Harris v. Prough et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ISAIAH DUPREE HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PROUGH, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-11647
Honorable Robert J. White
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. (ECF No. 7). No Defendant filed a timely response to the motion, and
the Court will decide it without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For
the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
Plaintiff initially asserted claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, arising from a misconduct investigation and his treatment at a state
corrections facility. (ECF No. 1). On August 4, 2025, the Court partially dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court concluded that (1) Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim must fail because he was ultimately found not guilty of
misconduct and (2) Plaintiff insufficiently pled all material elements of his Eighth
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Amendment claim. (ECF No. 6). The Court therefore dismissed the Fourteenth
Amendment claim with prejudice, and the Eighth Amendment claim without
prejudice. But the Court granted Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint
concerning his Eighth Amendment claim, with the following instructions: “The
amended complaint must name the appropriate defendant(s) and provide specific
details concerning the (or each) defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.37).
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, along with his motion, on September 2,
2025. (ECF Nos. 7-8). Notably, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend states that he
“seek[s] to add a due process claim against Kim Cargo, (Warden) on similar grounds
to those alleged in connection with due process.” (ECF No. 7, PageID.38). The
amended complaint, however, is properly limited to claims under the Eighth
Amendment. To the extent Plaintiff is still seeking to pursue due process claims, the
Court already dismissed these with prejudice.
Moving to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s proposed amended Eighth
Amendment claims,1 to establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the
1 The Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it
determines that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(footnote and citations omitted). Stated differently, “a complaint must contain
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conditions of confinement, an inmate must show that (1) he suffered a “sufficiently
serious” deprivation and (2) a prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind” in creating that condition. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(citation omitted). In prison-conditions cases, a sufficiently culpable state of mind
is one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “placing a prisoner in a cell
covered with fecal matter” is a sufficiently serious deprivation satisfying the first
element of an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim.2 Taylor v.
Larson, 505 F. App’x 475, 477 (6th Cir. 2012). With respect to the second element,
“a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id.
2 Although the amended complaint generally refers to “cell conditions” without
specifying the nature of such conditions, Plaintiff’s initial complaint makes clear that
he was allegedly placed in solitary confinement for 9½ days in a cell “covered in
human feces urine and other bodily fluids, along with rodent excrement.” (ECF No.
1).
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The key issue here is whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that each Defendant
knew of and disregarded the conditions of his confinement. First, this bar is clearly
met for corrections officers Kramer and Ellis, who allegedly “placed Plaintiff into a
segregation cell[] even after a visual inspection of the cell conditions.” (ECF No. 8,
PageID.48). The same is true for ombudsman Keith Barber, who allegedly
“contributed to Plaintiff’s suffering by failing to repond [sic] or intervene on behalf
of Plaintiff after having been alerted to the suffering and serious deprivation
[plaintiff] was forced to endure.” (ECF No. 8, PageID.49).
This is not so for Winchell and Prough, however, since the allegations against
them essentially relate to the misconduct investigation against Plaintiff rather than
his allegedly unconstitutional confinement. (ECF No. 8, PageID.49). Indeed,
nothing in the proposed amended complaint indicates that either Winchell or Prough
knew of or disregarded the conditions of Plaintiff’s solitary confinement.
Lastly, concerning warden Kim Cargo, Plaintiff alleges that
Cargo[,] in the course of the ten plus days [Plaintiff was subject to
solitary confinement], as supervisor was, or should have been, aware of
the ongoing actions of all Defendants under her supervision. As such[,]
Cargo showed signs of deliberate indifference. Including ignoring or
not examining the segregation cell conditions that Plaintiff and other
inmates are being placed in.
(ECF No. 8, PageID.48).
The Court concludes that these allegations are too speculative to establish that Cargo
ever knew of or disregarded any excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Instead,
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Plaintiff appears to base Cargo’s liability on the sole fact that she supervised the
other defendants in this case. But Plaintiff has not pled any claim for supervisor
liability under Monell.
* * *
For the reasons given, the Court ORDERS that the motion for leave to file an
amended complaint (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint
(ECF No. 8) is accepted for filing, but his claims against Defendants Winchell,
Prough, and Cargo are DISMISSED.
Dated: October 27, 2025 s/Robert J. White
Robert J. White
United States District Judge
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