Oliver and Company et al v. Zamber et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
OLIVER AND COMPANY, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-00132-MTS
)
DR. RONALD ZAMBER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Receiver Jason Buhlinger’s Motion for Leave to File his
Preliminary Report under Seal, Doc. [127], as well as Defendant Michael Cosby’s Motion for
Continued Sealing, Doc. [140], pursuant to Eastern District of Missouri Local Rule 13.05. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motions without prejudice. The Court will provide
these parties with fourteen days to file a renewed Motion for Continued Sealing consistent with
the Court’s discussion below. If no renewed Motion is filed, the Court will enter an Order lifting
the seal, and Documents [128], [128-1], [141], and [141-1] will be placed on the public docket,
subject to the mandatory fourteen-day stay of an Order Denying Sealing. E.D. Mo. L.R.
13.05(A)(4)(g).
I. Background
On June 04, 2025, the Court appointed Jason Buhlinger as Receiver for Visionary Private
Equity Group I, LP (“VPEG”) and Visionary Fund Manager, LLC. Doc. [88] at 23. In that Order,
the Court directed Receiver Buhlinger to “prepare a report that contains for each month from
January 01, 2021, to the present a statement of cash receipts and disbursements by Defendants”
and “schedules and reports of assets, liabilities, or inventories that are necessary and proper.” Id.
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at 27. Pursuant to that directive, Receiver Buhlinger prepared a Preliminary Report providing the
Court “with a status update and a summary of [his] initial and preliminary findings and
observations to date.” Doc. [128-1] at 1. Although Receiver Buhlinger “believes that his
Preliminary Report does not need to be filed under seal,” he did so out of an abundance of caution
given the contentious nature of this litigation and the possibility that other parties might disagree.
Doc. [127] at 2–3 (summarizing statements made by certain Defendants). In light of those
representations, the Court ordered Defendants to file a Motion for Continued Sealing and a sealed
Memorandum Supporting Sealing setting forth “the specific legal and factual reasons justifying
the sealing of the Receiver’s Preliminary Report . . . in its entirety.” Doc. [135] (quoting E.D. Mo.
L.R. 13.05(A)(4)(a), (b)(i)).
Defendant Michael Cosby was the only Defendant to respond. He contends that Receiver
Buhlinger’s Preliminary Report contains “private financial and sensitive business information,
which the public has little legitimate interest in accessing.” Doc. [140] (citing Hoffmann Bros.
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Hoffmann Air Conditioning & Heating, LLC, 4:19-cv-00200-
SEP, 2022 WL 1718882, at *5 (E.D. Mo. May 27, 2022)). Defendant Cosby further argues the
Preliminary Report contains nine discrete categories of information “of the type” that courts have
previously filed under seal. Doc. [141] at 3. Those categories are as follows:
• Bank account information for accounts related to VPEG at Great Southern Bank, including
accounts held by non-party entities;
• Bank account balance information for accounts related to VPEG at Great Southern Bank,
including accounts held by non-party entities;
• Information pertaining to potential future investments;
• Detailed cash in-flow information for VPEG;
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• Identification of vendors (individuals and entities) and detailed information concerning
vendor payables;
• Detailed financial statement and tax return information for VPEG;
• Detailed information concerning VPEG’s operating costs;
• Detailed information pertaining to potential future funding; and
• Detailed information concerning VPEG’s portfolio and investments.
According to Defendant Cosby, “VPEG has treated its financial information as confidential and
proprietary, as it has only been disseminated under non-disclosure agreements, protective orders,
or other confidentiality requirements.” Doc. [141] at 4. As a result, he “requests that the Court
enter an Order requiring the continued sealing of the Receiver’s Preliminary Report.” Id.
II. Legal Standard
“[T]here is a common-law right of access to judicial records, but that right is not absolute.”
Flynt v. Lombardi, 885 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435
U.S. 597–98 (1978)). Determining the precise contours of that right in a given case “requires a
weighing of competing interests.” Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 898 F.2d 1371,
1376 (8th Cir. 1990). The “right of access bolsters public confidence in the judicial system by
allowing citizens to evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of judicial proceedings, and to keep
a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.” IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th
Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). However, those interests must be balanced “against the
salutary interests served by maintaining confidentiality of the information sought to be sealed.”
Id. at 1223. “[T]he weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of
the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and resultant value of such
information to those monitoring the federal courts.” Id. at 1224 (quoting United States v. Amodeo,
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71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)). Ultimately, “[t]he presumption of public access to judicial
records may be overcome if the party seeking to keep the records under seal provides compelling
reasons for doing so.” Flynt, 885 F.3d at 511 (citing In re Neal, 461 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir.
2006)).
III. Discussion
Defendant Cosby has not carried his burden to show that the relevant balance weighs in
favor of restricting public access to Receiver Buhlinger’s Preliminary Report. See id. (explaining
that the key question is “whether the party seeking to prevent disclosure has overcome the
common-law right of access”). His argument is limited to the observation that other courts have
seen fit to seal information related to financial records, bank accounts, operational costs, and other
non-public matters in other cases. Doc. [141] at 3–4. The problem for Defendant Cosby is that
his contentions address only one half of the interests that the Court must weigh. To be sure,
litigants and non-litigants have a legitimate interest in keeping “private financial information”
confidential. Eagen v. Kirksville Missouri Hosp. Co., 2:20-cv-00056-SPM, 2021 WL 6134381, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 29, 2021). And courts have permitted sealing or targeted redactions of private
financial information under appropriate circumstances. Hoffmann Bros., 2022 WL 1718882, at *4
(permitting targeted redactions of “private financial information that played no role in the parties’
arguments or the court’s analysis” (citation modified)). But Defendant Cosby provides no analysis
whatsoever regarding how these interests should balance against the weight of the right of public
access to Receiver Buhlinger’s Preliminary Report.
As the Court sees it, the right of public access outweighs the interests that Defendant Cosby
advances. First, the claims in this matter directly relate to much of the information over which he
seeks continued sealing, including the financial health of VPEG, the decision-making of its
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individual officers, and VPEG’s state of affairs when those officers made certain statements and
material omissions to the Plaintiffs. It follows that the information in the Receiver’s Preliminary
Report will play a “role in the parties’ arguments or the court’s analysis” in this action. Id. So,
unlike cases where similar information was appropriately sealed, “the role of the material at issue
in the exercise of Article III judicial power and resultant value of such information to those
monitoring the federal courts,” IDT Corp., 709 F.3d at 1224 (citation omitted), is much more
substantial. See Woods v. City of St. Louis, 4:24-cv-00868-MTS, 2025 WL 40759, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 7, 2025) (observing that “when the information at issue is relevant to the ultimate resolution
of the lawsuit, the public will have a strong interest in accessing that information so that they can
‘evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of [the proceeding]’” (quoting IDT, 709 F.3d at 1222)).
As a result, the presumption of public access balances differently here.
Second, the Preliminary Report bears upon the Court’s exercise of its judicial authority in
other ways. After all, the Preliminary Report was prepared by a Court officer pursuant to directions
contained in the Court Order that appointed him. See Doc. [88] at 27; see also Bowersock Mills
& Power Co. v. Joyce, 101 F.2d 1000, 1002 (8th Cir. 1939) (explaining that an equitable receiver
is “an officer of the court” who acts “for the court”). And the Court’s appointment of Receiver
Buhlinger was itself an extraordinary exercise of judicial authority under the circumstances. See
Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc., 999 F.2d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1993) (“A receiver
is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is only justified in extreme situations.”). Accordingly, a
publicly accessible Preliminary Report likely furthers the public’s interest in “evaluat[ing] the
reasonableness and fairness of judicial proceedings,” especially where, as here, the Court has
exercised its Article III powers in such a significant way, and Receiver Buhlinger continues to do
so as a court-appointed officer. See IDT Corp., 709 F.3d at 1222; see also Lugosch v. Pyramid
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Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that public access provides “a
measure of accountability” and guards against “arbitrary judicial behavior” (quoting Amodeo, 71
F.3d at 1048)).
In contrast, a review of the proceedings thus far indicates that the interests raised by
Defendant Cosby are not as “compelling.” See Flynt, 885 F.3d at 511 (explaining that the right of
public access may be overcome if there are “compelling reasons for doing so”). A significant
portion of the information that Defendant Cosby would place under seal has been the subject of
other public filings, testimony in open Court, and the Court’s prior decisions. See, e.g., Doc. [82]
at 88, 108 (discussing the contents of VPEG’s Great Southern Bank accounts); Doc. [88] at 4–7
(surveying court documents and discussing backpay owed to independent contractors, obligations
owed to vendors, and the financial state of certain portfolio companies). As this Court has
previously observed, a party’s “continuing interest in sealing the court record” is “severely
diminished” when the information is publicly available. Wishah v. City of Country Club Hills,
4:19-cv-03410-SRC, 2021 WL 3860328, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2021) (remarking that “the
genie is out of the bottle”); see also Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting
that “[t]he interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public
record” (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494–95 (1975))). And, to the
extent that Defendant Cosby raises concerns that a publicly available Preliminary Report will have
an adverse impact on VPEG, the Court finds it significant that Receiver Buhlinger—whom the
Court has charged to “prevent waste and preserve, manage, secure, and safeguard” VPEG—
believes that the Preliminary Report “does not need to be filed under seal.” Doc. [127]. The Court
is inclined to agree with Receiver Buhlinger’s assessment, especially considering the Court’s
discussion above.
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Finally, even assuming Defendant Cosby has identified specific pieces of confidential,
sensitive information that outweigh the heavy presumption of public access under the
circumstances, his arguments fail to justify redacting the entirety of Receiver Buhlinger’s
preliminary findings and observations. See Doc. [148] at 3–15. One portion simply describes the
Receiver’s expected fees considering the duties that the Court has assigned him. Doc. [141-1] at
8. Other paragraphs and statements throughout do not appear to contain sensitive or confidential
material. See, e.g., id. at 7 (explaining why VPEG will incur ongoing operational costs); id. at 12
(summarizing VPEG’s portfolio and the source of that information without providing detailed
figures). Thus, it appears that “portions of the [Preliminary Report would] be amenable to public
access without jeopardizing” the purported confidentiality concerns that Defendant Cosby has
raised. IDT Corp., 709 F.3d at 1224 (remanding and requiring the district court to assess whether
targeted redactions of “confidential business information” would be practicable).
IV. Conclusion
Therefore, for all these reasons, the Court will deny Receiver Jason Buhlinger’s Motion
for Leave to File his Preliminary Report under Seal as well as Defendant Michael Cosby’s Motion
for Continued Sealing. However, because of the confidentiality concerns at issue, the Court will
deny the Motions without prejudice and provide these parties with an additional opportunity to
demonstrate that some amount of targeted redactions is appropriate under the circumstances.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Receiver Jason Buhlinger’s Motion for Leave to File
his Preliminary Report under Seal, Doc. [127], is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Michael Cosby’s Motion for Continued
Sealing, Doc. [140], is DENIED without prejudice.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above parties have leave to file, no later than
March 30, 2026, a renewed Motion for Continued Sealing that (1) properly balances the
competing interests discussed above, and (2) puts forth proposed, targeted redactions of the
Preliminary Report, if appropriate.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that, if neither party files a renewed Motion, the Court will
issue an Order lifting the seal, and Documents [128], [128-1], [141], and [141-1] will be placed on
the public docket, subject to the mandatory fourteen-day stay of an Order Denying Sealing. E.D.
Mo. L.R. 13.05(A)(4)(g).
Dated this 16th day of March 2026.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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