Bangurah v. Miniard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Abdulai Bangurah,
Plaintiff,
v.
Gary Miniard,
Defendant.
________________________________/
Case No. 24-cv-11961
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge
Mag. Judge Kimberly G. Altman
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE CASE
Pro se Plaintiff Abdulai Bangurah filed a complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is a state inmate incarcerated at
the Central Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan. (Id.
at PageID.2, 5.) The Court granted him permission to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). (ECF No. 7.)
He eventually paid the filing fee in full. (ECF No. 8.) Because the
complaint improperly challenges the validity of Plaintiff’s sentence in a
§ 1983 action, the case must be dismissed without prejudice under Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and pursuant to the screening
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requirements imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
I. 	Background
Plaintiff is serving a sentence for his 2014 Bay Circuit Court
convictions of first-degree home invasion and first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) See Michigan Department of
Corrections 	Offender 	Tracking 	Information 	System,
https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=925
406. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “is under a judgment of
sentence that is invalid.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5; see id. at PageID.8.)
According to Plaintiff, the prosecutor conceded that the sentencing
guidelines were scored incorrectly, and that Plaintiff’s “habitual status”
should have been changed from three to two. (Id. at PageID.7–8.)
Plaintiff states that, despite the concession, he was improperly
sentenced as a third-time habitual offender rather than a second-time
habitual offender. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court
directing the state court to resentence him. (Id.)
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II. Legal Standard
The Prison Litigation Reform Act “requires dismissal of any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”
Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e),1 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). “A complaint can be frivolous
either factually or legally.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). Courts hold
a pro se complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see
Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Pro se plaintiffs
enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and
filings.”).
1 Section 1915(e)(2) requires the dismissal of a case “at any time” for the
reasons listed above “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that
may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
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III. Discussion
Plaintiff seeks to invalidate his state-court sentence in this federal
civil rights action. For the reasons set forth below, the action is barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Heck requires that before a § 1983 plaintiff may bring a civil
action seeking relief from an unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, he must first “prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. “This ‘favorable
termination’ requirement holds true regardless of the relief sought by
the plaintiff, id. at 487–89, and regardless of the target of the prisoner’s
suit. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005).” Sutherby v. City of
Southgate, No. 23-cv-13112, 2024 WL 763334, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25,
2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 23-13112, 2024 WL
762364 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2024). Moreover, “Heck blocks a state
prisoner’s § 1983 claim if its success ‘would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’” Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F.3d
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880, 881 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487); see Wilkinson,
544 U.S. at 81–82 (“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent
prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable
relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading
to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.” (emphasis in original)).
In this case, Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence. He
seeks relief on the following basis: the prosecutor conceded that his
sentencing guidelines were incorrectly scored, but the erroneous
guidelines were nevertheless used to determine his sentence. Plaintiff
has not alleged or proven that his conviction or sentence has been
invalidated. And success on his claim would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of the duration of his confinement. See id. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s action is barred by Heck.
The proper instrument for a state prisoner to challenge a criminal
conviction or sentence is a direct appeal, a state post-conviction relief
motion, or a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus. See Bey v.
Gulley, No. CIV.A. 02-71395-DT, 2002 WL 1009488, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
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May 6, 2002); Sampson, 917 F.3d at 881 (“The idea [behind Heck] is to
channel what amount to unlawful-confinement claims to the place they
belong: habeas corpus.” (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81)); Davis v.
Lambros, No. 2:22-cv-38, 2022 WL 702377, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 9,
2022) (“A state prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of
confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 484, 493 (1973))). Here, the Court will not convert Plaintiff’s
civil rights complaint into a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.
This court has stated that
[w]hen a suit that should have been brought under the
habeas corpus statute is prosecuted instead as a civil rights
suit, it should not be “converted” into a habeas corpus suit
and decided on the merits. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497,
500 (7th Cir. 1999). Instead, the matter should be dismissed,
leaving it to the prisoner to decide whether to refile it as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.
Bey, 2002 WL 1009488, at *2. Moreover, the Court elects to not convert
this case into a habeas case because a petition for a federal writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant to § 2254 and a civil action brought under
§ 1983 implicate different parties, fees, and procedural requirements,
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and they involve different standards for relief. See Visner v. Gatza, No.
19-11289, 2019 WL 3943168, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2019) (noting
that “[t]here are a number of differences between a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a motion in a civil
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and “declin[ing] to resurrect
[the plaintiff’s] § 1983 complaint and convert it to a § 2254 petition”
because “the differences between a § 2254 petition and a § 1983 action
will likely require a change in the parties, change in the relief
requested, and some changes to the procedures governing the action
and the claims raised”).
Because Heck bars Plaintiff’s action, the action is dismissed
without prejudice. See Parker v. Phillips, 27 F. App’x 491, 493 (6th Cir.
2001) (“conclud[ing] that the district court properly dismissed [the
plaintiff’s § 1983 prisoner civil rights] complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)” in part because Heck “applie[d] to bar [the plaintiff’s]
claim”); Bey, 2002 WL 1009488, at *3 (“Because this Court is dismissing
plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint under Heck, the dismissal will be without
prejudice.” (citing Diehl v. Nelson, 198 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1999); Bell v.
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Raby, No. 99-72917, 2000 WL 356354, at *8 n.14 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28,
2000))).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s action is dismissed
without prejudice under Heck. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action
would be taken in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the
Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 4, 2025 	s/Judith E. Levy
Ann Arbor, Michigan 	JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to
their respective email or first-class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of
Electronic Filing on November 4, 2025.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ
Case Manager
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