Citizens Against Donald Trump, Inc. v. Trump et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CITIZENS AGAINST DONALD TRUMP
INC.,
)
)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-00311-SRC
)
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity
as President of the United States of America
et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
Memorandum and Order
Citizens Against Trump, Inc., a Missouri nonprofit corporation, sued various executive
officials, agencies, and an alleged advisory committee. Plaintiff allegedly “represents a wide
range of citizens” who “challenge the creation and operation of the so-called Department of
Government Efficiency” under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Defendants moved to
dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual background
The Court accepts the following well-pleaded facts as true for purposes of this motion.
Plaintiff states that President Trump created DOGE on November 12, 2024—even before
assuming office. See doc. 1 at ¶ 63. President Trump “made clear that it would not be a formal
part of government, despite its governmental-sounding name.” Id. at ¶ 64. Then citing to a
preinauguration-day social-media post, Plaintiff asserts that President Trump “appointed”
Defendant Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to lead DOGE. Id. at ¶ 66. Plaintiff also cites to a
news article that DOGE began operating across the federal government before President Trump
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assumed the presidency. Id. at ¶ 76. Plaintiff states that President Trump established DOGE to
work together with OMB to “develop recommendations on how to dismantle, slash, and
restructure” federal agencies. Id. at ¶ 81 (cleaned up); see id. at ¶¶ 83–91.
Plaintiff claims that DOGE has taken no steps to comply with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA). Id. at ¶ 109. For one, DOGE’s members clandestinely communicate
over an “ephemeral messaging application Signal.” Id. at ¶ 110. And though Plaintiff made a
Freedom of Information Act request to OMB for various documents about Defendant DOGE and
Defendant Musk, it has not received a response. Id. at ¶¶ 114–15.
Plaintiff also questions Defendant Musk’s then federal-employment status as a “special
government employee” under 18 U.S.C. § 202(a). Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff states that “Defendant
Trump and the White House announced, declared[,] and made Defendant Musk, Head of
Defendant DOGE, a [special government employee].” Id. at ¶ 121. The problem being: the
head of a federal agency cannot be a special government employee. Id. at ¶ 131.
Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiff asserts three counts against: (i) President Donald J.
Trump in his official capacity, (ii) Elon Musk as “agency head” of the Department of
Government Efficiency (DOGE), (iii) DOGE as an advisory committee under FACA, (iv) Russel
Vought in his official capacity as Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
(v) OMB, (vi) Doug Collins in his official capacity as acting director of the Office of
Government Ethics (OGE), and (vii) OGE. Id. at 1–2 (The Court cites to page numbers as
assigned by CM/ECF.). First, Plaintiff claims that DOGE is an de-facto advisory committee
within the meaning of FACA. Id. at ¶ 150. Yet DOGE hasn’t complied with several of FACA’s
requirements for creating an advisory committee. Id. at ¶¶ 151–54. Second, Plaintiff claims that
DOGE failed to make any of its records publicly available, id. at ¶ 160, as required by FACA, id.
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at ¶¶ 159–62. And third, Plaintiff claims that DOGE violated FACA’s requirement that an
advisory committee maintain a fairly balanced range of viewpoints because the Trump-Vance
Administration rebuffed Plaintiff’s request for representation within DOGE. Id. at ¶¶ 167–70.
For these three claims, Plaintiff seeks relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See
id. at ¶¶ 155–56, 164, 171; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706.
Next, Plaintiff seeks several writs of mandamus, see doc. 1 at ¶¶ 172–85. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361. Plaintiff seeks a writ to compel Defendants to comply with FACA. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 173–
74. Plaintiff also seeks a writ to compel Defendants “to produce all relevant documents of
Defendant Musk’s work and work relationship with Defendant Doge [sic],” id. at ¶ 179, or in the
alternative a declaratory judgment that Defendant Musk is not a “special [g]overnment
employee,” id. Lastly, Plaintiff states that Defendants knowingly “conspired to and did violate
the separation of powers implicit in the United States Constitution” by “cancelling Government
contracts, leases[,] and grants,” and by “offering buyouts to full-time federal employees,” as this
“interferes with Congress’ budget.” Id. at ¶ 183. Plaintiff therefore seeks a third writ of
mandamus compel Defendants to return “the status quo of all contracts, leases, grants, and
buyouts.” Id. at ¶ 185.
B. 	Procedural background
About two months after Plaintiff filed its complaint, Defendants filed their motion to
dismiss on May 16, 2025. Doc. 30. That triggered a deadline of May 30, 2025, for Plaintiff to
file any response in opposition. See E.D.Mo. L.R. 4.01(B). Plaintiff sought and received four
extensions of time to file its response. See docs. 31–38, 42–43. After the third extension
request, Plaintiff then filed a countermotion in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
doc. 39, and a memorandum in support of its countermotion, doc. 40. Plaintiff’s fourth request
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for additional time assured the Court that Plaintiff would file, no later than July 14, its response
to Defendants’ motion and a separate motion and memorandum in support. Doc. 42 at ¶¶ 11–13.
In various motions for extension of time, Plaintiff’s counsel—James W. Schottel, Jr.—described
personal ailments and struggles necessitating, in his view, extensions of time. See doc. 33 at ¶ 3;
doc. 42 at ¶¶ 2–9.
Ten days after Plaintiff’s July 14 deadline to file a response, the Court issued its first
show-cause order. Doc. 45. Plaintiff filed a near-barren response to the order, again reciting
personal struggles. See doc. 46 at ¶¶ 2-5. The next day, Plaintiff moved the Court for leave to
supplement that response. Doc. 47 at 2. In that motion, Mr. Schottel detailed similar personal
struggles and referenced his criminal and civil caseload. See id. at ¶¶ 4–6. Notably, in both
filings, Plaintiff neither requested a specific amount of time to get its response and additional
motion filed nor indicated when (or if) the Court could expect Plaintiff to file those documents.
So after waiting another week for Plaintiff’s response, the Court issued its second
show-cause order. Doc. 48. The Court ordered Plaintiff, no later than August 15, 2025, to
explain why the Court should not summarily grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss this case. Id.
The Court warned Plaintiff that “failure to comply with any part of this show-cause order may
result in the Court dismissing this case without prejudice.” Doc. 48 at 2. But August 15 came
and went without Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s second show-cause order.
Instead, on August 18, Plaintiff filed a motion to convert Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment, and to request an order permitting discovery and taxation
of costs of service against Defendants. See docs. 50–51. Finally, after some confusion, see doc.
53 at 1, Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Convert. Id. In sum, after four
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extensions of time, two show-cause orders, and some motion practice to boot, Plaintiff still has
not filed a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
The Court notes that according to Plaintiff’s filings with the Missouri Secretary of State,
Plaintiff’s sole counsel—Mr. Schottel—also serves as Plaintiff’s sole incorporator and sole
registered agent. Missouri Business Filings, Mo. Sec’y of State, https://bsd.sos.mo.gov/
BusinessEntity/BESearch.aspx?SearchType=0 (last visited Jan. 22, 2026) (enter “Citizens
Against Trump” in “Business Name”). On October 15, the Missouri Secretary of State warned
Plaintiff that its failure to file a registration report would result in administrative dissolution of
Plaintiff. Id. And on January 8, 2026, the Missouri Secretary of State administratively dissolved
Plaintiff. Id. But see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 355.691.2(5) (stating that a corporation’s dissolution does
not “abate or suspend” a pending proceeding brought by the corporation). And, despite the
hardships that Mr. Schottel claimed prevented him from complying with the deadlines in this
case—and perhaps, with the deadlines set by the Missouri Secretary of State—he managed to
draft and file an entirely new lawsuit on behalf of the same Plaintiff. See Citizens Against
Donald Trump, Inc. v. United States Coast Guard, 4:25-cv-01826-SRC (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16,
2025), doc. 1.
The Court could dismiss this case for failure to comply with a court order, but the Court
has sufficient information to decide this case on the merits. For the reasons stated below, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Convert and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Docs. 30, 50.
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II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Convert
Before addressing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court first addresses a procedural
hiccup. As noted above, instead of filing a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff
filed a motion to convert it into a motion for summary judgment. Doc. 50.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants presented extrinsic evidence in support of their motion to
dismiss when they attached a Declaration by Joshua Fisher, see doc. 30-2 (describing Elon
Musk’s then federal-employment status). Doc. 50 at ¶¶ 6–7. Plaintiff claims that this violates
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), which states that if a motion to dismiss presents
information outside the pleadings “and [is] not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment.” And so, Plaintiff requests that the Court convert Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and order the start of discovery. Doc.
51 at 2–5. Defendants respond that the Court may either take judicial notice of Elon Musk’s
federal-employee status when Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit or just disregard the attached exhibit.
See doc. 53 at 2–3.
The Court opts for the latter. The Court has “complete discretion” to disregard “any
material beyond the pleadings that [Defendants] offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” Stahl v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 5A Wright &
Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (2d ed. 1990)). And because the declaration
isn’t necessary to decide the motion to dismiss, the Court disregards it. The Court therefore
denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Convert. Doc. 50. The Court now turns to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
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III. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
A. 	Legal standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The pleading standard of
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To meet this standard and to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requirement of
facial plausibility means the factual content of the plaintiff’s allegations must “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The
Court must grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lustgraaf v.
Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2010).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “must liberally construe a complaint in favor
of the plaintiff.” Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010).
But if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recover on a legal theory, the Court
must dismiss that claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Crest
Constr. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 2011). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 	Nor does a “pleading that merely pleads ‘labels and
conclusions,’ or a ‘formulaic recitation’ of the elements of a cause of action, or ‘naked assertions’
devoid of factual enhancement” suffice. 	Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010)
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(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Although courts must accept all factual allegations as true, they
are not bound to take as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. 	Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Therefore, the Court must determine if the well-pleaded factual
allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. This “context-specific task”
requires the Court to “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
B. 	Plaintiff fails to establish a distinct entitlement to mandamus relief
Plaintiff seeks several writs of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to compel Defendants
to: (i) comply with FACA, doc. 1 at ¶¶ 173–74, (ii) “produce all relevant documents of
Defendant Musk’s work and work relationship with Defendant Doge [sic],” id. at ¶ 179, and
(iii) return “the status quo of all contracts, leases, grants[,] and buyouts,” id. at ¶ 185. Congress
conferred original jurisdiction on district courts over “any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. “The issuance of a writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy reserved for extraordinary situations.” In re MidAmerican Energy Co.,
286 F.3d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 2002). To warrant such extraordinary relief, Plaintiff must show
that: (i) it has a “clear and indisputable right to the relief sought,” (ii) the officer has “a
nondiscretionary duty to honor that right” and (iii) it has “no other adequate remedy.” Mitchael
v. Colvin, 809 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2016). Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]he
common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a
remedy for a plaintiff only if [Plaintiff] has exhausted all other avenues of relief.” Heckler v.
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984). For the reasons stated below, because Plaintiff also seeks the
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same remedy under the APA, the Court addresses its claims to compel agency action under the
APA rather than under the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
1. 	Plaintiff cannot seek the same remedy under both the APA and 28
U.S.C. § 1361
Plaintiff can seek to compel agency action under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 or the APA, but
Plaintiff cannot seek a duplicative remedy under both statutes. The parties have not cited, nor
has the Court found, Eighth Circuit precedent for this proposition. But federal courts have come
to this conclusion for the following two reasons. See 33 Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure § 8305 (2d ed. 2025).
First, both statutes require Plaintiff to show that no other adequate remedy exists. See
Mitchael, 809 F.3d at 1054; see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (stating that courts can only review final
agency actions “for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”). Because the APA
constitutes an adequate and available remedy—and Plaintiff seeks relief under the APA—
Plaintiff cannot show entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. See, e.g.,
Hollywood Mobile Ests. Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“The availability of relief under the Administrative Procedure Act . . . forecloses a grant of a
writ of mandamus.”); Serrano v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“[Appellant] cannot satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief . . . .[Appellant] has sued
under the APA, which provides an adequate remedy.”); Audubon of Kansas, Inc. v. United States
Dep’t of Interior, 67 F.4th 1093, 1111 n. 10 (10th Cir. 2023) (“When review by other means,
such as under the APA, is possible, mandamus isn’t available.”); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925,
934 (3d Cir. 1996).
Second, “the standard for undue delay under the Mandamus Act . . . is identical to the
APA standard.” Kangarloo v. Pompeo, 480 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Norton
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v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004)); see Mohammad v. Blinken, 548 F. Supp.
3d 159, 164–65 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Kangarloo, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 142); cf. Org. for
Competitive Markets v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 912 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that claims
under section 706(1) of the APA should be substantively reviewed as a petition for mandamus
under the All Writs Act but not deciding the issue of whether the availability of APA relief
negates the availability of mandamus relief). Because Plaintiff seeks the same remedy, i.e., to
compel various agency action, see 28 U.S.C. § 1361; 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), the Court addresses all
claims under section 706(1). See Kangarloo, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 142 (explaining that “because
Plaintiffs’ APA claim fails, mandamus is not available”). This Court has previously adopted this
latter approach and does so here as well. See, e.g., Sotnikov v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
4:24-cv-00902-SRC, 2025 WL 2411084, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 20, 2025).
C. 	Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead entitlement to relief under the APA
In addition to its requests for three writs of mandamus, see doc. 1 at ¶¶ 172–85, Plaintiff
asserts three largely duplicative claims under the APA, see id. at ¶¶ 150–71; see also 5 U.S.C. §
706. While the APA offers Plaintiff the remedy of compelling agency action unlawfully
withheld or delayed, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), the Court still must determine whether Plaintiff met
its threshold burden that that the APA applies to each Defendant in this case.
The APA, by its terms, limits judicial review to “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.
Thus, the Court must first determine if Plaintiff sued “agencies.” See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). If so,
the Court then must find that the agency defendants engaged in “final agency action” reviewable
by this Court. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). If Plaintiff either sued nonagencies or sued agencies that
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didn’t engage in a final agency action, the Court cannot “exercise [its] powers of review under
the APA.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
1. 	Nonagency defendants
Axiomatically, the APA applies only to agencies. The APA broadly defines an “agency”
as including “each authority of the Government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). But
this broad definition doesn’t reach all executive officials. For one, the President is not an
“agency” under the APA. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796. The Supreme Court explained that “[o]ut
of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the
President . . . textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA.”
Id. at 800–01. Thus, President Trump is not subject to the APA. And so the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s APA claims against President Trump for failure to state a claim upon which the Court
can grant relief.
Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss Defendant DOGE from this case,
because an agency cannot also be an advisory committee. Doc. 30-1 at 25. But the Court need
not decide the more nuanced issue of whether an agency can sometimes be an advisory
committee. See Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Obama, 807 F. Supp.2d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2011) (“An
entity cannot be at once both an advisory committee and an agency.”); Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403
F. Supp. 238, 242 (D.D.C. 1975) (“An advisory committee cannot have a double identity as an
agency.”) (cleaned up); but see Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Comm’n on A.I., 466 F. Supp.
3d 100, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Nothing in FACA . . . prevents a [5 U.S.C.] § 552(f)(1) agency
from also being an advisory committee.”). Because even if DOGE constitutes an agency under
the APA, and even if an agency can simultaneously be an advisory committee, Plaintiff hasn’t
plausibly pleaded any final agency action by Defendants.
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2. 	Final agency action
The APA defines “agency action” as including “the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. §
551(13). “For an agency action to be ‘final’ under the APA, the action must (1) mark the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, and (2) be one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Firearms
Regul. Accountability Coal., Inc. v. Garland, 112 F.4th 507, 518 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016) (cleaned up)).
Here, an “agency’s mere failure to act is not usually a final agency action triggering
judicial review.” Org. for Competitive Mkts., 912 F.3d at 462. The Eighth Circuit hasn’t defined
the contours of when an agency’s mere failure to act matures into a final agency action. But the
Court notes three situations when a failure to act may become final agency action: (i) “if the
agency affirmatively rejects a proposed course of action,” (ii) “if the agency unreasonably delays
in responding to a request for action,” and (iii) “if the agency delays to the point until the
requested action would be ineffective.” Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003)
(cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead that DOGE took any final agency action. Plaintiff
merely declares that “Defendants’ failure to comply with FACA in relation to Defendant DOGE
is ‘final agency action.’” Doc. 1 at ¶ 157. And Plaintiff asserts, in a conclusory manner, that
Defendants’ establishment of DOGE “without the fairly balanced membership required by
FACA. . . . is also ‘final agency action.’” Doc. 1 at ¶ 171. While Plaintiff points to news articles
and social-media posts written before the creation of DOGE, see doc. 1 at ¶¶ 60–108, these
statements don’t plausibly allege that Defendants consummated their decision-making process to
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not comply with FACA. For one, none of these statements discuss FACA or DOGE’s alleged
decision not to comply with FACA. And statements made before DOGE’s creation cannot
constitute agency action—much less final agency action. An agency, or in this case a
reorganized sub-agency, cannot act until it legally exists. And Plaintiff has not pled sufficient
facts—from after DOGE’s reorganization by Exec. Order. No. 14158, 90 Fed. Reg. 8441 (Jan.
20, 2025), which taken as true, support a plausible claim to relief. Iqbal, 556 at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court therefore grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims under the APA for failure to state a claim upon which the Court can grant
relief.
D. 	Plaintiff fails to plausibly establish entitlement to declaratory relief
Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that “Defendant Musk is not a special
Government employee,” doc. 1 at ¶ 179, but rather a “regular federal Government employee,”
doc. 1 at 53. To show entitlement to declaratory relief, Plaintiff must establish that the claim
“presents an Article III case or controversy.” McLeod v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 856 F.3d 1160, 1166
(8th Cir. 2017). This requires Plaintiff to show the claim has “a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment.” Id. And even if Plaintiff makes such a showing, the Court may
exercise its discretion not to entertain such a claim. See Pub. Affs. Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369
U.S. 111, 112 (1962).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, entitlement to declaratory relief.
And even if Plaintiff had attempted to show an entitlement to declaratory relief, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that Defendant Musk is no longer a federal employee. Elon Musk
(@elonmusk), X, As my scheduled time as a Special Government Employee comes to an end, I
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would like to thank President @realDonaldTrump for the opportunity to reduce wasteful
spending. (May 28, 2025, at 7:01 p.m. CT), https://x.com/elonmusk/status/
1927877957852266518; C-SPAN, White House Daily Briefing, at 16:21–16:27 (May 29, 2025)
(confirming Musk’s departure from the administration); see Fed. R. Evid. 201. And having
dismissed Plaintiff’s other claims, the Court finds no immediacy that warrants declaratory relief.
Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.
IV. 	Plaintiff’s Countermotion
Lastly, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s Countermotion to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
See doc. 39. Plaintiff asks this Court to deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because it “failed
to comply with Rule 7 and 10 of the Federal Rules of a Procedure [sic] by doing the following
things that must be done: (1) the motion does not state with particularity the grounds for seeking
the order; and (2) the motion does not state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each
limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstance.” Id. at ¶ 14 (emphasis in original).
The Court finds this argument frivolous. Motions are not pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 7.
And Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss states with particularity their grounds for seeking dismissal,
albeit in its memorandum in support. See E.D.Mo. L.R. 4.01(A). Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 4.01(A).
V. 	Conclusion
The Court grants Defendants’ [30] Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which the Court can grant relief. The Court dismisses this case with prejudice. Knowles v. TD
Ameritrade Holding Corp., 2 F.4th 751, 758 (8th Cir. 2021). A separate order of dismissal
accompanies this memorandum and order. The Court denies Plaintiff’s [39] Countermotion and
its [50] Motion to Convert. Finally, the Court denies Plaintiff’s [47] Motion to Supplement and
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its request for preliminary injunctive relief, doc. 1 at ¶ 148, as moot. The Court grants
Defendants’ [49] Motion to Withdraw Counsel.
So ordered this 22nd day of January 2026.
STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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