-making authority. This alone is sufficient to demonstrate that
Mazur has failed to state a Monell claim under the ratification theory. See Brown v. Chapman,
814 F.3d 447, 463 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff’s ratification theory fails because, as discussed above,
it requires that plaintiff make allegations against a specific final decisionmaker and plaintiff does
not make those allegations.”); Campell v. Hamilton Cty., No. 22-315, 2023 WL 6295803 at *9
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2023) (granting motion to dismiss Monell claim under the ratification theory
because plaintiff had not identified an official with final decision-making authority in his
complaint). The first time that Mazur alleges that Garrison is an official with final decision-making
authority is in her response to Livingston’s motion to dismiss. Resp. to Livingston Mot. at
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PageID.284. “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss…is the complaint. This precludes
the consideration of new allegations that may be raised in plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to
dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Wilson v. RBS Citizens, N.A., No. 12-11691, 2012
WL 13013453, at *5, n. 2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2012) (punctuation modified). Because the
allegation that Garrison is an official with final decision-making authority is not included in the
complaint, the Court will not consider it.
Second, Mazur’s argument that Garrison’s signature on a warrant that he lacked firsthand
knowledge of demonstrates that he was a policy maker who failed to meaningfully investigate the
acts of a subordinate is also insufficient to state a Monell claim under the ratification theory. “[A]n
allegation of a single failure to investigate a single plaintiff’s claim does not suffice.” Pineda v.
Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted). Rather, a Monell
claim based on inadequate investigation requires “not only an inadequate investigation in this
instance, but also a clear and persistent pattern of violations in earlier instances.” Id. (punctuation
modified). Mazur’s amended complaint does not include allegations related to Garrison’s failure
to investigate his subordinate’s acts or a pattern of earlier violations. Furthermore, the first time
Mazur mentions this allegation is in her objection to the R&R.4 Mazur cannot raise new allegations
in her objections to the R&R. See Wilson, 2012 WL 13013453, at *5, n. 2. The Court overrules
objection two.
4 The position she takes in her objection is contrary to the position she took in her responses to
both motions to dismiss. In her responses to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, she stated that
“This is not a case of ‘failure to investigate’ at all.” Resp. to Livingston Mot. at PageID.284; Resp.
to Pinckney Mot. at PageID.317. Mazur cannot take a different position than the position she took
before the Magistrate Judge. See Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Courts have held that while the Magistrate Judge Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq., permits de novo
review by the district court if timely objections are filed, absent compelling reasons, it does not
allow parties to raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to
the magistrate.”).
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In objection three, Mazur appears to argue that she does not have to allege that Garrison
had authority to make final policy because as chief, “Garrison is always in charge and responsible
for the model of professional standards he sets for his subordinates….” Obj. at PageID.444. This
argument fails as a matter of law. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 463. Mazur does in fact have to make
allegations that an individual is a policy maker with final decision-making authority to state a
plausible Monell claim under the ratification theory. Id. Objection three is also overruled.
In objection four, Mazur makes arguments that are not fully intelligible. She appears to
take issue with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Monell liability could not be premised on
Prater’s or Garrison’s “ratification” of the prosecutor’s charging decision. The R&R noted that
charging decision was for the prosecutor to make, not police officers or officials. R.&R. at
PageID.433. Mazur’s arguments that charges “were requested” by Prater or “augmented” by
Garrison, Obj. at PageID.444, do not refute that. Those actions—which pre-date the charging
decision by the Livingston County Prosecutor—cannot “ratify” the later-in-time prosecutorial
decision.
Mazur also misses the mark by claiming that these actions are somehow “prima facie
evidence of the very inadequate training under Monell.” Obj. at PageID.445 (emphasis in
original). This unexplained argument is not the Court’s responsibility to clarify. Howard v. Sec’y
of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that an “objection” that
does nothing more than disagree with a magistrate judge's determination, “without explaining the
source of the error,” is not considered a valid objection). Objection four is overruled.
Mazur’s fifth objection challenges the R&R’s conclusion that she did not sufficiently plead
a failure to train and supervise claim under the “inaction” theory of Monell. Obj. at PageID.445–
446. She alleges that she has properly plead elements two through four of an “inaction” claim and
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that the “only element that can be subject to debate is the first” because “what quantity of action
defines ‘pattern.’” Id. at PageID.446. She argues that Justice Brennan’s concurrence in City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), demonstrates that she can establish a “pattern” of
inaction with just one instance of unconstitutional conduct. Id.
Mazur is wrong as a matter of law. The Sixth Circuit has recently observed that a “plaintiff
cannot rely solely on a single instance to prove the existence of an unconstitutional custom.”
Franklin v. Franklin Cnty., Kentucky, 115 F.4th 461, 472 (6th Cir. 2024) (punctuation modified).
Objection five is overruled.
In her sixth objection, Mazur appears to challenge the R&R’s recommendation that her
claims against Garrison, Sloat, and Prater in their official capacities are duplicative and thus should
be dismissed. Obj. at PageID.447; R. &R. at PageID.435–436. The Court is unsure of what
Mazur’s contention is here, as she states that she “reserves her right to object to this determination
as a matter of law for purpose of appeal.” This is not a valid objection. See Aldrich v. Bock, 327
F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“A general objection ... is not sufficient to alert the court
to alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge. An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than
state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been
presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context.”). If Mazur is arguing
that the R&R is incorrect to recommend dismissing the claims against the individuals in their
official capacities, she is wrong as a matter of law. Claims against individuals in their official
capacities are duplicative of claims against the entities for which the individuals work. Direct
Construction Servs., LLC v. City of Detroit, Mich., 820 F. App’x 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2020). The
Court overrules objection six.
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Mazur disagrees, in objection seven, with the R&R’s recommendation that she has failed
to state a Monell claim as to Livingston County. Obj. at PageID.447–448; R.&R. at PageID.437.
Mazur contends that she has stated a Monell claim under the ratification theory. Obj. at
PageID.447. She argues that, in paragraph 24 of her amended complaint, she has clearly alleged
that “Defendant Sizemore ratified [Garrison’s alleged illegal act] by signing the complaint on
November 29th.” Obj. at PageID.448. As to Parker, Mazur argues that she had the “opportunity
to mitigate damages,” and that when Mazur sent Parker documents regarding her status with the
tribe, Parker “either studied them and chose to exercise deliberate indifference or just ignored
them.” Id. at PageID.448. These arguments fail because Mazur did not allege in her amended
complaint that Sizemore or Parker were officials with final decision-making authority, as required
to state a plausible Monell claim under the ratification theory. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 463. The
Court overrules objection seven.
In objection eight, Mazur references a statement in the Pinckney Defendants’ motion
regarding her membership in the Nation, which she claims raises a genuine issue of material fact.
Obj. at PageID.448–450. However, her membership status in the Nation played no role in the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant the Defendants’ motions to dismiss; nor does it matter
to the Court’s opinion here. Mazur’s membership or non-membership status in the Nation is
irrelevant to whether she has pled plausible claims in her amended complaint. Objection eight is
also overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court adopts the R&R (Dkt. 44), overrules Mazur’s objections (Dkt. 45), and grants
the motions to dismiss (Dkts. 36, 37).
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SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 18, 2025 	s/Mark A. Goldsmith
Detroit, Michigan 	MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First-Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on November 18, 2025.
s/Joseph Heacox
JOSEPH HEACOX
Case Manager
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