CLAWSON v SUPERINTENDENT, EASTERN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RANDY CLAWSON, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	1:23CV937
)
LESLIE COOLEY DISMUKES, Secretary, )
North Carolina Department of Adult )
Correction, 	)
Respondent. 	)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
On August 8, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge’s 131-
page 	Memorandum 	Opinion 	and 	Recommendation 	was 	filed, 	and 	notice
was 	served 	on 	the 	parties 	in 	accordance 	with 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 636(b).
Petitioner then filed eighty-five pages of objections to the report
and 	recommendation 	within 	the 	time 	limits 	prescribed 	by 	§ 636.
(Doc. 49.) 	Respondent filed a response to Petitioner’s objections
(Doc. 50), and the court held a hearing on Petitioner’s objections
on December 16, 2025.
Petitioner, 	a 	teacher, 	was 	convicted 	of 	several 	sex 	offense
charges involving a minor student that were found to have occurred
during the student’s first- and third-grades years; Petitioner was
acquitted 	of 	crimes 	allegedly 	occurring 	during 	the 	student’s
second-grade 	year. 	At 	trial, 	the 	State 	presented 	several
witnesses, 	including 	the 	minor 	alleged 	victim, 	and 	three 	expert
witnesses 	- 	a 	social 	worker, 	pediatrician, 	and 	licensed
professional 	counselor 	- 	who 	provided 	testimony 	that 	the 	victim
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displayed 	symptoms 	consistent 	with 	sexually-abused 	children
(“profile” testimony) and (as to the licensed counselor) suffered
from 	post-traumatic 	stress 	disorder 	(“PTSD”). 	Petitioner’s
objections relate principally to their testimony.
Of 	Petitioner’s 	objections, 	one 	warrants 	discussion.
Petitioner 	objects 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	determination 	that
trial counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction for the
testimony 	of 	the 	State’s 	PTSD 	expert 	was 	not 	objectively
unreasonable. 	(Doc. 49 at 45.) 	Specifically, Petitioner contends
that, because North Carolina case law required the trial court to
instruct the jury as to the permissible limited uses of PTSD expert
testimony, 	no 	reasonably 	competent 	defense 	attorney 	in 	North
Carolina would decline to request the limiting instruction. 	(See
id. at 50.)
To 	establish 	an 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	claim, 	a
petitioner must make two, distinct showings. 	First, the petitioner
is “required to establish that his ‘counsel’s representation fell
below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of 	reasonableness,’ 	measured 	by 	the
‘prevailing 	professional 	norms.’” 	Fisher 	v. 	Lee, 	215 	F.3d 	438,
446 	(2000) 	(quoting 	Strickland 	v. 	Washington, 	466 	U.S. 	668, 	688
(1984)). 	Second, 	the 	petitioner 	must 	show 	prejudice, 	that 	is,
“that 	there 	is 	a 	reasonable 	probability 	that, 	but 	for 	counsel’s
unprofessional 	errors, 	the 	result 	of 	the 	proceeding 	would 	have
been 	different.” 	Id. 	at 	446-47 	(quoting 	Strickland, 	466 	U.S. 	at
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694).
When 	reviewing 	a 	challenge 	to 	a 	conviction 	for 	ineffective
assistance 	of 	counsel, 	“[j]udicial 	scrutiny 	of 	counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.” 	Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689. 	Accordingly, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s 	conduct 	falls 	within 	the 	wide 	range 	of 	reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption 	that, 	under 	the 	circumstances, 	the 	challenged 	action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” 	Id. (quoting Michel
v. 	Louisiana, 	350 	U.S. 	91, 	101 	(1955)). 	“Representation 	is
constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the proper
functioning 	of 	the 	adversarial 	process’ 	that 	the 	defendant 	was
denied 	a 	fair 	trial.” 	Harrington 	v. 	Richter, 	562 	U.S. 	86, 	110
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
Moreover, 	when 	addressing 	a 	habeas 	corpus 	petitioner’s
challenge to a state conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the
federal 	court 	must 	also 	give 	deference 	to 	a 	state 	court’s
determination 	regarding 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel. 	See
Moore v. Hardee, 723 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 2013). 	In fact, “the
standards 	created 	by 	Strickland 	and 	§ 	2254(d) 	are 	both 	‘highly
deferential,’ 	and 	when 	the 	two 	apply 	in 	tandem, 	the 	review 	is
‘doubly’ 	so.” 	Harrington, 	562 	U.S. 	at 	105 	(citations 	omitted).
“The 	question 	‘is 	not 	whether 	a 	federal 	court 	believes 	the 	state
court’s 	determination’ 	under 	the 	Strickland 	standard 	‘was
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incorrect 	but 	whether 	that 	determination 	was 	unreasonable 	– 	a
substantially higher threshold.’” 	Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 	123 	(2009) 	(quoting 	Schriro 	v. 	Landrigan, 	550 	U.S 	465, 	473
(2007)).
Here, 	the 	state 	court, 	on 	motion 	for 	appropriate 	relief,
focused 	solely 	on 	Strickland’s 	prejudice 	prong 	when 	it 	rejected
Petitioner’s 	Strickland 	claim.1 	(Doc. 	46 	at 	23.) 	The 	double
deference created by Strickland and § 2254(d) thus applies only to
Strickland’s 	prejudice 	prong, 	and 	not 	to 	whether 	trial 	counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
(Id. at 26.) 	The court must therefore apply a de novo standard of
review 	to 	Strickland’s 	first 	prong 	in 	assessing 	counsel’s
performance.
Neither 	party 	disputes 	that 	North 	Carolina 	law 	required 	the
trial 	court 	to 	issue 	the 	jury 	a 	limiting 	instruction 	precluding
consideration 	of 	PTSD 	evidence 	as 	substantive 	evidence 	that 	a
sexual 	assault 	has 	in 	fact 	occurred. 	According 	to 	the 	Supreme
Court of North Carolina, if PTSD evidence is admitted, “the trial
judge should take pains to explain to the jurors the limited uses
for 	which 	the 	evidence 	is 	admitted” 	and 	“[i]n 	no 	case 	may 	the
1 Specifically, in its order denying Petitioner’s motion for appropriate
relief, the state court “determined that there are no facts alleged in
the motion that, if true, would indicate a reasonably probability that
the results of 	the 	proceedings would 	have been 	different.” 	(Doc. 	1-1
at 410.) 	The court concluded “that the allegations in support of the
motion [were] wholly insufficient to indicate that any alleged deficient
performance by counsel prejudiced his defense.” 	(Id.)
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evidence be admitted substantively for the sole purpose of proving
that 	a 	rape 	or 	sexual 	assault 	has 	in 	fact 	occurred.” 	State 	v.
Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883, 891 (N.C. 1992). 	The court articulated two
primary problems with PTSD evidence. 	First, the court noted that
“the 	psychiatric 	procedures 	used 	in 	developing 	the 	diagnosis 	are
designed 	for 	therapeutic 	purposes 	and 	are 	not 	reliable 	as 	fact-
finding tools.” 	Id. at 889. 	And second, the court reasoned that
“the 	potential 	for 	prejudice 	looms 	large 	because 	the 	jury 	may
accord 	too 	much 	weight 	to 	expert 	opinions 	stating 	medical
conclusions 	which 	were 	drawn 	from 	diagnostic 	methods 	having
limited merit as fact-finding devices.” 	Id.
Further, 	neither 	party 	contests 	that 	the 	State’s 	expert
witness testified that she diagnosed the victim with PTSD based on
his allegations of sexual abuse. 	(See Doc. 46 at 60.) 	Yet trial
counsel 	neither 	objected 	to 	nor 	requested 	a 	limiting 	instruction
for 	this 	PTSD 	evidence, 	and 	so 	the 	trial 	court 	did 	not 	issue 	a
limiting instruction. 	(Id.); see State v. Quarg, 431 S.E.2d 1, 5
(N.C. 1993) (“The rule, however, in [North Carolina] has long been
that 	an 	instruction 	limiting 	admissibility 	of 	testimony 	to
corroboration is not required unless counsel specifically requests
such an instruction.”).
Nevertheless, 	as 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	Recommendation
thoroughly 	documents, 	courts 	routinely 	conclude 	that 	trial
counsel’s 	failure 	to 	request 	a 	limiting 	instruction 	falls 	within
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the 	boundaries 	of 	objectively 	reasonable 	litigation 	strategy.
See, 	e.g., 	United 	States 	v. 	Lindsay, 	157 	F.3d 	532, 	536 	(7th 	Cir.
1998) 	(“[L]awyers 	often 	make 	the 	strategic 	choice 	not 	to 	request
limiting instructions, because they wish to avoid underscoring the
troublesome 	material 	for 	the 	jury.”). 	Petitioner 	correctly
asserts that trial counsel’s decision to cross-examine the expert
witness 	did 	not 	preclude 	the 	request 	for 	a 	limiting 	instruction.
(Doc. 	49 	at 	52.) 	But 	here, 	trial 	counsel 	could 	have 	reasonably
concluded 	that 	cross-examination 	provided 	a 	better 	vehicle 	to
blunt 	the 	impact 	of 	the 	expert 	witness’s 	PTSD 	diagnosis 	of 	the
victim. 	In fact, trial counsel elicited admissions from the expert
witness 	that 	attacked 	the 	thoroughness 	and 	accuracy 	of 	her 	PTSD
diagnosis, 	undermining 	the 	conclusion 	that 	the 	trauma 	arose 	from
alleged 	sexual 	abuse.2 	(Doc. 	46 	at 	63.) 	Thus, 	Petitioner 	has
failed 	to 	show 	that 	trial 	counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	an
objective standard of reasonableness, even under a de novo standard
2 In his objections, Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s thorough
attack of the PTSD evidence via cross-examination supports a finding of
deficient performance because such an attack demonstrates how damaging
the evidence was to Petitioner’s defense. 	(Doc. 49 at 47-48.) 	However,
the potentially serious adverse impact of the PTSD evidence also offers
a 	rationale 	for 	why 	trial 	counsel 	may 	have 	avoided 	highlighting 	the
damaging 	material 	via 	a 	limiting 	instruction. 	See 	United 	States 	v.
Childs, 598 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“It is well known that, even
when a limiting instruction is likely to aid the accused’s cause, astute
defense counsel may prefer tactically to forego 	it in 	the interest 	of
avoiding 	its 	inevitable 	focus 	of 	the 	jury’s 	attention 	on 	unfavorable
evidence.”); 	see 	also 	Harrington, 	562 	U.S. 	at 	111 	(“[I]t 	is 	difficult
to establish ineffective assistance when counsel’s overall performance
indicates active and capable advocacy.”).
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of review.
Moreover, even if Petitioner had demonstrated trial counsel’s
deficient performance, he still would have to overcome the double
deference of Strickland and § 2254 by showing that the state court
unreasonably 	applied 	Strickland’s 	prejudice 	prong. 	(See 	id. 	at
67.) 	And “because the Strickland standard is a general standard,
a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that
a 	defendant 	has 	not 	satisfied 	that 	standard.” 	Knowles, 	556 	U.S.
at 	123. 	Yet 	as 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	Recommendation 	lays 	out,
the jury considered significant trial evidence - unrelated to the
PTSD 	evidence 	– 	corroborating 	the 	victim’s 	testimony 	that
Petitioner sexually abused the victim. 	(See Doc. 46 at 67-73.)
To be sure, this case presents notable inconsistencies. 	The
victim, 	who 	was 	twelve 	years 	old 	at 	the 	time 	of 	testifying 	and
nine years old when the abuse ended, admitted at trial that he had
lied 	about 	the 	location 	where 	the 	sexual 	abuse 	occurred. 	(Doc.
39-5 	at 	141-42.) 	Moreover, 	Petitioner 	argues 	that 	the 	victim’s
abuse 	allegations 	evolved 	substantially 	once 	he 	began 	therapy,
often 	expanding 	in 	a 	manner 	that 	seemed 	to 	incrementally 	confirm
the 	private 	suspicions 	shared 	between 	his 	therapist 	and 	the
investigating 	officer. 	(See 	Doc. 	49 	at 	18.) 	For 	example,
according 	to 	Petitioner, 	the 	victim 	never 	mentioned 	that 	he 	had
been 	anally 	sodomized 	by 	Petitioner 	until 	two 	days 	after 	his
therapist and the investigating officer discussed the possibility
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that such abuse may have occurred. 	(See id.) 	Moreover, Petitioner
further contends the victim initially claimed that Petitioner only
abused 	him 	during 	January 	2014 	of 	his 	third-grade 	year, 	but 	he
later 	alleged 	that 	Petitioner 	had 	abused 	him 	in 	first 	grade 	as
well – shortly after his therapist called the investigating officer
with 	suspicions 	that 	the 	abuse 	may 	have 	occurred 	before 	third
grade. 	(See id.) 	And although the victim ultimately claimed that
Petitioner 	sexually 	abused 	him 	repeatedly 	from 	the 	first 	through
third grades, and as noted below, the jury acquitted Petitioner of
all second-grade counts. 	(Id. at 5-6.)
The 	State 	was 	also 	unsuccessful 	in 	persuading 	a 	jury 	of
Petitioner’s guilt in its first attempt. 	Petitioner underwent two
trials, 	and 	the 	first 	ended 	in 	a 	mistrial. 	(See 	Doc. 	6 	at 	10.)
The 	victim’s 	testimony 	changed 	substantially 	between 	the 	two
trials. 	Petitioner argues, and Respondent does not deny, that in
the 	first 	trial 	the 	victim 	claimed 	that 	Petitioner 	always 	locked
the wooden door to the bathroom where the abuse allegedly occurred.
(Doc. 	49 	at 	11, 	14, 	15.) 	During 	the 	second 	trial, 	however, 	the
victim testified that Petitioner did not lock the door because the
door 	could 	not 	lock 	from 	the 	inside. 	(Doc. 	39-5 	at 	153-54.)
Further, although the victim first alleged that he regularly went
to 	Petitioner’s 	classroom 	throughout 	second 	grade, 	the 	victim
later 	testified 	that 	Petitioner 	typically 	came 	to 	teacher 	Karen
Sexton’s 	second-grade 	classroom 	and 	only 	rarely 	taught 	in
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Petitioner’s 	own 	classroom 	during 	second 	grade. 	(Id. 	at 	58-60;
Doc. 	49 	at 	13.) 	This 	shift 	occurred 	only 	after 	Karen 	Sexton 	had
testified 	during 	the 	first 	trial 	that 	Petitioner 	came 	to 	her
classroom and taught the victim there, rather than in Petitioner’s
classroom, 	during 	second 	grade. 	(See 	Doc. 	49 	at 	19.) 	This 	is
important 	because 	the 	victim 	claimed 	that 	Petitioner 	would
regularly dismiss the victim from his classroom last so Petitioner
could accompany the victim to his next class and abuse him en route
in the bathroom. 	(See Doc. 39-5 at 95, 182.) 	As noted, Petitioner
was 	acquitted 	of 	the 	charges 	involving 	abuse 	during 	the 	second
grade.
Another 	potentially 	complicating 	fact 	was 	that 	the 	victim’s
grandmother 	died 	in 	January 	2014, 	only 	days 	before 	the 	victim’s
behavioral 	changes 	that 	prefaced 	the 	sexual 	abuse 	allegations
became apparent. 	(Doc. 39-8 at 150.) 	The State argued that this
development 	was 	unlikely 	to 	have 	been 	the 	source 	of 	the 	victim’s
symptoms 	as 	the 	victim 	hardly 	knew 	his 	grandmother. 	(See 	id. 	at
152.) 	Moreover, although the victim first claimed that Petitioner
abused 	him 	throughout 	January 	2014, 	Petitioner 	only 	taught 	the
victim 	three 	times 	that 	month 	- 	and 	never 	on 	the 	week 	the 	victim
identified 	as 	the 	most 	recent 	instance 	of 	abuse. 	(Doc. 	39-5 	at
172, 237.)
In 	contrast, 	Respondent 	relied 	on 	expert 	witness 	testimony
that 	children 	who 	have 	experienced 	sexual 	abuse 	often 	delay
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disclosure 	of 	the 	full 	extent 	of 	their 	abuse 	because 	of 	shame 	or
fear. 	(Doc. 	39-7 	at 	170-73.) 	According 	to 	Respondent’s 	expert
witness, 	it 	is 	“not 	uncommon 	at 	all” 	for 	a 	child 	to 	provide 	his
therapist with more details of abuse as the relationship develops.
(Id. 	at 	176.) 	Moreover, 	the 	expert 	witness 	testified 	that 	“it’s
not 	abnormal 	at 	all” 	for 	children 	to 	confuse 	details 	of 	their
abuse, “particularly if the abuse has been ongoing over some amount
of time.” 	(Id. at 177.) 	Finally, according to the expert witness,
the 	victim 	here 	may 	have 	experienced 	heightened 	barriers 	to
disclosure because of the “high level of obedience” children often
demonstrate to teachers as authority figures. 	(Id. at 171-73.)
Ultimately, 	to 	the 	extent 	Petitioner’s 	conviction 	rested 	on
the 	credibility 	of 	the 	witnesses, 	“federal 	courts 	must 	defer 	to
the judgment of the jury in assigning credibility to the witnesses
and in weighing the evidence.” 	Lucas v. McBride, 505 F. Supp. 2d
329, 358 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d
1156, 	1172 	(11th 	Cir. 	2001)). 	The 	record 	contains 	facts 	that
support 	conflicting 	inferences, 	and 	indeed 	the 	jury 	in 	the 	first
trial 	must 	have 	struggled 	with 	those 	as 	it 	failed 	to 	reach 	a
conviction. 	No 	doubt, 	this 	tends 	to 	be 	consistent 	with
Petitioner’s contention that the jury may have leaned more heavily
on 	the 	expert 	testimony 	in 	the 	second 	trial 	to 	determine 	whether
abuse 	in 	fact 	occurred. 	But 	even 	“taking 	due 	account 	of 	the
effect” 	of 	any 	error 	regarding 	the 	PTSD 	evidence 	on 	the 	jury’s
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findings, as the Magistrate Judge outlined in detail, “the totality
of 	the 	evidence” 	supports 	the 	jury’s 	finding 	of 	guilt 	beyond 	a
reasonable doubt. 	See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 	Accordingly,
the 	state 	court 	did 	not 	unreasonably 	apply 	Strickland 	in 	finding
that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability of a
different 	outcome 	if 	trial 	counsel 	had 	requested 	a 	limiting
instruction for the PTSD evidence.
The court, having appropriately reviewed the portions of the
Magistrate Judge’s report to which objections were made and having
made a de novo determination in accord with the Magistrate Judge’s
report, therefore adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation.
Petitioner 	also 	requests 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability.
(Doc. 	49 	at 	86.) 	“In 	a 	habeas 	corpus 	proceeding 	in 	which 	the
detention 	complained 	of 	arises 	from 	process 	issued 	by 	a 	state
court, 	or 	in 	a 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255 	proceeding, 	the 	applicant 	cannot
take 	an 	appeal 	unless 	a 	circuit 	justice 	or 	a 	circuit 	or 	district
judge 	issues 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2253(c).” 	Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). 	Pursuant to § 2253(c)(2),
a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability only if
he 	has 	made 	a 	“substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional 	right.” 	To 	satisfy 	this 	standard, 	where 	a
petitioner’s 	constitutional 	claims 	have 	been 	adjudicated 	and
denied 	on 	the 	merits 	by 	the 	district 	court, 	the 	petitioner 	must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the issue
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should 	have 	been 	decided 	differently 	or 	show 	that 	the 	issue 	is
adequate 	to 	deserve 	encouragement 	to 	proceed 	further. 	Slack 	v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Here, at bottom, the question is whether, even assuming that
trial 	counsel’s 	performance 	was 	ineffective, 	the 	state 	court’s
decision that Petitioner failed to show prejudice was contrary to,
or 	involved 	an 	unreasonable 	application 	of, 	clearly 	established
federal 	law 	as 	determined 	by 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	the 	United
States. 	The court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner has not
made the necessary substantial showing that the issue is debatable
or 	adequate 	to 	deserve 	encouragement 	to 	proceed 	further.
Petitioner 	is, 	of 	course, 	free 	to 	seek 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability 	from 	the 	circuit 	justice 	or 	a 	circuit 	judge.
Consequently, 	Petitioner’s 	request 	for 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability will therefore be denied.
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 25) is GRANTED and that the amended petition (Doc.
6) 	is 	DISMISSED. 	Finding 	neither 	a 	substantial 	issue 	for 	appeal
concerning 	the 	denial 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right 	affecting 	the
conviction 	nor 	a 	debatable 	procedural 	ruling, 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability is DENIED.
/s/ 	Thomas D. Schroeder
January 9, 2026 	United States District Judge
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