Thomas v. UACJ Automotive Whitehall Industries, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NOLAN M. THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UACJ AUTOMOTIVE WHITEHALL
INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-944
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Plaintiff Nolan Thomas brings this action against Defendant UACJ Automotive Whitehall
Industries, Inc. (“UACJ”), under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Plaintiff, a widower, seeks to recover death benefits allegedly owed to
him under his late husband Andre Thomas’s supplemental life insurance plan. When Andre was
employed by UACJ, he elected to take $300,000 in life insurance coverage, the maximum amount,
even though he was not permitted to do so under the terms of the plan. Plaintiff contends UACJ
misled Andre to believe he elected the maximum coverage when it failed to notify him that he did
not qualify under the plan and withheld from his paycheck insurance premiums consistent with the
maximum election. Following Andre’s death, the United of Omaha Life Insurance Company—
the designated claims administrator under the plan—determined UACJ had only signed Andre up
for $50,000 in coverage. Following several unsuccessful attempts to contact UACJ, Plaintiff sued
to hold UACJ to its alleged misrepresentations and recover the remaining $250,000.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s amended complaint. In his original complaint, Plaintiff sued
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA on a breach of fiduciary duty theory. (See Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1.)
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Defendant did not answer, and Plaintiff moved for a default judgment. (See ECF No. 13.) This
Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because no equitable remedy authorized monetary relief from
UACJ’s general assets. (See Op. & Order Denying Mot. for Default J. 8–11, ECF No. 18.)
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff replaces his § 502(a)(3) claim with two new causes of
action. He first brings a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) “to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). He also brings a claim for civil penalties under
§ 502(c) for UACJ’s alleged failure to respond to a plan beneficiary’s request for plan documents.
Id. § 1132(c)(1)(B). UACJ has again failed to appear, and Plaintiff moves again for default
judgment. (ECF No. 26.) The Court holds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) because the plan unambiguously prohibits an employee earning Andre’s salary
from electing $300,000 in life insurance coverage, and precedent bars modification of an
unambiguous plan absent extraordinary circumstances that are not present here. The Court further
holds that Plaintiff is not entitled to civil penalties because he has not shown that UACJ’s failure
to respond to his document requests caused him prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
UACJ provides two kinds of life insurance to its employees: a basic plan where the
premiums are covered by the company, and a voluntary plan where employees are responsible for
covering the premiums. (Compl. ¶ 9–11.) UACJ is the plan administrator on both plans (id. ¶ 13),
and United of Omaha is the claims administrator and insurer (id. ¶ 14). Employees who enroll in
the voluntary plan may select coverage ranging from $5,000 to $300,000, in increments of $5,000.
(Grp. Voluntary Term Life Benefit 2, ECF No. 27-2.) Under the voluntary plan, employees cannot
elect coverage greater than “5 times [their] Annual Earnings, rounded to the next higher multiple
of $5,000.” (Id.) Additionally, to obtain coverage over $100,000, an employee must submit an
evidence of insurability form establishing that they are in good health. (Id. at 2, 27.)
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Plaintiff affirms that Andre signed up for $300,000 in coverage (Nolan Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-
4; Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 19), even though the maximum coverage for which he was eligible
was $240,000—five times Andre’s yearly salary of $47,340.80 ($236,704) rounded up to the
nearest multiple of $5,000 (Compl. ¶ 19). Beginning on January 6, 2023, and continuing for ten
weeks, UACJ withheld $15.90 in life insurance premiums from Andre’s weekly paycheck.
(Earnings Statements, ECF No. 27-5; see Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) This withholding amount is consistent
with $300,000 in voluntary life insurance coverage. (See Summary Plan Description, ECF No. 27-
3, PageID.271.) UACJ, however, never explicitly confirmed that Andre had signed up for
$300,000 in coverage, nor did it communicate to him that he had failed to obtain, or was ineligible
for, the maximum coverage. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.)
Andre passed away on March 6, 2023. (Id. ¶ 12.) Following Andre’s death, Plaintiff
completed the beneficiary’s portion of the “Proof of Death Claim Form” and sent it to Stephanie
Frees, UACJ’s human resources director, for her signature. (Compl. ¶ 28.) This form is required
to begin the claims process. (Id.) While initially receptive to Plaintiff’s outreach, Frees and UACJ
soon stopped responding altogether. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17.) Plaintiff made several attempts to
contact UACJ to no avail (id. ¶ 15), and United of Omaha eventually closed the claim because
Plaintiff was unable to obtain a signed copy of the Proof of Death Claim Form from UACJ (Compl.
¶ 38). Sometime in 2024, Plaintiff obtained a printout of Andre’s voluntary benefit form from
UACJ, which revealed that it had only signed him up for $50,000 in voluntary life insurance
benefits. (Id. ¶ 42; see Voluntary Employee Life Plan, ECF No. 27-6.) On February 6 and
November 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent subpoenas to UACJ requesting documents relating to
Andre’s insurance coverage. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff asserts that UACJ has never responded
to these requests for information. (Id. ¶ 31.)
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With the assistance of his current counsel, Plaintiff was able to get in contact with Frees.
On June 2, 2025, she sent a completed Proof of Death Claim Form, which allowed United of
Omaha to reopen the claim and begin processing Plaintiff’s benefits under the basic and voluntary
plans. (Compl. ¶¶ 45–46.) The next day, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Frees requesting a copy of
Andre’s insurance enrollment form, but she never responded. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30–31.) Later that
month, United of Omaha approved Plaintiff’s life insurance claims, but it only paid out a $50,000
death benefit to Plaintiff under the voluntary plan. (Compl. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff also received $48,000
under the UACJ basic life insurance plan. (Id.)
Following United of Omaha’s determination that he was owed only $50,000 under the
voluntary plan, Plaintiff sued UACJ under § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty. (Id. ¶¶ 68–
70.) UACJ defaulted, and Plaintiff moved for default judgment. This Court denied relief because
no equitable remedy allowed for the vindication of Andre’s expectation interest against UACJ.
(See Op. & Order 2.) It also held that UACJ could not be made to disgorge the premium
overpayments because those payments had been passed on to United of Omaha. (Id. at 11.) The
Court then gave Plaintiff twenty-one days from the entry of its order to join United of Omaha as a
party. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on February 5, 2026. In his amended pleadings,
Plaintiff leaves behind his § 502(a)(3) claim and replaces it with two new ones. (See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 26, 32.) He now brings a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim for $250,000 in life insurance benefits allegedly
owed to him under the terms of the voluntary plan. He also brings a second claim for civil penalties
under § 502(a)(c) arising from UACJ’s alleged failure to respond to Plaintiff’s document requests.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff declined to add United of Omaha as a defendant in his amended
complaint.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 55, following proof of service and an entry of default, a district court may enter
a default judgment against a party who has failed to make an appearance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
Rule 55 sets out two mechanisms for obtaining a default judgment: by the clerk or by the court.
The former, which is mandatory under a narrow set of circumstances, applies when “the plaintiff’s
claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation” and he has presented
“an affidavit showing the amount due.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
In all other circumstances, such as here, the party seeking a default judgment must apply
to the court. On entry of default, the moving party’s well-pleaded factual allegations, except those
related to damages, are taken as true. See Antoine v. Atlas Turner, 66 F.3d 105, 111 (6th Cir.
1995). The moving party, however, “is not entitled to [default] judgment as of right.” Nessel v.
Bolo Cellars, LLC, No. 1:23-cv-11705, 2024 WL 1638615 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2024) (quoting
10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2685 (4th ed. 2024) (West)). Because
defaulting parties do not concede the law, “[a] district court ‘must exercise sound judicial
discretion’ in deciding if default judgment is proper.” Id. In exercising that discretion, a district
court considers the following factors:
(1) possible prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the claims; (3) the sufficiency
of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake; (5) possible disputed material
facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the preference
for decisions on the merits.
Russell v. City of Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002).
III. ANALYSIS
This Court has previously evaluated the Russell factors and determined they universally
weigh in favor of Plaintiff. (See Op. & Order 4–7.) But its conclusions on the second and third
factors were predicated on evaluating the merits of a breach of fiduciary duty claim under
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§ 502(a)(3) and the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s initial complaint, respectively. Here, the Court
confronts Plaintiff’s amended complaint with two new claims. The Court therefore considers anew
the second and third Russell factors as to these new causes action. For the following reasons, the
Court holds that Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery on either of his claims.
A. Benefits Under the Plan
1. Merits
Plan beneficiaries are statutorily entitled to the benefits of an ERISA plan. Section
502(a)(1)(B) authorizes a beneficiary to bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan,” or “to enforce his rights” under the same. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). An
ERISA plan can mean an employee welfare benefit plan, an employee pension benefit plan, or
both. Id. § 1002(3). Here, the voluntary plan is an employee welfare benefit plan because it is an
insurance program “established . . . by an employer . . . for the purposes of providing [life
insurance] for its participants or their beneficiaries.” Id. § 1002(1)(A). Section 402 of ERISA
governs how plans are established. Plans “shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument.” Id. § 1102(a)(1). That written instrument must “specify the basis on which payments
are made to and from the plan.” Id. § 1102(a)(4). Since the statute contemplates plans as self-
contained written instruments, it is the text of the plan that governs. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,
563 U.S. 421, 435–38 (2011). Other instruments, such as summary plan descriptions, or
representations by plan fiduciaries, are presumptively excluded to the extent they contradict or
modify the plan’s text.
Courts have consistently read § 502(a)(1)(B) to accord with ERISA’s emphasis on text.
See Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 477 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2007);
Pearson v. Voith Paper Rolls, Inc., 656 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 2011); Julia v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 101 F. App’x 27, 30–31 (6th Cir. 2004) (listing cases). An action
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brought under § 502(a)(1)(B) “sounds in contract,” which consequently leaves little room for
equity to enlarge or modify the plan’s text. Feifer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 306 F.3d
1202, 1213 (2d Cir. 2002). In other words, § 502(a)(1)(B) “does not allow a ‘change, akin to the
reform of a contract,’ because doing so ‘seems less like the simple enforcement of a contract as
written and more like an equitable remedy.’” Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 60 F.4th
848, 852 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Amara, 563 U.S. at 436). When the text of a plan is
unambiguous, the Court is bound to apply its terms.
Here, the terms of the voluntary life insurance plan unambiguously preclude Andre’s
eligibility for the maximum life insurance election. The plan schedule states that an employee
“may elect to be insured” up to $300,000 but provides that “[i]n no event shall [the employee’s]
amount of life insurance exceed 5 times” the employee’s annual salary, “rounded to the next higher
multiple of $5,000.” (Grp. Voluntary Term Life Benefit 2.) The summary plan description
confirms these parameters. In a table on the first page labeled “Coverage Guidelines” in bold
letters, the “Maximum” coverage available was “$300,000, . . . but no more than 5 times annual
salary.” (Summary Plan Description, PageID.269.) Andre’s annual salary was $47,340.80 per
year, so the maximum amount of life insurance he could have elected under the plan was $240,000.
(See Compl. ¶ 19.) The plan documents are clear: an individual making Andre’s salary was
ineligible for $300,000 in voluntary life insurance coverage at the time of his election.
Plaintiff nevertheless seeks to have this Court read a plan out of Andre’s reliance on
UACJ’s misrepresentations. Plaintiff argues that Andre detrimentally relied on both UACJ’s
failure to “provide Andre with notice that he was not eligible for $300,000” in life insurance
coverage (Am. Compl. ¶ 10), and the fact that UACJ withheld from Andre’s paycheck insurance
premiums consistent with the maximum election (id. ¶ 8). But Andre had notice from the plan
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documents that he was ineligible to elect the maximum coverage because he did not qualify under
its defined salary-to-benefit ratios. Those same plan documents established that Andre could not
elect over $100,000 in coverage without filling out a proof of insurability form, which Andre did
not file. Modifying those terms to allow relief here would be inconsistent with ERISA’s plain
meaning and the scope of relief available under § 502(a)(1)(B). See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 492, 494–95 (1996).
Furthermore, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claim can be brought under
§ 502(a)(1)(B). The Sixth Circuit has not clarified whether equitable estoppel is a doctrine that is
appropriately nested within § 502(a)(1)(B)—“to estop the plan from being enforced as written”—
or within ERISA’s equitable “catchall” cause of action, § 502(a)(3). Julia, 101 F. App’x at 31.
The rule is not consistent across circuits. The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, views equitable
estoppel under ERISA as a “common law doctrine” that is allowed under § 502(a)(1)(B). Katz v.
Comprehensive Plan of Group Ins., 197 F.3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit, in
contrast, has strictly limited reliance theories to cases brought under § 502(a)(3). See Feifer, 306
F.3d at 1213–14. For its part, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of an estoppel claim without
reference to its statutory basis, see Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 403–04 (6th Cir.
1998) (en banc), but in a more recent case a Sixth Circuit panel indicated without analysis that
equitable estoppel claims are properly brought under § 502(a)(3). See Pearce v. Chrysler Group
LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 2018).
Whether or not to wade “deeply into this morass” is a question for the Court of Appeals.
Julia, 101 F. App’x at 31. Even if Plaintiff has selected the appropriate vehicle for his reliance
claim, he has not made out a claim for equitable estoppel under ERISA because he has not alleged
that UACJ intended to mislead Andre into electing, or remaining enrolled in, a plan for which he
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was not eligible. See Sprague, 133 F.3d at 403 (requiring that the “party to be estopped must
intend that representation be acted on,” among other factors). The unfortunate reality is that the
voluntary plan unambiguously forecloses Andre’s eligibility for the maximum life insurance
coverage. Plaintiff understandably focuses on UACJ’s omissions and misrepresentations, but they
do not create a “plan” for purposes of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B). Therefore, no recovery is
available to him.
2. Due Process
As an alternative basis for recovery under § 502(a)(1)(B), Plaintiff argues that UACJ’s
failure to properly administer the voluntary plan denied him due process under Wilkins v. Baptist
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 1998). To the extent Plaintiff seeks a substantive
remedy based solely on an allegation that UACJ violated ERISA’s procedural requirements, his
argument is meritless. See Lewandowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 986 F.2d 1006, 1008 (6th
Cir. 1993); Van Loo, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 1030 n.7. Moreover, the portion of Wilkins that Plaintiff
invokes says nothing about what constitutes a denial of due process under ERISA’s procedural
guarantees.
In any event, if there is a dearth of process in this case the fault rests with Plaintiff. Here,
the voluntary plan sets out a clear process for appealing the denial of claims. (Claim Rev. &
Appeal Procs. 22–24, ECF No. 27-2.) Plaintiff has chosen not to follow these procedures. After
receiving notice that United of Omaha only approved a $50,000 award from the voluntary plan,
Plaintiff ignored the claims appeal process and instead chose to file this action.1 (See Compl. ¶ 52.)
1 Ordinarily, this failure alone would be fatal to Plaintiff’s case, as the Sixth Circuit has held “ERISA requires a
participant to exhaust his or her administrative remedies prior to commencing suit in federal court.” Miller v. Metro
Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 986 (6th Cir. 1991). This Court, however, has previously held that exhaustion “is an
affirmative defense that the defendant must plead.” Beamon v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 917 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666
(W.D. Mich. 2013). Accordingly, the Court will not raise the matter on a motion for default judgment where defendant
has failed to make an appearance.
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No policy or action from UACJ compelled this result. If Plaintiff believes that an appeal would
have been futile because of UACJ’s unresponsiveness, he has offered no explanation of the sort to
this Court. Having not followed the voluntary plan’s established procedures, Plaintiff is in no
position to argue today that they were inadequate.
B. Civil Penalties
Plaintiff also seeks civil penalties against UACJ for its failure to respond to requests for
plan information. Beneficiaries under an ERISA-covered insurance plan are entitled to receive
plan documents upon request. Gatlin v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 16 F. App’x 283, 289 (6th Cir.
2001). Under § 502(c), plan administrators who fail to respond to such requests by any “participant
or beneficiary” within thirty days of the request may “in the court’s discretion be personally liable
to such participant or beneficiary” up to $110 per day starting from the date of failure or refusal.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1 (increasing the penalty from $100 to $110 a
day). Section 104(b)(4) of the Act requires administrators to provide the following information
upon a beneficiary’s request: “the latest updated summary, plan description, . . . the latest annual
report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other
instruments under which the plan is established or operated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that UACJ has failed to respond to his repeated requests for “plan
documents . . . as well as other related documents” since February 6, 2024. (Am. Compl ¶ 30.)
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations of fact at face value, the penalty began to accrue on March 8, 2024,
thirty-one days after Plaintiff first requested insurance documents. (Id. ¶ 35.) But it is unclear
whether Plaintiff has a statutory entitlement to the documents he sought. None of Plaintiff’s
several document requests mirror the language of § 104(b)(4), and the Sixth Circuit has cabined
the catchall provision concerning “other instruments” to apply only to “documents which provide
a plan participant with information concerning how the plan is operated.” Allinder v. Inter-City
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Prods. Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff makes no effort in his brief to justify
that the documents he sought fall under § 104(b)(4). The Court must therefore take this step on its
own accord.
1. Plan Documents
Plaintiff demanded documents beyond the scope of § 104(b)(4). Claims forms and
elections forms are not documents that an administrator is mandated to turn over to a beneficiary
under § 104(b)(4). See Strang v. Ford Motor Co. Gen. Retirement Plan, No. 14-cv-14410, 2015
WL 13541159, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2015) (citing Allinder, 152 F.3d at 549); accord Jordan
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 312 F. App’x 733–34 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff nevertheless repeatedly
invokes UACJ’s failure to provide elections forms and claims forms as a basis for relief. In his
first subpoena, sent to UACJ on February 6, 2024, Plaintiff requests information referencing “any
and all claims made for coverage under the policy.” (Feb. 6 Subpoena ¶ 3, ECF No. 27-10.) His
second subpoena repeats the request. (See Nov. 8 Subpoena ¶¶ 16–18, ECF No. 27-10.) And on
June 2, 2025, Plaintiff’s attorneys requested a “copy of Andre’s life insurance enrollment form(s)”
from UACJ. (See Email from Haney L. Office to S. Frees, ECF No. 27-11, PageID.352.) Plaintiff
characterizes these requests as requests for “official plan documents applicable to Andre’s
benefits.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) But precedent says otherwise. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to
civil penalties for UACJ’s failure to deliver these documents.
Some of Plaintiff’s requests, however, appear to qualify under § 104(b)(4). For example,
in his November subpoena, Plaintiff asked for “any and all documents which constitute the life
insurance policy/policies associated with” Andre. (Nov. 8 Subpoena ¶ 1.) This request, while
perhaps broadly drawn, reasonably sweeps in the summary plan description and the plan itself
because those documents set forth the terms and conditions of Andre’s voluntary life insurance
policy. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). And breadth or ambiguity is not necessarily a bar here.
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Indeed, if UACJ had responded, it could have sought greater clarity. See Cultrona v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co, 748 F.3d 698, 707 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] plan administrator is free to place the burden
of clarity squarely on the requester simply by replying to an ambiguous demand for . . . documents
with the administrator’s own request for greater specificity.”). UACJ chose not to respond (see
Am. Compl. ¶ 31), and the Court finds no issue with letting Plaintiff’s general request stand as a
colorable demand for plan documents under § 104(b)(4). It finds so in no small part because UACJ
had knowledge of why Plaintiff was seeking information about its voluntary insurance plan. See
Anderson v. Flexel, Inc., 47 F.3d 243, 248 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n administrator’s knowledge of
surrounding circumstances or the information being requested may require a response to an
otherwise general request.”).
Plaintiff’s allegations, however, seem to contradict each other. In his amended complaint,
he asserts that UACJ “has not provided plan documents or even a response to the requests.” (Am.
Compl. ¶ 31.) But in his initial complaint, Plaintiff stated that his former attorneys were able to
secure documents from UACJ sometime in 2024, including a copy of Andre’s voluntary life
benefit summary form. (See Compl. ¶ 42; Voluntary Life Benefit Summary, ECF No. 27-6.)
While it is plausible that Plaintiff could have obtained this document before he sent his first
subpoena to UACJ on February 6th, there is no indication in the record that this is the case. It is
equally plausible that UACJ did respond to some of Plaintiff’s requests for documents sometime
in 2024 after he sent his first subpoena.
Plaintiff also fails to explain how and when he came into possession of the voluntary plan
document and the summary plan description. Both documents were attached to his original and
amended complaints. (See Grp. Voluntary Term Life Benefit, ECF Nos. 1-2, 27-2; Summary Plan
Description, ECF Nos. 1-3, 27-3.) He has not stated whether he possessed them prior to filing suit,
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or obtained them from UACJ, from United of Omaha, or from a third party. Combined, these
documents comprehensively lay out the terms and conditions of the voluntary plan, and they
contain much of the information Plaintiff sought to obtain in his subpoenas. (See Feb. 6 Subpoena
¶ 1; Nov. 8 Subpoena ¶¶ 2, 5–15.) Plaintiff also offers no reason why the plan documents and the
summary plan description were insufficient to determine his rights under the plan. In other words,
absent the desire to seek claim and enrollment forms unprotected by § 104(b)(4), it appears
Plaintiff had all the information he needed to determine Andre’s eligibility under the plan, and
consequently his own rights as a beneficiary.
2. Prejudice
Relatedly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that UACJ’s unresponsiveness prejudiced him.
While prejudice is not a necessary element under § 1132(c)(1)(B), “[a] showing of prejudice to the
claimant is a ‘logical concern’ in a court’s decision to impose a penalty.” Cultrona v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 936 F. Supp. 2d 832, 854 (E.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting Gatlin, F. App’x at 289). The
prejudice inquiry is a factual one; it focuses on whether the Plaintiff is “in a worse position because
of [UACJ’s] delays than [he] would have been if the required documents had been timely
disclosed.” Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1067 (6th Cir. 1994). “The focus of inquiry
into an injury . . . is upon the delay in receiving the information, not upon the denial of benefits.”
Hinkel v. Navistar, Intern. Corp., No. 90-6561, 1992 WL 5435, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). In
the absence of prejudice, this Court has discretion to award no penalties at all. See Bartling, 29
F.3d at 1068–69.
Here, the word “prejudice” does not appear once in Plaintiff’s brief or amended complaint.
On its own review of the record, the Court finds none. As discussed above, the voluntary plan and
the summary plan description clearly answer whether Andre was eligible for $300,000 in life
insurance coverage. Plaintiff is in possession of both documents, and there is no allegation that
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UACJ withheld them from either him or Andre. Therefore, even if this Court took Plaintiff’s
allegation that UACJ has failed to respond at all to his written requests for plan documents at face
value, he has failed to connect that omission to any cognizable theory of prejudice.
3. Penalty
The purpose of § 502(c) is “to punish plan administrators who fail to comply with requests
for documents which ERISA requires them to provide.” Osborn v. Knights of Columbus, 401 F.
Supp. 2d 825–26 (N.D. Ohio 2005). “Even mere negligence might justify an award of statutory
penalties.” Thompson v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 871, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
(citing McGrath v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 48 F. App’x 543, 557 (6th Cir. 2002)). Here, UACJ
has been at least negligent in responding to Plaintiff’s requests. UACJ first received notice that
Plaintiff sought to recover his benefits under Andre’s life insurance plan on March 27, 2023. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 13.) UACJ acknowledged receipt and then stopped responding without explanation. (Id.
¶ 15). Plaintiff asserts that UACJ has to this day not responded to his requests for plan documents.
(Id. ¶¶ 31, 33). Even if Plaintiff’s underlying claims lacked merit, UACJ, as plan administrator,
owed him a statutory duty to respond to his document requests with, at a minimum, a demand for
greater specificity or a reasoned explanation for its refusal to turn over the requested documents.
On the other hand, Plaintiff has failed to allege prejudice and has repeatedly and
erroneously characterized requests for documents outside the ambit of § 104(b)(4) as requests for
“plan documents.” (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30–31; Pl.’s Br. 6, ECF No. 27.) And even if some of
Plaintiff’s requests can be construed as qualifying under § 104(b)(4) (see Feb. 6 Subpoena ¶ 1,
Nov. 8 Subpoena ¶¶ 1–2), Plaintiff has not told the Court how the documents he already has (the
voluntary benefit plan and the summary benefit description) are insufficient to understand his
rights as a beneficiary under the plan. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1070 (noting that “courts should
favor disclosure where it would help participants understand their rights”). These omissions and
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errors are ultimately fatal. Given the apparent lack of articulated purpose for the document
requests combined with the absence of prejudice, the Court declines to award statutory penalties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff cannot recover under § 502(a)(1)(B) because the plan documents unambiguously
preclude an individual earning Andre’s salary from electing $300,000 in life insurance coverage.
The Court also declines to award statutory penalties under § 502(c) because Plaintiff has not
alleged he was prejudiced by UACJ’s failure to deliver documents relating to Andre’s insurance
coverage.
An order consistent with this opinion will issue.
Dated: October 13, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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