DARBY v. DIRECT EXPRESS, EXECUTIVE TEAM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ARTHUR DONALD DARBY, JR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV109
)
DIRECT EXPRESS, EXECUTIVE TEAM, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket
Entry 1 (the “Application”)), submitted in conjunction with a
Complaint (Docket Entry 2; see also Docket Entry 3 (Civil Cover
Sheet); Docket Entry 5 (supporting documents)). The Court will
grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending
dismissal of this action as frivolous (due to the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
INTRODUCTION
According to the Complaint, this Court possesses subject
matter jurisdiction over this action based on both the presence of
a “[f]ederal question” (Docket Entry 2 at 3) and the “[d]iversity
of citizenship [of the parties]” (id.). Regarding the former,
asserted, jurisdictional basis, the Complaint lists these “specific
federal statutes . . . that are at issue in this case” (id.):
“Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office Foreign Asset
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Control.” (Id.; see also id. (adding term “Section 8.1” above
words “Office Foreign Asset Control”).) On the Civil Cover Sheet,	1
in turn, Plaintiff cited “18 U.S. Code § 246 – Deprivation of
Relief Benefits” (Docket Entry 3 at 1) as the “[s]tatute under
which [he was] filing” (id.). To establish jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship, the Complaint identifies Plaintiff as a
citizen of North Carolina (see Docket Entry 2 at 3) and
“[D]efendant [a]s a corporation” (id. at 4), “incorporated under
the laws of . . . Texas” (id.), with “its principal place of
business in . . . Texas” (id.). Lastly (as will become relevant to
review of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction), the Complaint
describes the relief sought as “[d]amages to personal credit,
benefits, [and] personal bank (PNC) bill collections” (id.), as
well as “[a]ny payment owed” (id.), while the Civil Cover Sheet	2
makes a total “demand” (Docket Entry 3 at 1) of “$75,000.00” (id.).
DISCUSSION
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at Section 1915], is intended to guarantee that
Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings apply standard	1
capitalization conventions and omit any underscoring.
In the section for “Relief” (Docket Entry 2 at 4), the	2
Complaint refers to Plaintiff as a “[v]ictim of identity theft”
(id.), “citing the financial disclosure requirements[, ] difficulty
in finding banks . . . willing to accept [Plaintiff] as a customer,
[and] the time frame to wait beyond unreasonable explanation” (id.
(parentheses omitted); see also id. (referencing “provi[sion of]
false information, debit card surrendered[, and] Social Security
Sanford North Carolina needs for new Social Security number”)).
2
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no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because his
poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.”
Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir.
1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Dispensing
with filing fees, however, [is] not without its problems. . . . In
particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis d[o] not need to
balance the prospects of successfully obtaining relief against the
administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376
F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this concern, the in
forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt shall dismiss the
case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . . (B) the action
. . . (i) is frivolous . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As to
that ground for dismissal, the United States Supreme Court has
explained that “a complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256 (“The word
frivolous is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical
definition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Notably, the Court bears “an independent obligation to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,” Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010), and, to that end, “[a]s part of
th[e] frivolity review under § 1915(e)(2), the Court may consider
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction,” Gateway Plaza
Greensboro, LLC v. Spigner, No. 1:22CV1047, 2022 WL 22839643, at *1
3
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(M.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2022) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2023) (Eagles,
J.); accord, e.g., Glenn v. Glenn, No. 1:21CV510, 2021 WL 12157701,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2021) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.),
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 21828633 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2022)
(unpublished) (Biggs, J.); see also Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756,
760 (4th Cir. 1968) (“The burden is on the party asserting the
jurisdiction of the court to show that jurisdiction does, in fact,
exist.”). Put another way, “[a]n in forma pauperis complaint that
fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction lacks an arguable
basis in law, and therefore may be dismissed sua sponte.” Hill v.
United States, No. 1:12CV92, 2013 WL 1192312, at *4 n.5 (N.D. W.
Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (unpublished); see also Utley v. Utley-Frye, No.
5:23CV14, 2023 WL 3775069, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 2, 2023)
(unpublished) (“[T]he complaint does not establish subject matter
jurisdiction. In the absence of such jurisdiction, the complaint
lacks an arguable basis in law and therefore fails as frivolous.”
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (W.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2023).
Here (as documented in the Introduction), the Complaint
purports to invoke the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction, see
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”), by vaguely adverting to
4
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the “Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering and Office Foreign
Asset Control” (Docket Entry 2 at 3; see also id. (ambiguously
citing “Section 8.1”)). However, “[t]here is no private right of
action under the Bank Secrecy Act . . . or the implementing
regulations.” Best v. Green Dot Corp., No. 4:22CV146, 2023 WL
2733413, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2023) (unpublished),
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2731035 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2023)
(unpublished); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Cook, No. 23-1945,
2025 WL 2237439, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (unpublished)
(observing that “federal courts across the country . . . [have]
held that the [Bank Secrecy Act] does not create a private right of
action”); Frankel-Ross v. Congregation OHR Hatalmud, No. 15 Civ.
6566, 2016 WL 4939074, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2016)
(unpublished) (“[I]t is now well settled that the anti-money-
laundering obligations of banks, as established by the Bank Secrecy
Act, obligate banks to report certain customer activity to the
government but do not create a private cause of action permitting
third parties to sue for violations of the statute.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).3
To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert any claims under	3
“the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311, et seq.,” Pierre
Invs., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bancorp, No. 23-3269, 2023 WL 8373001,
at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2023) (unpublished) (italics omitted), the
undersigned Magistrate Judge finds “no support for the proposition
that . . . [said] statute[] impl[ies] a private right of action,”
id. See id. (holding that “district court properly dismissed [any
such] claims”); Mansor v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 183 F. Supp.
(continued...)
5
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“Over the years th[e United States Supreme] Court has
repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to
entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,
wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, plainly unsubstantial,
or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Put another way, “where a claim is obviously without merit, Hagans
precludes a federal district court from exercising its
jurisdiction.” Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.
1999); see also Marshall v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., No.
(...continued)	3
3d 250, 265 (D. Mass. 2016) (“To the extent the [plaintiffs’] claim
is based on alleged violations of federal anti-money laundering
laws, it must fail as well.” (internal parenthetical omitted)).
The Complaint’s reference to the “Office Foreign Asset Control”
(Docket Entry 2 at 3) similarly does not invoke any viable cause of
action. See generally Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, Misc. No. 17-151, 2025 WL 3281353, at *8 (D.
Del. Nov. 25, 2025) (unpublished) (explaining that “Department of
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control . . . administers and
enforces economic sanctions programs primarily against countries”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), appeal filed, No. 25-3350 (3d
Cir. Dec. 2, 2025); see also Peterson v. Bank Markazi, 121 F.4th
983, 991 (2d Cir. 2024) (describing “Office of Foreign Asset [sic]
Control” as “enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury”). Lastly, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under “18
U.S. Code § 246 [for d]eprivation of [r]elief [b]enefits” (Docket
Entry 3 at 1). See, e.g., Benjamin v. Vaughan, No. 1:16CV136, 2016
WL 7496124, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2016) (unpublished)
(Schroeder, J.) (ruling that “18 U.S.C. § [] 246” does not
“provide[] a private right of action”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 246
(creating federal criminal misdemeanor offense for interference
with benefits supported by federal “funds for work relief or relief
purposes, on account of political affiliation, race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin”).
6
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1:16CV550, 2017 WL 2774265, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 26, 2017)
(unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“As to federal question
jurisdiction, the court does not lack authority to act simply
because a claim lacks merit or is doubtful. But a claim is too
insubstantial and frivolous to support federal question
jurisdiction when it is obviously without merit.” (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted)). Because the Complaint does
not identify any non-frivolous, federal claim, Plaintiff has failed
to establish a basis for this Court to exercise federal-question
jurisdiction over this action.
Nor does the Complaint allege facts adequate to support a
finding that the Court possesses diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between (1) citizens of different
States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state, except . . . [lawful permanent residents] domiciled
in the same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which
citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or
of different States.” (emphasis added)). Specifically, Plaintiff
expressly has “demand[ed] $75,000.00” (Docket Entry 3 at 1), i.e.,
7
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an amount that does not “exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000,” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (emphasis added).4
CONCLUSION
This action may not proceed in this Court due to the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application (Docket Entry 1)
is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO
CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without
prejudice as frivolous (for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 30, 2026
Moreover, the Complaint does not set forth any facts that	4
would support an inference that Plaintiff’s damages exceed $75,000.
(See, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at 4 (discussing transaction in which
Plaintiff allegedly “should’ve received round [sic] about $1,111”);
Docket Entry 5 at 2 (stating, in letter addressed to Plaintiff from
“Direct Express Fraud Services Department,” that said department
“has started an investigation into [Plaintiff’s] claim dated
02/02/2024 in the amount of $73.96”), 5-7 (indicating that
Plaintiff disputed charge in amount of $49.97).)
8
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