Lemicy v. Hefele et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY LEMICY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:25-cv-0332-MTS
)
TODD HEFELE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Plaintiff Anthony Lemicy on four counts of sexual exploitation of
a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). United States v. Lemicy, 122 F.4th 298,
302 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 347 (2025). 	This action, filed by Plaintiff
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stems from the initial police involvement that led to those
charges. 	See id. at 302–304; see also Doc. [15] at 5–6.* 	After a careful review of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in this matter, Doc. [15], the Court will dismiss this
action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915e(a)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint names as Defendants Todd Hefele, Courtney
Jordan, and Michael Spreck. All are (or at least were), Plaintiff alleges, employees of the
Saint Louis Metropolitan Police Department. 	Plaintiff specifically indicates that he
brings the claims against these Defendants in their official capacities. See Doc. [15] at 1;
see also Reynolds v. Cook, No. 24-1618, 2025 WL 670428, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025)
* There appears to be no issue under Heck v. Humphrey here for the reasons explained by the
Supreme Court in footnote seven of its opinion in that case. See 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994).
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(unpublished per curiam). 	As such, Plaintiff has sued only the officers’ employer, the
City of St. Louis. 	Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1201 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998); accord
Fisher v. Koopman, 693 F. App’x 740, 746 (10th Cir. 2017) (“An official capacity suit
against 	a 	municipal 	official 	like 	a 	police 	officer 	is 	treated 	as 	a 	suit 	against 	the
municipality.”). Unfortunately for Plaintiff, though, his claims against the City fail.
Even assuming that Plaintiff has plausibly shown a constitutional violation, see
Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “a
constitutional violation by a city employee” is necessary to support “Monell liability for
the City”), which is itself a stretch given Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, Plaintiff has
woefully failed to plead facts that plausibly support the inference of an existence of an
unconstitutional policy or custom that was the moving force behind any such violation.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also
Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 32–33 (2010) (“Under Monell’s holding
a municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal ‘policy or custom’ caused a
plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right.”).
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For this reason, the Court will enter herewith an Order of
Dismissal, dismissing this action without prejudice. See id.; see also id. at 1915e(b)(1).
Dated this 1st day of July 2026.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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