Njogu v. Family Court Saint Louis Circuit Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
FRANCIS M. NJOGU, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-01900 CDP
)
FAMILY COURT SAINT LOUIS 	)
CIRCUIT COURT, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Self-represented Plaintiff Francis M. Njogu brings this action for alleged violations of his
civil rights. The matter is now before the Court upon the motion of Plaintiff for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, or without prepayment of the required filing fees and costs. [ECF No. 3].
Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court will
grant the motion and waive the filing fee in this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). As Plaintiff is
now proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Based on such review, the Court will dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel
will be denied as moot.
The Complaint
On December 23, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this civil action against defendant “Family Court
Saint Louis Circuit Court.” [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant State Court violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to custody of his minor child. He asserts that he was denied
custody of his daughter on May 2, 2019 “without any explanations or cause” by the Circuit Court
of Saint Louis County. Id. at 5. Since the denial in custody, Plaintiff has written letters to the Saint
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Louis County Court and prosecuting attorney, that have gone unanswered. Furthermore, Plaintiff
alleges that the “opposing lawyers” at the Court have been a source of frustration and intimidation
when he “mention[s] [that] his daughter[‘s] passport [has been] forged.” Id.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks primary custody of his daughter, as well as control of his
daughter’s passport. He also wishes to have no restriction on communication with his daughter.
Last, Plaintiff seeks the waiver of attorneys’ fees and Court costs which were imposed by the
Family Court. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff’s Related Actions
This is Plaintiff’s third federal court action relating to the May 2, 2019, custody
determination in Saint Louis County Circuit Court. In July 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil rights action
against Catherine Kagotho in which he sought injunctive relief prohibiting Kagotho from applying
for a passport for their minor child without Plaintiff’s permission. See Njogu v. Kagotho, No. 4:24-
cv-00944-SPM (E.D. Mo.). The case was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on
August 21, 2024. On August 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a substantially similar action to the present
action alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights based on a denial of custody of his
minor child by the Saint Louis County Circuit Court. See Njogu v. Family Court Saint Louis Circuit
Court, No. 4:24-cv-01122-MTS (E.D.Mo.). The case was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) on December 2, 2024, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as untimely, on February 24, 2025. Njogu v. Family Court of St.
Louis County, Missouri, 25-1067 (8th Cir. 2025).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis
if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a
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complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-
pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes
the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district
court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits the claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015).
However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim
for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts or to
construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible
claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
Discussion
Plaintiff brings this civil action under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that his rights
were violated when the Saint Louis County Circuit Court denied him custody of his daughter
without explanation or cause. For purposes of this legal analysis, the Court will liberally construe
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United
States Supreme Court has explained that “[c]onstitutional rights do not typically come with a built-
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in cause of action to allow for private enforcement in courts. … Instead, constitutional rights are
generally … asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause of action designed for that
purpose, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 291 (2024). Furthermore,
the Eighth Circuit has held that a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim should be structurally
treated as a claim brought for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since a claim may not be brought
directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wax ‘n Works v. City of St. Paul, 213 F.3d 1016, 1019
(8th Cir. 2000).
Federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a “broad remedy for violations
of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation of that right
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In this case, Plaintiff names a single defendant: Family Court Saint Louis Circuit Court.
However, state courts are not suable under §1983 because they are protected by state immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. Harris v. Mo. Ct. of Appeals, W.D., 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir.
1986); see also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh
Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court.”).
Because the only named defendant is a state court not suable under § 1983, this case must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Furthermore, even if the defendant State Court was not protected by immunity, it appears
that Plaintiff’s case would also be subject to dismissal as time-barred. “Although the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may properly dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915[] when it is apparent the statute of limitations has run.” Myers
v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992). Section 1983 claims are analogous to personal injury
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claims and are subject to Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. Sulik v. Taney Cnty., Mo., 393
F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2005); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4). In this case, the State’s alleged
failure to provide Plaintiff with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the State Court
litigation ended. See Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023). Thus, the statute of limitations on
Plaintiff’s claim began to run when the State Court issued its custody decision on May 2, 2019.
Plaintiff’s complaint in this matter was signed and filed on December 23, 2025. Therefore, by the
time Plaintiff initiated this suit, the five-year statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim had already
expired.
And to the extent Plaintiff brought this suit to seek review of the State Court’s child custody
decision, this Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct such an examination. Any review of the State
Court’s decision would most likely violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which applies to “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Based on this doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate
review of state court decisions. Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162
(8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, because Plaintiff seeks review of the State Court judgment on custody,
this federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Id.; see also Arseneau v. Pudlowski, 110 F.4th 1114, 1117 (8th Cir. 2024) (stating that
“a federal court may bypass a ‘murky’ Rooker-Feldman issue when the merits of the case ‘easily
result in dismissal’”) (quoting King v. City of Crestwood, 899 F.3d 643, 647-48 (8th Cir. 2018)).1
1Furthermore, because the crux of this case relates to child custody matters, this Court also lacks
jurisdiction over this action under the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. This
exception, first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 603
(1858), “divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over any action for which the subject is a divorce,
allowance of alimony, or child custody.” Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation
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For these reasons, the Court will dismiss this case for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s pending motion for appointment of
counsel will be denied as moot.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, [ECF No. 3], is GRANTED and the filing fee is waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel, [ECF
No. 2], is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 7th day of January, 2026.
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
omitted). As the Supreme Court later explained in Ex parte Burrus, “[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of
the United States.” 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). Even “when a cause of action closely relates to but does
not precisely fit into the contours of an action for divorce, alimony or child custody, federal courts
generally will abstain from exercising jurisdiction.” Kahn, 21 F.3d at 861.
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