MULUGU v. DUKE UNIVERSITY et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRAHMAJOTHI VASUDEVAN MULUGU, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:23CV957
)
DUKE UNIVERSITY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a
recommended ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Docket Entry 66) and Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket Entry 72), as well as Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Amend Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 81 (“Motion for Leave”)). (See
Docket Entry dated June 6, 2025 (referring Docket Entry 66); Docket
Entry dated Sept. 11, 2025 (referring Docket Entry 72); Docket
Entry dated Sept. 25, 2025 (referring Docket Entry 81).) For the
reasons that follow, the Court (A) should grant in part and should
deny in part the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (such that
only Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Duke University for
retaliation in violation of federal law and for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in violation of
state law would remain), (B) should deny the Motion for Leave, and
(C) should deny the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 1 of 84

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff commenced this case pro se by filing the Complaint
(Docket Entry 1), which, in short order, she amended as a matter of
course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) (see Docket
Entry 5 (the “Amended Complaint”)). As the first defendant, the
Amended Complaint names Duke University School of Medicine (see id.
at 2-3), but the Court (per the undersigned Magistrate Judge)	1
later corrected that defendant’s name to Duke University (see
Docket Entry 46 at 19). The Amended Complaint also identifies as
defendants various employees of Defendant Duke University,
including (as still relevant) Donald Patrick McDonnell, Mary
Frances Earley Klotman, and Sharon Adele Dowell-Newton
(collectively, “Individual Defendants,” and, along with Defendant
Duke University, “Defendants”). (See Docket Entry 5 at 2-3.)2
1 Pin cites to documents filed by Plaintiff refer to page
numbers that appear in the footer appended to those documents upon
their filing in the CM/ECF system (not to any original pagination).
All quotations from Plaintiff’s filings omit bold font.
2 The Amended Complaint additionally lists as defendants the
late Mohamed Bahie Abou-Donia, Geeta Krishna Swamy, and Colin
Stephen Duckett (see Docket Entry 5 at 2-3); however, the Court
(per Chief United States District Judge Catherine C. Eagles)
dismissed Dr. Abou-Donia from the case (see Docket Entry 56 at 1)
and dismissed the claims lodged against Drs. Swamy and Duckett (see
id. at 1-2; see also Docket Entry 46 at 13-14 (denying as futile
Plaintiff’s request to amend Amended Complaint to assert race
discrimination claims against Drs. Swamy and Duckett under 42
U.S.C. § 1981); Text Order dated Dec. 4, 2025 (denying Plaintiff’s
request for reconsideration of denial of her prior request to add
Section 1981 claims against Drs. Swamy and Duckett)).
2
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 2 of 84

The Amended Complaint asserts claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (see Docket Entry 5 at 4), for
“discriminatory conduct” (id. at 5), in the form of “[t]ermination
of [Plaintiff’s] employment[, f]ailure to promote [her], . . .
[u]nequal terms and conditions of [her] employment[, r]etaliation[,
and] . . . [f]raud” (id.). In particular, the Amended Complaint
alleges “discriminat[ion] against [Plaintiff] based on [her] . . .
race[,] Asian[,] color[,] Brown[,] gender/sex[,] Female[,]
religion[,] Hindu[,] national origin[,] Indian[, and] age[, born]
1967.” (Id. (parentheses omitted).) Subsequently, the Court (per
the undersigned Magistrate Judge):
deemed [the Amended Complaint further] amended to assert
(i) a race discrimination claim under [42 U.S.C. §] 1981
against Defendants Duke University, McDonnell, and
Klotman, for failing to promote Plaintiff to research
assistant professor after she obtained [a Department of
Defense (“DoD”)] grant, (ii) a race discrimination claim
under Section 1981 against Defendants Duke University,
Klotman, and Dowell-Newton, for failing to keep proper
records for Plaintiff’s DoD grant, and (iii) a state-law
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing against Defendant Duke University in
connection with the research misconduct investigation
against Plaintiff . . . .
(Docket Entry 46 (“Amendment Order”) at 19-20; see also Docket
Entry 56 at 1-2 (dismissing Title VII and ADEA claims against
Individual Defendants).)
3
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 3 of 84

Discovery commenced on November 19, 2024. (See Text Order
dated Nov. 19, 2024 (adopting Joint Rule 26(f) Report (Docket Entry
54)); see also Docket Entry 54 at 2 (providing for commencement of
discovery upon adoption of Joint Rule 26(f) Report).) With just
over a month left in the discovery period, Defendants filed their
instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (See Docket Entry 54
at 2 (setting discovery deadline of May 30, 2025); Docket Entry 66
at 3 (documenting filing date of April 21, 2025).) In it, they
contended “that all of Plaintiff’s claims against [] Defendants
stated in the Amended Complaint are either untimely or not
plausibly pled . . ., except for Plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory
termination in violation of Title VII.” (Docket Entry 66 at 1.)
Plaintiff responded in opposition. (See Docket Entry 69.)
Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed their
instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Docket Entry 72 at 3
(documenting filing date of June 30, 2025); see also id. at 1
(“Plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute of material fact with
respect to any of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants are therefore
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).) Via letter dated July
1, 2025, the Clerk advised Plaintiff of her “right to file a 20-
page response in opposition to th[at M]otion [for Summary
Judgment]” (Docket Entry 74 at 1; see also id. (“Your response may
be accompanied by counter affidavits, or you may submit other
responsive material.”)), “within 30 days from the date of service
4
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 4 of 84

of th[at M]otion [for Summary Judgment]” (id.). On the deadline	3
for Plaintiff’s summary judgment response, she moved for an
extension “up to and including August 4, 2025.” (Docket Entry 75
at 1; see also id. (bearing file-stamp of July 30, 2025).) To
support that request, Plaintiff stated:
Due to illness over the past several days, I have been
unable to complete my response to Defendants’ [M]otion
for [S]ummary [J]udgment by today’s deadline. I have
been managing significant symptoms that have limited my
ability to focus and work effectively. . . . I have been
working diligently as my health allows. However, despite
my efforts, I need additional time to finish researching,
drafting, and finalizing my response so that it is
complete and accurate.
(Id. at 2; see also id. at 3 (“Counsel for Defendants have
indicated that they consent to this [m]otion.”).) The Court (per
the undersigned Magistrate Judge) granted Plaintiff that extension.
(See Text Order dated July 31, 2025.)
When the extended deadline arrived, Plaintiff again moved for
an extension, this time “up to and including August 11, 2025.”
(Docket Entry 76 at 1; see also id. (bearing file-stamp of August
4, 2025).) As her justification for that request, Plaintiff first
pointed to continued illness (see id. at 2), then stated that she
had “nearly finished drafting [her response]” (id.), and lastly
cited “technical difficulties that have slowed [her] ability to
3 Plaintiff received electronic service of the Motion for
Summary Judgment at the time of its filing. (See Docket Entry 3 at
1 (“consent[ing] to receive service of documents and notices of
electronic filing via the Court’s Electronic Filing System”
(internal parenthetical omitted)).)
5
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 5 of 84

compile and print the necessary exhibits” (id.; see also id. at 3
(“I request an extension of seven (7) days . . . to allow me time
to compile my exhibits to my response . . . and ensure that my
filing is complete. . . . Counsel for Defendants have indicated
that they consent to this [m]otion.”)). Once more, the Court (per
the undersigned Magistrate Judge) extended Plaintiff’s deadline.
(See Text Order dated Aug. 5, 2025.) The day that second extension
expired, Plaintiff filed yet another request for more time, “up to
and including August 18, 2025.” (Docket Entry 77 at 1; see also
id. (bearing date-stamp of August 11, 2025).) According to that
motion, “[w]hile finalizing [the] compiled exhibits for filing,
[Plaintiff’s] computer froze and requires restoration, preventing
[her] from completing the process for filing.” (Id. at 2; see also
id. at 2-3 (“This unforeseen technical issue arose last night
. . . . I have worked diligently and am otherwise ready to
finalize the filing once my computer is restored. . . . Counsel
for [D]efendants have consented to this motion, on the condition
that this is the last extension for this filing.”).) The Court
(per the undersigned Magistrate Judge) granted that motion, but
cautioned Plaintiff that she “should not anticipate receiving any
further extensions of th[at by-then]-thrice-extended deadline.”
(Text Order dated Aug. 12, 2025.)
On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 28-page Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
6
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 6 of 84

(Docket Entry 78 (“Summary Judgment Response”) at 1-28), along with
approximately 450 pages of exhibits (see Docket Entries 78-1
through 78-5; Docket Entry 79; Docket Entries 79-1 through 79-19).
Fifteen days later, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Leave
(see Docket Entry 81 at 1 (bearing date-stamp of September 2,
2025)), along with a 26-page Amended Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry
83 (“Amended Summary Judgment Response”) at 1-26), with over 2000
pages of exhibits (see Docket Entries 83-1 through 83-11; Docket
Entry 84; Docket Entries 84-1 through 84-19; Docket Entry 85;
Docket Entries 85-1 through 85-24; Docket Entry 86; Docket Entries
86-1 through 86-24; Docket Entry 87; Docket Entries 87-1 through
87-19). Defendants responded in opposition to the Motion for Leave
(see Docket Entry 90) and Plaintiff replied (see Docket Entry 91).
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
“After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to
delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (“Rule 12(c)”). “A Rule 12(c) motion tests
only the sufficiency of the complaint and does not resolve the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims or any disputes of fact.” Drager
v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014).
Nonetheless, as with a motion to dismiss, in the face of a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, “the complaint’s factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
7
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 7 of 84

level – that is, the complaint must contain enough facts to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bass v.
Weinstein Mgmt. Co., Inc., 56 F.4th 355, 360-61 (4th Cir. 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys.,
LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[I]mportantly, [pleading
a plausible claim] ‘requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[ ] will
not do.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007))); Independence News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d
148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009) (“applying the same standard for Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motions as for motions made pursuant
to [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)”).
Section 1981 Claims
As detailed in the Introduction, the Amendment Order construed
the Amended Complaint as asserting two Section 1981 race
discrimination claims: (1) the first “against Defendants Duke
University, McDonnell, and Klotman, for failing to promote
Plaintiff to research assistant professor after she obtained [a]
DoD grant” (Docket Entry 46 at 19); and (2) the second “against
Defendants Duke University, Klotman, and Dowell-Newton, for failing
to keep proper records for Plaintiff’s DoD grant” (id.). To
support their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants
argued that “Plaintiff’s [first] claim under Section 1981 against
[Defendants] Duke [University], McDonnell, and [] Klotman is time-
8
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 8 of 84

barred.” (Docket Entry 67 at 14.) Specifically, Defendants
observed (A) that “[t]he statute of limitations for a Section 1981
claim is four years” (id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658)), and (B) that
“Plaintiff did not file this action until November 6, 2023, more
than four years after she was informed that she would not be
promoted in July 2019” (id. (citing Docket Entry 1 and Docket Entry
5 at 14); see also Docket Entry 47 at 88 (pleading as Fifth
Affirmative Defense in Defendants’ Answer to Amended Complaint:
“To the extent Plaintiff’s claims seek to address alleged acts or
omissions beyond the applicable statute of limitations, such claims
are barred.”)). Plaintiff did not address (much less contest) that
specific time-bar argument. (See Docket Entry 69 at 1-10.) The
Court should grant judgment on the pleadings for Defendants Duke
University, McDonnell, and Klotman on Plaintiff’s failure-to-
promote, Section 1981 claim.
Regarding that claim, the Amended Complaint alleges:
1) “[o]n May 1, 2018, [Plaintiff] received a letter of
congratulations from DoD saying that a proposal [she] had submitted
in 2017 was recommended for funding” (Docket Entry 5 at 10);
2) “[o]n May 29, 2018, Dr. Abou-[D]onia took [Plaintiff] to
[Defendant] McDonnell . . . to recommend [Plaintiff] for a position
change from research scientist to research assistant professor”
(id.);
9
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 9 of 84

3) during that meeting, Defendant McDonnell “told [Plaintiff]
that, ultimately, the decision to change [her] position rested with
[Defendant] Klotman, and[,] if [Plaintiff] didn’t hear from
[Defendant McDonnell] in 3 months, [Plaintiff] was welcome to
contact [Defendant] Klotman directly” (id.; see also id. at 11
(alleging that, after that meeting, Plaintiff “informed Dr. Swamy
that . . . [Defendant] McDonnell was not willing to change
[Plaintiff’s] position”));
4) “[i]n April 2019, Dr. Abou-[D]onia suggested that . . .
[Plaintiff] should send [Defendant] Klotman a request letter for a
position change to [r]esearch [a]ssistant professor” (id. at 13);
5) “[Plaintiff] sent an email to [Defendant] Klotman on May
12, 2019, . . . requesting [he] recommend [her] for a position
change to research assistant professor” (id. at 14);
6) “[Plaintiff] met [Defendant] McDonnell on July 24, 2019 to
discuss the possibility of a position change in connection with
[Plaintiff’s] email to [Defendant] Klotman” (id.); and
7) “[d]uring th[at] discussion, [Defendant] McDonnell told
[Plaintiff she was] better off moving to the Department of Medicine
if [she was] seeking a faculty position” (id.; see also id. at 15
(“[Defendant] McDonell also told [Plaintiff] that he only talks to
faculty and that he would not communicate directly with [her] in
the future.”)).
10
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 10 of 84

The foregoing allegations of the Amended Complaint establish
that, as of July 24, 2019, Plaintiff knew she would not receive the
promotion that she had requested from Defendants McDonnell and
Klotman; however, Plaintiff did not institute this action until
more than four years later, on November 6, 2023 (see Docket Entry
1 at 1). “Section 1981 claims based upon conduct occurring after
the formation of an employment contract, including . . . claims of
discrimination . . . like the one[] raised here, arise under the
1991 amendments [to Section 1981]. Accordingly, [this S]ection
1981 claim[ is] subject to the four-year statute of limitations in
[S]ection 1658 . . . .” White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d
288, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Because
Plaintiff did not file this action within four years of learning
that Defendants Klotman and McDonnell would not grant her the
requested promotion, her claim for race discrimination under
Section 1981 against Defendants Duke University, McDonnell, and
Klotman for failure to grant that requested promotion falls short
as a matter of law based on the pleadings. See, e.g., Rouse v.
Duke Univ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (Eagles, J.)
(“Courts also routinely and appropriately dispose of cases on
statute-of-limitations grounds at the Rule 12(c) stage when the
pleadings themselves contain sufficient information to make a
ruling.”); see also West v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 683 F.2d 845,
846 (4th Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal of case on Rule 12(c)
11
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 11 of 84

motion when “facts alleged” showed statute of limitations barred
claim); Tollison v. B & J Mach. Co., 812 F. Supp. 618, 619 (D.S.C.
1993) (“A motion under Rule 12(c) is an appropriate procedure when
the statute of limitations is alleged to provide an effective bar
against a plaintiff’s claims.”).4
Similarly, Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings
on Plaintiff’s “‘race discrimination claim under Section 1981
against Defendants Duke University, Klotman, and Dowell-Newton, for
failing to keep proper records for Plaintiff’s DoD grant’” (Docket
Entry 67 at 19 (quoting Docket Entry 46 at 19)), on the ground that
“Plaintiff was aware of the record[-]keeping issue no later than
August 2018 but did not file this action until November 2023” (id.
at 20; see also id. at 19-20 (discussing allegations in Amended
Complaint regarding deficient record-keeping for grant)), such that
said claim fails as “barred by the four-year statute of limitations
applicable to Section 1981 claims” (id. at 20 (citing Section
1658)). Plaintiff did not respond to that particular, statute-of-
4 In opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Plaintiff did invoke “the continuing violation doctrine” (Docket
Entry 69 at 7) and did cite authority for the proposition “that
hostile environment claims by their nature involve repeated conduct
and are treated as one continuing violation” (id. (emphasis added)
(citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117
(2002)). But the continuing violation doctrine and its application
to hostile work environment claims does not aid Plaintiff in this
instance; to the contrary, “[b]ecause failure to promote is a
discrete act of discrimination, the continuing violation doctrine
does not apply here and cannot save [this] untimely claim[].”
Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2004)
(internal citation omitted).
12
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 12 of 84

limitations argument in opposing the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. (See Docket Entry 69 at 1-10.) The Court should enter
judgment in favor of Defendants Duke University, Klotman, and
Dowell-Newton on this Section 1981 claim, due to its untimeliness,
as the allegations in the Amended Complaint concerning inadequate
record-keeping for Plaintiff’s grant focus on events more than four
years before she filed this action on November 6, 2023 (see Docket
Entry 1 at 1). See White, 375 F.3d at 292 (holding that Section
1658’s four-year statute of limitations applies to post-contract-
formation, discrimination claims under Section 1981); see also
Rouse, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (recognizing that courts routinely
dismiss cases under Rule 12(c) when pleadings show untimeliness).5
5 More particularly (per the Amended Complaint), in 2018,
Plaintiff sought to comply with procedures necessary to conduct
human testing pursuant to her grant, but could not obtain “the
first page of the submitted version of [her] grant” (Docket Entry
5 at 11), upon contacting “[Defendant] Duke University’s Office of
Research Administration, [which, in turn,] referred [her] to [her]
department . . . as the source . . . responsible for keeping those
records” (id.; see also id. (alleging that Defendant Dowell-Newton
“failed to keep appropriate records of [Plaintiff’s] submitted
grant, although [Defendant Dowell-Newton] did this for others in
[that department] who received grants, all of whom were lighter
skinned than [Plaintiff],” as well as that “[Defendants] Klotman
and Duke University failed to ensure that [said department’s]
administration maintained appropriate records . . ., creating a
work environment that facilitated the creation of disparities”)).
Importantly, Plaintiff cannot rely on allegations of other, more
recent instances of discrimination as to matters other than record-
keeping to avoid the time-bar on this discrimination claim. See,
e.g., Akpan v. Holy Cross Health, Inc., Civ. No. 23-2810, 2025 WL
2616656, at *14 n.11 (D. Md. Sept. 10, 2025) (unpublished) (“It is
well-settled that the continuing violation doctrine cannot be used
to pursue discrete act claims challenging time-barred conduct.”).
13
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 13 of 84

As a result, the Court should grant the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims.
Title VII and ADEA Claims
The Amended Complaint also asserts claims against Defendant
Duke University under Title VII and the ADEA for (A) discriminatory
“[f]ailure to promote [her]” (Docket Entry 5 at 5), “[u]nequal
terms and conditions of [her] employment” (id.), and “[t]ermination
of [Plaintiff’s] employment” (id.), due to her “race” (id.),
“color” (id.), “gender/sex” (id.), “religion” (id.), “national
origin” (id.), and “age” (id.), as well as for (B) “[r]etaliation”
(id.) and (C) “[f]raud” (id.). Defendants have sought judgment on
the pleadings as to all of those claims except for the retaliation
claim. (See Docket Entry 67 at 2 & n.1.)
Discrimination - Failure to Promote
Starting with the Title VII and ADEA claims for discriminatory
non-promotion, Defendants (in aid of the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings) have argued that “Plaintiff’s claims relating to lack of
promotion to research assistant professor are barred by the statute
of limitations” (id. at 13), because:
1) “[u]nder Title VII and the ADEA, plaintiffs must file an
[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] Charge [of
Discrimination] within 180 days of alleged discrimination” (id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)));
14
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 14 of 84

2) “Plaintiff was aware that she would not be promoted to
research assistant professor no later than July 24, 2019” (id.
(citing Docket Entry 5 at 14)); and
3) “[Plaintiff] did not file her initial Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC until August 19, 2021, . . . far past
the 180-day deadline” (id. at 13-14 (citing Docket Entry 5 at 41)).
“Under Title VII, a timely charge [of discrimination] must be
filed with EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.”
Welton v. Durham Cnty., No. 1:17CV258, 2017 WL 3726991, at *3
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2017) (unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (citing, inter
alia, Section 2000e-5(e)(1)), aff’d, 781 F. App’x 242 (4th Cir.
2019). The ADEA likewise “requires that a charge of age
discrimination be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred.” Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777
F.2d 849, 856 (4th Cir. 1985) (referring to Section 626(d)).
The Amended Complaint alleges that, “[o]n August 19, 2021,
[Plaintiff] filed [her] complaints to the EEOC.” (Docket Entry 5
at 41.) “Any claims of discrimination . . . that occurred [over
180 days] before [that date] . . . are time-barred and [should] be
dismissed.” Welton, 2017 WL 3726991, at *3. As documented in the	6
6 “If North Carolina were a ‘deferral state,’ the time period
[under Title VII] would be 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1). However, North Carolina is a deferral state only in
limited circumstances not applicable here.” Fulmore v. City of
Greensboro, 834 F. Supp. 2d 396, 411 n.7 (M.D.N.C. 2011)
(Schroeder, J.) (citing Bratcher v. Pharmaceutical Prod. Dev.,
(continued...)
15
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 15 of 84

discussion of the parallel claim for discriminatory denial of
promotion under Section 1981, according to the Amended Complaint,
by July 24, 2019 (i.e., more than two years before she filed her
Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC), Plaintiff knew that she
would not receive the promotion she had requested. The Court
therefore should enter judgment on the pleadings for Defendant Duke
University on Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claim(s) for failure
to promote her. See, e.g., Rouse, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (noting
propriety of “dispos[ing] of cases on statute-of-limitations
grounds at the Rule 12(c) stage when the pleadings themselves
contain sufficient information to make a ruling”).7
6(...continued)
Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 533, 539-43 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (discussing
narrow situations in which 300-day limitation period applies in
North Carolina)); see also Long v. Forsyth Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., No. 1:15CV683, 2016 WL 7496122, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 30,
2018) (unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (same as to ADEA).
7 Nothing in Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings alters this analysis; indeed, as concerns the
statute of limitations, she merely baldly asserted that the
continuing violation doctrine somehow renders timely all her
allegations of discrimination “by Defendants from 2016 through
[her] termination in 2022” (Docket Entry 69 at 7). (See id. at 1-
10.) That bald assertion falls short: “[E]ven if [Plaintiff] is
correct that [Defendant Duke University’s] failures to promote her
. . . were part of a broader pattern or practice of discrimination,
those failures to promote remain discrete acts of discrimination.”
Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 2004).
“Such discrete acts of discrimination are not actionable if time-
barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed
charges [of discrimination].” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Welton, 2017 WL 3726991, at *3 (“Each allegedly
unlawful practice must separately satisfy the 180-day test.”).
16
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 16 of 84

Discrimination - Unequal Terms and Conditions of Employment
Next, to advance their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Defendants have contended that “Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA
[c]laims for [u]nequal [t]erms and [c]onditions of [e]mployment
[a]re [u]ntimely.” (Docket Entry 67 at 14 (bold font omitted).)
In furtherance of that contention, Defendants distilled from the
Amended Complaint these allegations by Plaintiff of “unequal terms
and conditions of employment” (id. (internal brackets and quotation
marks omitted)): “she (a) was not given research support,
including working in an ‘under[-]resourced space’ . . . [where] her
‘belongings were taken from [her], and this theft was not
investigated;’ (b) ‘was held to ambiguous standards in regard to
her departmental role;’ and (c) was investigated for research
misconduct” (id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Docket Entry
5 at 45-46)). That distillation accurately quotes and summarizes
the Amended Complaint’s description of Plaintiff’s three-part
“[c]laim[]” (Docket Entry 5 at 45) for “[u]nequal terms and
conditions of employment” (id.). (See id. at 45-46.) Moreover, in
opposing the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Plaintiff did
not contest Defendants’ construction of her claim(s) for unequal
terms and conditions of employment. (See Docket Entry 69 at 1-10.)
For the first two, above-identified sub-claims (or categories)
of unequal terms and conditions of employment, i.e., “the alleged
lack of support and ambiguous standards” (Docket Entry 67 at 14
17
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 17 of 84

(internal quotation marks omitted)), Defendants requested that the
Court rule any claim(s) “untimely because [Plaintiff] did not file
an EEOC Charge of Discrimination within 180 days of either event”
(id. (citing Section 2000e-5(e)(1) and Section 626(d))). To
justify that request, Defendants argued:
Plaintiff alleges that when she “joined Dr. Abou-Donia’s
lab in July of 2016, although every other lab was fully
equipped, Dr. Abou-Donia was only provided a room that
was used as a dumping area for surplus materials to be
picked up.” She also claims that she personally brought
all supplies to the lab, did not receive a computer, and
did not receive any information technology support.
Plaintiff was aware that the lab was “under-resourced” no
later than July 2016. Meanwhile, the “theft” of
Plaintiff’s personal belongings and [Defendant] Duke[
University’s] failure to investigate allegedly occurred
on August 23, 2019.
Plaintiff’s allegations that she was held to “ambiguous
standards” all relate to actions taken by [Defendant]
McDonnell while he served as Chair of PCB, a position he
held until September 1, 2020. Plaintiff does not allege
that [Defendant] McDonnell engaged in misconduct after
September 1, 2020.
Plaintiff filed her EEOC Charge August 19, 2021, which is
well beyond 180 days after she was aware of the “lack of
support” for her lab or the “ambiguous standards” of her
position. As such, her Title VII and ADEA claims
relating to those allegations are untimely.
(Id. at 14-15 (internal brackets, citations, and footnote omitted)
(quoting and/or citing Docket Entry 5 at 7, 16, 35, 42).)
Plaintiff declined to engage with the above-quoted argument,
other than to state that (A) “the continuing violation doctrine
provides that[,] if the plaintiff experiences a series of separate
acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice,
18
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 18 of 84

the charge filing period (or limitations period) can be satisfied
as long as at least one of the acts falls within the filing period”
(Docket Entry 69 at 7 (emphasis added)), (B) “the Supreme Court
[has] held that hostile work environment claims by their nature
involve repeated conduct and are treated as one continuing
violation” (id. (emphasis added) (referring to National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002))), and (C) the
Amended Complaint’s “allegations describe a continuous course of
conduct by Defendants from 2016 through [Plaintiff’s] termination
in 2022” (id.; see also id. at 6 (“I experienced a continuing
violation from 2016 to 2022: disparate treatment before and after
my grant success, escalation to a hostile environment, and
retaliation culminating in termination and reputational harm.”)).
Consistent with the first two of those statements, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has observed that
“[t]he continuing violation theory allows for consideration of
incidents that occurred outside the time bar when those incidents
are part of a single, ongoing pattern of discrimination, i.e., when
the incidents make up part of a hostile work environment claim.”
Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir.
2007) (emphasis added) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118).
“However, this [continuing violation] exception to the []
limitations period is inapplicable for two reasons.” Breck v.
Maryland State Police, Civ. Action No. 16-2075, 2017 WL 2438767, at
19
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 19 of 84

*4 (D. Md. June 5, 2017) (unpublished). “First, [Plaintiff] d[id]
not plead a hostile work environment claim in [the Amended]
Complaint,” id.; accord, e.g., Askew v. New York, No. 1:09CV553,
2013 WL 450165, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2013) (unpublished); see
also Adams v. U.S. Airways, Inc., Civ. Action No. 2:10-1658, 2011
WL 1326054, at *5 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2011) (unpublished) (“There
can be no serious claim of a continuing violation because that
doctrine is only applicable to a claim of hostile work environment,
not pled in this case.”), recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1261451
(D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2011) (unpublished), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 293 (4th
Cir. 2011). (See Docket Entry 5 at 45-46 (making no mention of
“hostile work environment” in “[c]laim[]” for “[u]nequal terms and
conditions of employment”); see also id. at 5 (failing to list
“hostile work environment” in blank for description of
“discriminatory conduct of which [Plaintiff] complain[ed]”).)
Second, the inclusion in an opposition brief of “a mere
conclusory allegation of a continuing violation is not sufficient
to overcome the time and filing requirements of Title VII [and the
ADEA].” Taylor v. City Nat’l Bank, 642 F. Supp. 989, 996 (S.D. W.
Va. 1986), aff’d, No. 86-1715, 836 F.2d 547 (table), 1987 WL 30208
(4th Cir. Dec. 16, 1987) (unpublished); see also Holland v. Sam’s
Club, 487 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting “argu[ment that]
the district court erred by not applying the continuing violations
doctrine,” where, “[i]n the district court proceedings, [the
20
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 20 of 84

plaintiff] never designated the specific facts supporting [its]
application,” as “the district court [wa]s not obligated to wade
through and search the entire record for [such] specific facts”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Rodriguez Ruiz v. Microsoft
Operations P.R., LLC, Civ. No. 18-1806, 2021 WL 933355, at *7
(D.P.R. Mar. 11, 2021) (unpublished) (“[The plaintiff’s pleading]
alleges that his supervisor . . . (1) transferred him . . .,
(2) evaluated him improperly, (3) refused to transfer him back,
(4) refused to give him reasonable accommodations, (5) made
disparaging comments . . ., (6) wrongfully reprimanded him,
(7) imposed subjective goals . . ., and (8) terminated him . . . .
[The p]laintiff’s conclusory argument that all these acts are part
of one continuous and repeated hostile work environment is
insufficient.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Madera v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 99 CIV. 4005, 2002 WL 1453827, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002) (unpublished) (“[The p]laintiff’s
conclusory allegations that the [defendant’s] acts amounted to a
continuing violation are an insufficient substitute for an
explanation of how these distinct acts are related.”).
Regarding that second point, even if the Court construed the
Amended Complaint’s “[c]laim[]” (Docket Entry 5 at 45) for
“[u]nequal terms and conditions of employment” (id.) as a hostile
work environment claim, Plaintiff did not support her bald
assertion that the Amended Complaint’s “allegations describe a
21
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 21 of 84

continuous course of conduct by Defendants from 2016 through [her]
termination in 2022” (Docket Entry 69 at 7 (emphasis added)), much
less show the existence of a single, six-year, “‘abusive working
environment,’” Breck, 2017 WL 2438767, at *4 (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). (See Docket Entry 69
at 6-8 (offering no citation (or even reference) to any particular
allegations in Amended Complaint while invoking continuing
violation doctrine).) Importantly, “[i]n order for the continuing
violation doctrine to apply, [ P]laintiff has the burden to show
that the hostile acts occurring outside the filing period were not
isolated incidents and that at least one anchoring incident
occurred during the filing period.” Burrs v. Walter Kidde Portable
Equip., Inc., No. 1:16CV1149, 2018 WL 1626120, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar.
30, 2018) (unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (emphasis added). Further,
“in order for several events to qualify as part of the same hostile
work environment, all of the incidents must be so significantly
related to each other as to comprise one unitary and ongoing
unlawful employment practice.” Edwards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C.,
760 F. Supp. 2d 607, 621 (E.D. Va. 2011) (emphasis added).
Hence, for the continuing violation exception to save
Plaintiff from the time-bar defense to her first two sub-claims for
unequal terms and conditions of employment, Plaintiff:
must show that [] Defendant [Duke University] committed
an act of sexual[, religious, racial, color-based,
national origin-based, and/or age-based] harassment
within [180] days of filing her Charge [of
22
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 22 of 84

Discrimination] with the EEOC . . . . She can then
support her claim with other earlier incidents if she can
show that the timely act is part of the same hostile work
environment as the earlier “untimely acts” . . . .
Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the Amended Complaint’s “[c]laim[]”
(Docket Entry 5 at 45) for “[u]nequal terms and conditions of
employment” (id.) focuses on three categories of alleged
discriminatory treatment:
1) “[Plaintiff] was not given support throughout the research
process . . . though other lighter-skinned researchers were given
support in the research process, such as Dr. [Elizabeth] Lapadula”
(id. (emphasis added)), in that (a) “[Plaintiff] had to work in an
under-resourced space that [she] established with [her] belongings,
[(b) her] belongings were taken from [her], and this theft was not
investigated . . . [but,] instead, it was used against [her] even
though she reported the loss first” (id.), and (c) “[she] lost many
of [her] items when [she] was not allowed to return to work” (id.);
2) “[Plaintiff] was held to ambiguous standards in regard to
[her] departmental role” (id. at 46), in that (a) “[Plaintiff] was
given more responsibilities than a research scientist” (id.), yet
was “accused of acting like a faculty” (id.), (b) Plaintiff “was
held to compliance standards that were disproportionate to [her]
role while being underpaid despite [her] grant, as demonstrated by
[Defendant] Dowell-Newton’s attempt to have [Plaintiff] come at
specific times, when Dr. Lapadula did not have to do that” (id.;
23
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 23 of 84

see also id. (alleging that “Dr. Abou-[D]onia and [Defendant]
Dowell-Newton expected [Plaintiff] to work until late night” and
made “erroneous statements that [she] was a technician,” as well as
that “[Plaintiff] was asked to account for data that Dr. Abou-
[D]onia had taken home with him”)), and (c) “[Defendant] McDonnell
was using his executive powers to appoint Dr. [Don] Fox and send
out [Defendant] Dowel-Newton [sic] and Traci McNeil to constantly
disturb [Plaintiff] . . . and scrutinize [her]” (id.); and
3) during the research misconduct investigation, “[Plaintiff]
was not told there would be an attorney in the room, [her] data was
being misinterpreted, [she] was deemed as disrespectful when [she]
would correct incorrect statements, and . . . [she] was never
communicated with in a timely and transparent fashion” (id.; see
also id. (“Multiple times after the no-contact order was
instituted, [Plaintiff] was ordered to only communicate with Dr.
Abou-[D]onia . . . . [T]his no-contact order . . . obstructed any
attempt on [Plaintiff’s] part to clear [her] name of the
allegations against [her] because [she] was unable to contact Dr.
Abou-[D]onia to verify what data he had.”)).
The allegations in the first category (quoted above) attribute
the poor research support Plaintiff purportedly received while
working in Dr. Abou-Donia’s lab – which she “joined . . . in July
of 2016” (id. at 7) – to discrimination based on race/color and
single-out Dr. Lapadula as the comparator validating that
24
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 24 of 84

attribution. (See id. at 45.) But, per the Amended Complaint, Dr.
Lapadula worked in the same allegedly “under-resourced space” (id.)
as Plaintiff (see id. at 20 (alleging that, in “October of 2019[,]
Dr. Abou-[D]onia had hired a new research scientist, Dr. []
Lapadula”)), thus undermining reliance on Dr. Lapadula as a
comparator to establish that researchers lighter-skinned (or of
another race) than Plaintiff received better research support. The
allegation that Plaintiff up-fitted Dr. Abou-Donia’s lab with her
own “belongings” (id. at 45) similarly cannot sustain even a narrow
claim of racial or color-based discrimination by Defendant Duke
University in 2016 (let alone provide a plausible foundation for a
broader claim that, from 2016 to 2022, Defendant Duke University
continuously subjected Plaintiff to a work environment imbued with
racial and color-based animus), given the Amended Complaint’s
admission that Plaintiff acquired materials she imported into Dr.
Abou-Donia’s lab through her prior job at Defendant Duke University
(see id. at 7 (“[S]ince [Dr. Abou-Donia’s] lab did not have
anything, I brought all the supplies I had acquired from my first
position at [Defendant] Duke University, where I was a research
scientist . . . in the Department of Cardiology . . . .”)).8
8 In other words, if Defendant Duke University discriminated
against research scientists of Plaintiff’s race/color by denying
them proper research materials, why did Defendant Duke University
supply Plaintiff with such materials in her prior post? Moreover,
the allegedly substandard conditions in Dr. Abou-Donia’s lab
predated Plaintiff’s arrival (see Docket Entry 5 at 7 (“When I
(continued...)
25
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 25 of 84

The remaining allegations in the sub-claim for inadequate
research support, i.e., loss of Plaintiff’s belongings and failure
to investigate (see id. at 45), date back to August 2019, when
“[Plaintiff] found a trash bag on [her] chair” (id. at 16) and
discovered that “[m]any files and items were missing from [her]
desk, including an independent-study student’s notebook and file
folder” (id.). Per the Amended Complaint, “[Plaintiff] sent an
email to [Defendant] Dowell-Newton” (id.), who “sent . . . the
Coordinator . . . of Building Support Services” (id.), which
resulted in “blame [being] directed at the custodian” (id.);
however, “when [Plaintiff] checked with the custodian, he had not
been in the room, and he told [her] that was not his trash bag”
(id.). Plaintiff thereafter allegedly “reported [her] concerns
repeatedly, [but] no further action was taken . . ., despite the
disappearance of research files, and this set the stage for
unfounded allegations against [Plaintiff] of data integrity
violations as the days proceeded.” (Id.) A similar, alleged
8(...continued)
joined Dr. Abou-[D]onia’s lab in July of 2016, although every other
lab was fully equipped, Dr. Abou-[D]onia was only provided a room
that was used as a dumping area for surplus materials to be picked
up.”)) and therefore Plaintiff’s race/color did not cause Defendant
Duke University to improperly equip that lab. Nor (according to
the allegations of the Amended Complaint) did Defendant Duke
University afford Dr. Abou-Donia’s lab different information
technology (“IT”) support than other labs in the same department.
(See id. (“[E]ach lab was given the option to pay NetFriends for IT
needs, and the labs would submit their invoices to [the department]
for payment. . . . Many labs chose not to use [NetFriends’s]
services, including Dr. Abou-[D]onia’s lab.”).)
26
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 26 of 84

incident occurred in the fall of 2020. (See id. at 35 (“On
September 1, 2020 I went back to work. . . . I noticed that many
of my files and personal accessories were missing and still have
not been returned, nor has the disappearance of my files and
belongings been investigated or accounted for . . ., even though I
reported it . . . .”).) Plaintiff evidently viewed those events as
discrimination based on her race and/or color because: “On Mar[ch]
17, 2020, they reported a theft from Dr. Kuhn’s lab. [Plaintiff]
ha[d] several times reported the theft of files from [her] desk in
Dr. Abou-[D]onia’s lab, but emails were never sent out. Dr. Kuhn
is a White female.” (Id. at 32 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff’s second category of “[u]nequal terms and conditions
of employment” (id. at 45), i.e., that “[she] was held to ambiguous
standards in regard to [her] departmental role” (id. at 46), begins
with the allegation that “[she] was given more responsibilities
than a research scientist” (id.), but was “accused of acting like
a faculty by [Defendant] McDonnell” (id.). The Amended Complaint
shows that Plaintiff knew of those responsibilities, as well as
that accusation, when “[she] met with [Defendant] McDonnell on July
24, 2019” (id. at 14). (See id. at 15 (“Throughout the meeting,
[Defendant] McDonnell would remark that I was acting like a
faculty. However, the fact that I was given additional
responsibilities beyond my role as a scientist . . . without the
requisite increase in position or pay[] was never addressed.”).)
27
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 27 of 84

Furthermore, the Amended Complaint does not elucidate how a
reasonable fact-finder could infer that such treatment stemmed from
racial, color-based, sexual, religious, national origin-based,
and/or age-based bias. (See id. at 14-15.) As Defendants have
argued, “[t]he closest [the Amended Complaint] comes to alleging
[Defendant] McDonnell acted with discriminatory animus is [the]
claim that[,] ‘in his lab, at that time [July 2018], all of the
scientists (who were lighter-skinned than [Plaintiff]) who got a
grant were immediately promoted to research faculty positions.’”
(Docket Entry 67 at 16 (emphasis added) (sixth set of brackets in
original) (quoting Docket Entry 5 at 10).)
The next allegations in the “ambiguous standards” category
concern events from late 2019 to early 2020 involving Defendant
McDonnell (who, as just noted, allegedly secured promotions for
lighter-skinned scientists but not Plaintiff) and Dr. Lapadula (who
allegedly received better treatment than Plaintiff based on their
color and/or religion). (Compare Docket Entry 5 at 46 (alleging
that (A) Plaintiff “was held to compliance standards that were
disproportionate to [her] role while being underpaid despite her
grant, as demonstrated by . . . attempt[s] to have [her] come at
specific times, when Dr. Lapadula did not have to,” (B) “Dr. Abou-
[D]onia and [Defendant] Dowell-Newton expected [Plaintiff] to work
until late night . . . [and made] erroneous statements that [she]
was a technician,” and (C) “[Plaintiff] was asked to account for
28
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 28 of 84

data that Dr. Abou-[D]onia had taken home”), with id. at 15-16
(detailing incident in August 2019 when Dr. Abou-Donia required
Plaintiff to work overnight), 17 (“Dr. Abou-[D]onia sent a memo on
September 14, 2019, . . . per order from [Defendant] McDonnell,
containing stipulations that [Plaintiff] must be there by 9 AM
. . . .”), 20 (discussing Dr. Lapadula’s hiring in October 2019,
alleging that “[Plaintiff] was discriminated against compared to
Dr. Lapadula because[,] although she had not been in a lab for 25
years, she was hired for the same position . . . but . . . not held
to the same attendance and compliance standards [though] . . . paid
more,” and asserting that “only difference was [their] skin color
and [] religion”), 21 (describing incident in November 2019 when
Defendant Dowell-Newton confronted Plaintiff about files, “Dr.
Abou-[D]onia admitted . . . he took the files home,” and
“[Defendant] Dowell-Newton did not say anything”), 25 (alleging
that in January 2020 “Dr. Abou-Donia would also yell at [Plaintiff]
. . . [that she] was just a technician” and “administration who
witnessed this behavior . . ., including [Defendants] McDonnell[
and] Dowell-Newton . . . did not act to protect [Plaintiff]”), and
29 (alleging that in February 2020 Defendant Dowell-Newton
“indicated that [Plaintiff was] just a technician”).)9
9 As pertains to Defendant Dowell-Newton, the Amended
Complaint makes only one (largely conclusory) allegation from which
one could infer racial or color-based animus: “[Department]
administration, among whom [Defendant] Dowell-Newton was in charge,
(continued...)
29
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 29 of 84

Lastly – in relation to Plaintiff’s discriminatory-treatment
sub-claim that Defendant Duke University “held [her] to ambiguous
standards in regard to her departmental role” (id. at 46) – the
Amended Complaint alleges that “[Defendant] McDonnell was using his
executive powers to appoint Dr. Fox and send out [Defendant] Dowel-
Newton [sic] and [Ms.] McNeil to constantly disturb [Plaintiff]
during working hours, and scrutinize [her]” (id.). That conduct by
Defendant Dowell-Newton and Ms. McNeil (at the supposed behest of
Defendant McDonnell) allegedly occurred in October 2019 (see id. at
19 (alleging that in October 2019 “[Plaintiff] was periodically
monitored in the lab by [Defendant] Dowell-Newton and Ms. McNeil”),
20 (alleging that in October 2019 “[Plaintiff] was going through
tremendous unpredictable harassment and interruptions from
9(...continued)
failed to keep appropriate records of [Plaintiff’s] submitted
grant, although they did this for others in [the department] who
received grants, all of whom were lighter skinned than
[Plaintiff].” (Docket Entry 5 at 11 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 10-11 (alleging that grant-related, record-keeping failure came
to light in 2018).) The Amended Complaint also makes this
allegation of age-based bias against Defendant Dowell-Newton:
On July 19, 2019, I was asked to meet with [Defendant]
Dowell-Newton . . . . [A]fter I had returned inside the
building from the summer heat, I ran upstairs to the
office of [Defendant] Dowell-Newton to meet her, when
[she] saw me, she asked if I was premenopausal and then
asked me my age. This was the first discriminatory
statement I had heard directly from an administrator, and
it occurred . . . [while Defendant] Dowell-Newton was
representing [the department] as the Business Manager.
(Id. at 12 (emphasis added).)
30
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 30 of 84

[Defendants] Dowell-Newton and [] McDonnell, in spite of explaining
and providing proof that the data that was previously obtained were
periodically communicated to Dr. Abou-[D]onia by email”)), while
Dr. Fox’s interactions with Plaintiff occurred in February 2020
(see id. at 26-27 (discussing Dr. Fox’s appointment, his e-mail to
Plaintiff, her response, and his reply); see also id. at 30 (“On
Feb[ruary] 25, 2020, I sent [Defendant] Dowell-Newton . . . my
performance report that I sent Dr. Fox.”)). The Amended Complaint
does not describe any overt racial, color-based, sexual, religious,
national origin-based, and/or age-based aspect of those events.
(See id. at 19-20, 26-27.)
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Amended Complaint’s first
two (of three) sub-claims for “[u]nequal terms and conditions of
employment” (id. at 45), when viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, show (at most) these (possibly) discriminatory events:
1) in August 2019 and September 2020, property of Plaintiff
went missing from the lab where she worked and Defendant Duke
University failed to adequately investigate her reports about those
thefts, despite taking the more aggressive step of sending out e-
mails about a theft reported by a white employee in a different lab
in March 2020 (see id. at 16, 32, 35, 45);
2) in July 2019, Defendant McDonnell did not reward
Plaintiff’s performance of duties beyond the norm for her position
as a research scientist (such as by securing her a promotion, as he
31
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 31 of 84

did for lighter-skinned scientists in his lab) and instead accused
her of acting like a faculty member (see id. at 10, 14, 15, 46);
3) between August 2019 and February 2020, Dr. Abou-Donia,
Defendant McDonnell, and/or Defendant Dowell-Newton (who (i) failed
to keep proper records of Plaintiff’s DoD grant in 2018, unlike
with lighter-skinned grant recipients, and (ii) expressed age-based
bias in July 2019) required Plaintiff to work late and to report at
specific times, (a) while not imposing such requirements on (the
lighter-skinned and Christian) Dr. Lapadula, who also received
better pay with less experience, and (b) while blaming Plaintiff
for missing files Dr. Abou-Donia took home and errantly calling her
a technician (see id. at 11, 12, 15-17, 20, 21, 25, 29, 46);
4) in October 2019, Defendant McDonnell caused Defendant
Dowell-Newton and Ms. McNeil to interrupt Plaintiff’s work (see id.
at 19-20, 46); and
5) in February 2020, Dr. Fox (presumably at Defendant
McDonnell’s direction) sought information (via e-mail) from
Plaintiff about her research activities (see id. at 26-27, 46).
That hodgepodge of facially unconnected incidents interspersed
over a seven-month period, which ended a year-and-a-half before
Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination on August 19, 2021
(see id. at 41), does not qualify as “so significantly related to
each other,” Edwards, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 621, let alone to other
allegedly discriminatory acts that took place during the 180-day,
32
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 32 of 84

limitations period (or thereafter), such as Dr. Swamy’s suspension
of Plaintiff’s DoD grant on March 10, 2021 (see Docket Entry 5 at
39), Dr. Duckett’s notice of September 15, 2021 that Plaintiff’s
employment would end in November 2021 (see id. at 41), and
Defendant Klotman’s research-misconduct finding on October 31, 2022
(see id. at 45), “as to comprise one unitary and ongoing unlawful
employment practice,” Edwards, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (emphasis
added). Put another way, Plaintiff cannot “support [any
discrimination] claim with [these] earlier incidents [because the
Amended Complaint does not] show that [any] timely act is part of
the same hostile work environment as the[se] earlier ‘untimely’
acts and is thus capable of ‘anchoring’ them to [any timely]
claim.” Id. at 622 (emphasis added); see also Burrs, 2018 WL
1626120, at *3 (“In order for the continuing violation doctrine to
apply, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the hostile acts
occurring outside the filing period were not isolated incidents and
that at least one anchoring incident occurred during the filing
period. Here, [the plaintiff] has not met that burden. The two
[timely incidents] came months after . . . the last [untimely]
event [the plaintiff] contends was part of the hostile work
environment. Nor has [the plaintiff] shown that the scattered
incidents occurring over an eight-month period [beyond the statute
of limitations] were anything more than isolated occurrences.”
(internal citation omitted)).
33
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 33 of 84

“[T]he Fourth Circuit has made clear that invoking ‘continuing
violation’ is not ‘a talismanic or shibboleth term automatically
relieving a [plaintiff] of any obligation to comply with the
statutory time requirement for the filing of a charge with the EEOC
under Title VII [and/or the ADEA].’” McCain v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
115 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting Hill v. AT&T
Techs., Inc., 731 F.2d 175, 179-80 (4th Cir. 1984)). Here,
“[Plaintiff] has offered only a passing, conclusory argument in
support of applying the continuing violations doctrine, and the
[Amended C]omplaint’s factual allegations do not plausibly suggest
a continuation of a violation into the [limitations period].”
Shepherd v. Wilson, Civ. Action No. 15-373, 2015 WL 9685562, at *5
n.8 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2015) (unpublished) (internal quotation
marks omitted), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 110509 (S.D. Ala.
Jan. 8, 2016) (unpublished), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 813 (11th Cir.
2016). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s invocation of the
continuing violation “theory, if accepted, would, as [the Fourth
Circuit] ha[s] said . . ., destroy the policies of finality and
repose inherent in the filing requirement[s] of Title VII [and the
ADEA].” Hill, 731 F.2d at 180; see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) (“By choosing what are obviously quite
short deadlines, Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt
processing of all charges of employment discrimination.”). The
Court therefore should grant judgment on the pleadings in favor of
34
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 34 of 84

Defendant Duke University on Plaintiff’s first two sub-claims of
“[u]nequal terms and conditions of employment” (Docket Entry 5 at
45), due to their untimeliness under Title VII and the ADEA.10
That determination leaves only Plaintiff’s third sub-claim for
“[u]nequal terms and conditions of employment” (id.):
Even when [Plaintiff] cooperated with the [research
misconduct] investigation[,] Dr[]. Swamy, [Defendant]
McDonnell[, and Dr.] Duckett levied against [her], [she]
was not told there would be an attorney in the room,
[her] data was being misinterpreted, [she] was deemed as
disrespectful when [she] would correct incorrect
statements, and [she] was to submit information according
to their deadlines, but [she] was never communicated with
in a timely and transparent fashion. Multiple times
10 As shown in prior quotations, the Amended Complaint’s
“[c]laim[]” (Docket Entry 5 at 45) for “[u]nequal terms and
conditions of employment” (id.) does not make reference to Dr.
Abou-Donia’s alleged sexual harassment/assault of Plaintiff in late
2019 and early 2020 (see id. at 45-46; see also Docket Entry 41 at
59-60 (summarizing Plaintiff’s allegations about such matters by
citing and quoting Docket Entry 5 at 19-25, 28, 30, 32)).
Regardless, those events fall well outside the applicable
limitations period, which (as established above) reaches back 180
days before Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination on August
19, 2021. (See Docket Entry 41 at 61 (“[T]he remainder of the
Amended Complaint’s chronology alleges no sexual harassment/assault
after March 19, 2020. Moreover, the Amended Complaint reflects
that events unfolded in a way that insulated Plaintiff from further
sexual harassment/assault by Dr. Abou-Donia.” (emphasis and
internal citation omitted) (citing Docket Entry 5 at 32-45)), 62
(“[T]his distinct adverse employment action, i.e., sexual
harassment/assault by Dr. Abou-Donia . . ., ended on March 19,
2020, and thus [any] corresponding Title VII sex discrimination
claim accrued no later than that date.” (emphasis and internal
citations omitted)).) And – because Dr. Abou-Donia’s alleged
sexual harassment/assault of Plaintiff differs so markedly,
including in terms of the nature, perpetrator, and timing of the
conduct, from the alleged acts of discrimination that occurred
within 180 days of her filing of her Charge of Discrimination (or
later) – the continuing violation doctrine would not apply. See
Burrs, 2018 WL 1626120, at *3; Edwards, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
35
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 35 of 84

after the no-contact order was instituted, [Plaintiff]
was ordered to only communicate with Dr. Abou-[D]onia,
even though [she] was not allowed to communicate with
him, nor did he with [her]. Further, this no-contact
order instituted by [Defendant] Duke University further
obstructed any attempt on [Plaintiff’s] part to clear
[her] name of the allegations against [her] because [she]
was unable to contact Dr. Abou-[D]onia to verify what
data he had.
(Id. at 46.) For purposes of the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, Defendants have not argued that said sub-claim runs
afoul of the statute of limitations; rather, they made this
argument: “[the Amended Complaint] does not plausibly allege that
the investigation was the result of intentional discrimination in
violation of Title VII or the ADEA.” (Docket Entry 67 at 16.)
To bolster that position, Defendants quoted the Court’s prior
decision that the Amended Complaint lacks any “‘factual allegations
remotely indicative of racial discrimination by [Drs.] Swamy or
Duckett[.]’” (Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Docket Entry 46 at
14).) Nor do the Amended Complaint’s factual allegations about
Drs. Swamy and Duckett reveal that they took any action due to
hostility towards persons of Plaintiff’s sex, color, national
origin, religion, and/or age. (See Docket Entry 5 at 32 (alleging
that “Dr. Abou-[Do]nia told [Plaintiff] that if [she] report[ed his
sexual harassment] ‘[Defendant] McDonnell[] will use . . . Dr.
Swamy[] to destroy [Plaintiff’s] scientific career,” because
“faculties stick together and help each other”), 34 (describing
investigation that Drs. Swamy and Duckett “supported” as
36
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 36 of 84

“unjustified” without stating anything about their motives), 35
(alleging that Dr. Duckett “inquir[ed] about the whereabouts of
experiments notebooks” but offering no basis to conclude that
Plaintiff’s traits motivated his action), 38 (referring to “data
integrity investigation” that “Drs. Duckett and Swamy had started”
as “based upon [] spurious allegations,” while failing to allege
facts to show demographically-based bias by Drs. Swamy or Duckett),
39 (discussing (A) meeting with Dr. Swamy where (i) Plaintiff “was
asked to either retract three of [her] papers and relinquish [her]
grant [or] otherwise[ Defendant] Duke [University] would [do so],”
and (ii) Plaintiff “was wrongly accused as being disrespectful,” as
well as (B) Dr. Swamy’s subsequent suspension of Plaintiff’s grant,
all without alleging facts showing intent by Dr. Swamy to
discriminate based on Plaintiff’s characteristics and instead
describing such activity as “retaliation”), 40 (asserting that
“Drs. Swamy . . . and Duckett refused to provide a detailed report
of the investigation” and “forced [Plaintiff] to keep everything
confidential” but making no allegations about their motives), 41
(detailing facts about Dr. Swamy’s termination of Plaintiff’s grant
and Dr. Duckett’s notice of her firing without addressing their
motives), 42 (“The retaliatory actions [in the research misconduct
investigation] were initiated by Drs. Duckett and Swamy after
[Defendant] McDonnell stepped down from chairmanship and Dr. Abou-
[D]onia resigned.”).)
37
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 37 of 84

In fact, the foregoing quotations show that the factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint ascribe retaliation (not
racial, color-based, national origin-based, sex-based, religious,
or age-based discrimination), as the motive for Drs. Swamy’s and
Duckett’s alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff during the research
misconduct investigation. Likewise, the Amended Complaint’s
factual allegations about Defendant McDonnell’s role in the
research misconduct investigation label his motivation retaliatory.
(See, e.g., id. at 43 (indicating that Plaintiff lodged internal
complaint “that the processes that [Defendant] McDonnell initiated
against [her]” constituted “retaliation”), 44 (detailing
Plaintiff’s contention during research misconduct investigation
that Defendant McDonnell “initiated the previous investigation and
this investigation” while “motivated to retaliate against [her],”
in particular “because [she] requested a non-tenured faculty
position and [he] construed that [she] was reporting about him to
[Defendant Duke University’s] officials”), 45 (asserting that
Defendant McDonnell “utiliz[ed] his institutional authority to
protect Dr. Abou-[D]onia and subject [Plaintiff] to . . .
retaliation”); see also id. at 36 (alleging that, “[i]mmediately
[]after [Defendant Duke University’s internal investigation
confirmed Plaintiff suffered sexual harassment,] retaliation
38
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 38 of 84

intensified” and she “was subjected to various retaliatory
incidents as part of the ongoing unjustified investigation”).)11
Simply put, the facts Plaintiff has pleaded in the Amended
Complaint “allege[] retaliation by [Defendant Duke University] for
her complaints [of discrimination] and her similar protected
activities – which is not discrimination on the basis of her sex[,
race, color, national origin, religion, or age].” Litman v. George
Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587 (E.D. Va. 2001) (emphasis and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Heuer v. Weil-McLain,
203 F.3d 1021, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he conduct [at issue]
had nothing directly or immediately to do with [the plaintiff’s]
being a woman, but rather with her having filed a charge of
discrimination . . . . The charge arose out of [the] earlier
creation of a hostile working environment motivated by [her] sex,
but that is too remote a connection, for otherwise every claim of
retaliation for filing charges of discrimination would be a claim
for discrimination, even though Title VII makes discrimination and
11 Plaintiff’s brief opposing the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings does not argue otherwise; to the contrary, it describes
her claim(s) about the research misconduct investigation as
retaliation-based. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 69 at 2 (stating that
Plaintiff brought claim for “retaliatory misconduct investigation,
leading to [her] wrongful termination, that followed [her]
harassment complaint”), 5 (“Instead of addressing my [sexual
harassment] complaint, [Defendant] Duke [University] began
scrutinizing me. . . . [J]ust seven days [after I made that
complaint], my laptop was confiscated and I was placed under
investigation for research misconduct. . . . [Dr. Abou-Donia] had
previously warned me: ‘If you report harassment, [Defendant]
McDonnell will destroy your scientific career.’”).)
39
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 39 of 84

retaliation separate wrongs.”). Thus, however styled, Plaintiff’s
claim(s) of mistreatment during the research misconduct
investigation – “which at their core allege that [s]he was
mistreated because [she] had exercised rights protected by [anti-
discrimination laws] – sound in retaliation, not discrimination.
Accordingly, Defendants’ [M]otion for [ J]udgment [on the
Pleadings] on [Plaintiff’s] discrimination claims based on alleged
adverse employment actions [during the research misconduct
investigation should be] granted.” Wu v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., No. 1:18CV6543, 2020 WL 615626, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,
2020) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Solorzano v. University of Miami, No.
12-22852-Civ., 2014 WL 12498004, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25,
2014) (unpublished) (“[The p]laintiff alleges that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action because of her complaint
[about race discrimination], not because of her race, thereby
stating a claim for retaliation, not discrimination.”).12
12 The fact that Plaintiff has pleaded an apparently timely
retaliation claim associated with the research misconduct
investigation does not revive her untimely claim(s) about the
inadequate investigation into the loss of her files (discussed
previously), notwithstanding the Amended Complaint’s allegations
that said loss later “was used against [her]” (Docket Entry 5 at
45) and “set the stage for unfounded allegations against [her] of
data integrity violations” (id. at 16). See A Soc’y Without a Name
v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ontinual
unlawful acts are distinguishable from the continuing ill effects
of an original violation because the latter do not constitute a
continuing violation.” (emphasis added)).
40
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 40 of 84

Discrimination – Termination of Employment
Moving on to Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination
claims for “[t]ermination of [her] employment” (Docket Entry 5 at
46), Defendants have sought judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that those “wrongful termination claims are not supported by
sufficient factual allegations to render them plausible” (Docket
Entry 67 at 18). On that front, Defendants contended as follows:
[The Amended Complaint] does not allege that
[Plaintiff’s] race played any role in the termination of
her employment. [The Amended Complaint] specifically
identifies [Dr.] Swamy as the person who “terminated
[Plaintiff’s] grant . . . thus terminating [her]
employment.” But, as the Court has already recognized,
“Plaintiff has tendered no factual allegations remotely
indicative of racial discrimination by [Dr.] Swamy.”
Likewise, [the Amended Complaint] does not allege any
facts indicating that [Dr.] Swamy terminated Plaintiff’s
grant based on her color, sex, religion, national origin,
or age [].
(Id. (internal brackets and citations omitted) (ellipsis in
original) (quoting Docket Entry 5 at 47 and Docket Entry 46 at 14,
respectively); see also id. at 19 (arguing that Amended Complaint
“makes no factual allegations that plausibly indicate that [Dr.]
Swamy terminated [Plaintiff’s] grant and her employment because of
[her] race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or age”).)
Plaintiff’s brief opposing the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings does not meaningfully challenge these contentions. (See
Docket Entry 69 at 1-10.) Nor could it, as the Amended Complaint
alleges (A) that, “[o]n March 10, 2021, Dr. Swamy went ahead and
suspended [Plaintiff’s] grant” (Docket Entry 5 at 39), (B) that, in
41
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 41 of 84

August 2021, Plaintiff received notice that “Dr. Swamy notified DoD
of the[] research misconduct inquiry finding of a need for an
investigation to start and requested unilateral termination of
[Plaintiff’s] grant” (id. at 41; see also id. at 43 (“Dr. Swamy
took it upon herself to inform DoD to relinquish [Plaintiff’s]
grant . . . .”)), and (C) “DoD offered an opportunity to do a no-
cost extension of [Plaintiff’s] grant, but[,] when [Plaintiff]
informed Dr. Swamy, she terminated [Plaintiff’s] grant instead,
thus terminating [her] employment” (id. at 47), without (as
documented in the preceding subsection) (D) offering any factual
matter showing that Dr. Swamy – and/or Dr. Duckett, to the extent
the Amended Complaint alleges that he played a part in Plaintiff’s
firing (see id. at 41) – ever exhibited bias based on a protected
trait, but instead (E) asserting that they acted with retaliatory
intent (see, e.g., id. at 42 (alleging that “retaliatory actions
were initiated by Drs. Duckett and Swamy after Dr. McDonnell
stepped down from chairmanship and Dr. Abou-[D]onia resigned”), 43
(“[Defendant Duke University] failed to prevent the retaliation I
experienced through use of institutional hierarchy perpetrated by
Drs. . . . Swamy[ and] Duckett . . . .”)).13
13 In addition, just as with Plaintiff’s claim(s) for
mistreatment during the research misconduct investigation
(addressed in the preceding subsection), her opposition brief
depicts her firing as a product of retaliation (not discrimination
based on her race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age).
(See Docket Entry 69 at 2 (describing “retaliatory misconduct
(continued...)
42
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 42 of 84

As a result, the Court should enter judgment on the pleadings
in favor of Defendant Duke University on Plaintiff’s Title VII and
ADEA claims for discriminatory termination of her employment.
Fraud
The Amended Complaint identifies Title VII and the ADEA as the
two, lone, legal bases for Plaintiff’s claims. (See id. at 4
(checking boxes for Title VII and ADEA but not boxes for “Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,” “Other federal law,” “Relevant
state law,” and “Relevant city or county law”).) Regarding “[t]he
discriminatory conduct of which [Plaintiff] complain[ed]” (id. at
5), the Amended Complaint lists – in addition to “[t]ermination of
[her] employment” (id.), “[f]ailure to promote [her]” (id.),
“[u]nequal terms and conditions of [her] employment” (id.), and
“[r]etaliation” (id.) – “[o]ther acts” (id.), “specif[ied]” (id.
(italics omitted)) as “[f]raud” (id.). Elsewhere, under the
heading “Claims” (id. at 45) and the sub-heading “Fraud” (id. at
47), the Amended Complaint sets out “[t]he following []
illustrative examples of behavior supporting this claim” (id.):
1. [Defendant] Dowell-Newton made representations to
[Plaintiff] that [she] would be given a new
appointment letter after [she] received [her] grant
13(...continued)
investigation,” which “followed [Plaintiff’s] harassment
complaint,” as “leading to [her] wrongful termination”), 5 (“On
September 15, 2021, I was told my employment would end in November
2021, as my salary came from grant funds now under
investigation.”), 6 (“I experienced . . . retaliation culminating
in termination and reputational harm.”).)
43
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 43 of 84

and Dr. Abou-[D]onia’s grant period ended, but
[she] was never given this appointment letter.
Further, even the previous appointment letter did
not contain all the duties [she] was expected to do
in Dr. Abou-[D]onia’s lab.
2. [Defendant] McDonnell made representations to
[Plaintiff] that, if [she] did not hear from him
within a month regarding promotion to a non-tenured
faculty position, that [she] was welcome to contact
[Defendant] Klotman. Right after [Plaintiff]
contacted [Defendant] Klotman, the incidents of
harassment began against [Plaintiff].
3. [Defendant] McDonnell also said that [Plaintiff]
could take [her] grant and move to another
department, but he stopped two opportunities for
[her] to do that with Dr. Lee and Dr. Sanders, thus
jeopardizing [Plaintiff’s] ability to escape from
the harassment [she] was experiencing in [Defendant
McDonnell’s department], as well as [her] future
employment and promotion opportunities.
(Id. at 47-48.)
Defendants have requested judgment on the pleadings on the
foregoing, Title VII and ADEA claim(s), because “[a]ll [three
incidents] are untimely.” (Docket Entry 67 at 17.) Along those
lines, Defendants documented (A) that, as to the first incident,
the Amended Complaint placed the date on which the “grant funds
were released to [Defendant] Duke [University as] August 1, 2018”
(id. (citing Docket Entry 5 at 12)), (B) that, per the Amended
Complaint, the alleged representation by Defendant McDonnell
referenced in the second incident, happened “on May 29, 2018” (id.
(citing Docket Entry 5 at 10); see also Docket Entry 5 at 13
(alleging that Plaintiff e-mailed Defendant Klotman about promotion
in April 2019)), and (C) that the Amended Complaint dates Defendant
44
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 44 of 84

McDonnell’s conduct at issue in the third incident to “March and
April of 2020” (Docket Entry 67 at 17 (citing Docket Entry 5 at 32-
33)). Defendants then reasoned that “[a]ny Title VII or ADEA claim
relating to these incidents is untimely because [P]laintiff did not
file her EEOC Charge [of Discrimination] until long after her 180-
day deadline.” (Id. at 18 (citing Section 2000e-5(e)(1) and
Section 626(d)); see also Docket Entry 5 at 41 (“On August 19,
2021, I filed my complaints to the EEOC.”).)
Plaintiff’s brief opposing the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings lists “fraud” (Docket Entry 69 at 2) among her “claims”
(id.) in the section titled “Factual Background” (id. (large, all-
caps font and underscoring omitted)), but makes no other mention of
that claim (see id. at 1-10). To the extent Plaintiff has argued
that the continuing violation doctrine renders timely all her Title
VII and ADEA claims from 2016 to 2022 (see id. at 7), she has
failed to show that any timely act of discrimination or retaliation
alleged in the Amended Complaint and the three incidents of fraud
set out in the Amended Complaint share similarities that make them
“so significantly related to each other as to comprise one unitary
and ongoing unlawful employment practice,” Edwards, 760 F. Supp. 2d
at 621; see also Burrs, 2018 WL 1626120, at *3 (noting that the
plaintiff bears burden of establishing applicability of continuing
violation doctrine). (See Docket Entry 69 at 1-10.)
45
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 45 of 84

For these reasons, the Court should grant Defendant Duke
University judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Title VII and
ADEA claim(s) for fraud.
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Via the Amendment Order, the Court (per the undersigned
Magistrate Judge) “deemed [the Amended Complaint] amended to assert
. . . a state-law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing against Defendant Duke University in
connection with the research misconduct investigation against
Plaintiff . . . .” (Docket Entry 46 at 19-20; see also Docket
Entry 9 at 3-4 (seeking leave “to add an additional claim of breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which arises
from the same set of facts as the claims raised [in the Amended
Complaint]” and contending, inter alia, that Defendant Duke
University “violat[ed its] own policies in regards to scientific
misconduct investigations and acting in good faith”).) In	14
14 Under North Carolina law, “[t]o state a valid claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a
plaintiff must plead that the [defendant] took action ‘which
injured the right of the [plaintiff] to receive the benefits of the
[parties’] agreement,’ thus ‘depriving the [plaintiff] of the
fruits of the bargain.’” Conleys Creek Ltd. P’ship v. Smoky
Mountain Country Club Prop. Owners Ass’n, 255 N.C. App. 236, 253,
805 S.E.2d 147, 158 (2017) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting
Bicycle Transit Auth., Inc. v. Bell, 314 N.C. 219, 228-29, 333
S.E.2d 299, 305 (1985)); see also Tillis v. Calvine Cotton Mills,
Inc., 251 N.C. 359, 363, 111 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1959) (“Parties to an
executory contract for the performance of some act or services in
the future impliedly promise not to do anything to the prejudice of
the other inconsistent with their contractual relations . . . .”).
46
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 46 of 84

reaching that result, the Amendment Order rejected Defendant Duke
University’s argument that “‘Plaintiff failed to identify an
underlying contract that would serve as the basis for this claim”
(Docket Entry 46 at 17-18 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting
Docket Entry 19 at 10)), by pointing to Plaintiff’s submission of
“e-mails showing that [she] executed a Science Culture and
Accountability Plan with Defendant Duke University, which imposed
personal and institutional obligations and which Defendant
McDonnell thereafter invoked on behalf of Defendant Duke University
to mandate certain acts by Plaintiff” (id. at 18 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted) (citing Docket Entry 28-2 at 1-4)).
Defendant Duke University could have objected to that aspect of the
Amendment Order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“A party may serve and
file objections to [a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive, pretrial]
order within 14 days after being served with a copy.”), but did not
do so (see Docket Entries dated Sept. 23, 2024, to present (showing
no such objections following docketing (and thus electronic service
on Defendant Duke University) of Amendment Order)).
Nevertheless, Defendants now have asserted that the Court
should enter judgment on the pleadings for Defendant Duke
University on this contractual claim because “[n]either the Science
Culture and Accountability Plan (‘SCAP’) signed by Plaintiff nor
[Defendant] Duke[ University’s] Research Misconduct Policy created
47
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 47 of 84

a contract with Plaintiff.” (Docket Entry 67 at 22.) As concerns
the SCAP, Defendants developed their argument as follows:
The SCAP is a statement of the ‘fundamental guiding
principles’ intended to guide research activities in the
department [where Plaintiff worked]. The SCAP explains
that
In [this] department, each laboratory sets its
own research agenda and goals and is
responsible for ensuring the integrity and
provenance of research data. However, it is
the responsibility of each member in the
department (faculty, staff, fellows, and
students) to make sure that they actively
participate in the establishment and
maintenance of a work environment that fosters
high quality rigorous research.
The SCAP is not supported by consideration and does not
include any mutual obligations. Instead, it is a
statement of the department’s expectations for its
researchers. Under North Carolina law, a statement of
policy like this does not constitute an enforceable
contract.
(Id. at 22-23 (internal citations omitted) (quoting and block-
quoting Docket Entry 67-3 at 1) (citing Shaughnessy v. Duke Univ.,
No. 1:18CV461, 2020 WL 4227545, at *5 (M.D.N.C. July 23, 2020)
(unpublished) (Eagles, J.)).) The Court should decline to grant
Defendant Duke University judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s
contractual claim based on that argument.
“North Carolina defines a contract as an agreement between two
or more persons, upon sufficient consideration, to do or to refrain
from doing a particular act. An offer and acceptance are essential
elements of a contract, and they constitute the agreement between
the parties.” Gladden v. Pargas, Inc. of Waldorf, Md., 575 F.2d
48
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 48 of 84

1091, 1093 (4th Cir. 1978) (internal citation omitted) (citing
McCraw v. Llewllyn, 256 N.C. 213, 216, 123 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1962),
as support for first sentence, and Yeager v. Dobbins, 252 N.C. 824,
828, 114 S.E.2d 820, 823-24 (1960), as support for second
sentence). Notably, under North Carolina law, “[e]mployment
contracts which are terminable at will may be modified at any time
by either party with the continuance of the relationship serving as
the consideration for the modification.” Fraver v. North Carolina
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 69 N.C. App. 733, 738, 318 S.E.2d 340,
344 (1984) (emphasis added); accord Jimoh v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Housing P’ship, Inc., No. 3:08CV495, 2010 WL 1924480, at *9
(W.D.N.C. May 12, 2010) (unpublished), aff’d, 428 F. App’x 241 (4th
Cir. 2011). Considering those legal precepts and viewing the facts
alleged by Plaintiff in the light most favorable to her, she has
shown that she and Defendant Duke University entered into a
contract which incorporated the SCAP.
To begin, the e-mails tendered by Plaintiff to justify the
addition of this contractual claim could support a reasonable
inference that, on or about June 7, 2020, Defendant Duke University
– through its “Office of Scientific Integrity” (Docket Entry 28-2
at 1) – required Plaintiff, as a condition of continued employment,
to execute the SCAP, the “[s]igning . . . [of which] convey[ed]
. . . personal and institutional obligat[ions]” (id. at 2), i.e.,
obligations on both Plaintiff and Defendant Duke University.
49
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 49 of 84

Subsequently, on July 23, 2020, Defendant McDonnell sent an e-mail
to Plaintiff (with a copy to Dr. Duckett, the then-dean of the
medical school) regarding “concerns about the processes that
[Plaintiff] use[d] to store data/images and the ability to provide
raw data corresponding to images/figures in publications and grant
applications.” (Id. at 3.) In that e-mail, Defendant McDonnell
advised Plaintiff that she bore “responsib[ility] for the
management of all data [she] generate[d] and [that she] signed
[the] SCAP [to] confirm[] that [she] underst[oo]d th[o]se
responsibilities.” (Id.) He also emphasized that, “[a]s Chair [of
the department where Plaintiff worked], [he] ha[d] a responsibility
to [Defendant Duke University] . . . to ensure that [she]
maintain[ed] best practices in data storage and provenance.” (Id.)
Finally, Defendant McDonnell “set[] a deadline . . . for
[Plaintiff] to provide [specified] information.” (Id.) Those
alleged statements by Defendant McDonnell could provide further
support for an inference that the SCAP created obligations for both
Plaintiff and Defendant Duke University (via its supervisory
officials, like Defendant McDonnell and Dr. Duckett).15
15 The SCAP (a copy of which Defendants submitted with the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings) includes terms that, when
read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, also indicate that
the SCAP imposed duties not just on Plaintiff but also on Defendant
Duke University (through its supervisory officials, such as the
then-departmental chair, Defendant McDonnell). (See, e.g., Docket
Entry 67-3 at 2 (“Mitigation of the impact of [negative] influences
on the rigor and reproducibility of research is the responsibility
(continued...)
50
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 50 of 84

Taken together, such inferences could permit a reasonable
fact-finder to conclude (A) that Defendant Duke University made an
offer of continued employment to Plaintiff, conditioned upon her
execution of the SCAP, and (B) that Plaintiff accepted said offer
by signing the SCAP, after which (C) Defendant Duke University and
Plaintiff proceeded with their employment relationship, subject to
the mutual requirements of the SCAP, such that (D) “[t]he completed
[SCAP] constituted a contract under North Carolina law,” Gladden,
575 F.2d at 1093, despite (E) Defendant Duke University’s present
contentions that “[t]he SCAP [wa]s not supported by consideration
and does not include any mutual obligations” (Docket Entry 67 at
23). Because, for purposes of the Motion for Judgment on the	16
15(...continued)
of everyone in the department.”), 4 (“Scientific integrity and the
provenance of data is the collective responsibility of all faculty,
staff, fellows and students.” (emphasis in original)).)
16 Shaughnessy does not require a different result.
Concerning the SCAP, Defendants cited that case for the proposition
that, under North Carolina law, “‘unilaterally promulgated
employment manuals or policies do not become part of the employment
contract unless expressly included in it.’” (Docket Entry 67 at 23
(emphasis added) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Shaughnessy,
2020 WL 4227545, at *5, which, in turn, quotes Walker v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 259, 335 S.E.2d 79, 83-
84 (1985)).) As shown above, a reasonable fact-finder could
determine that Plaintiff and Defendant Duke University expressly
included the SCAP in her employment contract (such that Shaughnessy
provides no bar to Plaintiff’s contractual claim predicated on the
SCAP). To the extent Defendants have relied on Shaughnessy to
argue that “[Defendant] Duke[ University’s] Research Misconduct
Policy [in the Faculty Handbook] is also not a contract” (id.; see
also id. (“This Court has already recognized on multiple occasions
that [Defendant] Duke[ University’s] Faculty Handbook is not a
(continued...)
51
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 51 of 84

Pleadings, Defendants did not contest the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s allegations as to any element of her claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing other than
the element requiring the existence of a contract (see id. at 22-
24), the Court should not enter judgment on the pleadings in favor
of Defendant Duke University on that contractual claim.
In sum, Defendants have established their entitlement to
judgment on the pleadings on both of Plaintiff’s Section 1981
claims and all of her Title VII and ADEA claims other than for
retaliation (which the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings does
not address), but Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.17
16(...continued)
contract.” (citing Shaughnessy, 2020 WL 4227545, at *5))), the
Court need not address that argument to resolve the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, as the SCAP provides an adequate
foundation for Plaintiff’s contractual claim at the pleading stage.
17 Plaintiff’s brief opposing the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings states that, “[s]hould the Court have any doubt about the
sufficiency of any particular claim, [Plaintiff] respectfully
request[s] the opportunity to amend the [Amended C]omplaint.”
(Docket Entry 69 at 9.) Plaintiff, however, has not shown how she
could amend her Amended Complaint to remedy any of the deficiencies
(discussed above) that entitle Defendants to judgment on the
pleadings on all of Plaintiff’s federal claims except for
retaliation under Title VII and/or the ADEA. (See id. at 1-10.)
To the contrary, Plaintiff has insisted that any further amendment
of her pleadings “should be unnecessary, as [her] current pleadings
adequately notify Defendants of the claims and the grounds upon
which they rest, which is all that [Federal] Rule [of Civil
Procedure] 8 requires.” (Id. at 10.) Furthermore, Plaintiff
already has taken many swipes at refining her claims. (See, e.g.,
Docket Entry 5 (Amended Complaint); Docket Entry 9 (Motion for
(continued...)
52
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 52 of 84

MOTION FOR LEAVE
On August 13, 2024, the Court (per Chief Judge Eagles)
notified the parties that “[t]he deadlines in the Local Rules
provide adequate time for briefing in all but exceptional
circumstances and [the] parties should not expect motions for
extensions of time to be granted.” (Docket Entry 43 (“Standard
Preliminary Order”) at 3; see also id. at 1 (“The Court enforces
the requirements of the Local Rules, as modified and supplemented
herein.”), 3 (“The Court expects the parties to promptly move the
case towards final resolution and to build in time for coping with
delays and obstacles, as they are a normal part of litigation.”).)
17(...continued)
Leave to File Amended Complaint against Two Additional Defendants,
with an Additional Claim, and Additional Relief Requested), Docket
Entry 10 (Amended Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint,
Requesting All Statements, Claims, and Relief Requested with an
Additional Basis for Jurisdiction, and Challenges to Anticipated
Objections Raised by Defendants), Docket Entry 22 (Motion for
Substitution of Party), Docket Entry 50 (Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint), Docket Entry 92 (54(b) Motion to Reinstate Defendants
Geeta Krishna Swamy and Collin Stephen Duckett).) “Hence,
Plaintiff[’s] unsupported, cursory request for leave to amend
[should] be denied.” Swarey v. Desert Cap. REIT, Inc., Civ. Action
No. 11-3615, 2012 WL 4208057, at *14 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012)
(unpublished); see also, e.g., Patel v. Truist Bank, No. 2:23CV54,
2023 WL 12204763, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2023) (unpublished) (“[A]s
to [the p]laintiff’s request for leave to amend to cure any
deficiencies, the [c]ourt notes that [the p]laintiff has not filed
a motion to amend or submitted a proposed amended pleading; nor
does [the p]laintiff support his conclusory request to amend with
any additional information identifying how a second amended
complaint would cure the deficiencies. Additionally, because [the
p]laintiff has already had the opportunity to file an amended
complaint, the [c]ourt agrees with [the d]efendant that it is
appropriate to dismiss the specific causes of action alleged
against [the defendant] with prejudice.” (emphasis omitted)).
53
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 53 of 84

Defendants thereafter filed (and thereby served on Plaintiff) their
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2025. (See Docket Entry 72
at 3 (certifying that, on June 30, 2025, Defendants’ counsel “filed
[Motion for Summary Judgment] with the Clerk of Court using the
CM/ECF system and served [it] upon . . . Plaintiff via th[at
CM/ECF] system and pursuant to [her] Pro Se Authorization Form to
Receive Documents Electronically” (citing Docket Entry 3)).) The
Court’s Local Rules thus required Plaintiff (A) to file any
response by July 30, 2025, see M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(f) (“A respondent,
if opposing a motion, shall file a response brief, within . . . 30
days if the motion is for summary judgment . . . .”); accord
M.D.N.C. LR 56.1(e), and (B) to include within that response, inter
alia, “the specific, authenticated facts existing in the record or
set forth in accompanying affidavits that would be sufficient to
support a jury finding of the existence of the disputed elements
[of her claims],” M.D.N.C. LR 56.1(e); see also M.D.N.C. LR 7.2(a)
(requiring inclusion in response briefs of “concise statement of
the facts” with “[e]ach statement of fact . . . supported by
reference to a part of the official record in the case”).18
18 Via the Standard Preliminary Order, Chief Judge Eagles also
had cautioned Plaintiff that, for court filings, “factual
assertions unsupported by citation to specific evidence in the
record will be disregarded” (Docket Entry 43 at 1), as well as that
“a citation to a multi-page exhibit . . . must contain a pin cite
to the specific page . . . containing the cited material” (id.).
54
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 54 of 84

Consistent with those rule provisions, the Clerk promptly
notified Plaintiff (in pertinent part) as follows:
[ D]efendants . . . have filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on 06/30/2025 . . . .
You have the right to file a 20-page response in
opposition to th[at ] motion. Your response may be
accompanied by counter affidavits, or you may submit
other responsive material. . . . [F]ailure to respond
or, if appropriate, to file counter affidavits or
evidence in rebuttal within the allowed time may cause
the [C]ourt to conclude that [Defendants’] contentions
are undisputed. . . . Any response or counter affidavits
or any other responsive material to a motion for summary
judgment must be filed within 30 days from the date of
service of [Defendants’] motion upon you.
(Docket Entry 74 at 1 (emphasis added).)
As detailed in the Introduction (and despite Chief Judge
Eagles’s warning not to expect extensions of briefing deadlines),
Plaintiff requested and received (by order of the undersigned
Magistrate Judge) three extensions of her deadline to respond to
the Motion for Summary Judgment, for a total additional period of
19 days. (See Docket Entries 75, 76, 77; Text Orders dated July
31, Aug. 5, and Aug. 12, 2025.) Plaintiff attributed (A) her need	19
for the first extension to “illness over the past several days”
(Docket Entry 75 at 2), and (B) her need for the second extension
to continued “significant illness” (Docket Entry 76 at 2), as well
19 On each occasion, Plaintiff waited until the afternoon of
the response deadline to file her motion for extension of time.
(See Notice of Elec. Filing, Docket Entry 75 (showing filing “on
7/30/2025 at 2:27 PM”); Notice of Elec. Filing, Docket Entry 76
(showing filing “on 8/4/2025 at 3:32 PM”); Notice of Elec. Filing,
Docket Entry 77 (showing filing “on 8/11/2025 at 4:00 PM”).)
55
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 55 of 84

as “technical difficulties that have slowed [her] ability to
compile and print the necessary exhibits” (id.). In connection
with that second extension request, Plaintiff emphasized that she
had “nearly finished drafting [her response]” (id.) and committed
that “this will be the last extension for this filing” (id. at 3).
Contrary to that last commitment, when (a week later) Plaintiff’s
then-twice-extended deadline arrived, she once more moved for an
extension, with this justification:
While finalizing my compiled exhibits for filing, my
computer froze and requires restoration, preventing me
from completing the process for filing. This unforeseen
technical issue arose last night, after my prior
extension request.
. . . I have worked diligently and am otherwise ready to
finalize the filing once my computer is restored.
Because filing must occur in person and all materials
must be printed, I respectfully request an extension of
seven (7) days, up to and including August 18, 2025, to
complete this process and ensure my filing is accurate
and complete.
(Docket Entry 77 at 2-3 (emphasis added).)
Given that, on August 4, 2025, Plaintiff had assured the Court
that her response to the Motion for Summary Judgment then stood
“nearly finished” (Docket Entry 76 at 2), with progress underway
(though slowed) in her “compil[ing] and print[ing of] the necessary
exhibits” (id.), and that, seven days thereafter, Plaintiff told
the Court that she had begun “finalizing [her] compiled exhibits”
(Docket Entry 77 at 2), such that – but for a last-minute,
computer-glitch, which “prevent[ed her] from completing the
56
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 56 of 84

process” (id.) – she remained “ready to finalize [her] filing”
(id.), the undersigned Magistrate Judge (while granting a third
extension) reasonably advised Plaintiff that she “should not
anticipate receiving any further extensions of this now-thrice-
extended deadline” (Text Order dated Aug. 12, 2025). It appeared,
at first, that Plaintiff took that advice to heart, as she filed
her Summary Judgment Response by that last deadline. (See Docket
Entry 78 at 1 (bearing file-stamp of August 18, 2025).) However,
a half-month later, Plaintiff sought a belated, fourth extension of
time to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, by filing the
Motion for Leave (see Docket Entry 81 at 1 (bearing file-stamp of
September 2, 2025)), along with the Amended Summary Judgment
Response (see Docket Entry 83 at 1 (bearing file-stamp of September
2, 2025)) and a huge swath of new exhibits (compare Docket Entries
78-1 through 78-5, Docket Entry 79, and Docket Entries 79-1 through
79-19, with Docket Entries 83-1 through 83-11, Docket Entry 84,
Docket Entries 84-1 through 84-19, Docket Entry 85, Docket Entries
85-1 through 85-24, Docket Entry 86, Docket Entries 86-1 through
86-24, Docket Entry 87, and Docket Entries 87-1 through 87-19).
The Motion for Leave “move[s] this Court pursuant to Rule
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the [Summary
Judgment Response].” (Docket Entry 81 at 1.) In a supporting
brief, Plaintiff purported to substantiate that request with these
factual allegations, all of which lack record citations, contrary
57
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 57 of 84

to the directive in the Local Rules that “[e]ach statement of fact
[in a brief] should be supported by reference to a part of the
official record in the case,” M.D.N.C. LR 7.2(a)(2), as well as the
Standard Preliminary Order’s admonition that “factual assertions
unsupported by citation to specific evidence in the record will be
disregarded” (Docket Entry 43 at 1):
1) Plaintiff filed the Summary Judgment Response “on August
18, 2025, the final date allowed under the Court’s third extension,
despite ongoing challenges with processing, compiling, printing,
and delivering documents for this filing” (Docket Entry 82 at 2);
2) the Summary Judgment Response “is incomplete” (id.), in
that it “did not contain a word-count certification, contained an
unfinished paragraph, and lacked completed exhibits for the
Statement of Facts, an exhibit index, and audio files which must be
submitted manually on a flash drive” (id.);
3) “[d]ue to unexpected computer issues, the disk [Plaintiff]
was working from became corrupted and many files could not be
recovered” (id.);
4) “[Plaintiff] had to reconstruct the document quickly, which
resulted in omissions and formatting problems, and [she] was unable
to include the exhibits” (id.);
5) “[s]ince then, [Plaintiff] ha[s] worked diligently to
recreate and correct the document to comply with the Court’s
standards” (id. at 2-3);
58
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 58 of 84

6) “[w]hile the [Amended Summary Judgment Response] could not
be reduced below 7,584 words, it is shorter overall, and it
contains the same number of pages as [] Defendants’ memorandum [in
support of the Motion for Summary Judgment]” (id. at 3);
7) “[t]he [A]mended [Summary Judgment Response] does not alter
the legal argument section materially, other than a reduction of
words; it only corrects deficiencies in the Statement of Facts by
inserting exhibit references, attaching exhibits, and clarifying
factual details” (id.); and
8) “[this] request is not made for purposes of delay or
gamesmanship” (id.; see also id. (“I seek only to ensure the record
is accurate and complete . . . .”).
In response, Defendants rightly observed that “Plaintiff’s
request to file a new brief and over 1,500 pages of new exhibits is
not governed by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15(a) because
Plaintiff does not seek to amend a ‘pleading’” (Docket Entry 90 at
3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a))). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)
(defining “pleadings” as “[o]nly” “complaint,” “answer to a
complaint,” “answer to a counterclaim,” “answer to a crossclaim,”
“third-party complaint,” “answer to a third-party complaint,” and,
“if the court orders one, a reply to an answer”); see also Schwartz
v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 235, 235 n.1 (D. Md. 1990) (agreeing
“that [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15(a) [wa]s inapplicable
in that the original [m]otion [proposed for amendment] does not
59
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 59 of 84

fall within the [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 7(a) definition
of ‘pleadings’ subject to the [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure]
15 liberal amendment provisions”). Defendants further asserted
that, “[i]nstead, Plaintiff’s request is governed by [Federal] Rule
[of Civil Procedure] 6(b)[(1)(B)] which allows a party to seek
leave to take an action after expiration of a deadline upon a
showing of ‘excusable neglect.’” (Docket Entry 90 at 4 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B)).) Plaintiff’s reply concedes that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) does not apply, but contests
application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B). (See
Docket Entry 91 at 4-5 (“[T]he correct standard for th[is ]
amendment is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) governing
modification of the scheduling order, as was done here.”).)
To support that position, Plaintiff argued that “[c]ourts in
the Fourth Circuit have previously held ‘the good cause
modification provision specific to [Federal] Rule [of Civil
Procedure] 16(b)(4) takes precedence over the generally applicable
extension provisions of [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure]
6(b)(1),’ governing excusable neglect.” (Id. at 5 (internal
brackets omitted) (placement of internal quotation mark corrected)
(quoting United States, for the Use and Benefit of Manganaro
Midatlantic LLC v. Grimberg/Amatea JV, Civ. No. 16-2816, 2018 WL
3818876, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2018) (unpublished), as also quoted
in Eichin v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., No. 4:21CV3274, 2024 WL
60
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 60 of 84

4564611, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2024) (unpublished)).) That
argument lacks force here because, in the quoted case, “a party
s[ought] leave to file a dispositive motion after the deadline
established by the scheduling order ha[d] passed,” Manganaro
Midatlantic, 2018 WL 3818876, at *1 (emphasis added); see also
Eichin, 2024 WL 4564611, at *5 (addressing motion “seek[ing] leave
to retain and file [party’s] expert disclosures after the deadline
established by the scheduling order ha[d] passed” (emphasis
omitted)), whereas the Motion for Leave (as documented above)
requests permission to file the Amended Summary Judgment Response
after the deadline for filing such responses set by Local Rule (as
extended by the Court), not any deadline in the scheduling order
for this case (see Text Order dated Nov. 19, 2024 (“adopting
[parties’] Joint Rule 26(f) Report (Docket Entry 54)” as scheduling
order); Docket Entry 54 at 1-4 (setting no deadline for responses
to summary judgment motions)). Given that distinction, the Court
should resolve the Motion for Leave under the rule provision
authorizing the Court to “extend the time,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b)(1), “[w]hen act [of responding to the Motion for Summary
Judgment] may or must be done,” id., based “on [Plaintiff’s M]otion
[for Leave] made after the time has expired if [she] failed to act
because of excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).
When considering whether Plaintiff has shown that, in seeking
leave to file the Amended Summary Judgment Response 15 days after
61
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 61 of 84

the summary judgment response deadline passed, she previously
“failed to act because of excusable neglect,” id., the Court should
note, as an initial matter, that the Fourth Circuit has made clear
that “‘[e]xcusable neglect’ is not easily demonstrated, nor was it
intended to be,” Thompson v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d
530, 534 (4th Cir. 1996). To that end, the United States Supreme
Court has described the excusable neglect “determination [a]s at
bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant
circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395
(1993). “These [circumstances] include . . . [1] the danger of
prejudice to [Defendants], [2] the length of the delay and its
potential impact on judicial proceedings, [3] the reason for the
delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of
[Plaintiff], and [4] whether [Plaintiff] acted in good faith.” Id.
Examining those four Pioneer factors in light of the record of
this case, the Court first and foremost should conclude that
Plaintiff’s explanation for her failure to file the Amended Summary
Judgment Response by the response deadline – “[t]he most important
of the factors identified in Pioneer for determining whether
‘neglect’ is ‘excusable,’” Thompson, 76 F.3d at 534 – weighs
against relief. As detailed herein, the Motion for Leave
attributes Plaintiff’s failure to file a proper, timely response to
the Motion for Summary Judgment to vaguely described and wholly
62
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 62 of 84

unsubstantiated computer issues; yet, the Supreme Court has held
that courts should “give little weight to the fact that [a person
responsible for a filing] was experiencing upheaval . . . at the
time of the [deadline],” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 398. Moreover, the
record reflects that, as far back as January 2025, Plaintiff
reported similar, litigation-related, “technical difficulties.”
(Docket Entry 90-3 at 3; see also id. at 2 (stating in e-mail dated
January 27, 2025: “While I was able to upload some files over the
weekend, I am still experiencing intermittent technical
difficulties that have delayed the completion of the process [of
producing documents].”).) Then again, via letter of March 13, 2025
(see Docket Entry 90-5 at 2), Plaintiff blamed her delay in handing
over materials to Defendants on “technical difficulties related to
accessing and organizing [her] materials” (id. at 3). And (as
previously documented) Plaintiff cited computer malfunctions as the
basis for multiple requests to extend her summary-judgment-response
deadline in early August 2025. (See Docket Entry 76 at 2; Docket
Entry 77 at 2.) Plaintiff’s decision to persist in relying on
computer equipment and/or data management processes that had proven
unreliable time after time warrants a finding that – to the extent
problems of that sort contributed to her inability to file (what
she deemed) a proper response to the Motion for Summary Judgment
until September 2, 2025 – “th[at] reason for the delay . . . was
within [her] reasonable control,” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.
63
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 63 of 84

Turning to the other Pioneer factors, the Court should hold
that permitting Plaintiff to file the Amended Summary Judgment
Response out-of-time would cause “prejudice to [Defendants],” id.,
by rendering moot (and thus wasting the time and expense they
devoted to) their timely filed reply (see Text Order dated Sept. 2,
2025 (re-setting reply deadline to September 9, 2025); Docket Entry
89 at 15 (certifying electronic filing of Defendants’ reply on
September 9, 2025)). Acceptance of the untimely Amended Summary
Judgment Response also would frustrate the Court’s interest in
resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment without the additional
delay that would become necessary to allow time for Defendants to
file a new reply addressing the Amended Summary Judgment Response;
in that respect, granting the Motion for Leave would lead to a
negative “impact on judicial proceedings,” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at
395. Lastly, based on the foregoing considerations, “the length of
the delay,” id., associated with the Motion for Leave and the
Amended Summary Judgment Response remains unreasonable, even if the
Court assumes Plaintiff “acted in good faith,” id.
On balance (with at least three of the four Pioneer factors,
including the most important one, weighing against Plaintiff), she
has not shown excusable neglect as she must to prevail on the
Motion for Leave and the Court therefore should not accept the
Amended Summary Judgment Response. See id. (indicating that courts
should construe excusable neglect standard in fashion that deters
64
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 64 of 84

“parties from freely ignoring court-ordered deadlines in the hopes
of winning a permissive reprieve”); see also Hairgrove v. City of
Salisbury, No. 1:21CV814, 2023 WL 5985349, at *2 n.2 (M.D.N.C.
Sept. 14, 2023) (unpublished) (Eagles, C.J.) (“The Court has
considered whether to give [the plaintiff] another opportunity to
correct her briefing. But she has already been given several
chances to adequately brief the motions. It would not be fair to
the defendants, who would yet again have to respond. In its
discretion, the Court declines to prolong the proceedings.”
(internal citation omitted)), aff’d, No. 23-2236, 2024 WL 4490634
(4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2024) (unpublished); Qayumi v. Duke Univ., No.
1:16CV1038, 2017 WL 6626193, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2017)
(unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (“Deadlines are in place for a reason
and they are relied upon by the parties and the Court to move a
case efficiently and fairly towards final resolution.”).20
20 Plaintiff would have the Court place dispositive weight on
“the need for the Court to consider a complete record.” (Docket
Entry 82 at 3; see also id. at 2 (“I now respectfully seek leave to
amend [my Summary Judgment Response] and supplement the record so
the Court may have a complete and largely rule-compliant submission
upon which to base its decision.”).) However, an assessment
“[t]hat the [Amended Summary Judgment Response] would be helpful to
the Court does not establish good cause or excusable neglect for
[Plaintiff’s] failure to comply with filing deadlines.” Bruce-
Terminix Co. v. Terminix Int’l Co. Ltd. P’ship, No. 1:20CV962, 2022
WL 3028165, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2022) (unpublished) (Eagles,
J.). In any event, even a cursory review of the Amended Summary
Judgment Response suggests it would do little to aid the Court in
resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment. (See, e.g., Docket
Entry 83 at 2-18 (consistently citing to multi-page exhibits
without pin-cites in contravention of Standard Preliminary Order).)
65
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 65 of 84

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants have “request[ed] that the Court grant summary
judgment in their favor on Plaintiff’s claims.” (Docket Entry 72
at 1; see also Docket Entry 73 (“Summary Judgment Brief”) at 1-2
(“Plaintiff cannot show that there is a genuine issue of material
fact and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all
claims.”).) “The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material factual dispute exists “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). When considering summary judgment, the Court
“tak[es] the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . .” Henry
v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Based on the proposed resolution of the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, only Plaintiff’s federal retaliation claim and state
contractual claim require discussion at the summary judgment stage.
In regard to the latter claim (for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing under North Carolina law),
Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief makes the same argument as
Defendants made with their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
i.e., that “[n]either the SCAP nor [Defendant] Duke[ University’s]
66
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 66 of 84

Research Misconduct Policy created a contract with Plaintiff”
(Docket Entry 73 at 23). (Compare id. at 23-24, with Docket Entry
67 at 22-24.) For the reasons detailed in the prior discussion of
this claim in relation to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
the Court should conclude that record evidence (viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff) could sustain a finding that she and
Defendant Duke University entered into a contract that incorporated
the SCAP; accordingly, the Court should deny summary judgment for
Defendant Duke University on Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
As to Plaintiff’s only other, remaining “[c]laim[]” (Docket
Entry 5 at 45), for “[r]etaliation” (id. at 47), the Amended
Complaint states as follows:
A week after [Plaintiff] asked [Defendant] Dowell-Newton
not to report the harassment [Plaintiff] was experiencing
due to [her] concerns about retaliation, [her] laptop was
confiscated by Dr. Donna Kessler and given to [Defendant]
McDonnell, and [he] told [Plaintiff] that he was going to
destroy [her] and that he ha[d] executive powers [which]
is a [form of] verbal abuse and a threat. There is a
conflict of interest with [Defendant] McDonnell being a
scientist, having his own research lab, and being an
administrator of the department at that time as the
Chairman of [the department]. He remarked during [a]
meeting [with Plaintiff] that [she] ha[d] good
grantsmanship and that scientists working in the lab had
scientific discussions with [her]. On March 12 ,	th
2020[,] Dr. Abou-[D]onia told [Plaintiff], “[Defendant]
McDonnell will use that woman (indicating Dr. Swamy) to
destroy your scientific career and you will be homeless.”
This started the chain of investigation against
[Plaintiff] that was unjustified, unwarranted, and
continues on [to the date of the filing of the Amended
Complaint], affecting [her] ability to have a career in
science and remain employed.
67
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 67 of 84

(Id.; see also id. at at 19 (“From October of 2019, Dr.
Abou-[D]onia began sexually harassing [Plaintiff] on a frequent
basis.”), 22 (describing incident, on December 7, 2019, when Dr.
Abou-Donia “made [Plaintiff] touch his penis”), 23-24 (detailing
sexually harassing activity by Dr. Abou-Donia on January 7 and 8,
2020), 27-28 (discussing Plaintiff’s communications with
“investigator from [Defendant Duke University’s] Office of
Institutional Equity” (“OIE”) on February 5 and 10, 2020, about
sexual harassment), 30 (asserting that Plaintiff reported sexual
harassment to Defendants Dowell-Newton and McDonnell on March 2,
2020), 31 (relating Plaintiff’s interactions with Defendant
McDonnell, Dr. Abou-Donia, and Dr. Kessler on March 9, 2020,
including seizure of Plaintiff’s personal laptop, as well as
Defendant McDonnell’s statements that he could “‘take [her] laptop,
[because he] ha[d] executive powers’” and that he could “‘destroy
[her]’”), 46 (making allegations about improprieties in research
misconduct investigation in sub-claim for unequal terms and
conditions of employment), 47 (stating, as to claim for termination
of employment, that “DoD offered an opportunity to do a no-cost
extension of [Plaintiff’s] grant, but . . . [Dr. Swamy] terminated
[Plaintiff’s] grant instead, thus terminating [her] employment,
before an investigation had even found any wrongdoing on [her]
part” and despite “determinations made during the investigation
that no further investigation was warranted”).)
68
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 68 of 84

Elsewhere in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff made more
allegations that Defendant Duke University (through its supervisory
officials) investigated her research activities in retaliation for,
among other things, her objection to sexual harassment by Dr. Abou-
Donia. (See, e.g., id. at 32 (alleging that, throughout “Mar[ch]
12-19th 2020,” “Dr. Abou-[D]onia would continue to make sexual
comments [to Plaintiff] and [he] would say ‘now you can go tell
[Defendant] McDonnell[]’” and “that if [she] report[ed]
‘[Defendant] McDonnell[] will use . . . Dr. Swamy[] to destroy your
scientific career,’” as well as that “‘no matter where you go and
complain, faculties stick together and help each other’”), 35
(alleging (A) that, “[o]n July 17, 2020, [Plaintiff] received an
email from [Defendant] Klotman that [Defendant] McDonnell was
stepping down as chair [of Plaintiff’s department]” and (B) that,
“[o]n July 20, 2020,” Dr. Kessler notified Plaintiff that Defendant
Duke University “‘ha[d] completed a review of the data integrity
and publication concerns raised [about Plaintiff] and determined an
inquiry under the research misconduct process [wa]s not
warranted,’” but (C) nonetheless, “on July 23, 2020, Dr[]. Duckett
and [Defendant] McDonnell sent [Plaintiff] an email inquiring about
the whereabouts of experiments notebooks” and “retaliation began”
again), 36 (alleging (A) that, on “November 5, 2020, [Plaintiff]
received [Defendant] Duke [University’s] OIE report . . . that the
[OIE] investigation concluded with the preponderance of evidence
69
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 69 of 84

showing sexual harassment . . . occurred in [Plaintiff’s
department]” and (B) that “[i]mmediately thereafter retaliation
intensified,” as she “was subjected to various retaliatory
incidents as part of the ongoing unjustified [research misconduct]
investigation”), 37 (“On November 16, [2020,] Dr. Duckett sent
[Plaintiff] an email that Dr. Abou-[D]onia had been relieved of his
duties at [Defendant] Duke [University]. On November 25, [2020,
Plaintiff] met with Dr. Duckett, who clarified his previous
statement . . . by telling [her that] Dr. Abou-[D]onia had resigned
. . . .”), 42 (alleging that “retaliatory actions were initiated by
Drs. Duckett and Swamy after [Defendant] McDonnell stepped down
from chairmanship and Dr. Abou-[D]onia resigned”), 44 (alleging
(A) that “[Defendant] McDonnell and [Dr.] Abou-[D]onia . . . were
motivated to retaliate against [Plaintiff] through this bad-faith
research misconduct investigation,” (B) that “[Defendant] McDonnell
wanted to retaliate against [Plaintiff] because [she] requested a
non-tenured faculty position and [he] construed that [she] was
reporting about him to [Defendant Duke University’s] officials,”
and (C) that “Dr. Abou-[D]onia wanted to retaliate against
[Plaintiff] to help out [Defendant] McDonnell and because of [her]
allegation of sexual harassment”), 45 (alleging that Defendant
McDonnell “utiliz[ed] his institutional authority to protect Dr.
Abou-[D]onia and subject [Plaintiff] to . . . retaliation”).)
70
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 70 of 84

Plaintiff’s foregoing claim of retaliation for reporting
sexual harassment arises under Title VII, which “prohibits an
employer from . . . retaliating against an employee for complaining
about prior discrimination or retaliation.” Foster v. University
of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a)). “Th[is] antiretaliation
provision protects an individual . . . from retaliation that
produces an injury or harm.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). More precisely, to succeed on a
Title VII retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 69 (recognizing that even relatively limited actions
like “excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that
contributes significantly to the employee’s professional
advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining
about discrimination”).
“Plaintiffs may prove these violations either through direct
and indirect evidence of retaliatory animus, or through the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).” Foster, 787 F.3d at 249 (internal parallel
citation omitted). “‘Direct evidence [for a retaliation claim]
71
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 71 of 84

encompasses conduct or statements that both (1) reflect directly
the alleged retaliatory attitude, and (2) bear directly on the
contested [adverse action].’” Johnson v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 839 F. App’x 781, 783 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal brackets
omitted) (quoting Laing v. Federal Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717
(4th Cir. 2013)). Conversely, “[t]o prevail under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, [Plaintiff] must first establish a prima facie
case by showing: (i) that she engaged in protected activity,
(ii) that [Defendant Duke University] took adverse action against
her, and (iii) that a causal relationship existed between the
protected activity and the adverse [] activity.” Foster, 787 F.3d
at 250 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “The
burden then shifts to [Defendant Duke] University to show that its
purportedly retaliatory action was in fact the result of a
legitimate non-retaliatory reason.” Id. “If [Defendant Duke
University] makes this showing, the burden shifts back to [
P]laintiff to rebut [Defendant Duke University’s] evidence by
demonstrating that [its] purported non-retaliatory reasons were not
its true reasons, but were a pretext for [retaliation].” Id.
(hyphen added for consistency) (internal quotation marks omitted).21
21 For example, “[i]f a plaintiff can show that she was fired
under suspicious circumstances and that her employer lied about its
reasons for firing her, the factfinder may infer that the
employer’s undisclosed retaliatory animus was the actual cause of
her termination.” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250.
72
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 72 of 84

Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief argues that Plaintiff
cannot establish retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. (See Docket Entry 73 at 12-18 (arguing that
she cannot satisfy causation element of prima facie retaliation
case and cannot show non-retaliatory justification for adverse
action constituted pretext for retaliation).) Defendants, however,
made no argument regarding Plaintiff’s ability to prove retaliation
“through direct and indirect evidence of retaliatory animus,”
Foster, 787 F.3d at 249. (See Docket Entry 73 at 12-18 (failing to
mention that method of proof).) As a result, the Court should deny
the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim,
as “[Defendant] Duke [University] has not met its initial burden to
show that it is entitled to summary judgment on th[is] claim[],”
Shaughnessy, 2020 WL 4227545, at *6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
See id. (denying summary judgment motion where the defendant did
“not, as required by the Local Rules, identify the elements for
[the] claim” and did “not explain why the evidence [wa]s
insufficient to support a jury verdict” (citing M.D.N.C. LR
56.1(e))); see also Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Laboratories, Inc.,
797 F. Supp. 3d 580, 585 (M.D.N.C. 2025) (Eagles, C.J.) (“The
moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of
any material issue of fact . . . .”), appeal dismissed, Nos. 2026-
1125, 2026-1206, 2025 WL 3640819 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2025)
(unpublished); Hill v. Carvana, LLC, No. 1:22CV37, 2022 WL 1625020,
73
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 73 of 84

at *5 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 2022) (unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (“It is
not the Court’s job to undertake the analysis and legal research
needed to support a perfunctory argument, nor should a party expect
[the C]ourt to do the work that [the party] elected not to do.”
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).22
22 Because Defendants’ Summary Judgment Brief fails to contest
Plaintiff’s ability to prove retaliation “through direct and
indirect evidence of retaliatory animus,” Foster, 787 F.3d at 249,
it matters not that Plaintiff also failed to address that issue in
her Summary Judgment Response (see Docket Entry 78 at 24-26
(responding to Defendants’ contentions about prima facie case and
pretext in opposing summary judgment on retaliation claim)). See
Natera, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 585 (explaining that “non-moving party
must come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial”
only “once the moving party meets its initial burden”). Consistent
with that notion, another district court in the Fourth Circuit
recently examined the evidentiary record to determine whether the
plaintiff “ha[d] provided any such direct or indirect evidence [of
retaliation],” Covington v. Union Mem’l Hosp., Civ. Action No. 22-
2655, 2024 WL 3784539, at *30 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2024) (unpublished),
even though “[the p]laintiff d[id] not request to proceed by direct
or indirect evidence of retaliation,” id. See id. at *30-31
(identifying nine different evidentiary items from record before
concluding that “none provide direct or indirect evidence that [the
d]efendants terminated [the plaintiff’s] employment because of
[his] reports”). If the Court undertook that same sort of record
review in this case, it might well conclude that, “under ordinary
principles of proof[, Plaintiff could] avert summary judgment in
[Defendant Duke University’s] favor, [because she] ‘produce[d]
direct evidence of a stated purpose to retaliate and/or indirect
evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue
of material fact,’” Hailey v. Donahoe, No. 6:11CV22, 2012 WL
1356594, at *5 (W.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2012) (unpublished) (internal
brackets omitted) (quoting Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
257 F.3d 373, 391 (4th Cir. 2001)). Specifically, along with her
Summary Judgment Response, Plaintiff produced her deposition, which
(read in the light most favorable to her) includes her “testimony
[(A) that,] on February 28th, 2020, [she] actually sent [an] e-mail
[reporting sexual harassment] directly to [Defendant] McDonnell”
(Docket Entry 78-4 at 38), (B) that, within a matter of days,
(continued...)
74
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 74 of 84

Alternatively, the Court should conclude that material
questions of fact regarding causation at the prima-facie-case and
pretext stages of the McDonnell Douglas, burden-shifting, proof
scheme preclude summary judgment for Defendant Duke University on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Beginning with the prima face case,
“[Plaintiff] has established the first two elements of the prima
facie case through undisputed evidence.” Jacobs v. North Carolina
Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 578 (4th Cir. 2015). First,
“she engaged in protected activity,” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted), by (as conceded by
22(...continued)
Defendant McDonnell urgently convened a meeting with Plaintiff (see
id. at 61; see also id. at 63 (placing date of said meeting as
March 9, 2020), 65 (same)), after which he sent her to her lab with
Dr. Kessler (see id. at 61-62), who (once there) took Plaintiff’s
“personal computer” (id. at 65) and gave it to Defendant McDonnell
(see id.), and (C) that, when Plaintiff “went and talked to
[Defendant McDonnell] twice to get [her] computer back” (id.), he
“said that he had executive authority [over her]” (id. at 66) and
“also threatened to destroy [her]” (id.; see also id. at 66-67
(“[I]t happened. [The] first time, he shut the door on me, and
then he came back and he was shivering and angry. . . . I was
concerned. . . . I have known people shouting, but not so close on
my face. . . . He was screaming . . . .”), 73 (testifying that
research misconduct investigation “started with [Defendant
McDonnell] as [an] internal investigation”)). “[I]n examining
th[at] record, the Court [could] find[] the tenor of the
communications between Plaintiff and [one of] her supervisors could
allow a juror to infer a causal link between retaliatory animus
against Plaintiff and [materially adverse action].” Staley v.
McDonough, No. 1:22CV317, 2025 WL 1014738, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4,
2025) (unpublished) (Biggs, S.J.); see also id. (citing “[e]mails
from [the p]laintiff’s supervisors . . . [that] could be read as
tense, with some appearing to reflect open frustration and
annoyance” and “[o]ther emails . . . [that] could be reasonably
read as short-tempered or rude, and importantly, some of that
emotion was directly conveyed to [the p]laintiff”).
75
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 75 of 84

Defendants) “reporting [sexual] harassment . . . on February 28,
2020” (Docket Entry 73 at 13; see also Docket Entry 73-37 at 2
(setting out Defendant Dowell-Newton’s declaration under penalty of
perjury that, on February 28, 2020, she became “aware of [the]
alleged sexual harassment by Dr. [] Abou-Donia towards
Plaintiff”)). See, e.g., Traore v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, Civ.
Action No. 22-793, 2024 WL 4361860, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2024)
(unpublished) (“Internal complaints of discrimination are protected
activities.”). Second, Defendant Duke University “took adverse
action against [Plaintiff],” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (internal
quotation marks omitted), (again as Defendants conceded) via “the
research misconduct investigation and its consequences” (Docket
Entry 73 at 13), acts which “well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,”
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, because the research misconduct investigation
followed (or, at a minimum, suddenly and dramatically escalated)
very close in time to Plaintiff’s internal report of sexual
harassment, a reasonable fact-finder also could determine “that	23
23 For instance, viewing Plaintiff’s deposition in the light
most favorable to her, a reasonable fact-finder could determine
that, immediately after Plaintiff disclosed Dr. Abou-Donia’s sexual
harassment to Defendants McDonnell and Dowell-Newton on February
28, 2020, the department’s “admin[istrators] were like dynamos
running around” (Docket Entry 78-4 at 37), and Defendant McDonnell
summoned Plaintiff to his office for a meeting on March 9, 2020,
after which he sent her back to her lab with Dr. Kessler, to
(continued...)
76
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 76 of 84

a causal relationship existed between the protected activity and
the adverse [] activity,” Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (internal
quotation marks omitted). See Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 579 (“[C]lose
temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a disputed issue of
fact as to the causation element of the prima facie case.”); see
also Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 851 F. App’x 341, 350 (4th Cir.
2021) (“[E]stablishing a ‘causal relationship’ at the prima facie
stage isn’t an onerous burden.”). Defendants have requested that
the Court find that “Plaintiff cannot show that her protected
activity . . . was the but-for cause of the research misconduct
investigation and its consequences because [Defendant] Duke
[University] began investigating concerns about Plaintiff’s
research practices before the protected activity.” (Docket Entry
73 at 13 (emphasis in original).) The Court should reject that
request for several reasons.
For starters, to support their position, Defendants’ Summary
Judgment Brief asserts that “[Defendant] McDonnell first identified
concerns with Plaintiff’s research practices in September 2019, a
month before Plaintiff experienced any [sexual] harassment.” (Id.
at 14.) As the evidentiary basis for that assertion, Defendants
23(...continued)
investigate data handling, including by seizing Plaintiff’s
personal computer (see id. at 61-65; see also id. at 66 (recounting
that, on March 9, 2020, Defendant McConnell stated to Plaintiff
that “he had executive authority” and “threatened to destroy
[her]”), 67 (“He was screaming . . . .”)).
77
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 77 of 84

cited “Ex. F.” (Id.) “Exhibit F” (Docket Entry 73-7 at 1 (large,
bold, all-caps font omitted)) consists of six pages of lengthy e-
mails (see id. at 2-7). That approach to citation contravenes the
express terms of the Standard Preliminary Order, which mandate that
“a citation to a multi-page exhibit . . . must contain a pin cite
to the specific page . . . containing the cited material.” (Docket
Entry 43 at 1.) Defendants’ assertion on this point thus
effectively amounts to a “factual assertion[] unsupported by
citation to specific evidence in the record [which] will be
disregarded” (id. (emphasis added)). See, e.g., Cray Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Novatel Comput. Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir.
1994) (upholding district court’s “discretion [to] refus[e] to
ferret out the facts that counsel had not bothered to excavate”).24
24 To the extent the Court elects to consider the e-mails in
question, it may note that they involve communications between
Defendant McDonnell and Dr. Abou-Donia about concerns (most
unrelated to data handling) that Dr. Abou-Donia raised about
Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry 73-7 at 6-7 (initial e-mail from
Defendant McDonnell to Dr. Abou-Donia following up on meeting
between them); see also id. at 1-6 (follow-up e-mails between Dr.
Abou-Donia and Defendant McDonnell).) Read in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, those e-mails could support reasonable
inferences (A) that Dr. Abou-Donia contacted Defendant McDonnell to
shift blame to Plaintiff for Dr. Abou-Donia’s own missteps and to
remind Defendant McDonnell of their intertwined interests (see,
e.g., id. at 6 (setting out Dr. Abou-Donia’s concern about becoming
“the ‘scapegoat’” despite “hav[ing] fully cooperat[ed] with
[Defendant McDonnell]” and asking that, before “be[ing] accused
[of] anything,” he receive opportunity “to protect [him]self”)),
and (B) that Defendant McDonnell perceived Plaintiff as a threat
(see id. at 7 (“[Plaintiff] has reported to [Defendant Duke
Univesity’s] leadership that I am treating her unfairly as she
tries to gain independence of you in her research activities. The
(continued...)
78
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 78 of 84

Next, Defendants have pointed to e-mails Defendant McDonnell
exchanged with Drs. Fox and Swamy on February 26 and 27, 2020,
regarding, inter alia, data management practices in Dr. Abou-
Donia’s lab. (See Docket Entry 73 at 14 (citing Docket Entries 73-
12 and 73-13).) Defendants, however, failed to note that the
principal concern about Plaintiff highlighted by Dr. Fox related to
whether she denied other researchers co-authorship credit for her
three publications, not whether she committed research misconduct
related to those publications (or anything else). (See Docket
Entry 73-12 at 2.) And – in any event – those communications
simply raise a material question of fact: Did Defendant McDonnell
take aggressive measures to investigate Plaintiff starting on March
9, 2020, because of legitimate concerns raised by Dr. Fox on
February 26, 2020, or because of the report of sexual harassment
committed by Dr. Abou-Donia made by Plaintiff on February 28, 2020?
24(...continued)
timing of you releasing the memo/issues to me (yesterday) and my
response to these issues could be seen by her as retaliation. I do
not appreciate been [sic] put in this situation.”)). Those e-mails
thus would not compel a finding that, as of September 2019, a
legitimate basis existed for Defendant McDonnell to commence a
research misconduct investigation of Plaintiff, particularly not in
the manner that he launched it on March 9, 2020 (as documented in
Footnotes 22 and 23 from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony).
Moreover, other record evidence suggests that, by November 26,
2019, after receiving information from Plaintiff – not just Dr.
Abou-Donia – Defendant McDonnell’s concern about Plaintiff’s
conduct in this area had ebbed, as he expressed “appreciat[ion to
her for] establishing a system to allow reporting and storage of
[her] data in a secure manner.” (Docket Entry 73-10 at 3; see also
id. (“I am sure the system you develop will be excellent.”).)
79
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 79 of 84

Finally, Defendants have contended that “the research
misconduct [investigation] proceeded in good faith according to
[Defendant] Duke [University’s] policy.” (Docket Entry 73 at 14.)
But, as their Summary Judgment Brief tacitly acknowledges, the
record gives rise to material questions of fact regarding at least
some steps in the investigatory process, such as why the research
misconduct investigation against Plaintiff continued (or re-
started) after an initial finding that no basis existed to pursue
it. (See id. at 15 (conceding that “initial [a]ssessment found
that an inquiry [into whether Plaintiff committed research
misconduct] was not warranted because of the inadequacy of the
available research record” (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Docket Entry 73-18)).) Defendants evidently
would have the Court accept as irrefutable facts both (A) that
Defendant Duke University could not proceed with a research
misconduct investigation against Plaintiff because she could not
produce her data and (B) that Defendant Duke University could
resume a research misconduct investigation against Plaintiff (and
ultimately find her guilty of research misconduct) because she
could not produce her data. (Compare, e.g., id. (“[A]n inquiry
could not be conducted [as of July 13, 2020] simply because
Plaintiff could not produce any source data to support her grant or
papers.”), with, e.g., Docket Entry 73-24 at 4 (finding research
misconduct inquiry warranted on February 26, 2021, because “absence
80
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 80 of 84

of and/or failure to provide adequate documentation to support the
research described in the three 2020 publications and 2018 DoD
grant may constitute evidence of data fabrication or
falsification”).) Perhaps Defendants could satisfy a reasonable
fact-finder that said course of events bespeaks good-faith
adherence to sound policy, but (at least at this juncture) they
have not provided a sufficient basis for the Court to rule that no
reasonable fact-finder could view that course of events more
skeptically, particularly given that Defendant Duke University’s
apparent about-face over the propriety of a research misconduct
inquiry came after the OIE investigation corroborated Plaintiff’s
report of sexual harassment by Dr. Abou-Donia and he lost his job
(see Docket Entry 78-4 at 56 (confirming that, “[i]n November of
2020, OIE issued a report substantiating [Plaintiff’s] complaint of
sexual harassment” and that “Dr. Duckett later informed [Plaintiff]
that Dr. Abou-Donia had been relieved of his duties”)).
Given the foregoing discussion, the Court should conclude that
Defendants have failed to show entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim on the ground that she
cannot make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. That conclusion leaves just the question of whether the
Court should grant summary judgment in Defendant Duke University’s
favor pursuant to McDonnell Douglas’s pretext prong. (See Docket
Entry 73 at 15 (“[Defendant] Duke [University] has identified
81
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 81 of 84

legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for its actions that Plaintiff
cannot show were pretextual.”).) Here, just as with its attack on
causation at the prima facie stage, Defendant Duke University
insists that it “had serious concerns about Plaintiff’s research
practices” (id.) and “followed each step of the Research Misconduct
Policy while investigating Plaintiff’s conduct” (id. at 16 (citing
Docket Entry 73-14)). However, for reasons discussed above,	25
[C]onsidering the facts in the light most favorable to
[Plaintiff], the Court [should] find[] that there is
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact whether the proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory
reasons for the [adverse] actions were pretextual, and
whether the true reason for those actions was retaliation
for [her] protected activity.
Vedula v. Azar, Civ. Action No. 18-386, 2020 WL 5500279, at *14 (D.
Md. Sept. 11, 2020) (unpublished).
Of particular note, the portions of Plaintiff’s deposition
addressing the events of March 9, 2020 (detailed in Footnotes 22
and 23), “support[] a reasonable inference that [Defendant
McDonnell’s] retaliatory animus motivated [at least some of
Defendant Duke University’s] materially adverse actions,” id.
Accordingly, although the ultimate conclusion of the research
misconduct investigation in 2022 may stand untainted, due to the
25 Once more, Defendants relied on an undifferentiated
citation to a multi-page document as its sole support for the
above-quoted assertion (in contravention of the Standard
Preliminary Order). (See Docket Entry 73 at 16 (offering no pin-
cites to Docket Entry 73-14); Docket Entry 73-14 at 2-13 (setting
out 12 single-spaced pages of policies and procedures).)
82
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 82 of 84

absence of “evidence to suggest that numerous independent
decisionmakers, including [Drs.] Kessler, Swamy, Duckett, . . . and
the six committee members, were taking orders from [Defendant]
McDonnell rather than fulfilling their responsibilities in good
faith” (Docket Entry 73 at 18), Plaintiff need only show that some
retaliatory action taken by Defendant McDonnell along the way “well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination,” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In short, [Plaintiff] has provided
enough evidence for her retaliation claim to survive the [ M]otion
for [S]ummary [J]udgment. Ultimately, a jury should decide whether
[any of the adverse actions at issue occurred] in retaliation for
her reporting [Dr. Abou-Donia’s] unlawful conduct.” Seaton v. City
of N. Charleston, No. 2:10CV3186, 2013 WL 6859050, at *9 (D.S.C.
Dec. 30, 2013) (unpublished).
CONCLUSION
All of Plaintiff’s federal claims in the Amended Complaint
(except for retaliation) fail as a matter of law based on the
pleadings; however, even disregarding the untimely Amended Summary
Judgment Response, her federal retaliation claim and her state
contractual claim should proceed to trial.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court (A) grant in part
and deny in part the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket
Entry 66), by (i) granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of
83
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 83 of 84

Defendants on both of Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims and all of
her Title VII and ADEA claims other than for retaliation (which the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings does not address), but
(ii) denying judgment on the pleadings for Defendant Duke
University on Plaintiff’s claim under North Carolina law for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (B) deny
the Motion for Leave (Docket Entry 72), and (C) deny the Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 81).
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 16, 2026
84
Case 1:23-cv-00957-CCE-LPA Document 99 Filed 01/16/26 Page 84 of 84