Queen v. Farhat et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Joseph Queen filed this pro se civil rights case regarding the adjudication of
his child custody dispute in Wayne County Circuit Court. (ECF No. 1.) He sued the
judge in that case, Helal Farhat, and the State of Michigan. (Id.) On April 22, 2025,
the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF No. 17) and entered a
judgment dismissing the case (ECF No. 18). Then Queen filed a notice of appeal and
requested permission to appeal in forma pauperis (ECF No. 19), which the Court
granted (ECF No. 21). The next day, Queen filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment, (ECF No. 22) which the Court ultimately denied (ECF No. 28.)
Now Queen has filed an “Emergency Motion to Reopen Case Under FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b)(4) AND (6) and for Limited Emergency Relief.” (ECF No. 33.) For the
reasons below, the motion is DENIED.
JOSEPH QUEEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HELAL FARHAT, in his individual and
official capacities, and STATE OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-10444
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION TO REOPEN
CASE [33]
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I.
Since Queen filed what the Court deemed a notice of appeal (ECF No. 29), and
the Sixth Circuit recently reinstated that appeal (ECF No. 32), this Court lacks
jurisdiction to address his newly filed motion to reopen the case (ECF No. 33). See,
e.g., United States v. Carman, 933 F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a
notice of appeal “confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district
court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal” (quoting
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982))). As a general rule,
“a district court no longer has jurisdiction over an action as soon as a party files a
notice of appeal, and at that point the appellate court assumes jurisdiction over the
matter.” Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 1993). This is true when
the litigant asks the Court to consider a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion
after the appeal has been filed. Id. (deciding that “the district court did not have
jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 60(b) motion after the [party] filed a notice of appeal.”)
In sum, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Queen’s motion.
II.
Even if the Court did have jurisdiction, it would deny Queen’s motion on the
merits.
Post-judgment 	relief 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	60(b)—the
reopening of a case—is an “extraordinary remedy that is granted only in exceptional
circumstances.” McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 502–03
(6th Cir. 2000). Indeed, “the district court’s discretion to vacate the judgment is
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circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of
litigation.” Waifersong, Ltd. Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir.
1992); see Massi v. Walgreen Co., 337 F. App’x 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(“To give [the plaintiff] a second opportunity to litigate these issues would destroy the
near paramount interest our judicial system places on the ‘finality of judgments and
termination of litigation.’”). The party seeking Rule 60(b) relief “bears the burden of
establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Info-Hold,
Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008).
A motion under Rule 60(b) is “neither a substitute for, nor a supplement to, an
appeal.” GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2007). “The ground
for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) must be something that could not have
been used to obtain a reversal by means of a direct appeal.” Jinks v. AlliedSignal,
Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir. 2001). “The purpose of a Rule 60(b) motion . . . is to
permit a district court to reconsider its judgment when that judgment rests on a
defective foundation.” Koe v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., Inc., No. 22-01455, 2023 WL
10352931, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2023). So “[a] proper Rule 60(b) motion ‘attacks
not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some
defect in the integrity of the federal [] proceedings.’” U.S. ex rel. Oakes v. Cinnaire,
Nos. 20-1911, 20-1938, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 38037, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2020)
(omission in original) (quoting Carter v. Anderson, 585 F.3d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir.
2009)). It “does not allow a defeated litigant a second chance to convince the court to
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rule in his or her favor by presenting new explanations, legal theories, or proof.”
Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. App’x 900, 917 (6th Cir. 2019).
But Queen’s motion seeks this second chance. His motion relitigates his earlier
claims, arguing that there is a continuing pattern of “judicial bias, threats, and
collusion.” (ECF No. 33, PageID.284.) And his due process concerns all relate to the
state case that he is challenging, not the entry of the judgment in this federal case.
(Id. at PageID.281–285.) Further, the Court dismissed this case based on the
doctrines of judicial and sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 17, PageID.158–163.) But his
motion does not even mention those words let alone address the Court’s conclusions.
Accordingly, Queen’s motion for emergency relief (ECF No. 33) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 24, 2025
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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