USA v. Alowonle et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Victor Collins (5),
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cr-293 (PJS/DTS)
ORDER AND REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION
The Government charges fourteen defendants with Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy. Those defendants have filed more than sixty
pretrial motions. This Order and Report & Recommendation addresses two of Defendant
Victor Collins’s five pretrial motions. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends
Collins’s motion to suppress be denied and denies his motion to disclose the identity of a
confidential informant.
FACTS
I. 	Collins’s 2024 Warrantless Arrest
Officer Smedsrud is a police officer for the Minneapolis Police Department tasked
with investigating narcotics and firearms. Hr’g Tr. 10–11, Dkt. No. 486. On March 11,
2024, Officer Smedsrud received a tip from a confidential informant that a person riding
on the Minneapolis light rail was selling fentanyl and was in possession of a firearm. Id.
at 17. The informant described the suspect as “a black male with long dreadlocks,
wearing a dark blue polo brand puffy coat, with brown pants, wearing a black backpack.”
Id. at 18. The informant had provided Officer Smedsrud with accurate information in the
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six months preceding the tip. Id. (testifying that the warrant affidavit’s description of his
history with the informant was accurate).
Upon receiving this tip, Officer Smedsrud and his partner began searching for the
suspect. The officers were driving a marked police car. Id. at 19. When they arrived at the
Minneapolis light-rail platform between 22nd Avenue South and Lake Street, the officers
observed someone—Defendant Victor Collins—who matched the description provided by
the informant. Id. at 20. They circled the block, then parked along Lake Street to the east
of where Collins was standing. The officers, wearing Minneapolis Police uniforms, got out
of their squad car and walked toward Collins. Id. at 20–21. Officer Smedsrud claims that
he intended to conduct a “soft stop,” i.e., an “investigative detention to speak with
[Collins].” Id. at 22.
Officer Smedsrud asked Collins to take his hands out of his pockets while the
officers spoke with him. Hr’g Tr. at 23. Collins took his hands out of his pockets, but then
turned and ran away. Id. at 23–24. Only seconds passed between the officers’ approach
and Collins’s flight. Officer Smedsrud shouted, “no, don’t,” and the officers chased after
Collins. Hr’g Tr. 24. The chase lasted a little over a minute, taking the officers through two
parking lots, an intersection, and onto another street. Gov. Ex. A.4 0:52–2:13 (Smedsrud
BWC). Officer Smedsrud’s partner, who pulled ahead during the chase, shouted orders
at Collins.1 Smedsrud BWC 1:48–53, 2:05, 2:08–10.
By the time Officer Smedsrud caught up to his partner, Collins had been tazed and
was on the ground. Smedsrud BWC 2:13. The officers placed Collins face down on the
ground, handcuffing his hands behind his back. Id. at 2:13–3:15. A third officer, who had
1 These orders can only be faintly heard on Officer Smedsrud’s body-worn-camera video.
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just arrived on scene, assisted Officer Smedsrud and his partner handcuff Collins. Id. at
2:44–3:15. The officers then pulled Collins’s backpack out from underneath him, setting
it on the ground a few feet away. Id. at 3:18–22. When Collins asked why he was under
arrest, officers responded, “right now for running.” Hr’g Tr. 27. Officers proceeded to
search Collins’s person and his backpack. Smedsrud BWC 3:30–4:26.
The officers found a loaded handgun in the backpack. Id.; Hr’g Tr. 28. On Collins’s
person they found cash, an iPhone, and a plastic bag containing a pink, powdery
substance. Hr’g Tr. 29; Gov. Ex. A.1. When officers searched the route along which
Collins had fled, they found a discarded plastic bag containing 63 blue pills. Hr’g Tr. 29.
The blue pills tested field positive for fentanyl. Id. The pink powder field tested positive for
fentanyl and methamphetamine. Id. at 30.
II. 	Search Warrants
A. 	March 2024 Search Warrants
1. 	The March 11, 2024 Warrant
Later the same day, Officer Smedsrud applied for a warrant to search Collins’s
iPhone. Gov. Ex. A.1. Officer Smedsrud’s supporting affidavit outlined most of the facts
described above.2 The warrant sought “[a]ll information contained in the [iPhone] that
relate to firearm possession” within the date range of January 1, 2024, to March 11, 2024.
Gov. Ex. A.1 at 2. Hennepin County District Judge Peralta issued the requested search
warrant.
2 The March 11 warrant affidavit did not detail the number of blue pills found in the bag,
nor describe the results of the field testing. The warrant affidavit also included additional
details—for example, that Collins was prohibited from possessing firearms—that are not
relevant to Collins’s motion to suppress.
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2. 	The March 21, 2024 Warrant
During his search of the iPhone, Officer Smedsrud found evidence of narcotics
transactions. Hr’g Tr. 37. He documented roughly 12 pages of narcotics transactions in
his police report (based on his search of the phone). Hr’g Tr. 37. After realizing that the
warrant did not authorize him to search for information related to drug trafficking, Officer
Smedsrud applied for and received a second warrant on March 21, 2024. Hr’g Tr. 15. The
March 21 warrant sought information related to the possession and sale of narcotics in
addition to information related to firearm possession. Gov. Ex. A.2 at 2. The warrant
affidavit explained that “[t]his warrant was already signed, however, in the items to be
searched for, narcotics was not listed. Your affiant is resubmitting this search warrant to
include recovering evidence related to narcotics and narcotics possession.” Id. at 3.
The March 21 warrant affidavit contained a few additional details, see, e.g., id. at 4
(describing the results of field testing for the blue pills and pink powder), but the warrant
affidavit did not reference any narcotics-related evidence Officer Smedsrud had found
during the prior search of Collins’s iPhone.
B. 	May 2024 Search Warrant
FBI Task Force Officer David Ligneel applied for and received a search warrant on
May 31, 2024, for three devices and extractions held by state authorities. Gov. Ex. A.3
at 5. Relevant here is a red iPhone that had been seized from Collins a year earlier, on
April 15, 2023. Id. Officer Ligneel sought information related to the Government’s RICO
investigation into the Lows gang. Id. at 7. According to Officer Ligneel, Collins was a
member of the Lows. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Although state law enforcement had already applied
for and received a warrant to search the red iPhone shortly after Collins’s 2023 arrest, the
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Government sought “this additional warrant out of an abundance of caution to be certain
that the warrant covers all evidence related to this broader federal investigation[.]” Gov.
Ex. A.3 at 24–25.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Warrantless Arrest
A. 	Probable Cause
Collins contends that his March 11, 2024 warrantless arrest was unlawful, seeking
to suppress evidence seized as a result of the arrest. Collins’s Mot. Suppress 1–2, Dkt.
No. 376. “The exclusionary rule enjoins the Government from benefiting from evidence it
has unlawfully obtained[.]” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475 (1980). Under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule extends to the suppression of evidence
“obtained directly or indirectly through the exploitation of police illegality.” United States
v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 493–94 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463,
465 (8th Cir.1987)). The fighting issue here is whether the warrantless arrest of Collins
on March 11, 2024, was lawful.
“A warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by
probable cause.” Royster v. Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 687–88 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fisher
v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Probable cause exists when
the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonable
person to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.” Brown
v. 	City 	of 	St. 	Louis, 	40 	F.4th 	895, 	900 	(8th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(citation 	modified). 	This
probable-cause determination is based on the facts known to the arresting officer at the
time of the arrest. United States v. Finley, 56 F.4th 1159, 1165 (8th Cir. 2023).
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Officer Smedsrud testified that he arrested Collins for fleeing from a police officer
on foot in violation of Minnesota Statute § 609.487, subdiv. 6, which reads as follows:
Whoever, for the purpose of avoiding arrest, detention, or
investigation, or in order to conceal or destroy potential
evidence related to the commission of a crime, attempts to
evade or elude a peace officer, who is acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty, by means of running, hiding, or
by any other means except fleeing in a motor vehicle, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subdiv. 6. Relevant here, the elements of the crime of fleeing on
foot are: “(1) the defendant attempted to evade or elude a peace officer, (2) the officer
was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, (3) the defendant’s flight occurred
by means of running, hiding, or by any other means except fleeing in a motor vehicle, and
(4) the defendant acted with the specific intent to avoid arrest, detention, or investigation.”
State v. Lutz, No. A23-1668, 2024 WL 3755942, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2024); see
also 	10A 	Jonathan 	Hoffmann, 	Minnesota 	Practice 	Series 	Jury 	Instruction 	Guides
CRIMJIG § 29.23 (7th Ed. Oct. 2025 Update) (summarizing the elements).
Based 	on 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances, 	Officer 	Smedsrud 	reasonably
concluded that Collins had committed the crime of fleeing the police on foot. First,
because Officer Smedsrud and his partner got out of a marked police car wearing police
uniforms, a reasonable person would have concluded that Collins knew he was being
approached by police officers. Thus, Collins’s headlong flight was an attempt to evade
the police. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (“Headlong flight—
wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion[.]”). Second, Officer Smedsrud’s
job 	in 	the 	Minneapolis 	Police 	Department 	was 	handling 	narcotics 	and 	firearm
investigations. Officer Smedsrud approached Collins to investigate whether he illegally
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possessed a firearm and was distributing narcotics. Therefore, Officer Smedsrud was
acting in the discharge of an official duty, and nothing in the record suggests his conduct
was unlawful.3 Third, Collins fled on foot.
Fourth and finally, it was reasonable for Officer Smedsrud to conclude that Collins
acted with the specific intent to avoid arrest, detention, or investigation. Collins’s
immediate headlong flight upon encountering police officers, although “not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, . . . is certainly suggestive of such.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–
25. Moreover, Collins’s headlong flight must be taken in conjunction with the informant’s
tip that Collins possessed contraband and was engaged in criminal activity. When
Collins—a criminal suspect who an informant claimed was in the possession of narcotics
and a firearm—immediately fled upon being approached by the police, a reasonable
person in Officer Smedsrud’s position would have concluded that Collins was fleeing with
the intent to avoid arrest, detention, or investigation.
Collins counters that Officer Smedsrud initiated a consensual encounter, “[a]nd in
any consensual encounter, Mr. Collins maintained the right we all have under the Fourth
Amendment to ignore the officers, to walk away, or even to run away.” Dkt. No. 548 at 9.
Fair enough. “A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop when the questioning is so
‘intimidating, threatening or coercive that a reasonable person would not have believed
himself free to leave.’” United States v. Hathcock, 103 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1997)
(quoting United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1419 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
Although Officer Smedsrud claims he intended to conduct an investigatory stop, his
conduct lacked the hallmarks of a seizure: he did not display a weapon, physically touch
3 Collins only contends that his warrantless arrest was unlawful.
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Collins, use language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with requests was
compelled, or approach Collins with several officers. United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775,
779 (8th Cir. 1996) (summarizing factors to consider when deciding whether an encounter
is consensual). That meant Collins could “decline to listen to the questions . . . and . . . go
on his way.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983). But although Collins was free
to leave, that does not mean he was free to evade the police “with the specific intent to
avoid arrest, detention, or investigation.” Lutz, 2024 WL 3755942, at *4. Stated otherwise,
the plain language of § 609.487, subdivision 6 criminalizes, in certain circumstances,
flight from consensual encounters with law enforcement, and the Court is not persuaded
that 	Minnesota’s 	flight-by-other-means 	statute 	thereby 	runs 	afoul 	of 	the 	Fourth
Amendment.
Regardless, even assuming that Collins is correct and the police could not arrest
him for avoiding a consensual encounter, circumstances changed when Collins fled.
Officer Smedsrud warned Collins not to run, then officers chased him for over a minute,
and near the end of the chase Officer Smedsrud’s partner shouted orders at Collins. That
the officers chased Collins and told him to stop fleeing made it clear that Collins was not
free to leave. In other words, although Officer Smedsrud initiated a consensual encounter,
it quickly shifted to an attempted seizure. Collins continued to flee anyway. Thus, Collins’s
reliance on his “right . . . to ignore the officers, to walk away, or even to run away” does
not alter the outcome. Even if § 609.487 does not (or could not) criminalize flight from a
consensual encounter with police, the encounter was no longer consensual once officers
attempted to seize Collins. Officer Smedsrud had probable cause to arrest Collins for
fleeing from the police on foot. See United States v. Wells, No. 23-cr-271, 2024 WL
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1794404, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2024) (finding probable cause to arrest a suspect who
ignored police orders and fled); United States v. Balenger, No. 19-cr-318, 2020 WL
4582228, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2020) (finding probable cause to arrest a suspect who
fled after an attempted investigatory stop); United States v. Shaffer, No. 24-cr-301, 2025
WL 1571007, at *4 (D. Minn. May 15, 2025), R. & R. adopted by 2025 WL 1569974
(D. Minn. June 3, 2025) (finding probable cause to arrest a suspect who refused to comply
with police orders and took off running); United States v. Gant, No. 12-cr-61, 2012 WL
2060637, at *4 (D. Minn. June 7, 2012) (“Where a defendant, like Gant, refuses to obey
officer commands and flees, a police officer has probable cause to arrest the defendant
for resisting arrest.”).
Collins disagrees, arguing that “there must have been a lawful basis for detention
before [] Collins could potentially have been guilty of this offense.” Dkt. No. 548 at 8.
Not so. The Eighth Circuit has “consistently held that a defendant’s response to an arrest
or Terry stop—even an invalid one—may constitute independent grounds for arrest.”
United States v. Flores-Lagonas, 993 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 2021). Courts in this District
have repeatedly applied this Eighth Circuit precedent to Minnesota’s flight-by-other-
means statute. See Wells, 2024 WL 1794404, at *4; Shaffer, 2025 WL 1571007, at *4;
Gant, 2012 WL 2060637, at *4. This makes sense given that a basis for lawful detention
is not an element of the offense. See Lutz, 2024 WL 3755942, at *4; 10A Jonathan
Hoffmann, Minnesota Practice Series Jury Instruction Guides CRIMJIG § 29.23 (7th Ed.
Oct. 2025 Update).
Even if it mattered, there was, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion for the officers
to detain Collins once he fled. “Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of
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particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime is being committed.” United States v.
Givens, 763 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). Officer Smedsrud received
a tip from a confidential informant who claimed that someone matching Collins’s
description was selling narcotics and was in possession of a firearm. This informant had
provided reliable information to Officer Smedsrud for the preceding six months. Upon
seeing the police, Collins immediately fled. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25 (although “not
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, . . . [headlong flight] is certainly suggestive of such”).
These facts, at a minimum, reasonably warranted suspicion that Collins was engaged in
criminal activity—e.g., drug possession and trafficking—distinct from fleeing from the
police on foot. Thus, Officer Smedsrud had a lawful basis to detain Collins. For all the
above reasons, the Court recommends denying Collins’s motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of his arrest.
B. 	Search Incident to Arrest
Collins separately challenges the warrantless search of his backpack following his
arrest. Dkt. No. 548. The Government responds that the search of the backpack was a
valid search incident to arrest. Dkt. No. 573 at 6–7. “[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One of those
exceptions is a search incident to arrest. United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 750
(8th Cir. 2010). “A search incident to arrest may lawfully extend to ‘the arrestee’s person
and the area within his immediate control,’ that is, ‘the area into which an arrestee might
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reach 	in 	order 	to 	grab 	a 	weapon 	or 	evidentiary 	items.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Chimel 	v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). “The exception derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009).
Eighth 	Circuit 	precedent 	squarely 	forecloses 	Collins’s 	argument 	that 	the
warrantless search of the backpack went beyond the scope of a permissible search
incident to arrest. In United States v. Perdoma, police officers searched a zippered bag4
after handcuffing the defendant, escorting him to a separate area, and taking the bag
away from him. 621 F.3d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 2010). There, the Eighth Circuit explained
that “we have rejected the notion that an officer’s exclusive control of an item necessarily
removes the item from the arrestee’s area of immediate control.” Id. at 750. Because “the
record suggest[ed] that the search of the bag occurred in close proximity to where
Perdoma was restrained,” and “Perdoma had already run from the officers once,” the
search-incident-to-arrest exception applied. Id. at 751. There is no daylight between
Perdoma and this case.5 In Perdoma, the record suggested that officers had searched
the bag while it was near where the defendant was restrained. Here, body-worn-camera
footage depicts officers searching the backpack within a few feet of Collins only minutes
4 Although the Eighth Circuit did not describe the bag, the underlying Report and
Recommendation described it as “a small, soft-sided, carry-on bag with a seemingly
normal looking exterior and a zippered top in his possession.” United States v. Perdoma,
No. 8:08-cr-460, 2009 WL 1209556, at *1 (D. Neb. Apr. 7, 2009), R. & R. adopted in
relevant part by 2009 WL 1490595 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009).
5 Other Eighth Circuit precedent supports the same result. See, e.g., United States v.
Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 587 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Under the circumstances, Deputy Marshal
Postudensek could reasonably have believed that weapons were within reach of the
hand-cuffed detainees[.]”); United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 889–91 (8th Cir. 2008)
(applying the search-incident-to-arrest exception when the defendant was handcuffed
and placed in a squad car).
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after his arrest. Smedsrud BWC 2:10–4:26. Collins, like the defendant in Perdoma, had
recently fled from the police when his backpack was searched. If anything, the officers
had a more compelling reason to conduct a search incident to arrest here because a
confidential informant had told them Collins possessed a firearm. The Court therefore
recommends Collins’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his backpack be denied.
II. 	Motion to Disclose Confidential Informant
Collins moves to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who provided
the tip leading to his March 11, 2024 arrest. Dkt. No. 377. “In a motion to compel
disclosure of a confidential informant, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
a need for disclosure.” United States v. Wright, 145 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1998). When
determining whether disclosure is appropriate, courts weigh the Government’s privilege
to withhold the identity of its confidential informants against the criminal defendant’s right
to information. United States v. Lapsley, 334 F.3d 762, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2003). “[P]erhaps
the most important factor for a court in this circumstance to consider is whether the
[confidential informant’s] information is material to the defense.” Id. at 764. When a
confidential informant acts as a mere tipster, “i.e., a person who merely conveys
information but does not witness or participate in the offense, disclosure is not required.”
Carpenter v. Lock, 257 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2001). But when the confidential informant
“is an active participant or witness to the offense charged, disclosure will almost always
be material to the accused’s defense.” Id. (quoting Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201, 206
(8th Cir. 1995)).
Collins argues that “[t]he informant needs to be identified because he was the sole
person responsible for [his] arrest.” Dkt. No. 548 at 4. According to Collins, “the whole of
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the government’s argument that the arrest and subsequent searches were legal rests on
whether the informant’s conclusory and uncorroborated tip gave the officer’s [sic] the legal
justification to detain [him].” Id. at 5. Thus, Collins claims that the “credibility and veracity
of this informant are crucial to Mr. Collin’s defense.” Id. at 5. The Court disagrees.
Here, the confidential informant was a mere tipster. He informed the police that
Collins was in possession of narcotics and a firearm. Officer Smedsrud then approached
Collins to investigate the tip. The informant was not present at the time of Collins’s arrest,
and there is no indication the Government intends to call the informant to testify at trial.
The informant’s limited knowledge of Collins’s criminal activity, which he provided to the
police in the form of a tip, is not enough to render the informant a material witness. See
United States v. Bourbon, 819 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the informant
was a mere tipster even though “the informant admittedly was in appellant’s house and
personally observed the cocaine”); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878
(8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the informant was a mere tipster even though “the
informant made controlled buys from the apartment and observed the cocaine one day
prior to the warrant’s execution”).
Collins concedes as much by failing to meaningfully explain how the identity of the
confidential informant is important to presenting a defense at trial. See generally
Dkt No. 377. Rather, Collins claims the identity of the confidential informant is critical to
his pretrial suppression motion. Id. at 4 (“The informant is the only person besides the
officers who can testify about what information was actually conveyed, when it was
conveyed, and the circumstances under which it was obtained.”), 5 (“The informant’s tip
here was the direct and sole basis for establishing probable cause for defendant’s
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warrantless arrest.”); Dkt. No. 548 at 5 (“The credibility and veracity of this informant are
crucial to Mr. Collins’s defense and to the Court’s determination of Mr. Collins’s argument
that the arrests and searches were unconstitutional.”).
Collins’s reason for seeking the identity of the confidential informant is important
because the interests at stake in a suppression hearing are less than those at trial. As the
Supreme Court has explained,
[A]lthough the Due Process Clause has been held to require
the Government to disclose the identity of an informant at trial,
provided the identity is shown to be relevant and helpful to the
defense, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61, 77
S.Ct. 623, 627–28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), it has never been
held to require the disclosure of an informant’s identity at a
suppression hearing. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87
S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). We conclude that the
process due at a suppression hearing may be less demanding
and elaborate than the protections accorded the defendant at
the trial itself.
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980); see also United States v. Cummins,
912 F.2d 98, 103–04 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Due process does not require the disclosure of an
informant’s identity at a suppression hearing.”); United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562,
570 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[T]he interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser
magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself.” (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 679));
United States v. Jackson, No. 95-20942, 1997 WL 73735, at *2 (5th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (“[T]he interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of less importance than
those in the actual criminal trial.”); United States v. Napier, 436 F.3d 1133, 1136–37
(9th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ue process requirements at suppression hearings are less elaborate
and demanding than those at trial.”); United States v. Campbell, No. 4:22-cr-97, 2023 WL
5280039, at *7 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2023), R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 5275072 (E.D.
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Mo. Aug. 16, 2023) (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967)). At a minimum,
even if this factor is not dispositive, the fact that Collins seeks the identity of the
confidential informant to support his suppression motion—rather than to present a
defense at trial—weighs heavily in the Government’s favor.
In this case, there is not nearly enough to tip the scales in favor of disclosure.
Despite Collins’s protestations to the contrary, the suppression analysis rests primarily on
Officer Smedsrud’s body-worn-camera footage and Officer Smedsrud’s testimony, not
the confidential informant’s tip. See Supra, Part I.A. The fighting issue was not whether
the tip provided Officer Smedsrud probable cause to arrest Collins, but whether Officer
Smedsrud had probable cause to arrest Collins for fleeing the police. The tip, at most, is
only moderately relevant to the analysis of Collins’s specific intent. This is nowhere near
enough to override the Government’s interest in withholding the identity of its confidential
informants, see, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1991)
(summarizing the purpose of the Government’s privilege to withhold the identity of its
confidential informants), especially when Collins seeks the identity of the informant to
support a suppression motion. Collins’s motion to disclose the identity of the confidential
informant is denied.
III. 	Search Warrants
A. 	March 2024 Warrants
Collins moves to suppress evidence obtained from the search of an iPhone
recovered from him on the day of his March 11, 2024 arrest, arguing that Officer
Smedsrud’s search of the iPhone exceeded the scope of the March 11, 2024 warrant.
Dkt. No. 376 at 3–5. “If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a
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validly issued warrant . . . , the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.”
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990). “A lawful search extends to all areas and
containers in which the object of the search may be found.” United States v. Weinbender,
109 F.3d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997). “While the burden of proof for an allegation that the
Government exceeded the scope of a search warrant does not appear to be clearly
developed in the Eighth Circuit, courts have noted that ‘the burdens of production and
persuasion generally rest upon the movant in a suppression hearing.’” United States v.
Crawford, 220 F. Supp. 3d 931, 936–37 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (quoting United States v. Starks,
193 F.R.D. 624, 628 (D. Minn. 2000)).
The parties agree that the March 11, 2024 warrant was limited to information
regarding firearms and that Officer Smedsrud was not authorized to search the iPhone
for 	information 	regarding narcotics transactions. 	Therefore, 	Collins 	argues, Officer
Smedsrud exceeded the scope of the warrant and the evidence must be suppressed. The
Government does not contest this directly, but rather argues that the evidence of drug
trafficking was permissibly uncovered pursuant to the plain view doctrine. “The plain view
doctrine allows a police officer to seize evidence without a warrant when (1) the officer
did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence
could be plainly viewed, (2) the object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent,
and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.” United States v.
Abumayyaleh, 530 F.3d 641, 648–49 (8th Cir. 2008). “As with all exceptions to the
warrant requirement, it is the government’s burden to prove that the plain-view doctrine
applies.” United States v. Figueroa-Serrano, 971 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2020). The
Government contends that because “Officer Smedsrud was authorized to search the
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phone for evidence of firearms possession, he was ‘under no obligation to ignore’ text
messages or other evidence of Mr. Collins’s drug trafficking activity[.]” Dkt. No. 406 at 18.
Perhaps so. But the application of the plain view doctrine to this case is not so simple as
the Government’s cursory analysis suggests.
“[T]he Eighth Circuit has never explicitly adopted or rejected the plain view doctrine
with respect to digital searches.” United States v. Armstrong, No. 23-cr-324, 2024 WL
2894273, at *26 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 2024), R. & R. adopted sub nom. United States v.
Sam, 2024 WL 2354593 (D. Minn. May 23, 2024). However, most circuits to consider the
issue have applied the plain view doctrine to digital searches. See United States v. Galpin,
720 F.3d 436, 451 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 241–42 & n.16
(3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Loera, 923 F.3d 907,
922–23 (10th Cir. 2019); United States v. Miranda, 325 F. App’x 858, 860 (11th Cir. 2009).
But see United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1170–77
(9th Cir. 2010). Despite (largely) agreeing to apply the plain view doctrine to digital
searches, however, the courts that have applied the doctrine in that context are far from
uniform in how they apply it. See, e.g., Stabile, 633 F.3d at 241–42 (“We hold that the
plain view doctrine applies to seizures of evidence during searches of computer files, but
the exact confines of the doctrine will vary from case to case in a common-sense, fact-
intensive manner.”). For example, the Tenth Circuit “continue[s] to include inadvertence
as a factor to consider when deciding whether an electronic search fell within the scope
of its authorizing warrant or outside of it.” Loera, 923 F.3d at 919 n.3. The Fourth Circuit
disagrees, 	reasoning 	that 	“[i]nadvertence 	focuses 	incorrectly 	on 	the 	subjective
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motivations of the officer in conducting the search and not on the objective determination
of whether the search is authorized by the warrant or a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.” Williams, 592 F.3d at 523.
To decide whether the plain view doctrine is properly applied to a particular digital
search, courts in this District have considered how the digital files were stored, how
officers executed the search, and the character of the evidence at issue. United States v.
Panetti, No. 24-cr-324, 2025 WL 3906303, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025), R. & R. adopted
by 2025 WL 3687969 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); United States v. Armstrong, No. 23-cr-
324, 2024 WL 2894273, at *26–27 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 2024), R. & R. adopted sub nom.
United States v. Sam, 2024 WL 2354593 (D. Minn. May 23, 2024); United States v.
Eggerson, No. 0:18-cr-110, 2018 WL 6520648 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018), R. & R. adopted
by 2018 WL 5962481 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2018). Those details are missing from the record
here. See generally Hr’g Tr. This is fatal to the Government’s argument. Without reviewing
the at-issue text messages, for example, the Court cannot determine whether the
incriminating character of those text messages was readily apparent. Eggerson, 2018 WL
6520648, 	at 	*5 	(“[The 	investigator] 	immediately 	knew 	[the 	video 	evidence 	was]
incriminating because he knew Mr. Eggerson to be a felon prohibited from possessing
firearms.”); Armstrong, 2024 WL 2894273, at *27 (“[T]he criminality of [the] text messages
. . . are not immediately apparent.”). Similarly, without knowing how Officer Smedsrud
searched Collins’s iPhone, or where the information was in relation to other, properly
searched information, the Court cannot determine whether he impermissibly expanded
the scope of his search. Panetti, No. 24-cr-324, 2025 WL 3906303, at *8 (considering
“whether the officers discovered the unexpected evidence in plain view while acting within
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the scope of their existing search warrants”); Armstrong, 2024 WL 2894273, at *27 (“[B]y
choosing to remain ignorant of Cellebrite’s date sorting methods, and by adopting a
personal search strategy that involved finding evidence first and only checking the dates
of the messages after, SA Dieter effectively converted his first, temporally limited search
warrant into a general warrant[.]”); see also United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 451
(2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court’s review of the plain view issue should take into account
the degree, if any, to which digital search protocols target information outside the scope
of the valid portion of the warrant. To the extent such search methods are used, the plain
view exception is not available.”). In this case, because the record before the court
contains no details regarding the search for, discovery of, or content of, the text
messages, the Government has not met its burden to demonstrate that the plain view
doctrine applies to Officer Smedsrud’s discovery of the narcotics information during the
execution of the March 11, 2024 search warrant.
Nonetheless, the Court declines to recommend suppression of the evidence. The
later, March 21, 2024, search warrant provided Officer Smedsrud with a lawful basis to
search Collins’s iPhone independent of the allegedly illegal prior conduct. Under the
independent source doctrine, the exclusionary rule does not apply when the Government
demonstrates “that the evidence was acquired through a source independent of the taint.”
United States v. Swope, 542 F.3d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 2008). Two questions “must be
answered in the affirmative for [a] warrant to be an independent source: first, would the
police have applied for the warrant had they not acquired the tainted information; and
second, 	do 	the 	[supporting] 	affidavits 	support 	probable 	cause 	after 	[any] 	tainted
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information has been redacted from them.” Id. at 614. Although fairly debatable, the Court
finds that the answer to both questions is yes here.
Consider the facts that were included in the March 21, 2024 warrant affidavit
(which affidavit did not reference the tainted evidence of drug trafficking previously found
on Collins’s iPhone). Officer Smedsrud had received information from a confidential
informant that Collins was selling fentanyl. Gov. Ex. A.2 at 3–4. After Collins’s arrest,
officers recovered a bag with 63 blue pills which field tested positive for fentanyl. Id. at 5.
They also recovered a baggie containing pink powder that field tested positive for fentanyl
and methamphetamine. Id. According to Officer Smedsrud, this quantity of narcotics was
“not the amount a user would typically have.” Id. Collins also did not have any drug
paraphernalia on him indicating personal use of the narcotics found in his possession,
and he had denominations of cash consistent with narcotics sales. Id. These facts
established ample probable cause to search Collins’s iPhone for evidence of narcotics
transactions. Because none of this information flowed from Officer Smedsrud’s execution
of the March 11, 2024 search warrant, the March 21, 2024 warrant affidavit established
probable cause without reliance on any tainted information.
Moreover, given that 	Officer Smedsrud (1) was already investigating Collins for
selling fentanyl per the confidential informant’s tip; (2) had ample reason to believe
evidence of drug trafficking would be found on Collins’s iPhone; and (3) applied for the
March 21, 2024 warrant when he realized the March 11, 2024 warrant was limited to
information related to firearms, the Court finds that Officer Smedsrud would have applied
for a warrant to search Collins’s iPhone for evidence of drug trafficking even if he had not
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acquired the tainted information6. In short, this is a case where suppressing evidence
would place the Government in a worse position than it would have been had no
misconduct occurred. Therefore, the Court recommends denying Collins’s motion to
suppress the evidence of drug trafficking found on Collins’s iPhone.
Finally, Collins advances—though with scarce detail or development—one last
argument for suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the March 2024 warrants.
He asserts that the original warrant was overbroad and so lacked particularity that it
amounted to a “general warrant.” Thought he does not say it directly he appears to
suggest that any evidence seized pursuant to the second warrant must therefore be
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree (i.e. the original, defective warrant).
Collins’s argument stumbles out of the gate. Far from lacking in particularity, the
original warrant was narrow and specific. First, it was temporally limited to evidence
during a two-month window, “1/1/2024 to 3/1/2024.” Gov. Ex. A.1 at 2. It authorized a
search—within that window—for three defined categories of information: (1) evidence of
firearms 	transactions 	or 	possession; 	(2) 	identity 	of 	persons 	involved 	in 	firearms
distribution; and (3) evidence as to who used or owned the phone. Id. This is no general
warrant.
6 Collins may suggest that but for the discovery of the tainted information Officer
Smedsrud would never have either (1) realized that he had probable cause to search the
iPhone for any trafficking information and (2) would not have realized the phone might
contain such evidence. The record says otherwise. Though not expressly stated in the
record, it is reasonable to infer that Officer Smedsrud’s omission of the narcotics
trafficking from the initial warrant was inadvertent. It is likewise reasonable to infer that
the omission would likely have been discovered and corrected even if the tainted
evidence had never been searched.
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B. 	May 2024 Warrant
i. 	Unreasonable Delay
Collins moves to suppress evidence obtained from the May 2024 search of the red
Phone recovered from Collins a year earlier, in April 2023. Collins makes two distinct
arguments for suppression. First, he claims that the Government unreasonably delayed
in applying for a warrant to search the red iPhone. Dkt. No. 376 at 5. A warrantless seizure
reasonable at its inception may become unreasonable when the Government unduly
delays in applying for a warrant. United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 616 (8th Cir. 2021).
Courts “demand expediency in obtaining a search warrant to search seized evidence in
order to avoid interfering with a continuing possessory interest for longer than reasonably
necessary, in case the search reveals no evidence (or permissibly segregable evidence)
of a crime and the item has no independent evidentiary value and is not otherwise
forfeitable.” United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1340 (11th Cir. 2015); see also
United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The right of the police to
temporarily 	seize 	a person’s 	property 	pending 	the 	issuance 	of 	a 	search 	warrant
presupposes that the police will act with diligence to apply for the warrant.”). There is no
bright-line rule for determining when such a delay becomes unreasonable. Id. (citing
United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012)). Rather, courts balance
the property-owner’s possessory and privacy-related interests against law-enforcement-
related concerns to determine the reasonableness of any delay between the time an item
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is seized and a warrant to search is sought. Id. at 617 (summarizing the relevant
considerations).
Here, state law enforcement seized the red iPhone incident to Collins’s April 15,
2023 arrest, and applied for a warrant to search it three days later. Gov. Ex. A.3 at 20,
22. Because the delay in applying for the search warrant was negligible, there was no
undue delay so as to require this court to seriously weigh the relevant competing
concerns. Though Collins argues that the delay should be measured from when state law
enforcement seized the red iPhone to when the Government applied for its second
warrant on May 31, 2024, Dkt. No. 376 at 5–6, this makes little sense. Here, state law
enforcement, not the federal law enforcement, seized the cell phone. After seizing the red
iPhone, state law enforcement promptly secured a search warrant. State law enforcement
then retained the red iPhone as evidence of a crime. At that point, Collins’s possessory
interest evaporated. Stated otherwise, the concern that animates this doctrine was no
longer present once the initial search was conducted. The delay between the (prompt)
initial search and the second search is of no consequence. Simply put, this is not a case
where law enforcement seized an item without a warrant and then unreasonably delayed
applying for a search warrant.
ii. 	Staleness
Collins also claims that the May 31, 2024 warrant to search the red iPhone was
“stale.” Dkt. No. 376 at 5. “A warrant becomes stale if the information supporting the
warrant is not sufficiently close in time to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent
search conducted so that probable cause can be said to exist as of the time of the search.”
United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation modified); see also
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United States v. Lemon, 590 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The date of the evidence in
the 	affidavit 	is 	important 	to 	the 	probable 	cause 	determination 	because 	untimely
information 	may 	be 	deemed 	stale.”). 	To 	determine 	whether 	probable 	cause 	has
dissipated, courts consider the passage of time, the nature of the criminal activity at issue,
and the character of property subject to the search. United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d
1121, 1124 (8th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir.
1999) (“[T]he lapse of time is least important when the suspected criminal activity is
continuing in nature and when the property is not likely to be destroyed or dissipated.”).
Collins’s staleness argument would make sense if the only information supporting
the May 2024 search all came from the affidavit filed in connection with the original search
a year earlier. But that is not what occurred here. The affidavit supporting the May 2024
warrant recites facts regarding incidents in February and March of 2024 and avers that
the RICO activities of the Lows gang began in 2004 continues “to the present.” Gov. Ex.
A.3 at 17–24. Therefore, the information in the warrant affidavit was not stale. Nor could
it be colorably argued that the warrant lacked probably cause to establish that a cellphone
seized in 2023 would no longer have evidence of criminal activity in 2024. The affidavit
clearly expresses that the gang activities that are the subject of the investigation have
been ongoing since at least 2004. Gov. Ex. A.3 at 17–19. Smartphones retain data for
long periods of time. United States v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 1067, 1072 (8th Cir. 2022).
Therefore, a “delay between the time a cell phone is seized and when it is searched is
not likely to cause stored personal data to be lost, or data of potential evidentiary
relevance to become stale.” Id. Because there was no risk of the data on the red iPhone
being lost or destroyed while it remained in law enforcement custody, the length of time
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between seizure of the cell phone and execution of the federal search warrant is irrelevant
to the probable cause analysis. See United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1173
(8th Cir. 2009) (“The computer media at issue here were electronically-stored files in the
custody of law enforcement. Because of the nature of this evidence, the several months’
delay 	in 	searching 	the 	media 	did 	not 	alter 	the 	probable 	cause 	analysis.”). 	The
Government sought information related to a years-long, ongoing RICO conspiracy. There
was no reason to believe that responsive information (e.g., text messages from before
April 2023 demonstrating Collins’s membership with the Lows) could not be found on
Collins’s red iPhone. The Court recommends Collins’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained from the search of his red iPhone be denied.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Defendant Victor
Collins’s Motion to Disclose and Make Informant Available for Interview (Dkt. No. 377) is
DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that: Defendant Victor
Collins’s Motion to Suppress Any Evidence Obtained as a Result of Illegal Searches
(Dkt. No. 376) be DENIED.
Dated: February 26, 2026 	s/ David T. Schultz___________
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set for in LR 72.2(c).
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