Cournoyer v. Schamens

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
David Wayne Schamens, 	)
) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 23-10483
Debtor. 	)
______________________________________ )
John Paul H. Cournoyer, 	)
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 24-02010
)
David Wayne Schamens, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
______________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANT’S ANSWER AND ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
This 	adversary 	proceeding 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	the 	Motion
to Strike Defendant’s Answer, Enter Default Judgment, or for Other
Sanctions 	Under 	Rule 	37, 	filed 	by 	the 	U.S. 	Bankruptcy
Administrator, 	John 	Paul 	Hughes 	Cournoyer 	(“Plaintiff”) 	on 	March
4, 2025, ECF No. 36, and the Court’s Order on Motion by Bankruptcy
Administrator for Sanctions entered on June 20, 2025. 	ECF No. 49.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 2nd day of April, 2026.
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At 	the 	hearing, 	Plaintiff 	and 	David 	Wayne 	Schamens 	(“Defendant”)
appeared. 	Defendant 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se. 	Due 	to 	Defendant’s
persistent and willful failure to engage in the pre-trial process
and 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	orders 	of 	the 	Court, 	the 	Court 	will 	grant
Plaintiff’s 	motion, 	strike 	Defendant’s 	answer, 	and 	enter 	default
judgment, denying a discharge to Defendant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This 	Court 	has 	jurisdiction 	over 	this 	adversary 	proceeding
under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1334. 	Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	157(a), 	the 	United
States 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	Middle 	District 	of 	North 	Carolina
has 	referred 	the 	above-captioned 	bankruptcy 	case 	and 	this
adversary proceeding to this Court by its Local Rule 83.11. 	This
is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(J) and the Court
has 	constitutional 	and 	statutory 	authority 	to 	hear 	and 	determine
this 	proceeding 	by 	final 	order. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	14, 	¶ 	8 	(and
authorities 	cited 	therein). 	Venue 	is 	proper 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1409. 	The 	Court 	has 	personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	Defendant. 	See
ECF No. 19 at 16-17.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 	July 	11, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	commenced 	this 	adversary
proceeding seeking denial of Defendant’s discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 	727(a)(2), 	(3), 	(4) 	& 	(6). 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that
Defendant 	failed 	to 	disclose 	assets, 	liabilities, 	and 	pending
litigation 	in 	his 	schedules 	and 	statement 	of 	financial 	affairs,
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knowingly and fraudulently testified at his meeting of creditors,
and 	presented 	or 	used 	a 	false 	claim 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	prevent 	the
bankruptcy 	trustee 	from 	administering 	his 	residential 	real
property, 	among 	other 	things. 	See 	id. 	On 	August 	12, 	2024,
Defendant filed a timely motion to extend time to file an answer,
ECF No. 5, which was granted through September 10, 2024. 	ECF No.
6. 	On September 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or
stay 	the 	adversary 	proceeding. 	ECF 	No. 	10. 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a
response 	to 	Defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	or 	stay 	the 	adversary
proceeding on September 17, 2024, ECF No. 11, and on December 13,
2024, 	the 	Court 	entered 	an 	order 	denying 	Defendant’s 	motion 	and
determining that the complaint plausibly stated claims for relief
under § 727. 	ECF No. 19. 	Defendant timely filed an answer. 	ECF
No. 28.
Before 	the 	Court 	entered 	its 	order 	denying 	the 	motion 	to
dismiss, the parties filed a joint scheduling memorandum, setting
November 1, 2024, as the deadline for Defendant to file his initial
disclosures, and February 15, 2025, as the date on which discovery
must 	be 	completed. 	ECF 	Nos. 	13 	& 	14. 	On 	November 	15, 	2024,
Plaintiff 	issued 	written 	discovery 	requests 	to 	Defendant,
including 	requests 	for 	admission, 	interrogatories, 	and 	requests
for 	production 	of 	documents. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	9-18 	(collectively
the 	“Discovery 	Requests”). 	Defendant 	failed 	to 	timely 	file 	his
initial 	disclosures 	or 	to 	respond 	to 	any 	of 	these 	discovery
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requests. 	Having missed these deadlines, Plaintiff and Defendant
informally 	agreed 	to 	extend 	the 	deadlines 	to 	December 	2, 	2024;
Defendant still did not provide his initial disclosures and failed
to respond to the Discovery Requests. 	ECF No. 31, ¶ 3.
On 	January 	15, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	compel
Defendant 	to 	make 	initial 	disclosures 	and 	respond 	to 	Plaintiff’s
interrogatories 	and 	requests 	for 	production. 	ECF 	No. 	31. 	On
January 	22, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	held 	a 	hearing 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	motion
to compel. 	ECF No. 33. 	At that hearing, Defendant requested that
all deadlines in the scheduling order, including the deadline for
Defendant 	to 	file 	his 	initial 	disclosures, 	be 	extended 	by 	sixty
days. 	On 	January 	23, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	entered 	an 	order 	amending
the 	scheduling 	order 	and 	directing 	Defendant 	to 	provide 	initial
disclosures 	and 	respond 	to 	the 	outstanding 	discovery 	requests
within 	thirty 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	order, 	which 	was 	more 	time
than 	was 	requested 	by 	Defendant 	at 	the 	hearing. 	ECF 	No. 	34 	(the
“January 23 Order”).
Over 	a 	year 	ago, 	on 	March 	4, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	motion
requesting 	sanctions 	under 	Rule 	37, 	including 	the 	striking 	of
Defendant’s answer and entry of default judgment. 	ECF No. 36. 	On
March 	21, 	2025, 	the 	Clerk 	of 	Court 	issued 	a 	Notice 	of 	Right 	to
Respond 	to 	Dispositive 	Motion, 	setting 	April 	4, 	2025, 	as 	the
deadline 	for 	Defendant 	to 	respond 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for
sanctions, 	and 	providing 	Defendant 	notice 	that 	failure 	to 	timely
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respond 	could 	result 	in 	entry 	of 	default 	judgment, 	among 	other
things. 	ECF No. 37.
On 	April 	4, 	2025, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	motion 	requesting 	an
extension 	of 	time 	to 	file 	a 	response 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	motion, 	ECF
No. 39, and although Defendant failed to establish cause necessary
for granting such a motion, the Court granted an extension through
April 	15, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	40. 	On 	April 	15, 	2025, 	Defendant 	filed
a second motion requesting an extension of time to file a response
in 	order 	to 	confer 	with 	his 	counsel 	representing 	him 	in 	the
criminal 	proceeding 	discussed 	below. 	ECF 	No. 	43. 	The 	Court
granted Defendant’s second motion for an extension of time through
April 22, 2025, which was more time than Defendant requested, and
provided that the Court would not grant further extensions absent
extraordinary 	circumstances. 	ECF 	No. 	44. 	On 	April 	22, 	2025,
Defendant 	filed 	a 	reply 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	sanctions 	and
attached as an exhibit his purported discovery response. 	ECF No.
46, 	at 	5-7. 	At 	the 	hearing 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	sanctions
under Rule 37, Defendant indicated that he was subject to an order
from 	the 	United 	States 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	District 	of 	New
Jersey 	prohibiting 	him 	from 	using 	computers. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	49, 	at
5-6; United States v. Schamens et al., Case No. 2:22-mj-10299-JBC-
1 (D.N.J.).
The 	Court 	conducted 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	on 	Plaintiff’s
motion 	to 	compel 	on 	May 	28, 	2025. 	On 	June 	20, 	2025, 	the 	Court
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issued 	an 	order 	(the 	“June 	20 	Order”) 	determining 	that: 	(1)
Defendant had waived objections to Plaintiff’s interrogatories and
requests 	for 	production 	of 	documents, 	ECF 	No. 	49, 	at 	11; 	(2)
Defendant 	failed 	to 	verify 	his 	interrogatory 	responses, 	and 	they
were 	therefore 	invalid, 	in 	addition 	to 	their 	substantive
insufficiency, id. at 8; (3) Defendant still had not provided his
initial 	disclosures, 	id. 	at 	9; 	(4) 	Defendant’s 	responses 	did 	not
constitute 	a 	good 	faith 	attempt 	to 	comply 	with 	Plaintiff’s
requests, id.; (5) Defendant “has engaged in a pattern of dilatory
and bad faith conduct throughout this adversary proceeding and the
underlying 	case,” 	id.; 	and 	(6) 	despite 	his 	bad 	faith, 	the 	Court
would not yet deem Defendant to have admitted to the requests for
admission, but Defendant’s failure to respond sufficiently in the
future 	might 	result 	in 	the 	Court 	deeming 	the 	requests 	admitted.
Id. at 12.
The Court ordered Defendant to respond within thirty days to
all of Plaintiff’s interrogatories and to Plaintiff’s requests for
production of documents numbers 1-7 and 10. 	Id. at 13. 	The Court
further explained that Defendant’s inability to use a computer or
the 	2021 	seizure 	related 	to 	the 	criminal 	case 	were 	not 	valid
excuses for failure to comply. 	See id. at 10-11, 14-15. 	The Court
set 	a 	compliance 	hearing 	on 	July 	22, 	2025, 	and 	again 	warned
Defendant 	that 	failure 	to 	comply 	could 	result 	in 	sanctions,
including 	striking 	the 	responses 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for
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admission 	and 	deeming 	those 	requests 	admitted, 	striking 	his
answer, 	entering 	default 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	Plaintiff, 	and
denying his discharge. 	Id. at 15-17.
The 	deadline 	for 	Defendant 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	June 	20 	Order
expired. 	The 	Court 	directed 	Defendant 	to 	appear 	at 	a 	compliance
hearing 	on 	July 	22, 	2025, 	and 	show 	through 	admissible 	evidence,
rather 	than 	statements 	to 	the 	Court, 	all 	reasonable 	efforts 	made
to obtain information from sources other than through Defendant’s
use of a computer or demonstrate why any requested information is
unavailable 	through 	means 	other 	than 	the 	use 	of 	a 	computer. 	Id.
at 15.
Defendant 	appeared 	at 	the 	compliance 	hearing 	but 	did 	not
present admissible evidence and conceded that he had not made any
effort 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	June 	20 	Order, 	including 	without
limitation supplementing or verifying the responses to Plaintiff’s
interrogatories. 	ECF 	No. 	53, 	at 	8. 	On 	July 	31, 	2025, 	the 	Court
entered 	an 	order 	further 	continuing 	the 	compliance 	hearing 	to
September 	9, 	2025, 	and 	finding 	Defendant 	in 	contempt 	of 	both 	the
January 	23 	Order 	and 	the 	June 	20 	Order 	and 	indicating 	that
Defendant’s 	contempt 	is 	continuing. 	Id. 	at 	9-10. 	Defendant 	was
warned again that sanctions for contempt could include entry of a
default judgment denying his discharge. 	Id. at 11. 	At Defendant’s
request, 	the 	Court 	again 	continued 	the 	compliance 	hearing 	to
October 28, 2025. 	ECF No. 56, at 8.
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The 	day 	before 	the 	continued 	compliance 	hearing, 	Defendant
once 	again 	requested 	a 	continuance, 	claiming 	that 	he 	had 	only
recently learned of the continuance date, and because it conflicted
with a concurrent eviction proceeding ongoing in the Davie County
State Court for which the Court determined that the automatic stay
did 	not 	apply. 	ECF 	No. 	59, 	at 	1-2; 	see 	also 	Case 	No. 	23-10483,
ECF 	No. 	293. 	The 	Court 	found 	that, 	according 	to 	the 	record,
“Defendant’s 	claim 	to 	have 	discovered 	the 	date 	of 	the 	hearing
belatedly is again inaccurate.” 	ECF No. 60, at 2. 	Nevertheless,
the 	Court 	granted 	the 	continuance 	due 	to 	Defendant’s 	documented
medical 	issues 	and 	the 	conflicting 	state 	court 	proceeding
regarding 	his 	residence. 	Id. 	at 	3. 	The 	Court 	set 	the 	continued
compliance hearing for November 25, 2025. 	Id.
On 	November 	21, 	2025, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	motion 	representing
that he would be unable to attend the November 25 hearing because
of medical issues and requesting to appear via Zoom. 	ECF No. 63.
The Court again continued the hearing to January 6, 2026. 	ECF No.
64. 	A day before the January 6 hearing, Defendant again untimely
requested the hearing be held via Zoom. 	Despite the untimeliness,
the 	Court 	permitted 	the 	appearance. 	ECF 	No. 	67. 	Although
permitted 	to 	appear 	remotely, 	Defendant 	did 	not 	appear 	at 	the
January 	6 	hearing. 	Despite 	proper 	notice 	of 	the 	hearing 	and
Defendant’s 	unexplained 	absence, 	the 	Court 	again 	continued 	the
hearing to January 21, 2026. 	ECF No. 68. 	At the January 6 hearing,
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Plaintiff 	noted 	that 	“over 	400 	days 	hav[e] 	passed 	since 	the
discovery 	requests 	were 	issued, 	and 	[they] 	still 	have 	not 	been
complied 	with.” 	Id. 	at 	00:02:13-00:02:23. 	When 	the 	Court 	asked
whether 	Defendant 	had 	produced 	any 	additional 	information 	or
responses 	to 	interrogatories 	since 	the 	last 	order, 	Plaintiff
responded that he had not. 	Id. at 00:02:25-00:02:33.
At 	the 	January 	21, 	2026, 	hearing,1 	Defendant 	testified 	and
admitted 	that 	he 	still 	had 	not 	attempted 	to 	comply 	with 	the
discovery 	requests 	or 	the 	Court’s 	June 	20 	Order, 	and 	despite 	the
Court’s 	prior 	detailed 	orders 	and 	his 	failure 	even 	to 	attempt 	to
respond, contended that he did not understand what was required of
him.2 	Nevertheless, 	Defendant 	requested 	that 	the 	Court 	provide
Defendant 	and 	Plaintiff 	with 	additional 	time 	to 	resolve 	this
adversary proceeding by consent, and that no Opinion be issued on
Plaintiff’s motions prior to February 18, 2026. 	January 21, 2026,
hearing, 	00:23:38-00:23:50. 	On 	March 	24, 	2026, 	thirty-four 	days
after this Court indicated that an order may be entered, Defendant
sent an email to the Deputy Clerk requesting more time to resolve
this adversary proceeding by consent. 	Defendant again represented
that 	his 	medical 	issues 	hindered 	his 	attempt 	to 	consensually
1 	Because 	it 	contained 	discussion 	of 	Defendant’s 	medical 	status, 	the 	audio
recording of this hearing is not included on the publicly available docket.
2 “I don’t even know what you want, . . . whatever you want, I don’t have.”
January 21, 2026, Hearing, 00:15:00-00:15:40.
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resolve 	this 	adversary 	proceeding, 	and 	that 	additional 	time 	may
result 	in 	the 	voluntary 	resolution 	of 	this 	case. 	On 	March 	24,
2026, 	the 	Court 	yet 	again 	granted 	Defendant 	an 	additional 	seven
days, up to and including March 31, 2026, to resolve this adversary
proceeding by consent. 	ECF No. 70. 	Failing to find a consensual
resolution 	to 	the 	satisfaction 	of 	all 	parties, 	on 	April 	1, 	2026,
Defendant once again sent an email to the Deputy Clerk requesting
a hearing on further matters prior to entry of this Order. 	As the
Court indicated in the March 24 order, the Court will not further
delay its ruling.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
Because 	an 	understanding 	of 	the 	background 	in 	this 	case 	and
the 	underlying 	claims 	is 	necessary 	to 	assess 	the 	materiality 	of
the 	Defendant’s 	misstatements 	and 	obfuscation 	in 	these
proceedings, the Court will briefly summarize that history.
A. Dugan Judgment
On 	August 	11, 	2015, 	Guy 	M. 	Dugan, 	Karen 	Dugan, 	and 	the 	GDM
3 As a result of striking Defendant’s answer as set forth below, the Court has
accepted the factual allegations in the complaint, ECF No. 1, and the response,
ECF No. 11, as true. 	Opportunities Dev. Grp., LLC v. Andruss, Case No. 1:14-
cv-00062, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57614, at *12 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6)); see also Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, 155 F.3d
500, 506 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court erred in granting
default where complaint failed to state a claim). 	The Court also has deemed
Plaintiff’s requests for admission as admitted. 	In addition, the Court has
taken judicial notice of its own records and the record of this proceeding and
the main bankruptcy case. 	See, e.g., Anderson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 918
F.2d 	1139, 	1141 	n.1 	(4th 	Cir. 	1990) 	(finding 	that 	a 	district 	court 	“should
properly take judicial notice of its own records”).
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Family 	Trust 	(collectively, 	the 	“Dugan 	Plaintiffs”) 	filed 	a
lawsuit 	against 	Defendant, 	Defendant’s 	spouse, 	and 	various
business 	entities 	affiliated 	with 	Defendant 	in 	the 	United 	States
District 	Court 	for 	the 	Western 	District 	of 	North 	Carolina. 	Case
No. 	15-00366 	(W.D.N.C.), 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	On 	October 	2, 	2017, 	default
judgment 	was 	entered 	against 	Defendant, 	Defendant’s 	spouse, 	and
the 	affiliated 	business 	entities 	for 	an 	aggregate 	amount 	over
$640,000.00. 	Case No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No. 69 (the “Dugan
Judgment”).4
B. Aggie Investment Judgment
In December 2014, Aggie Investment LLC (“Aggie Investment”),
an 	entity 	owned 	or 	controlled 	by 	Guy 	Dugan, 	filed 	a 	lawsuit 	in
state 	court 	against 	Defendant, 	Defendant’s 	spouse, 	and 	other
affiliated entities. 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 13. 	On June 28, 2016, judgment
was 	entered 	against 	Defendant 	and 	the 	other 	defendants 	in 	the
amount 	of 	$570,179.69 	(the 	“Aggie 	Judgment”). 	Id. 	¶ 	14. 	After
this judgment, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which
Aggie Investment received a deed of trust against residential real
property 	located 	at 	138 	Arnold 	Palmer 	Drive, 	Advance, 	North
4 Defendant appealed the Dugan Judgment, Case No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No.
76, and on October 29, 2020, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter back to
the District Court. 	Dugan v. Schamens, 833 F. App’x 981 (4th Cir. 2020). 	On
March 	7, 	2022, 	the 	district 	court 	vacated 	the 	Dugan 	Judgment 	as 	to 	one 	of
Defendant’s affiliated business entities, but the judgment remained the same in
all other respects. 	Case No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No. 108.
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Carolina 	(the 	“Advance 	Property”)5 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	the 	Aggie
Judgment. 	Id. 	¶ 	22. 	Defendant 	defaulted 	under 	the 	terms 	of 	the
settlement 	agreement, 	id. 	¶ 	24, 	and 	in 	September 	2017, 	Aggie
Investment 	foreclosed 	on 	the 	Advance 	Property. 	Id. 	¶ 	25. 	Aggie
Investment 	was 	the 	purchaser 	at 	foreclosure 	with 	a 	bid 	of
$450,000.00 – leaving a portion of the Aggie Judgment unsatisfied.
Id. 	In 	December 	2019, 	Defendant 	purchased 	residential 	real
property at 812 Northern Shores Point, Greensboro, North Carolina
(the 	“Greensboro 	Property”).6 	Id. 	¶ 	26. 	Aggie 	Investment
domesticated 	the 	Aggie 	Judgment 	in 	Guilford 	County, 	North
Carolina, thereby creating a judgment lien against the Greensboro
Property. 	Id. 	¶ 	28. 	In 	May 	2021, 	the 	Guilford 	County 	Sheriff
provided 	Defendant 	with 	Notice 	of 	Execution 	Sale 	with 	respect 	to
the Greensboro Property. 	Id.
C. Daufuskie Judgment
On 	June 	25, 	2021, 	after 	Defendant 	received 	the 	Notice 	of
5 When Aggie Investment’s lawsuit was filed, the Advance Property was held in
the name of Invictus Real Estate Investment LLP (“Invictus”) – an entity owned
or controlled by Defendant. 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 15. 	In January 2015, shortly after
Aggie Investment’s lawsuit was filed, Defendant signed a warranty deed on behalf
of 	Invictus, 	transferring 	the 	Advance 	Property 	to 	himself 	in 	his 	individual
name. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	In May 2015, a deed of trust, signed by Defendant and granted
in 	favor 	of 	“Pillar 	Capital 	Partners” 	(“Pillar 	Capital”) 	in 	the 	amount 	of
$548,876.71 	was 	recorded 	against 	the 	Advance 	Property. 	Id. 	¶ 	19. 	Pillar
Capital did not actually make a loan to Defendant, and that the deed of trust
was recorded as an attempt to protect the Advance Property from execution by
creditors. 	Id. ¶ 20.
6 In connection with the purchase of the Greensboro Property, Defendant granted
to Carter Bank & Trust (“Carter Bank”) a deed of trust against the property in
the amount of $900,000.00. 	Id. ¶ 27.
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Execution Sale of the Greensboro Property with respect to the Aggie
Judgment, 	a 	deed 	of 	trust 	was 	recorded 	against 	the 	Greensboro
Property 	in 	favor 	of 	Daufuskie 	Lending 	Partners, 	LLC
(“Daufuskie”), 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$756,814.70 	(the 	“Daufuskie 	Deed
of Trust”).7 	Id. ¶ 29; see also A.P. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 1, at
6. 	In February 2022, the Dugan Plaintiffs domesticated the Dugan
Judgment 	in 	Guilford 	County, 	North 	Carolina. 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶ 	12.
The 	Daufuskie 	Deed 	of 	Trust 	references 	a 	note 	dated 	January 	5,
2015.8 	Id. 	¶ 	29. 	The 	Dugan 	Plaintiffs 	then 	commenced 	an 	action
in 	Guilford 	County, 	North 	Carolina, 	seeking 	a 	determination 	that
the 	Daufuskie 	Deed 	of 	Trust 	was 	fraudulent 	or 	otherwise 	invalid.
Id. ¶ 30. 	Despite discovery requests regarding the invalidity of
the Daufuskie Deed of Trust, the state court found that Defendant
did 	not 	produce 	any 	documentation 	supporting 	its 	validity 	in 	the
Guilford 	County 	action. 	Id. 	¶ 	39. 	On 	May 	12, 	2023, 	the 	state
court 	entered 	judgment 	in 	the 	Guilford 	County 	action 	determining
that the Daufuskie Deed of Trust was fraudulent and directing the
registrar of deeds to strike it from the public record.9 	Case No.
7 Defendant signed the Daufuskie Deed of Trust. 	Id. ¶ 29.
8 Daufuskie did not exist when the note secured by the Daufuskie Deed of Trust
was executed or when the deed of trust was recorded. 	Id. ¶ 35.
9 Defendant appealed this judgment even though he contended that Daufuskie was
a third party and even though the judgment determined that the putative claim
against him was invalid. 	Id. ¶ 32. 	Daufuskie did not appeal the judgment.
Id. 	On November 14, 2023, the Court entered its order modifying the automatic
stay 	to 	permit 	the 	state 	court 	proceedings 	brought 	by 	the 	Dugans 	against
Daufuskie to be brought to conclusion and final judgment. 	Case No. 23-10483,
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23-10483, ECF No. 30-14 (the “Daufuskie Judgment”).
D. Defendant’s prior bankruptcy filings
Defendant has previously filed successive bankruptcy cases in
this 	Court 	on 	May 	23, 	2022, 	and 	August 	16, 	2022, 	with 	each 	case
being dismissed and Defendant failing to take substantial steps to
move 	the 	cases 	forward. 	Case 	Nos. 	22-10260 	& 	22-10418,
respectively. 	In 	the 	first 	case, 	Defendant 	listed 	Daufuskie 	in
his 	bankruptcy 	schedules 	as 	having 	a 	lien 	encumbering 	the
Greensboro 	Property 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$350,000.00. 	Case 	No. 	22-
10260, 	ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	18. 	The 	Court 	dismissed 	the 	case 	on 	June
30, 	2022, 	for 	Defendant’s 	failure 	to 	obtain 	credit 	counseling 	as
required under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h). 	Case No. 22-10260, ECF No. 26.
On 	October 	17, 	2022, 	the 	Court 	entered 	its 	order 	dismissing
Defendant’s second case10 with a 12-month bar to refiling a chapter
13 petition for the reasons as stated at the hearing held in that
case on October 11, 2022. 	Case No. 22-10418, ECF No. 28. 	Further,
on April 19, 2023, this Court dismissed a chapter 13 case filed by
Defendant’s 	spouse 	with 	a 	180-day 	bar 	to 	refiling 	a 	case 	under
title 	11, 	because 	among 	other 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	found 	that 	the
record 	indicated 	the 	filing 	was 	“part 	of 	a 	further 	use 	of 	the
ECF No. 100. 	Defendant’s appeal was dismissed by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals on June 20, 2024, and the state court judgment determining that the
Daufuskie deed was fraudulent and invalid is final. 	Id.
10 During Defendant’s second bankruptcy case, the Dugan Plaintiffs commenced an
adversary proceeding seeking a judgment determining that the Daufuskie Deed of
Trust was invalid, unenforceable, and cancelled. 	Adv. No. 22-02020, ECF No. 1.
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bankruptcy 	system 	by 	Defendant 	and 	her 	spouse 	as 	a 	delay 	and
litigation tactic.” 	Case No. 23-10057, ECF No. 58.
E. Defendant’s current bankruptcy case
On September 5, 2023, and while subject to the order barring
Defendant from filing a case under chapter 13 due to abuse of the
bankruptcy 	system,11 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	petition 	for 	relief 	under
chapter 	11, 	commencing 	the 	underlying 	bankruptcy 	case. 	Case 	No.
23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	The 	Court 	entered 	its 	chapter 	11 	operating
order, 	which 	includes 	the 	requirement 	that 	Defendant 	close 	any
preexisting 	bank 	accounts, 	establish 	a 	debtor-in-possession
depository 	account, 	and 	provide 	the 	bankruptcy 	administrator
(“BA”) 	with 	account 	information 	within 	seven 	days. 	Case 	No. 	23-
10483, 	ECF 	No. 	6, 	¶ 	5. 	On 	September 	11, 	2023, 	Defendant 	filed 	a
motion to extend the time allotted under the operating order, Case
No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	17, 	and 	the 	Court 	granted 	the 	extension,
allowing Defendant until September 18, 2023, to establish a deposit
account. 	Case 	No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	21. 	On 	September 	19, 	2023,
Defendant 	filed 	a 	designation 	of 	depository, 	Case 	No. 	23-10483,
ECF No. 24; however, Defendant never provided any evidence of any
new 	depository 	account 	to 	the 	BA, 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	operating
order. 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 47.
On September 19, 2023, Defendant filed his initial bankruptcy
11 See Case No. 22-10418, ECF No. 28.
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schedules 	and 	statement 	of 	financial 	affairs 	(“SOFA”). 	Case 	No.
23-10483, ECF No. 28. 	In his initial schedules, Defendant listed
ownership 	of 	a 	half-interest 	in 	the 	Greensboro 	Property 	in 	the
amount 	of 	$800,000.00. 	Id. 	at 	3. 	Contrary 	to 	the 	representation
in his schedules, Defendant owned 100% of the Greensboro Property.
ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶ 	49. 	Defendant 	also 	indicated 	that 	he 	owned 	0%
interests 	in 	entities 	listed 	as 	“Bold 	Analytics, 	Ltd.” 	and
“GeniHealth, 	Inc.” 	Case 	No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	28, 	at 	7. 	In
contrast, 	Defendant 	indicated 	in 	his 	SOFA 	that 	within 	the 	four
years prior to filing his petition, Defendant was the owner of at
least 5% of the voting or equity securities of both Bold Analytics,
Ltd. and GeniHealth, Inc. 	Id. at 47. 	Defendant further scheduled
electronics 	valued 	at 	$500.00, 	golf 	clubs 	valued 	at 	$500.00, 	and
shoes valued at $1,000.00. 	Id. at 6. 	Defendant did not schedule
any 	other 	assets. 	See 	id. 	at 	3-12. 	With 	regard 	to 	scheduled
claims, 	Defendant 	listed 	Carter 	Bank 	and 	Daufuskie12 	as 	holding
secured 	claims 	against 	the 	Greensboro 	Property. 	Id. 	at 	18.
Defendant 	scheduled 	unsecured 	claims 	belonging 	to 	“Dugan 	et.
al.,”13 	Wells 	Fargo 	Bank, 	Chase 	Bank, 	Capital 	One, 	Discover, 	and
“Duke Energy/Piedmont Nat Gas.” 	Id. at 23–24. 	Defendant did not
12 	Daufuskie 	has 	not 	filed 	a 	proof 	of 	claim 	in 	this 	case 	or 	in 	any 	of 	the
previous bankruptcy cases filed in this Court by Defendant or his spouse.
13 Defendant scheduled the claim of “Dugan et. al.” as disputed. 	Case No. 23-
10483, ECF No. 28, at 23.
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schedule 	any 	other 	claims.14 	Id. 	at 	18-25. 	Defendant 	also
indicated in his schedules that he was the CEO of Bold Analytics,
Ltd., 	with 	a 	monthly 	income 	of 	$1,500.00, 	and 	that 	Defendant’s
non-filing 	spouse 	was 	unemployed 	with 	a 	monthly 	income 	of
$1,500.00. 	Id. at 31.
In 	his 	SOFA, 	Defendant 	indicated 	that 	he 	had 	no 	income 	from
any 	source 	during 	2022 	or 	during 	the 	portion 	of 	2023 	prior 	to
filing his petition. 	Id. at 38. 	In part 4 of the SOFA, Defendant
identified 	only 	one 	lawsuit 	to 	which 	he 	was 	a 	party 	in 	the 	year
preceding 	the 	filing 	of 	his 	petition 	– 	a 	lawsuit 	described 	as
“fraudulent 	case” 	brought 	by 	“Dugan, 	et 	al 	[sic]” 	in 	the 	United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
Id. 	at 	41. 	Defendant 	did 	not 	disclose 	that 	he 	was 	the 	defendant
in 	a 	pending 	civil 	securities 	fraud 	action 	brought 	by 	the
Securities 	and 	Exchange 	Commission 	in 	the 	New 	Jersey 	District
Court, 	which 	action 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	defrauded 	at 	least 	16
investors 	of 	at 	least 	$1.8 	million. 	Id.; 	see 	Securities 	and
Exchange 	Commission 	v. 	Schamens, 	No. 	22-01219 	(D.N.J.).
Similarly, Defendant did not disclose that he is the defendant in
a pending criminal case in the New Jersey District Court for wire
14 	The 	BA 	asserts 	that 	Defendant’s 	schedules 	omit 	the 	claims 	of 	“Aggie
Investment, Theodore Van Leer, Caroline Van Leer, Anne M. Blanken, the Credit
Shelter Share Trust, the Lambertsen Charitable Remainder Unitrust, a claim for
unpaid costs to the N.C. Court of Appeals, Weeks Hardwood Flooring Inc., and
Zayo Group LLC.” 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 55.
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fraud, 	securities 	fraud, 	and 	money 	laundering. 	United 	States 	v.
Schamens, 	Case 	No. 	23-00255 	(D.N.J) 	(the 	“Criminal 	Case”).15
Further, 	Defendant’s 	appeal 	of 	the 	Daufuskie 	Judgment 	remained
pending at the time Defendant filed his SOFA, but Defendant failed
to 	disclose 	this 	information. 	Case 	No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	28, 	at
41; ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 32-33.
On September 20, 2023, the Dugan Plaintiffs and the BA filed
motions to convert Defendant’s bankruptcy case from chapter 11 to
chapter 	7. 	Case 	No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	Nos. 	30 	& 	31. 	On 	October 	23,
2023, 	the 	Court 	granted 	the 	motions 	and 	converted 	the 	case 	to
chapter 	7 	for 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	on 	the 	record 	at 	the 	hearing
held on October 17, 2023. 	Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 68.
On 	October 	26, 	2023, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	motion 	seeking
authority 	to 	file 	documents 	with 	the 	Court 	electronically. 	Case
No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	78. 	The 	Court 	entered 	an 	order 	allowing
Defendant 	to 	submit 	filings 	via 	electronic 	mail 	to 	the 	courtroom
deputy, 	to 	be 	followed 	by 	a 	complete 	signed 	original 	by 	regular
mail 	within 	seven 	business 	days. 	Case 	No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	98.
Defendant 	violated 	this 	order 	on 	multiple 	occasions. 	ECF 	No. 	1,
¶ 70. 	As a result, the court first modified this permission, and
15 	Defendant’s 	criminal 	indictment 	alleges 	that 	multiple 	victims 	suffered
significant losses due to Defendant’s wire fraud, securities fraud, and money
laundering 	between 	2014 	and 	2021. 	Case 	No. 	23-00255 	(D.N.J.), 	ECF 	No. 	31.
Defendant did not list these victims’ claims in his schedules. 	Case No. 23-
10483, ECF No. 28.
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ultimately 	revoked 	it 	after 	continued 	violations. 	Case 	No. 	23-
10483, ECF Nos. 116, 117, 126 & 151.
Defendant 	appeared 	at 	the 	chapter 	7 	meeting 	of 	creditors 	on
November 	20, 	2023, 	but 	refused 	to 	answer 	most 	of 	the 	questions
asked, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. 	ECF No.
1, 	¶ 	71. 	The 	BA 	then 	filed 	a 	motion 	seeking 	to 	compel 	Defendant
to answer certain questions at his meeting of creditors. 	Case No.
23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	127. 	At 	the 	hearing 	on 	this 	motion 	on 	January
9, 2024, Defendant stated that he needed to file amended schedules.
ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶ 	72. 	On 	January 	9, 	2024, 	the 	Court 	entered 	an 	order
requiring 	Defendant 	to 	file 	the 	amended 	schedules 	by 	January 	19,
2024, Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 134, which was later extended to
January 	26, 	2024. 	Case 	No. 	23-10483, 	ECF 	No. 	151. 	Defendant
failed to comply with the order and did not file amended schedules
by this deadline.16
At 	the 	continued 	meeting 	of 	creditors 	on 	February 	5, 	2024,
Defendant 	testified 	that 	he 	had 	outstanding 	debt 	to 	Daufuskie
and/or Pillar Capital, and that he “never had an ownership interest
16 Defendant filed an amendment to his schedules on January 29, 2024, three days
after the deadline set by the Court’s order, to add two credit card accounts
with negative balances. 	Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 164. 	In February 2024,
Defendant 	amended 	his 	Sched. 	A/B, 	again 	listing 	a 	half-interest 	in 	the
Greensboro Property, but this time valuing his interest in the real property at
$750,000.00, instead of $800,000.00. 	Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 182, at 1; cf.
Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 28, at 3. 	Defendant also listed a putative cause of
action against the realtor authorized to list and market the Greensboro Property
for 	“aiding 	and 	abetting 	in 	identity 	theft, 	and 	conspiracy.” 	Case 	No. 	23-
10483, 	ECF 	No. 	182, 	at 	8. 	Defendant 	did 	not 	list 	any 	other 	assets 	in 	the
amended schedules. 	See Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 182.
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in” Daufuskie or Pillar Capital. 	ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 80-81. 	Defendant
further 	testified 	that 	the 	furniture17 in 	the 	Greensboro 	Property
was 	subject 	to 	a 	note 	in 	favor 	of 	Pillar 	Capital. 	Id. 	¶ 	78.
Defendant 	never 	disclosed 	any 	furniture 	or 	any 	secured 	claim 	or
lease 	in 	favor 	of 	Pillar 	Capital 	in 	his 	initial 	or 	amended
schedules. 	See Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 28, 164 & 182.
On 	March 	8, 	2024, 	the 	chapter 	7 	trustee 	filed 	a 	motion 	to
sell the Greensboro Property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 	Case
No. 23-10483, ECF No. 188. 	Defendant objected to the sale arguing,
inter 	alia, 	that 	the 	putative 	Daufuskie 	Deed 	of 	Trust 	fully
encumbered Defendant’s interest in the property. 	See Case No. 23-
10483, 	ECF 	Nos. 	217 	& 	223. 	On 	May 	3, 	2024, 	the 	Court 	authorized
the sale of the Greensboro Property free and clear of the Daufuskie
Deed of Trust.18 	Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 226.
F. Daufuskie Adversary Proceeding
On 	February 	14, 	2024, 	and 	while 	Defendant’s 	appeal 	of 	the
state court judgment against Daufuskie was pending, the bankruptcy
trustee 	initiated 	an 	adversary 	proceeding 	in 	the 	above-captioned
17 The complaint alleges that the Greensboro Property contained furniture and
other 	household 	goods 	that 	one 	would 	expect 	in 	a 	residence 	valued 	at
$1,500,000.00. 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 76.
18 Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), a trustee may sell property of the estate free and
clear of any interests in such property of an entity other than the estate, if
“such interest is in bona fide dispute.” 	11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(4). 	As of the
date of the Court’s order authorizing the sale of the Greensboro Property, the
validity of the Daufuskie Deed of Trust was in bona fide dispute. 	See Case No.
23-10483, ECF No. 226.
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chapter 	7 	case 	by 	filing 	a 	complaint 	against 	Daufuskie 	Lending
Partners, 	LLC. 	Adv. 	No. 	24-02001, 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	In 	his 	complaint,
the trustee alleged that Daufuskie is an artifice and sought entry
of a judgment by the Court deeming that the Daufuskie Deed of Trust
is void “or otherwise avoiding” it under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). 	Id.
Although 	not 	a 	party 	to 	the 	adversary 	proceeding, 	Defendant,
proceeding 	pro 	se, 	filed 	a 	motion 	in 	the 	adversary 	proceeding 	on
March 	25, 	2024, 	requesting 	that 	the 	Court 	allow 	Daufuskie
additional 	time 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	complaint. 	Adv. 	No. 	24-02001,
ECF 	No. 	7. 	Defendant 	also 	attached 	to 	the 	motion 	a 	letter
purporting 	to 	be 	from 	“Steven 	K. 	Novak” 	as 	manager 	of 	Daufuskie,
asserting 	that 	Daufuskie 	is 	a 	valid 	Delaware 	limited 	liability
company.19 	Id. 	at 	4–5. 	On 	March 	26, 	2024, 	the 	trustee 	filed 	an
objection to Defendant’s motion, attaching records tending to show
that the entity registered as Daufuskie Lending Partners, LLC was
created on March 11, 2024, by reviving a different dormant Delaware
limited liability company and filing a name change for that entity
to 	Daufuskie 	Lending 	Partners, 	LLC.20 	Adv. 	No. 	24-02001, 	ECF 	No.
19 The Complaint asserts that around this time, the trustee received emails from
“Steven K. Novak.” 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 86. 	The trustee requested a phone call with
Mr. 	Novak, 	but 	he 	declined. 	Id. 	In 	response, 	the 	trustee 	stated 	that 	he
suspected the emails may be Defendant posing as “Steven K. Novak” and that it
would be helpful to speak with Mr. Novak on the phone to dispel that suspicion.
Id. 	Mr. Novak declined to speak with the trustee on the phone. 	Id.
20 Defendant is deemed to have admitted that he caused Pillar Capital Partners
LLC to change its name to Daufuskie Lending Partners LLC in March 2024, and
that Daufuskie Lending Partners LLC did not exist prior to November 7, 2023.
ECF No. 36, at 13. 	Defendant now contends that Daufuskie and Pillar have always
been the same entity. 	See, e.g., Case No. 23-10483, at ECF No. 223, at ¶ 12.
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8. 	On March 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motion because
the sole named defendant in the adversary proceeding was Daufuskie,
a putative corporate entity which may not appear before this Court
except 	through 	licensed 	counsel 	— 	and 	Defendant 	is 	not 	licensed
counsel. 	Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 11.
On 	March 	26, 	2024, 	the 	trustee 	filed 	a 	motion 	seeking 	entry
of default against Daufuskie. 	Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 9. 	Two
days 	later, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	notice 	stating 	that 	the 	manager 	of
Daufuskie 	“was 	making 	a 	substantial 	filing 	with 	the 	Court 	via
overnight 	Federal 	Express.” 	Adv. 	No. 	24-02001, 	ECF 	No. 	10. 	On
April 	1, 	2024, 	an 	objection 	to 	the 	trustee’s 	motion 	for 	default
was 	filed, 	seeking 	more 	time 	for 	Daufuskie 	to 	respond 	to 	the
complaint. 	Adv. 	No. 	24-02001, 	ECF 	No. 	14. 	This 	objection 	was
delivered 	to 	the 	court 	via 	Federal 	Express 	and 	was 	purportedly
filed by “Steven K. Novak” as manager of Daufuskie. 	Id. 	On April
9, 	2024, 	the 	Court 	entered 	an 	order 	staying 	the 	adversary
proceeding 	pending 	resolution 	of 	the 	prepetition 	state 	court
proceedings. 	Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 20. 	Thereafter, the state
court judgment determining that the Daufuskie deed was fraudulent
and invalid became final, and the trustee dismissed the adversary
proceeding without prejudice. 	Id., ECF No. 37.
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Default judgment is warranted under the circumstances.
“Courts have broad discretion to manage discovery, including
the authority to impose sanctions for discovery abuses as part of
their 	case 	management 	responsibilities.” 	Smith 	v. 	Devine, 	126
F.4th 	331, 	342 	(4th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citing 	Russell 	v. 	Absolute
Collection 	Services, 	Inc., 	763 	F.3d 	385, 	396 	(4th 	Cir. 	2014)).
Specifically, “[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery, . . .” sanctions may include “dismissing the
action” 	or 	“rendering 	a 	default 	judgment 	against 	the 	disobedient
party[.]” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3037; see also Young Again Products, Inc. v. Acord, 459 Fed. Appx.
294, 301 (4th Cir. 2011).
A 	lower 	“court’s 	finding 	that 	[a 	party] 	deliberately
disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding. .
. 	that 	can 	be 	overturned 	[on 	appeal] 	only 	if 	clearly
erroneous.” 	Rabb 	v. 	Amatex 	Corp., 	769 	F.2d 	996, 	1000
(4th Cir. 1985). . . . Nevertheless, “[w]hen the sanction
involved 	is 	judgment 	by 	default, 	the 	district 	court’s
‘range 	of 	discretion 	is 	more 	narrow’ 	because 	the
district court’s desire to enforce its discovery orders
is 	confronted 	head-on 	by 	the 	party’s 	rights 	to 	a 	trial
by jury and a fair day in court.” 	Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th
Cir. 	1989). 	To 	balance 	those 	competing 	interests 	in
determining 	whether 	default 	judgment 	is 	an 	appropriate
sanction, courts must consider the Wilson factors: “(1)
whether 	the 	noncomplying 	party 	acted 	in 	bad 	faith; 	(2)
the 	amount 	of 	prejudice 	his 	noncompliance 	caused 	his
adversary; (3) the need for deterrence of the particular
sort of noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less
drastic sanctions.” 	Mey v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 203, 217
(4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Richards, 872 F.2d at 92).
Devine, 126 F.4th at 342 (citation modified).
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Defendant 	acted 	in 	bad 	faith 	by 	repeatedly 	evading
Plaintiff’s 	discovery 	requests, 	in 	the 	face 	of 	repeated 	warnings
from 	the 	Court. 	Mey, 	71 	F.4th, 	at 	219. 	Bad 	faith 	can 	include
repeatedly employing “evasive discovery tactics” despite warnings
from the court, and a pattern of “failure to disclose discoverable
materials . . . .” 	Id. at 219-20. 	Bad faith can also manifest as
a 	party’s 	flagrant 	disregard 	of 	the 	trial 	court’s 	orders 	and
noncompliance with deadlines when the noncompliant party has ample
opportunity to comply with the court’s orders. 	See National Hockey
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).
Over 	400 	days 	have 	passed 	since 	Plaintiff 	made 	the 	November
15, 	2024, 	discovery 	requests. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	9-19. 	The 	Court
entered two separate Orders on January 23, 2025, and June 20, 2025,
respectively, 	commanding 	compliance 	in 	responding 	to 	discovery
orders of which Defendant remains in continuing contempt. 	January
21, 	2026, 	Hearing, 	00:15:00-00:15:40. 	The 	Court 	has 	conducted
multiple 	evidentiary 	hearings 	and 	warned 	Defendant 	on 	multiple
occasions 	of 	the 	potential 	for 	serious 	sanctions 	if 	Defendant
continued 	to 	disregard 	this 	Court’s 	discovery 	orders. 	When
Defendant did submit “responses” they were both five months late,
facially 	invalid, 	and 	grossly 	inadequate 	– 	evincing 	Defendant’s
bad 	faith. 	ECF 	No. 	49, 	at 	9. 	The 	Court 	has 	determined 	that
“Defendant 	. 	. 	. 	can 	produce 	at 	least 	some 	documents 	and
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information 	requested 	by 	Plaintiff,”21 	id. 	at 	10, 	nevertheless
Defendant 	made 	no 	attempt 	to 	provide 	further 	information 	or 	to
verify the information previously provided as ordered by the Court.
Defendant 	was 	repeatedly 	made 	aware 	of 	the 	deficiencies 	in 	his
response, 	and 	the 	steps 	Defendant 	was 	required 	to 	take 	to 	comply
with 	discovery 	and 	the 	Court’s 	orders. 	Id. 	at 	14. 	Despite 	the
prior 	orders 	and 	instructions, 	Defendant, 	by 	his 	own 	admission,
did 	not 	make 	any 	effort 	to 	comply 	and 	has 	been 	in 	contempt 	since
at 	least 	July 	31, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	53, 	at 	9. 	At 	the 	January 	21,
2026, hearing, Defendant maintained that he could not, and cannot
now, comply because of his medical status and the location of the
requested 	documents.22 	This 	Court 	granted 	Defendant 	numerous 	and
liberal 	deadline 	extensions 	and 	has 	found 	that 	Defendant 	could
provide 	additional 	responses 	to 	the 	requested 	discovery. 	See,
21 Defendant’s response that his records were seized in 2021 is insufficient to
ward off discovery claims related to post-petition conduct, communications, and
knowledge, all of which necessarily accumulated after the filing of his petition
on 	September 	5, 	2023. 	Id. 	Nor 	has 	Defendant 	attempted 	to 	disclose 	the
“substance and timing of communications” he cannot access, as the Court ordered.
Id. 	Defendant did not attempt to answer the discovery requests through non-
computer sources. 	Id. at 14.
22 On October 27, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Continuance, ECF No. 59,
indicating that he could not attend a hearing previously scheduled on October
28, 2025, because it conflicted with a concurrent eviction proceeding ongoing
in the Davie County State Court for which the Court determined that the automatic
stay did not apply. 	See Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 293. 	That same day the
Court granted Defendant a continuance in contemplation of Defendant’s concurrent
litigation. 	ECF No. 60. 	Defendant fully participated in the Davie County State
Court 	litigation 	since 	at 	least 	April 	2, 	2025, 	including 	effectuating 	and
briefing an appeal of an eviction proceeding to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. 	See Bermuda Properties, LLC v. Beard, No. 25CVD000297-290 (N.C. Ct.
App. filed Dec. 16, 2025).
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e.g., ECF Nos. 34, 40, 44 & 49. 	Defendant’s willful disregard of
this Court’s orders amounts to bad faith.
Defendant’s non-compliance has prejudiced Plaintiff. 	Mey, 71
F.4th at 220. 	Defendant’s filibuster has effectively immobilized
this 	case, 	and 	the 	only 	discovery 	Defendant 	has 	provided 	is
deficient. 	After a discovery period spanning more than 400 days,
Defendant 	has 	failed 	to 	take 	any 	steps 	to 	further 	the 	resolution
of 	this 	case. 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	Defendant 	concealed 	his
assets, falsified and concealed documents, made false statements,
and disobeyed the orders of the Court in the underlying bankruptcy
case. 	ECF No. 1. 	Defendant’s unwillingness to engage in discovery
has prejudiced Plaintiff and his case.
The 	need 	for 	deterrence 	weighs 	heavily 	in 	favor 	of 	default
judgment. 	“While pro se litigants are entitled to some deference,
they 	. 	. 	. 	also 	. 	. 	. 	[must] 	. 	. 	. 	‘respect 	. 	. 	. 	court 	orders
without 	which 	effective 	judicial 	administration 	would 	be
impossible.’” 	Andruss, 	2015 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	57614, 	at 	*10-11
(E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (quoting Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93,
96 (4th Cir. 1989)). 	Defendant’s stalling and continued contempt
shows a callous disregard for the authority of this Court and the
Rules. 	“[T]o 	ignore 	such 	bold 	challenges 	to 	the 	. . . 	court’s
power 	would 	encourage 	other 	litigants 	to 	flirt 	with 	similar
misconduct.” 	Richards, 	872 	F.2d 	at 	92 	(citing 	National 	Hockey
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League, 	427 	U.S. 	at 	643). 	Defendant’s 	noncompliance 	must 	be
deterred, weighing heavily in favor of default judgment.
Lesser 	sanctions 	will 	not 	ensure 	Defendant’s 	compliance.
This 	Court 	has, 	as 	detailed 	above, 	issued 	several 	warnings 	about
the consequences of failure to make good faith discovery responses.
Defendant 	repeatedly 	has 	indicated 	that 	he 	is 	unable 	to 	afford
monetary sanctions, and the imposition of such sanctions will not
be effective. 	Because of Defendant’s noncompliance, resolving the
dispute 	on 	the 	merits 	is 	not 	possible. 	Re-opening 	discovery 	or
further extensions of time would not alter the result in the case.
Defendant 	has 	stated 	on 	the 	record 	that 	he 	does 	not 	intend 	to
provide 	further 	discovery 	responses. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	will
strike 	Defendant’s 	answer, 	strike 	the 	responses 	to 	Plaintiff’s
request 	for 	admission, 	deem 	those 	requests 	admitted, 	and 	enter 	a
default judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
All four factors weigh in favor of these sanctions and default
judgment against Defendant.
II. 	The Complaint and Response sufficiently state facts which,
as admitted, support a denial of discharge.
As 	indicated 	by 	the 	Court 	in 	its 	June 	20 	Order, 	the 	Court
will 	strike 	Defendant’s 	inadequate 	responses 	to 	Plaintiff’s
requests 	for 	admission 	and 	deem 	the 	request 	admitted. 	Fed. 	R.
Civ. 	P. 	37(b)(2)(A)(i), 	(ii); 	United 	States 	v. 	Renfrow, 	612 	F.
Supp. 2d 677, 682-83 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (explaining that because pro
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se litigant received fair notice of the consequences of failing to
respond to requests for admission, the court deemed the unanswered
requests 	admitted); 	see 	ECF 	No. 	49 	at 	12. 	Furthermore, 	when
default 	judgment 	is 	entered, 	the 	defendant 	admits 	all 	factual
allegations 	in 	the 	complaint. 	Fed 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	8(b)(6) 	(“An
allegation—other 	than 	one 	relating 	to 	the 	amount 	of 	damages—is
admitted 	if 	a 	responsive 	pleading 	is 	required 	and 	the 	allegation
is 	not 	denied.”); 	10A 	Charles 	Alan 	Wright 	& 	Arthur 	R. 	Miller,
Federal 	Practice 	& 	Procedure 	§ 	2688.1 	(4th 	ed.) 	(“If 	the 	court
determines 	that 	defendant 	is 	in 	default, 	the 	factual 	allegations
of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages,
will be taken as true . . . .”). “Even after default, however, it
remains 	for 	the 	court 	to 	consider 	whether 	the 	unchallenged 	facts
constitute a legitimate cause of action . . . .” Id.
Plaintiff 	asserts 	claims 	in 	its 	complaint 	under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
727(a)(2), 	(3), 	(4) 	& 	(6). 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	a 	declaration 	on 	all
four 	counts 	finding 	that 	the 	complaint 	and 	response 	constitute 	a
legitimate 	cause 	of 	action. 	Although 	plead, 	the 	Court 	did 	not
reach 	Count 	IV, 	whether 	a 	discharge 	should 	be 	denied 	under 	11
U.S.C. 	§ 	727(a)(6). 	Defendant’s 	repeated 	and 	continuing
disobedience of the Court’s orders in this case itself would likely
support barring his discharge under that section if the Court were
not 	otherwise 	bound 	by 	the 	bases 	in 	the 	pleadings 	under 	Fed. 	R.
Civ. 	P. 	54(c), 	applicable 	by 	way 	of 	Fed. 	R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	7054, 	in
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connection with default judgement. 	But, because Debtors discharge
will 	be 	denied 	on 	the 	other 	grounds, 	the 	Court 	does 	not 	need 	to
reach this section. 	See In re Abell, 549 B.R. 631, 674 (Bankr. D.
Md. 	2016) 	(quoting 	Farouki 	v. 	Emirates 	Bank 	Int'l, 	14 	F.3d 	244,
250 (4th Cir. 1994)). 	Defendant’s discharge is denied as detailed
below.
1. Defendant’s discharge is denied under 11 U.S.C. §
727(a)(2).
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) provides that a debtor shall not receive
a 	discharge 	if 	“the 	debtor, 	with 	intent 	to 	hinder, 	delay, 	or
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody
of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed,
mutilated, 	or 	concealed 	. 	. 	. 	property 	of 	the 	debtor, 	within 	one
year 	before 	the 	. 	. 	. 	filing 	of 	the 	petition; 	or 	. 	. 	. 	property
of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition.” 	11
U.S.C. 	§ 	727(a)(2). 	The 	intent 	required 	under 	§ 	727(a)(2) 	is
“actual 	intent.” 	In 	re 	McGalliard, 	183 	B.R. 	726, 	732 	(Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1995). 	Actual intent “requires that there be not only a
deliberate 	act, 	but 	also 	that 	there 	be 	a 	specific 	intent 	to 	harm
in 	the 	sense 	of 	delaying 	or 	hindering 	a 	creditor.” 	Id. 	Since
direct 	evidence 	of 	intent 	is 	rare, 	courts 	often 	rely 	on
circumstantial 	evidence, 	course 	of 	conduct, 	or 	reckless
indifference 	to 	the 	truth 	to 	infer 	intent. 	See 	In 	re 	White, 	128
F. App’x 994, 998-99 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Defendant 	failed 	to 	schedule 	his 	full 	interest 	in 	the
Greensboro Property, or any interest in the furniture or household
goods 	within 	the 	Greensboro 	Property. 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶¶ 	49, 	75-76.
Defendant 	failed 	to 	disclose 	in 	his 	schedules 	that 	he 	owned
business 	interests 	in 	Bold 	Analytics, 	Ltd. 	and 	GeniHealth, 	Inc.,
id. 	¶ 	50, 	and 	falsely 	stated 	at 	his 	meeting 	of 	creditors 	that 	he
had 	no 	ownership 	interest 	in 	Daufuskie 	or 	Pillar 	Capital.
Defendant is deemed to have admitted that he was a member-manager
of 	each.23 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶ 	21; 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	12-13. 	Defendant’s
residence 	contained 	significant 	personal 	property 	that 	Defendant
did 	not 	list 	on 	his 	schedules 	and 	for 	which 	he 	paid 	a 	moving
company 	over 	$14,000.00 	to 	move 	after 	the 	sale 	of 	the 	property.
ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶ 	76. 	Finally, 	Defendant 	falsely 	stated 	in 	filings
with the Court that his bankruptcy case was a “no asset case,” due
to 	the 	false 	Daufuskie 	claim 	and 	the 	absence 	of 	other 	personal
property. 	Id. ¶ 83.
The pleadings and deemed admissions are sufficient to support
Plaintiff’s 	claim 	under 	§ 	727(a)(2). 	These 	actions 	support, 	at
minimum, a reckless indifference to the true state of Defendant’s
financial 	affairs 	such 	that 	Defendant 	acted 	with 	the 	requisite
intent 	in 	transferring, 	removing, 	or 	concealing 	property 	of 	the
23 Defendant opened a bank account in July 2015 in Pillar Capital’s name, signing
the documents necessary to open the account as Pillar Capital’s member and was
the only person with signature authority on the account. 	ECF No. 1, ¶ 21; see
also Case No. 23-10483, at ECF No. 223, at ¶ 12.
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estate. 	Thus, denial of discharge is warranted under § 727(a)(2)
as Plaintiff has provided an appropriate basis for default judgment
as to Count I of the complaint.
2. Defendant’s discharge is denied under 11 U.S.C. §
727(a)(3).
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) provides that a debtor may be denied a
discharge 	if 	“the 	debtor 	has 	concealed, 	destroyed, 	mutilated,
falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information
. 	. 	. 	from 	which 	the 	debtor's 	financial 	condition 	or 	business
transactions 	might 	be 	ascertained, 	unless 	such 	act 	or 	failure 	to
act 	was 	justified 	under 	all 	of 	the 	circumstances 	of 	the 	case.”24
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3).
Defendant 	has 	been 	deemed 	to 	admit 	that 	he 	created 	Daufuskie
Lending 	Partners 	LLC, 	and 	that 	he 	falsified 	documentation
purporting 	to 	establish 	that 	a 	secured 	claim 	existed 	against 	the
Greensboro 	Property 	in 	favor 	of 	Daufuskie. 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶¶ 	26-39;
ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	13. 	Defendant 	filed 	falsified 	documents 	with 	the
Court 	and 	sent 	falsified 	letters 	to 	the 	trustee. 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶¶
24 	A 	plaintiff 	need 	only 	allege 	that 	the 	debtor 	failed 	to 	produce 	adequate
records and that those records relate to the debtor’s financial condition or
business transactions. 	In re Anderson, No. 03-13586C-7G, 2006 WL 995856, at *6
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2006). 	The burden of proof then shifts to the debtor
to justify the lack of records under all the circumstances of the case. 	Id.
Thus, a plaintiff need not allege in their complaint that a debtor’s lack of
records was unjustified under the circumstances. 	See id.; see also In re Abell,
549 	B.R. 	631, 	646, 	676 	(Bankr. 	D. 	Md. 	2016) 	(holding 	that 	plaintiff’s
allegations that debtor refused to provide discovery were sufficient to state
a claim for objection to discharge under § 727(a)(3), even when debtor argued
they could not gain access to records due to their incarceration).
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85-89. 	Defendant 	prepared 	these 	documents 	and 	letters 	and
presented them to the Court to support the putative Daufuskie claim
while 	“posing 	as 	Steven 	Novak, 	or 	acting 	in 	concert 	with 	him.”25
Id. 	¶ 	89. 	Daufuskie 	did 	not 	exist 	when 	the 	note 	secured 	by 	the
Daufuskie Deed of Trust was executed or when the deed of trust was
recorded. 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	13. 	Indeed, 	in 	March 	2024, 	Pillar
Capital, 	an 	entity 	controlled 	by 	Defendant, 	id. 	at 	13, 	attempted
to 	change 	its 	name 	to 	Daufuskie 	Lending 	Partners, 	LLC 	after 	the
commencement 	of 	this 	case, 	and 	despite 	discovery 	requests 	in 	the
prepetition 	state 	court 	litigation, 	Defendant 	did 	not 	provide
documentation supporting the validity of the Daufuskie claim. 	Id.;
ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶¶ 	17-18, 	21, 	26-39. 	The 	validity 	of 	the 	Daufuskie
claim affects the disposition of the Greensboro Property, which is
property 	of 	Defendant’s 	bankruptcy 	estate 	and 	relevant 	to
Defendant’s 	financial 	condition. 	Defendant 	submitted 	falsified
documents 	and 	letters 	related 	to 	the 	Daufuskie 	claim, 	and 	denial
of discharge is warranted under § 727(a)(3).
3. Defendant’s discharge is denied under 11 U.S.C. §
727(a)(4).
The 	false 	claim, 	along 	with 	Defendant’s 	misstated 	schedules,
also 	warrant 	a 	denial 	of 	discharge 	under 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	727(a)(4).
25 	Alternative 	pleading 	is 	permitted 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	8(d)(2), 	made
applicable to this adversary proceeding by Rule 7008. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)
(“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively
or hypothetically . . . . [T]he pleading is sufficient if any one of them is
sufficient.”).
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That 	section 	provides 	that 	a 	debtor’s 	discharge 	may 	be 	denied 	if
the debtor, in connection with the case, knowingly and fraudulently
“made a false oath or account,” “presented or used a false claim,”
or “withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession
. 	. 	. 	any 	recorded 	information 	. 	. 	. 	relating 	to 	the 	debtor’s
property 	or 	financial 	affairs.” 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	727(a)(4); 	see 	also
Williamson v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir.
1987) 	(“The 	false 	oath 	made 	by 	the 	debtor 	must 	have 	related 	to 	a
material 	matter.”). 	For 	purposes 	of 	§ 	727(a)(4), 	a 	debtor’s
petition, schedules, statement of financial affairs, and responses
made 	at 	a 	meeting 	of 	creditors 	all 	constitute 	statements 	under
oath. 	In 	re 	Worley, 	517 	B.R. 	593, 	601 	(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	2014).
Courts have found the requisite intent to defraud where a debtor’s
statements 	contain 	inconsistencies 	that 	exceed 	the 	bounds 	of
honest 	mistake 	or 	are 	incompatible 	with 	a 	debtor’s 	own 	knowledge
and 	information. 	Id. 	at 	602; 	In 	re 	Michael, 	452 	B.R. 	908, 	919
(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	2011); 	see 	also 	Matter 	of 	Beaubouef, 	966 	F.2d
174, 	178 	(5th 	Cir. 	1992) 	(upholding 	finding 	that 	debtor 	had
requisite 	intent 	to 	deceive 	where 	debtor’s 	schedules 	contained
multiple falsehoods, and debtor did not remedy falsehoods when he
filed amended schedules). 	Finally, the subject matter of a false
oath is material when it concerns the existence and disposition of
a debtor’s property. 	Williamson, 828 F.2d at 252.
There 	are 	a 	number 	of 	instances 	in 	Defendant’s 	main 	case 	of
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Defendant making false statements and omissions in his petition,
schedules, SOFA, and meeting of creditors, and many of Defendant’s
statements and omissions are inconsistent. 	ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 48-65,
74-81. 	For example, Defendant failed to schedule several claims
asserted 	against 	him, 	failed 	to 	disclose 	pending 	litigation,
falsely 	scheduled 	Daufuskie 	as 	a 	secured 	creditor, 	scheduled 	no
deposit accounts despite scheduling monthly income, and scheduled
no 	interest 	in 	any 	furniture 	or 	household 	goods 	within 	the
Greensboro 	Property 	despite 	paying 	$14,840.00 	post-petition 	to
move 	personal 	property 	from 	the 	residence.26 	Id. 	¶¶ 	55-65, 	75-
76. 	Defendant 	filed 	these 	schedules 	under 	penalty 	of 	perjury.
In re Evans, 538 B.R. 268, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015). 	Defendant
did 	not 	remedy 	these 	inconsistencies 	when 	he 	filed 	his 	amended
schedules. 	See ECF No. 1, ¶ 75. 	He claimed that he had no bank
accounts, 	cash 	on 	hand, 	furniture, 	household 	goods, 	clothes,
firearms, electronics, vehicles, business interests, or any other
property. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	75-76. 	Yet, 	Defendant 	paid 	a 	moving 	company
$14,840.00 	to 	move 	his 	personal 	property 	to 	another 	location.
Defendant’s schedules indicated only that he owned a TV, computer,
golf 	clubs, 	and 	clothing 	valued 	at 	$2,000.00. 	Id. 	¶ 	77.
26 At his meeting of creditors, Defendant testified that the furniture in the
Greensboro Property was subject to a note in favor of Pillar Capital, that he
“never had an ownership interest in” Pillar Capital, and that he had to “pay
rent” to Pillar Capital for the furniture. 	ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 78-81. 	Defendant
never disclosed any furniture or any secured claim or lease in favor of Pillar
Capital in his schedules. 	Id. ¶ 79; see Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 28, 134 &
164.
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Additionally, 	as 	discussed 	above, 	Defendant 	manufactured 	the
Daufuskie claim to hinder or avoid recovery against the Greensboro
Property. 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	¶¶ 	26-39; 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	13. 	These
inconsistencies, coupled with Defendant’s failure to remedy them,
show 	that 	Defendant 	acted 	with 	the 	requisite 	intent 	to 	deceive,
and 	additionally 	because 	those 	deceptions 	relate 	to 	Defendant’s
property 	and 	financial 	condition, 	they 	are 	related 	to 	material
matters. 	See Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 217 & 223. 	Thus, default
judgment is warranted under § 727(a)(4).
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	herein, 	the 	Court 	will 	strike
Defendant’s 	answer 	and 	his 	responses 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	requests 	for
admission, the requests for admission are deemed admitted, and the
Court will enter a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, denying
Defendant’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), (3) & (4). 	The
Court will enter judgment consistent with this opinion.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
(24-02010)
All parties to this adversary proceeding.
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